IR 05000387/1982033
| ML20027B939 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1982 |
| From: | Mccabe E, Mccann J, Nicholas H, Rhoads G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027B927 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-82-33, 50-388-82-10, NUDOCS 8209300350 | |
| Download: ML20027B939 (14) | |
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r U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Regicn I Report No. 50-387/82-33 50-388/82-10 Docket No. 50-387 (CAT B), 50-388 (CAT A)
NPF-14 License No. CPPR-102 Priority Category Licensee:
pennev1vania pnw.c and iinht enmnanu 2 North Ninth Ktreet Allentown. Penncv1vania 1R101
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Facility Name:
Susouchanna Steam Elmetric Station Inspection at:
Salem Township, Pennsylvania Inspection dates:- July 28 - September 7,1982 Inspectors:
IrdN, (A_ d c//r/f t 4pyG.Rhoads date' signed bL 9/2/2 L dphn F. McCann ddte' signed 9 / W l n -0-Y u&k.
9 ie ht 9Ieln H Nicholas pE/ Grey date signed date signed Approved by:
&OM 9/mht Ebe C, McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section 28, DPRP Inspection Summary: July 28 - September 7,1982 (Combined Report 50-387/82-33, 50-388/82-10).
Routine resident (169 hrs. Unit 1, 63 hrs. Unit 2) and regional inspection (19 hrs.
Unit 1, 22 hrs. Unit 2) of: Initial Fuel Load, Readiness for Initial Criticality, ASME Class 1 and Class 2 piping, Storage and Installation of Safety Components.
TMI Items, NRC Open Items, and Plant Status. One violation was identified; Failure to Provide Second Verification on Safety System Check-Off Lists.
F Region I Form 12-(Rev. April 77)
8209300350 820914 PDR ADOCK 05000387 G
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E DETAILS
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Arsons' Contacted
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t Pennsylvania' Power and~ Light' Company
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J. R. Calhoun, Senior Vice-President, Nuclear
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N, W. Curtis, Vice-President, Engineering and Construction, p
Nuclear (ProjectDirector)
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S. L. Denson, Project Construction Manager
F. Eisenhuth, Senior Compliance Engineer i
R. Featenby, Assistant Project Director
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J. Green, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor
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R. M. Harris, Project Licensing Specialist J. T. Kauffman, Executive Vice-President, Operations H. W. Keiser, Superintendent of Plant B. D. Kenyon, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations
R. Matthews, Senior Analyst - Nuclear Quality Assurance F
D. Thompson, Assistant Superintendent of Plant
Bechte1' Corporation A. Konjura, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer W. Mourer, Field Construction Manager
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J. O'Sullivan, Assistant Project Field Engineer 2.
Licensee Action on NRC Findings:
L a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (387/81-08-15; 388/81-04-12) Installation of
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Unreliable Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor.
The licensee stated in Section 5.2.5.1.2.3.1 of the FSAR that no direct correlation exists between the size of a primary coolant leak and contain-
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ment air borne radiation, and that therefore they were unable to state with
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certainty that the Primary Containnient Atmosphere Monitoring System would
detect a 1 gpm leak. The inspector noted that Section 5.2.5 of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) shows the leakage detection systems to be acceptable
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to NRR. The inspector discussed the particular issue with the NRR reviewer R
who acknowledged that the licensee did not concur with the 1 gpa leak de-f tection criterion of RG 1.45 for airborne particulate activity monitors p
and that this fact was considered prior to the SER conclusion that the leakage detection systems were acceptable.
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(Closed) Violation (387/81-19-01) General Electric Instrument Data Sheet I
(IDS) Not Being Maintained, f
On August 11, 1982 the inspector reviewed GE IDS sheets and GE Design Specifica-
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tions Data Sheets for the high pressure coolant injection, reactor core isolation cooling, residual heat removal, and core saray systems. The re-
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quired instrument accuracies had been deleted from t1e IDS sheet and had been placed into the GE design specification data sheets by Engineering Change
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Notices. The inspector compared the required accuracies as stated on the
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Design Specification Data Sheets with the actual instrument accuracies as
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stated in the IDS.
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No unacceptable conditions were noted, ir-
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c. ~ (Closed) Inspector Followu r Item (387/82-0917) Control ~of Access'to~the Document Control Center (D:C).
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On August 11 the inspector reviewed procedure R0-00-020 titled " Access to the Document Control Center Re?rds Facilities." This procedure provides instructions and control for DCC access during both normal and off-nomal hours. The DCC has also been moved to the first floor of the SerYice and Administrative Building. This completes required actions noted duH ng the previous inspection.
d.
(Closed)' Violation ~(387/82-04-04) Failure to Properly Verify Closure Times
'of The Containment Isolation Valves.
The licensee developed and perfomed a new Preo)erational Test, P59,3,
" Primary Containment Isolation Valve Timing," w11ch provides for closure time testing for the valves with closure times specified in FSAR Table 6.2-12 e.
(Closed) ~ Violation'(387/82-04-03)' Failure to Have ~ Adequate ~ Procedures Which Establish Sufficient Environmental Controls to Prevent Flooding of Safety-Related Equipment.
Inspection and rework of the flow transmitters was perfomed under Work Authorization WA-U-27120 (FT02209 A & B), and WA-U-27119 (FT01204 A & B).
I The access pit covers were installed and caulked, and the area surrounding the access pits wa regraded to direct run off away from the pits.
f.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (387/81-08-16; 388/81-04-13) Lack of Design Documentation For Hydrogen Analyzer and Containment Atmosphere Radiation
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Monitor.
Operational testing was performed on the H 1 Analyzer and Containment Leak
Detection Monitors in July,1982 'in lieu of detailed flow rate calculations.
These tests are documented in Preoperational Test P73.3 and P79.2, and verify that system flow requirements were met when 'A' and 'B' units were operated either independently or simultaneously.
g.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/81-27-06) Review of Agastat GP Relay Usage.
This item was previously reviewed during Inspection' Report 387/82-17. At that time the licensee stated that all Agastat type GP relays in safety related functions except for those in diesel generator control circuits would be replaced with the more reliable type EGP relays. The relays in the diesel generator circuits are sent back to Agastat for repairs and individually tested by the licensee. All other safety related type GP relays have been replaced with type EGP relays. This work was completed on August 20, 1982.
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h.
(Closed) Violation (387/81-08-09) Lack of Design For ISI Accessibility.
This item was previously reviewed during NPC inspection 387/82-19, and re-mained open pending completion of a 'walkdown' by the licensee of all welds requiring In-Service Inspection (ISI). The 'walkdown' was to determine if equipment and hanger installations made subsequent to the Pre-Service Inspections (PSI) caused any additional welds to be inaccessible for ISI.
The walkdown was completed on August 6, 1982, and identified approximately 9 additional welds which are potentially inaccessible. The licensee's final determination on the accessibility of these welds is scheduled to be completed by September 10, 1982. The licensee's action on this item to date is acceptable for initial criticality. Section2.C(10)ofthe operating license requires PP8L to submit a revised inservice inspection program for NRC approval by June 30, 1983, and therefore the remaining action to be taken on this item will be tracked as a license condition.
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(Closed) Unresolved' Item (387/82-17-02) Welder Qualification ~Practi,ce:.
The Welder Qualification-Field Procedure FP-W-1 was revised to reg'are a
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field welding engineer to witness proficiency welds, verify the q' ality of the welds, and document the information on his daily report. A copy of the daily report entry is to be maintained in the Welder Qualification Maintenance Record.
L (Closed) Unresolved Item (387/80-28-10) Time Delay Relay - Bechtel Drawing E-40, Sheet 5F.
Revision 5 of drawing E-40, sheet 5F changed the designation of relay 62-1570082 from 'non-Q' to 'Q'.
The relay was replaced with a properly qualified model under Work Authorization WA-U-21490.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/80-28-01) Core Spray FSAR' Drawing.
On July 12 the inspector reviewed FSAR Change Request Notice 847 approved
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July 9, 1981 correcting FSAR Figure 7.3-9 sheet 1.
This change will be incorporated into Revision 31 to the FSAR.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/81-13-03) Containment Isolation Valves-Changes To Technical Specifications.
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On July 12 the inspector reviewed FSAR Change Request Notice 849 which corrected FSAR Table 18.1-10.
This change notice will be incorporated into a future FSAR Revision.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (387/81-07-02) Bechtel Updating of FSAR Drawings.
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On July 12, 1982 the inspector reviewed the disposition of Bechtel Quality Action Request 8856-H-61 and the Bechtel FSAR Change Request 681 dated May 16, 1982 submitting updates to drawings in the FSAR. The inspector also reviewed the licensing open item tracking system which tracks Bechtel's requirement to make updates to FSAR drawings every six months.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/81-08-06)'QA Manual References Non--
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Existant Procedures.
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This problem was resolved for Unit I when the new Operations Ouality Assurance
Manual became effective, and the Operations QA Program was implemented.
Additionally, Nuclear Department Instruction NOI-QA-8.1.5, Revision 0,
"Nonconformance Control and Processing," was issued to clearly define nonconformance handling procedures.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (387/81-01-01, 388/82-01-01) QA Records of Main o.
Steam Isolation Valve Castings.
The inspector reviewed a letter from General Electric Company to PP&L, GP-82-130, dated May 19, 1982 which describes the results of testing of the
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Quaker Alloy Castings for the MSIVs which were supplied to Philadelphia Electric Company for the Limerick project.
These valves also had post
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weld heat treatment performed in the range of 13300F to 13650.~, and were found to meet ASME code requirements. The letter further states that the test results and records are applicable to Susquehanna Unit 1 and 2 MSIVs and that the material is acceptable as is.
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(Closed) Violation (387/80-06-02) Failure To Establish Control: Measures Designed To Prevent The Use of Encorrect or Defective Material Parts.
This item was previously reviewed during NRC Inspect %n 387/81-12 and left open because the licensee could not demonstrate that the seismic affect on the system as a whole (instrument function and brackett) was properly analyzed.
The inspector reviewed the final program for seismic qualification of GE
" ship loose" parts, which include temperature sensors, and determined the following:
-- GE provides the sensor mass and installation details to the
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licensee
-- seismic reponse for the sensor and hanger /ptpe section are calcul-ated by Bechtel; the hanger / pipe is evaluated
-- peak accelleration values for the instruments are supplied to GE fQr evaluation.
Calculations were reviewed for two randomly selected pipe-mounted components (B21-1D004B, B21-1D006C) and four randomly selected hanger mounted com-ponents(E11-IN009A,E51-IN0228,G33-IN016A,G33-1N023B). No unacceptable conditions were observed.
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(C1osed) Unresoliad Item (387/81-13-02) Audit' Findings ~Regarding Equipment Substitution Reports.
The corrective action taken in response to Bechtel Project Field Audit 24-3-7, Finding No. 3 was reviewed by the inspector and considered adequate.
Procedural control r ' 'quipment transfers is accom Procedure AD-QA-200, ' Aaterial Control Activities.glished by Administrative This procedure requires that the equipment be properly qualified and identified for the new locatio..
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{ Closed)' Construction' Deficiency (387/82-00-11)' Main' Steam Safety / Relief i
Talve unv] 5ettings.
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All Unit 1 SRV's were removed and the adjusting rings were reset for a
blowdown in the reconsnended range of 2% to 11% for the proper back pressure.:
The valves were then leak tested and re-instelled.
Four spare SRV's have
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also been re-adjusted and leak tested. This work is not completed for
Unit 2 valves, which must be adjusted and tested before installation.
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(Closed)' Inspector Followup Item:(387/81-24-09)'PORC Review'of' Station
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' Records Management System Ann 4.
This item had been reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 387/82-20 and left open pending licensee approval and issuance of a procedure concerning
i maintenance of QA records. On August 25 the inspector reviewed Record Management System Manual Procedure P13.0 Revision 0 which discussed main-
tenance of QA records. This procedure has been reviewed by PORC (meeting number 82-079)andapprovedonJuly9,1982. No unacceptable items were identified.
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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (387/82-09-08)' Approval'of Vendor' Manuals.
The inspector reviewed Administrative Procedure AD-QA-197 Revision 0 which
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documents the req)uirements to approve vendor Installation, Operating andTh;
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Maintenance (IOM Manuals by the plant Staff.
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on August 29, 1982 On September 3, 1982 the inspector reviewed PLI-20553
which states that all safety related IOM's will be approved prior to use and no later than January 1, 1983. This item will be reviewed during a
subsequent inspection, u.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item'(387/82-09-12)' Calibration of Plant In-stalled Instruments.
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On August 10, 1982 the inspector reviewed a computer run performed by the licensee to ascertain any plant instruments needed by the plant staff in performance of Operating Surveillances. The inspector questioned if any
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other surveillances would require plant installed instrumentation. On L
September 3 the inspector reviewed a PP&L internal letter, PLIS-5324,
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documenting a review performed by the plant Maintenance Department, and j
listing instruments used by their surveillances that should be in the calibration program.
t The inspector then reviewed minutes of PORC Meeting Number 82-080 dated July 10, 1982 in which the I&C/ Computer Supervisor briefed the PORC on how plant instruments were placed into the calibration program. The PORC concluded not to review individual instruments in the program, but directed the Supervisor to conduct the program in accordance with Plant
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Administrative Procedure AD-QA-605.
No unace ptable items were identified.
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(Closed) ~ Inspector ~ Followup Item (387/82-20-01) ' Surveillance ~ Setpoint Tolerances.
This item had been reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 387/82-28 and left open pending distribution and review of the licensee's official Technical Specificctions.
On August 27 the inspector reviewed the licensee's program for assuring that surveillances contair, accurate setpoints and tolerances in accordance with the Technical Specifications. The licensee was placing a cover sheet with surveillances which required the technicians to compare the sur-veillance with the Technical Specification to assure the correct setpoints were incorporated into the surveillance.
This cover sheet is then reviewed by the technician's Supervisor prior to
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using the surveillance procedure.
Throughout the inspection period surveillances were reviewed by the in-spector and compared with Technical Specification setpoints. No unaccept-
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able conditions were noted.
3.
Plant Tours The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas in the plant during normal and back shift hours.
During these tours the inspector observed house-keeping and cleanliness controls, construction work in progress, testing, main-tenance, in-place storage and protection of equipment, security measures and proper equipment line-up.
The Unit 2 Reactor Building housekeeping conditions were noted to be deterio--
rating. Trash and debris were particularly noticeable in the sump room. The inspector discussed these conditions with the Resident Nuclear Quality Assur-ance Engineer on August 30, 1982, and a QA audit of housekeeping was initiated on August 31. Housekeeping conditions were noticeably improved during subse-quent inspector tours. The inspector will continue to observe housekeeping practices as part of the routine inspection program.
4.
TMI Items a.
The following NUREG 0737 Three Mile Island Items were reviewed to verify licensee commitments:
(1) II.B.2 - Plant Shielding Study.
(2) II.K.3.31 - Small Break LOCA Plant Specific Analysis.
No discrepancies were noted.
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b.
The following previously reviewed TMI Items'had discrepancies which have been corrected:
(1) Item III.D.1.1TIntegrity of Systems 'Outside Containment.
The inspector reviewed operating surveillance procedure 50-00-018 Revision 0 approved July 14, 1982 which describes the program for determining.systen leakage on the following systems:
Residual Heat Removal, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Core Spray, High Pressure Core Injection Scrar $1scharge, Reactor Water Clean-up, Containment Air Monitors, n 4 <ost-Accident Sampling.
The inspector then reviewed data irom engineering surveillance SE-00-006 which included filter efficiucy testing of the standby gas treat-ment system.
These procedures covered all testing committed by the licensee to be performed by this program as described in the FSAR Section '8.1.69 and the Safety Evaluation Report of April 1981.
No unacceptable items were identified.
(2) Item I.C.6 - Verification of Operation ~ Activities.
In WRC Inspection Report 82-19 the inspector had reviewed this item,
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and had left it o check-off lists (pen pending verification of safety-related systems COL). On August 24 the inspector reviewed the con-
trol rcom COL's for the diesel generators and standby gas treatment system. An independent verification of system components had not
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i been perfonned as required by Administrative Procedure AD-QA-300, Revision 1, Technical Specification Section 6.8.1 and 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion V.
The inspector notified the Superintendent of Plant on August 24 that this was a Violation of Appendix B Criterion V.
On September 2 and 3 the inspector reviewed system (COL's) for safety-related systems. The inspector verified that verifications for the
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standby gas treatment system and diesel generators had been performed, and that no other discrepancies were noted with other systems.
(387/82-33-01;388/82-10-01)
(3) Item II.F.1 - Additional Accident-Monitoring Instrumentation.
Containment High Range Radiation Monitors - The inspector reviewed the Design Change Packages 50.IE and 50.1J which installed the containment high range radiation monitors, and inspected the detector in contain-
ment. The detectors were separated on opposite sides of the reactor l
vessel and were unshielded as required. Preoperational Test P79.1 Revision 0 perfonned a response test of these detectors.
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Containment Pressure Monitors / Containment Water Level Monitor - The inspector verified that control room displays and recorders for contain-ment pressure met the required range requirements as specified in the safety evaluation report of April 1981, and that level indicators went from 4.5 feet to 4.9 feet which met the requirements as stated in the SER of April 1981. On September 1, the inspector reviewed surveillance calibrations on level monitoring equipment. No unaccep-table items were noted.
Containment Hydrogen Monitor - The inspector reviewed the centrol room installation of the H /02 analyzer instrumentation. The H2 concentra-
tion range is from 0% to 30% as consnitted to in the April 1981 SER.
The inspector reviewed Preoperational Test P73.3 Revision 0 which performed a response check of the hydrogen monitors. On September 8, the inspector reviewed surveillance calibrations of the H /02 analyzers.
No unacceptable items were noted.
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Noble Gas Effluent Monitors / Plant Effluent Monitors - The installation and calibration of the Unit 1 turbine building, reactor building and standby gas treatment system vent monitors had been reviewed in NRC Inspection Reports 387/82-13, 387/82-25, and 387/82-27.
Calibration of the high range scales of the detector had not been completed during these inspections.
On September 2 the inspector reviewed calibration results for high range scales of the detectors.
No unacceptable items were noted.
(4) Item I.C.7 - General Electric Review of Procedures.
This item had been reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 387/82-20 and remained open pending incorporation of Category III connents into Emergency Operating Procedures.
On August 30, 1982, the inspector reviewed the Emergency Operating Procedures and a letter to PP&L from General Electric, DJT 82-109, dated August 24, 1982 which re-viewed the Category III items. The letter states all Category III items had been successfully resolved, or resolved to the extent that the procedures adequately fulfill the intent of the G.E. Emergency Procedure Guidelines.
No unacceptable items were identified.
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(5) Item ~ I.D.1' ' Control Room Desig l
This item had been reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 387/82-19 and
'i left open pending closecut of two items documented in the license
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condition C.15. On September 1 the inspector reviewed the items and verified the commitments made by the licensee and documented in an internal NRC memorandum from D. Serig to D. Tondi dated July 21,
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stem TheBaileycontrollersforthestandby9astreatmentsy(normal 1982.
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have been replaced with controllers with 'open on the right control room convention), and meter faces which had been labeled in increments of.3 units have been replaced with labels with.2 in-
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cremental units..No unacceptable items were identified.
j (6) Item I.G.1 - Low Power Training.
On September 2 the inspector reviewed Technical Procedures TP 2.14
Revision 1 and TP 3.68 Revision 0 which performed additional testing
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committed to by the licensee in FSAR Table 18.2-1 for the RCIC
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System and Reactor Pressure Vessel level instrument test. The in-
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spector also reviewed Operations Instruction OI-TR-003 titled " Low Power Training and Procedure Evaluation." This procedure documents training and reviews which will be performed during the startup test program, and satisfies the requirements of FSAR Table 18.2-1.
A license condition c(28)(b) requires the licensee to perform a simulated loss of all AC power test during the first fuel cycle.
The low power training program and loss of offsite power test will continue to be reviewed during the licensee's startup testing.
(7) Item II.D.3.3 - Inplant Iodine Radiation Monitoring.
The inspector reviewed the calibration of three Euclear Measurements Corporation 33-IF Continuous Air Monitors. These monitors have the capability for measuring iodine concentrations as committed to in FSAR 18.1.70. These instruments replaced the Particulate, Iodine, Noble Gas Monitor (Eberline PING 2A) as described in the FSAR. The licensee is submitting a FSAR change request to update the FSAR. No unacceptable conditions were note *
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5; Initial ' Fuel ' Loading
' References:
Final Safety Analysis Report;
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SSES Technical Specifications;
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ST 3.0 Revision 0, Initial Fuel Loading;
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ST 3.3 Revision 0, Fuel Loading;
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IE Circular 80-21, Regulation of Refueling Crews;
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RG 1.68 Revision 1, Initial Test Program for Water Cooled Nuclear Power
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Plants; 10CFR Requirements, 50.2, 50.54, 55.3, 55.4 and 55.9.
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' Discussion:
The entire core complement of fuel assemblies was prepared, inventoried and stored in the spent fuel pool prior to the start of fuel loading. Fuel was loaded into the core from the center out in a roughly spiral pattern of in-creasing size.
Before fuel was loaded, each control rod was tested for position indication, coupling and scram time This verified proper operation of the contrei rod and ensured that the blade guide was not interferring with control rod travel.
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loading chambers (FLC's) were connected to the source range instrumentation and the source range monitors were disconnected.
Fuel loading comenced using the Fuel and Core Component Transfer Authorization Sheet, for initial fuel loading, as the guiding document. Starting near the center of the core, four fuel assemblies were loaded around the central neutron source.
The loading continued in the control cell units that sequentially completed each face of the ever increasing square core.
Partial core shutdown margin was demonstrated during the loading process and this subtest ended with the core fully loaded and SRM's re-connected, inserted and adjusted.
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Inspector witnessing of initial fuel loading was accomplished by the following:
a.
Verifying licensee conformance to license requirements including identifying all technical specifications requirements and license conditions applicable during initial fuel loading; by independent in-spection of the applicable technical specifications ~and license cort-dition _
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Verifying licensee conformance to administrative and procedural require-ments including that direct communication has been established between the control room and the refueling floor; that crew requirements are being met as defined in the procedures, and that staffing satisfies re-quirements of technical specifications and license conditions regarding; licensed operators during separate periods; that the proper revision of the procedure is in use and that it is being followed; that the In-verse Multiplication Plots are being maintained in accordar.ce with pro-cedural requirements; that the shutdown margin and control blade opera-bility are being verified properly and at the required frequency; sur-veillance of monitoring instrumentation during interruptions of fuel loading; observing shift turnover for conformance with administrative procedures; review control of personnel access to refueling floor; observing and verifying use of the refueling status boards; visit to fuel loading station to assure that personnel understand their specific responsibilities; and review of shift work schedules for conformance with maximum work time limits.
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Review of fuel loading procedure including verification that a master copy of the procedure is assembled; review of changes to the procedure for conformance with administrative procedures and for proper management
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approval; reviewing records of deficiencies and difficulties encountered to assure the adequacy of corrective action, and the review and approval of actions taken; and review of data sheet entries for legibility, traceability and permanence, d.
Review of control rocm logs, surveillance sheets and inverse multiplica-tion factor-plots.
Findings:
Through discussions with licensee personnel, review of documentation, witnessing of fuel movement during all three shift periods and verification of nuclear in-struments and recording of data, the inspectors verified that acceptance criteria had been met.
Post Fuel Load Requirements For Initial ~ Criticality The inspector reviewed test exceptions that were resolved for preoperational tests completed during the test program and that are required to be closed for initial criticality.
The following completed test procedures were reviewed and test exceptions re-solved as noted:
A32.5, exception number 2, Security Control Center H&V;
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A65.1, exception numbers 24 & 25, Liquid Radwaste Process;
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A99.2, cy.ception number 4, Telephones;
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A68.1, exception numbers 5, 6, 7 and 8, Radwaste Solids Handling.
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Findings:
No discrepancies were noted and the inspector had no further questions on these items.
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7.
ASME Class 1 and Class 2 Piping The region-based inspector observed work and work activities and reviewed quality records for selected portions of the Unit 2 reactor coolant pressure boundary piping (ASME Class 1) and safety related piping (ASME Class 2).
Piping and pipe fittings located in the site warehouse, pipe fabrication-welding shop, and installed pipe runs were inspected. Quality records review included comparison of actual mechanical and chemistry test report values with those required by the applicable specification.
Records selected for review, including radiographs, were readily obtained from storage and appeared to be orderly and complete.
Pipe runs or components included in this inspec-tion were:
Pipe Runs Components DCA-208-1-4 Pipe - F45373 DLA-204-1-22 Pipe - F41408 Recirc. Line RS-2-B2 Flange - P.O.42612 GBB-218-3-3 Coupling - F38893 DBB-220-2-6 DBB-221-2-7C The as-built / final design reactor coolant loop drawings are not complete as pipe support / hanger installation is still in progress. Therefore as-built drawings review was not included in this inspection.
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No unacceptable conditions were found.
8.
Storage, Handling and Protection of Safety Related Components.
On August 11,1982, the inspector conducted a tour of the equipment storage warehouse to ensure that the items listed below were in accordance with re-quirements of Bechtel Procedure FP-G-11, Revision 22, " Procedure for Storage, Protection, Maintenance and Lay Up":
protective covers, caps, etc.
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-- identification segregation and identification of nonconforming items
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lubrication
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-- protective coatings, preservatives, dessicants, and heaters
-- handling of items being received or released for installation.
Installed Unit 2 components which are being stored "in-) lace" were also carefully observed during the inspector's plant tours to ensure t1at they were protected from debris, condensation, and adjacent construction activities.
No un-acceptable conditions were observed.
Equipment Maintenance Requirements and Record Sheets were reviewed for two reactor core spray pump motors. The specified maintenance requirements met or exceeded the vendor's recommended requirement::, and the maintenance activities were performed within the required time frame or adequate justifica-tion for delays was provided.
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,
g.
Installation ~of Core Spray' Pump Motor.
The inspector observed portions of the installation ano alignment of the
'
Unit 2 Core Spray Pump 'B'
and 'C' motors to er.sure that the construction specifications and work arocedures were technically adequate and the latest approved revision, and t1at the specified installation and alignment require-ments were met. No unacceptable conditions were observed.
10.
Construction Quality Assurance Activities.
Prior to issuance of an operating license for Unit 1, a large number of previously identified problems had to be resolved and reviewed by NRC.
l The principle point of contact with the on-site construction organization for closing these items was the licensee's Construction Qualify Assurance Group.
This arrangement allowec' the NRC inspectors to work more efficiently in closing out the open items since QA gathered and reviewed information for completeness prior to presenting it to NRC, however, it could erode the objectivity of the QA group if they feel under pressure to get the items closed. The inspector discussed this potential problem with the licensee's Nuclear Quality Assurance Manager who stated that he would relay the concern to senior management to determine if a compliance group function is required in the construction organization. Although the inspector has not observed any degradation of the Construction QA Program effectiveness resulting from involvement in closing out the NRC open items, this area will continue to be reviewed as part of the routine NRC inspection program.
21.
Exit Interviews During the course of this inspection, meetings were held with facility manage-ment to discuss the inspection and findings identified.
Those personnel attending these meetings are indicated in Section 1 of this report.
A
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