IR 05000387/1982003

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IE Insp Repts 50-387/82-03 & 50-388/82-02 on 820201-04.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Const Site Visit of Unit 2 Interior & Exterior & Interviews W/Personnel
ML20041F011
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/25/1982
From: Mccabe E, Narrow L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20041F008 List:
References
50-387-82-03, 50-387-82-3, 50-388-82-02, 50-388-82-2, NUDOCS 8203160086
Download: ML20041F011 (8)


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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report:

50-387/82-03, 50-388/82-02 Dockets: 50-387, (Cat. B), 50-388 (Cat. A)

Licenses: CPPR-101, CPPR-10E Licensee:

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Berwick, Pennsylvania

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Inspection Conducted:

February 1-4, 1982 Inspector:

-eb & % k Glu) Trt L. Narrow, Reactor Inspector date signed Approved By:

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t l2r/t1 Ebe C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor date signed Projects Section No. 2B Inspection Su~mmary:

Inspection (Unit 1 and 2) on February 1-4, 1982 (Combined Inspection Report No. 50-387/82-03,50-388/82-02)

Areas Inspected:

Routine unannounced inspection by one region-based inspector (Unit 1 - 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />, Unit 2 - 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) of. outstanding items.

No Violations were identified. Twenty-nine open items were reviewed, and 23 of them were closed.

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8203160086 820226 PDR ADOCK 05000387

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Pennsylvania Power and Light Company

  • R. A. Beckley, Resident Nuclear QA Engineer
  • J. R. Buczynski, Lead Construction Surveillance Engineer P. Capatosto, QA Engineer
  • S. Denson, Project Construction Manager E. Eustice, Senior QC Specialist F. Eisenhuth,-Senior Compliance Engineer
  • R.

H. Featenby, Assistant Project Director J. D. Green, Operations QA Supervisor

  • R. E. Matthews,-QA Engineer Bechtel Power Corporation S. Clark, ISG Startup Engineer
  • K. Cook, Field Engineer
  • E. W. Figard, ISG Supervisor S. Guarnaccia, Construction Engineer
  • A. M. Konjura, Lead QA Engineer
  • T. A. McHenry, Assistant-Project Field QC Engineer
  • T. Minor, Project Field Engineer
  • W. Mourer, Field Construction Manager W. Rose, Lead Field Welding Engineer General Electric Company R. Openhoske, QA Representative
  • Present at exit meeting.

Other licensee and contractor personnel were also interviewed.

2.

Facility Tour Work in progress, completed work, and plant status in several areas were observed during a general inspection of Unit 2.

Work items were examined for obvious defects or noncompliance with NRC requirements or licensee commitments. Craft and supervisory personnel encountered in work areas were interviewed. No Violations were identified.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) 388/77-07-02:

Failure to properly control project reference drawings.

This item was reviewed and resolved during inspection 387/81-2.

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(Closed) 388/78-08-04: Specification requirements for intermittent partial penetration groove welds.

Specification C-90 for structural welding does reference AWS DI.1-75.

(Closed) 388/80-03-01:

Containment liner plate imperfections. The inspector examined NCR No. 5719 which required examination of the liner plate with special attention to areas where the wind bracing had been attached to the liner. Areas not meeting specification requirements had been repaired by mechanical blending and, where necessary, by welding to meet the required thickness. NCR No. 5719 had been completed and accepted January 23, 1982.

The inspector also spot-checked the appearance of the containment liner plate in several areas during a general inspection of Unit 2.

Wo imperfections were observed.

(Closed) 388/80-11-01:

Failure to properly inspect concrete placements.

The inspector reviewed In Process Rework Notice No. 4240 and QCIR No.

C140-391-W-21A for repair and inspection of the noted concrete defects, which were closed out and accepted on February 1, 1981 and February 2, 1981, respectively.

The inspector also reviewed the following documents:

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Project Special Provision Notice SF/ PSP G-6.1, Rev. 4,

" Supplementary Instructions to Field Inspections Manual G-6",

which revised requirements for controlling records of inspection activities that cannot be completed.

NQA Work Instruction No. 11, Rev. 1, " Review of Quality Assurance

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Record Packages" Bechtel Project Field Audit 17-1-9 during the week ending

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December 26, 1980 included verification that all tasks had been closed for a large number (approximately 500) completed inspection records.

(Closed) 388/80-14-01:

Failure to Control Weld Filler Material. The inspector reviewed NQA Audit No. C-81-02 and Bechtel QA Audit No. 13-1-9, both of which included observation of weld filler material control. The inspector also observed control of weld filler material during the general inspection of Unit 2..No lack of control was observed.

(0 pen) 387/80-33-01, 388/80-20-01:

Separation criteria for instrument piping. The inspector examined Bechtel QAR F-656 and correspondence cnncerning this request as well as correspondence between the licensee end General Electric Company (PLG-1615 and EAG-3275) concerning this question.

Separation of the previously identified liner has been addressed.

Quantitative criteria concerning separation requirements have not been established.

This item remains unresolved pending NRC review of general separation criteria when they are established and of the adequacy of separation of the previously identified line.

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(Closed) 387/83-99-11:

Core Spray Sparger Welds. -As a result of manufac-turing deficiencies on reactor materials, General Electric Company (GE)

conducted an investigation which included a detailed inspection of core spray nozzle and elbow tack welds. The inspector examined the following documents.

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-Unit 1 - GE FDI 25/68754, FDDR KR1-098, KR1-233, PP&L NCR 80-374-1

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Unit 2 - GE FDI 17/68755 and KR2-072 Deficient tack welds were identified on Unit 1 and were shown as having been corrected.

4.

Eeview af Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Closec) Construction Deficiency Report (387/79-00-07, 388/79-00-07):

Sticking of Cutler-Hammer pushbutton' switches and improper seating of Amphenol Connectors in PGCC/ACR Panels. The licensee later reported that, based on GE study and tests of connector seating, the nonconforming conditions would not interrupt circuit continuity and were not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e).

The inspector examined HCAR 1-37 and NCR 4B13 which showed that the Cutler-Hammer E30 switches on the Unit 1 PGCC/ACR panels had been replaced.

No switches of this type were used in safety-related systems in the remainder of the plant.

This work was completed and the NCR was closed on March 20, 1980.

(0 pen) Construction Deficiency Report (387/80-00-03, 387/81-00-01, 387/81-00-09, 388/80-00-03, 388/81-00-01, and 388/81-00-09): These reports had all identified deficiencies in Pacific check valves, including; disc / body interference, excessive wear at valve hinge arm, and valve disc failure. To correct all of these nonconforming conditions, the licensee will replace the disc, hinge, nut and washers on all Q-listed Pacific check valves.

This rework will be performed in accordance with NCR 8302.

These items remain unresolved pending completion of the rework and review by an NRC inspector.

(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (388/80-00-15):

Cracked Yokes on Anchor Darling valves for the RHR system. The yokes had been supplied to Anchor Darling by Malcolm Co., Inc.

This item was also reported in NRC Bulletin 80-21.

Corrective action, consisting of replacement of the defective yokes, was reviewed during inspection 50-387/82-04. This item is resolved on the basis of that inspection.

(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (387/80-00-22, 387/80-00-25, 388/80-00-22,388/80-00-25):

Excessive voltage drop in MOV control circuits and in 230V DC power cable.

These items were reviewed during inspection 387/80-20, 388/80-10 but were omitted from that report.

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The licensee has corrected errors in their computer cable installation program. A new run was made with the corrected inputs and the data was issued in their report No. BLP 14708 dated April 22, 1981. New cables have been installed at the site as defined in the April 22, 1981 report.

The' inspector reviewed the quality control installation documentation and verified by inspection on a sample basis that new cables were installed to correct the undersize cable installation errors.

For Unit 2, engineering drawings were revised to provide the properly sized cable.

(Closed) Potential Construction Deficiency Report (387/80-00-24, 388/80-00-24):

Potential failure of solenoid-operated brakes on Limitorque valve operators.

This item was later determined to be not reportable.

The inspector examined Startup Field Report SFR 1320, NCR 8469, KR1-257 and KR2-143.

The wiring or. Unit I and 2 had been revised to provide 230 VAC and the brakes on Unit I had been replaced.

(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (387/80-00-14, 387/80-00-21, 387/81-00-20). Deficiencies in Limitorque Valve Operators consisted of (1) loosening of stationary electrical contacts on torque switches, (2)

cracking of limit switch rotors and (3) cracking of torque switches.

Corrective actions for these items included refastening torque switches with application of "Locktite" to screws and replacement of the melamine material in the torque switches and limit switch rotors with a fibrite material recommended by Limitorque Corp.

In addition, a number of other problems identified on NCR's were corrected.

For this purpose, the Integrated Startup Group (SG) prepared and issued TP 2.26 "Limitorque Valve Inspection Review and Corrective Action Program."

The inspector reviewed TP2.26, discussed the inspection and corrective action program with ISG and licensee QC personnel, and reviewed inspection and work records.

The log of inspection work authorization (WA) and rework WA's was reviewed.

Selected PP&L QC Inspection reports were also reviewed.

These records showed that all "Q" listed valve operators on site had been inspected for required rework, reworked, and inspected.

One "Q" listed operator not on site and is to be inspected upon receipt.

(0 pen) Construction Deficiency Report (388/80-00-14, 80-00-21, 81-00-20):

Deficiencies as described above in Limitorque Valve Operators.

The inspector examined Field Procedure FP-E-11, " Procedure for inspection of Limitorque Motor-Operated Valves", Construction Surveillance Group (CSG)

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memo dated February 2, 1982 concerning Limitorque Inspection FP-E-11, and i

Special Surveillance Instructions SSI-81-05, 81-23 and 82-10 concerning inspection and rework of these valves.

This item remains unresolved pending inspection and rework of the Unit 2 valves and NRC revie.

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(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (387/81-00-04):

Nonconforming dissimiliar metal welds consisting of 187 socket welds on small bore

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piping using a carbon to stainless steel weld procedure which had not been approved.

In addition, 90 of the welds were in systems with design temperatures above 212'F.

Review by Bechtel determined that the procedure used was acceptable and that 31 of the 90 welds were acceptable since the temperature at the weld would not reach 212'F. The remaining 59 welds were replaced as shown by NCR 6479.

In addition, Dwg. No. M-198 was revised to include the appropriate weld procedures and a note limiting dissimiliar metal welds to design temperatures of 212*F maximum was added to Dwg. No. M-199. A training session on welding of dissimiliar metal welds was conducted on March 27, 1981.

The inspector examined Quality Action Request F-653, NCR 6479, Construction Memo to Engineering CME 5397 Dwg.11-198, and Dwg. M-199 to determine the status of this item.

(Closed) Significant Deficiency Report (387/81-00-07) Deterioration of ASCO solenoid valves, Model NP-1, in contact with oil. This item was identified by NRC Information Notice 80-11.

The inspector reviewed Design Change Package DCP 390.1 and PP&L NCR No.81-205, 81-206,81-207 and 81-248. These showed that 16 valves in Unit 1 and common areas had been modified by replacement of the Ethylene Propylene seals with Viton seals.

(0 pen) Significant Deficiency Report (388/81-00-07): Deficie.icies as described above in ASCO Solenoid valves. Twelve of the valves in Unit 2-have not been modified.

This item is unresolved pending replacement of the seals with viton and NRC review.

(Closed) Potential Significant Deficiency Report (387/81-00-08, 388/81-00-08):

Wiring of ITE Gould Circuit breakers subject to insulation damage by the racking mechanism gear train. This item was determined to be not reportable since the breaker would not trip even if the wire were cut. NCR81-141 disposition provides for rework of the wire in proximity to the racking mechanism by enclosing it in a spiral wiring harness.

(0 pen) Construction Deficiency Report (387/81-00-17, 388/81-00-17):

Failure of diesel ganerator lube oil pump.

t The licensee determined that the pump had been misaligned and also that there was an excessive amount of particulate matter in the system. The pump was returned to the vendor and replaced in the system with a spare.

The system was cleaned and flushed out,the filters replaced in accordance with PP&L NCR's81-102, 81-103,81-104 and 81-10.

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The licensee's letter PLA-994 states that the preventive maintenance program in effect will assure that the prescribed oil system cleanliness will be maintained and also that, in response to an FSAR commitment, periodic laboratory testing of the lube oil quality is required. A procedure for monthly laboratory testing of an oil sample was established in September, 1981. However, these tests have been waived each month and have not been performed to date. This items remains unresolved pending determination that failure to perform these tests have not resulted in damage to the equipment and either performance of the tests or justification of their non performance.

(Closed) Construction Deficienc Report (387/81-00-21, 388/81-00-21):

a Inadequate throat thickness of s,.cket welds on small bore piping. The inspector discussed this problem with licensee and construction personnel and reviewed MCAR 1-73 and NCR 6963.

The licensee had determined that a single welder was responsible for all of the defective welds. All GTAW socket welds made by this welder were inspected. The defective welds (19) were either replaced or built up to the required throat thickness.

The welder was given additional instruction and training on GTAW welding of socket welds.

(Closed) Potential Construction Deficiency Report (387/81-00-22, 388/81-00-22):

Inadequate design of ESW system. This item was determined to be not reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e).

Review by PP&L NPE determined that the normally open valve which would have permitted the liner to drain will close when the pumps are shut down.

(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (387/81-00-24):

Potential shorting of electrical equipment by drainage of "Flaxoap" from conduit into equipment / enclosures.

Start-up Work Authorization's (SWA's) identify equipment which is to be sealed and which has been sealed.

Construction Surveillance Group is verifying sealing in accordance with SSI-81-18.

In addition, QC Instruction E-3.0, Item 3.4 requires verification of equipment / enclosure sealing and freedom from cable lubricant as a part of the final turnover inspection.

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(0 pen) Construction Deficiency Report (388/81-00-24):

This deficiency is described above.

Drawing E-49, Rev. 14 " Conduit and Cable Tray Notes and Details" requires

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sealing of equipment and enclostr'6s and prescribes the material and method of sealing. This item remaihs unresolved pending performance of the work and NRC inspection.

(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (387/81-00-28, 388/81-00-28):

AIW cable failed environmental testing.

NCR 8073 requires removal of the i

AIW cable from Unit 1 containment and replacement by BIW cable. This NCR was completed January 12, 1981 and accepted by QC January 19, 1982.

FP-E-8, Sheet 24, " Installed Cable Revision Action Notice" shows that AIW

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cable in Unit 2 has been removed.

It is to be replaced with BIW cable.

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(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (387/81-00-35):

Failure of fuel injector nozzle seating surface on diesel generator head assembly.

This item was also reported by Cooper Energy Services (CES) in accordance with 10CFR21.

The failed head was returned to CES as shown on PP&L NCR 81-435.

The replacement head was installed as shown on Work Authorization WA V-13794 which was closed December 21, 1981.

5.

Items Reported Under 10CFR21 (Closed) 10CFR21 Report (80-SC-01):

Loss of charcoal from tray absorber cells. This item was also described in NRC Bulletin 80-03.

It was reviewed by an NRC inspector during inspection 387/81-02 and is resolved based on that review.

(Closed) 10CFR21 Report (80-SC-04): Malfunction of Comsip containment gas analyser system. The inspector examined NCR 8487 which identified problems with documentation including environmental qualification provided with the replacement equipment.

Item 80-SC-04 is closed since the problem reported has been resolved.

The documentation questions remain unresolved and are identified as 387/82-03-01 and 388/82-02-01.

(Closed) 10CFR21 Report (80-SC-05):

Premature timeout and drifting of setpoints on Agastat 7000 and GE CR-2820 Relays.

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This deficiency was also reported by the licensee under 10CFR50.55(e)

(387/81-88-01,388/81-88-01):

Failure of Crosby SRV solenoids to actuate during LOCA with worst case power supply voltage. This item is closed

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since it was also reported by the licensee in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)

(387/81-00-27,388/81-00-27) and was reviewed during inspection 387/81-25.

6.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or Violations. An unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Detail 5.

7.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representative (see Detail 1) at the end of the inspection on February 4, 1982.

The NRC Resident Inspectors also attended the meeting. The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and identified the inspection findings.