IR 05000387/1982017
| ML20054K857 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1982 |
| From: | Mccabe E, Mccann J, Nicholas H, Rhoads G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054K853 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.D.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.K.3.28, TASK-2.K.3.30, TASK-TM 50-387-82-17, 50-388-82-07, 50-388-82-7, IEB-80-16, IEB-82-01, IEB-82-1, NUDOCS 8207060224 | |
| Download: ML20054K857 (19) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-387/82-17: 50-388/82-07 Docket No. 50-387 (CAT B), 50-388 (CAT A)
CPPR-101 License No. CFPR-102 Priority Category Licensee:
Pennsylvania Power and Licht Comoany 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility Name:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection at: Salem Township, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: May 18 - June 15,1982 mb
%[ls/ E t Inspectors:
Gary G.VRhoads date signed LL,71Lc
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' John F. McCann
'date signed On 6 fi d E t.
H. Nicholas date signed
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Approved by:
db f:n/17/97-Ebe C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section 2B, DPRP Inspection Summary: Inspection (Unit 1 and 2) on May 18 - June 15,1982 (Combined Inspection Report No. 50-387/82-17,50-388/82-07).
Routine resident (189 hrs. Unit 1, 25 hrs. Unit 2) and regional inspection (28 hrs.
Unit 1) of: TMI Items, Preoperational Testing; Preoperational Test Results Review; Bulletins and Circulars, Open Items; and Plant Status. Thirty open items, two bulletins, two circulars, three TMI items and fifteen Construction Deficiency Reports were closed. No Violations were identified; two other items were opened during this inspection.
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8207060224 820618
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PDR ADOCK 05000387 O
PDR Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Pennsylvania Power and Light Company W. E. Barberich, Manager, Nut. lear Licensing R. Beckley, Resident, Nuclear Quality Assurance J. Buczynski, NQA J. R. Calhoun, Senior Vice-President, Nuclear S. H. Cantone, Manager, Nuclear Support T. Crinnens, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering N. W. Curtis, Vice-President, Engineering and Construction, Nuclear (Project Director)
(1 R. H. Featenby, Assistant Project Director J. Green, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance J. T. Kauffman, Executive Vice-President, Operations H. W. Keiser, Superintendent of Plant B. D. Kenyon, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations R. Matthews, Senior Analyst, NQA C. Myers, Assistant Superintendent of Plant, Outages M. Provost, NQA A. R. Sabol, Manaper, Nuclear Quality Assurance R. J. Shovlin, Assistant Project Director (1)
D. J. Thompson, Assistant Superintendent of Plant Pa. DER (1) T. Polloy, Nuclear Engineer Bechtel Corporation (3 G. Bell, Bechtel Quality Assurance Engineer T. Henry, Bechtel Ouality Control Engineer A. Konjura, Bechtel Quality Assurance Engineer T. Minor, Bechtel Project Field Engineer US Nuclear Regulatory Commission S. H. Hanauer, Director, Division of Safety Technology, NRR J. J. Kramer, Division of Human Factors Safety R. Mattson, Director, Systems Integration, NRR R. L. Perch, Licensing PM, NRR A. Schwencer, Chief, LB-2, D0L, NRR R. L. Tedesco, Assistant Director Licensing, NRR M. Williams, Technical Assistant, Division of Licensing, NRR (1) Denotes those present at NRC:NRR Management Site Visit / Meeting on May 18, 1982 (2) Atterded G. Rhoads/J. McCann Exit June 15, 1982.
(3) Attended J. McCann Exit June 15, 198.
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2.
Licensee Action'on'NRC Findings:
a.
( Closed ) ' Inspector ' Foll owup ' Item ' (387/79-31-09) Testing of Load Center Transformers.
The inspector reviewed documentation verifying the successful performance of full load testing of the 4160/480 volt load center transformers.
No discrepancies were noted and the inspector had no further questions on this item,
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b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (387/80-20-09) Environmental' Qualification of i
Valve Position Indication.
The NRR Equipment Qualification Branch will report on their inspection of PP&L's environmental qualification program during a future supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report, f
c.
(Closed)' Inspector Followup Item (387/80-28-06) Annunciator Panel - Fire Protection.
The main fire annunciator panel has been replaced with a new simplex alarm panel. This panel has a tape printout for alarming conditions which de-scribes type of alarm, location of alarming condition, time of alarm, and status of alarm.
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d. '(Closed)' Inspector' Followup Item (387/80-28-07) FSAR ~ Discrepancy 'in ~ NE00 10466 Reference.
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On May 21 FSAR Change Number 690 was reviewed. This change revised FSAR Section 9.5.9 to reference Revision 2 of the NED0-10466 document. This
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change will be incorporated into Revision 30 of the FSAR.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup ~ Item (387/80-32-07) FSAR'Discrerancies in Description of Reactor Recirculation System.
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On May 21 FSAR Change Number 751 was reviewed. This change incorporates l
a description of the recirculation speed limiters into the FSAR. The l
change will be incorporated into Revision 30 of the FSAR.
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(Closed) Deviation (387/81-10-01) Failure'to' Perform Loss of Circulation
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Testing of Feedwater Valves.
On May 17 Preoperational Test P45.1 Revision 2 Feedwater System Preopera-tional Test was reviewed to verify all air operated valves listed on FSAR Table 423.28-1 were included in the test. TestChangeNotice'(TCN)
Number 001 had been added to the test to perform this required testing.
During this review the inspector noted that a test exception (number 003)
had been written for the loss of air testing for valves HV14107A and HV 141078 during the initial preoperational test, but that the exception had been resolved and closed out. The inspector could find no documentation
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explaining why the valves had not been tested during the preoperational test. Startup Administrative Procedure AD7.7 Revision 3 Section 5.4 re-quires that a Test Change Notice (TCN) be written for resolution of test exceptions.
On May 20 the inspector reviewed TCN Number 14 which documented that valves HV14107A/B could not be tested during the original preoperational test, and that testing was completed on March 11, 1982.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (387/81-13 03) Containment Isolation Valves -
Changes to Technical Specifications.
On May 19 FSAR Tables 6.2-12 ar.d 18.1-10 were reviewed along with the April 29 revision of the draft Technical Specifications.
Both table 6.2-12 and the Technical Specification listed valves E11-HV-1F011A,B and E11-HV-1F028A,B as the containment isolation valves for penetrations X204A,8 and X205A,B. However, FSAR Table 18.1-10 listed only Ell-HV-IF028 A,B as the containment isolation valve. The table also listed this valve as both an essential and non-essential valve. The resolution to these discrepancies will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection, h.
(Closed) Violation (387/81-25-01) Failure to Properly Modify Written Pro-
_q_edures.
On May 17 the licensee response to the NRC, PLA-989, dated December 31, 1982 and Administrative Procedure AD-QA-500 Revision 0 were reviewed.
The Administrative Procedure incorporates the additional criteria committed to in the response letter, i.
(Closed) Violation (387/82-04-05) Unauthorized Temporary Modification in RCIC System.
The inspector had verified on day of Violation that the licensee put a temporary modification tag on the switch after they were notified of the Violation. On May 17 training records were reviewed to verify that Inte-grated Startup Group Engineers and Plant Technical Engineers were given training sessions on temporary modification control. These corrective actions completed action required by the licensee based on their letter to the NRC, PLA-1070, dated April 26, 1982.
During tours of the facility no further Violations have been identified.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup ~ Item (387/80-01-04)' Piping Interferences.
As reported in Inspection Report 82-08 the licensee has developed a
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system for identifying, analyzing and correcting interference problems with piping, cable trays, and hangers.
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(Closed) Ins)ector Followup' Item (387/80-16-07) Licensee Controls of
' Radioactive Materials Received on Site.
Procedures for control of sources, receipt surveys, and training require-ments for handling of radiation sources were reviewed on June 3.
The procedures were adequate for controlling the receipt and control of sources.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup' Item (387/80-28-05) Temporary ' Modifications In Containment Atmosphere Circulation Testing.
On June 2 documentation was reviewed which removed the temporary modifica-tions identified in the Containment Atmosphere Circulation System during preoperational testing. Testing was performed after removal of the temporary modification to verify proper system functions resulting from the temporary modification removal.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item ~ (387/81-08-14; 388/81-04-11) Inadequacy of
' Review of Design Documents.
The individual Violations associated with this finding of program weakness in meeting instrumentation and control design committments were each re-solved.
No further evidence of progransnatic weakness in this area has been identified, n.
(Closed) Unresolved Item'(387/81-01-01;'388/81-01-01) Test Data'Does~Not Meet Requirements of Purchase Specifications.
The results of the " Seismic and Hydrodynamic Loading Qualification Test Report on Resistence Temperature Detector for Bechtel Corp." dated July 26, 1981 were reviewed. The tests met the requirements of purchase specification G-22, and were approved by a registered Professional Engineer.
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(Closed) Inspector' Followup Item (387/81-24-08) Procedures for Maintaining Internal System Cleanliness.
Administrative Procedure AD-QA-503 Revision 2 was reviewed. Section 6.5 had been revised to incorporate requirements for system cleaning and flushing.
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(Closed) Inspector Followu) Item (387/81-25-04) Environmental Qualification of Solenoid Valves on Crosay Steam Relief Valves.
This item was reported by the licensee as a Construction Deficiency Report and resolution will be followed under that report (81-00-27).
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (387/79-10-01) Control of "Information Only" Radiographs.
Bechtel Quality Assurance Manual Revision 2, Section WD.1, requires that completed weld radiographs, including original, all repairs, and final acceptance radiographs, but excluding in-process radiographs and radio-(
graphs of welds that are cut out, be returned as part of a weld documenta-tion package. No "information only" radiographs are kept in these records, nor are they used for documenting weld repairs.
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(Closed) Violation (387/82-04-02) Failure to Resolve Discrepancy in
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Containment Air Circulation Fan Alarms.
On June 2 the inspector reviewed documentation that training had been conducted on proper closecut of Startup Field Reports (SFR), and that the particular SFR identified in the Violation had been correctly re-solved.
The Work Authorization restoring the electrical circuitry of circulation fans to agree with resolution to the SFR was reviewed with no further unacceptable items identified.
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(Closed) Violation '(387/82 08-02)' Adjustment'of the APRM' Gain ~Potentio-j meter Not in Accordance with Applicable Procedure.
The licensee conducted a special training session on this issue for all
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test directors on April 28 and 29, 1982. The training stressed the im-
.portance of following established procedures and administrative control mechanisms. The inspector also reviewed the recalibration of all Average Power Range Monitor High Neutron Flux Trip Setpoints which was accomplished under Work Authorization No. 27495 dated April 16, 1982
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(Closed) Inspector Followup' Item (387/82-10-05)= Access contro1' Signs ~0n l
Diesel Generator Room Doors.
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On May 27 the inspector toured the diesel generator room and noted that
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signs controlling access had been removed.
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(Closed) Unresolved ~ Item (387/81-02-01) Turnover of'Bechtel ~In-Place l
Storage Surveillance Records to Plant Maintenance.
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The inspector reviewed the disposition of Quality Action Request (QAR)
Number 661 and verified that Bechtel's Engineering Field Procedure G-17 had been changed to incorporate comments identified in the QAR. The in-spector also reviewed a PP&L internal letter in response to a Quality
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Assurance Audit (Number 0-21) which had performed a review of all safety related systems, Bechtel In-Place Storage requirements, and documented
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changes made to the Plant Preventive Maintenance System based on this
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(Closed)' Unresolved' Item'(387/81-08-17; 388/81-04-14)~ Maintenance' Surveillance
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of Electrical Equipment and Components.
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over of Preventive Maintenance requirements between Bechtel and the PP&L Plant Staff. The procedures have been changed to require the Plant In-strument and Control Organization along with the Mechanical / Electrical
Organizations to receive Bechtel's in-place storage requirements at system turnover. The inspector also reviewed a recent turnover of the turbine building cranes and verified the Bechtel storage requirements had been j
transmitted to the plant staff, and that the requirements had been in-
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corporated into the plant's Preventive Maintenance Program.
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(Closed) Violation'(387/81-08-11) Lack of Control for Insta11ation'of Fire
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Proofing Material on Safety-Related Structures.
The inspecto. reviewed the Bechtel Report on Hilti Fasteners In Structural Steel which was submitted in response to Bechtel NCR-7519. The conclusion
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of the report is that since the steel structural members (ASTM A-36) are
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ductible and not subject to fatigue type loading, the beams were acceptable without repair. This conclusion was based on destructive testing of two t
samples of the A-36 steel which had Hilti fasteners driven into them to i
simulate extreme conditions. An interim change to Field Engineering Pro-i cedure FP-G-5 which requires that a Field Change Request be originated and
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submitted to Project Engineering when non-safety construction work may affect safety related structures. Additionally, Bechtel Quality Control inspection criterion for Hilti fastener spacing on structural steel were established in drawing C-806.
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(Closed) Violation (387/82-10-03) Failure to Include All Safety'and Shut-down Loads Connitted To In FSAR Table 8.3-1 Into Test Procedure P100.1.
The inspector reviewed the revised Cold Functional Test Procedure P100.1 Revision 1 and verified the inclusion of necessary loads on the busses for this test along with the load sequencing for this test. No discrepancies were noted and the inspector had no further questions on this item, y.
(Closed)' Unresolved Item (387/81-13-01) Review ~of~ Training Records (ISG).
The Training / Qualification Records of six qualified Preoperational Test Directors from the Integrated Startup Group were reviewed. Two individuals were PP&L employees, three were Bechtel employees, and one was a General Electric Co. employee. All met or exceeded the minimum requirements com-
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mitted to in FSAR Chapter 17, Answers to Questions 423.1 and 423,24.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item'(387/81-25-02) Design Change Work'Perfonned ~in 4.16KV Switchgear.
Revision 1 to Administrative Procedure AD6.11 which was issued on January 15, 1982, corrected NRC concerns with the previous procedure.
The inspector also reviewed the closeout documentation of two design changes which were performed in the 4.16KV bus outage of October, 1982 (DCP 8.42 and DCP451.2).
Although the licensee was able to provide auditable records indicating that the work was properly controlled and tested, the test records could not be readily identified with the Startup Work Request they were to support.
Considerable cross referencing was re-quired to verify that required testing was performed.
Licensee representa-tives were aware of the problem and plan to develop a more efficient method of linking test results to the associated test requirements, aa. Blosed)InspectorFollowupItem(387/81-09-01and387/81-27-01) Develop-ment of Generic Training Programs Not Complete.
Approved training programs were reviewed for the following personnel:
Health Physics Section, Technical Section, Chemistry Work Group, Instrumentation and Control Technicans, and Plant Management.
These programs appeared adequate.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item ~ (387/81-27-04) Review ~of Operator Training Files Established That Some Operators. Do Not Meet Licensee's Current Require-ments For Participation in NRC Examinations.
This item was resolved when the licensee issued procedure NDI 4.2.5 Revision 0 which specifically refers to Unit I cold license candidates and their unique training program.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item ~(387/81-27-02) Forms to Document Training and Recommendations for Participation in NRC Licensing Exams Not Completed.
A new instruction NDI 4.2.5 Revision 0 was prepared and approved which specifically applies to Unit 1 Cold License Candidates, and which' takes into account the additional training these candidates received while plant construction was being completed. A properly filled out form NDI 4.2.5A was available for each cold license candidate, dd.
(Closed) ~ Inspector Followup ' Item (387/81-27-03) ~ Required HP and ' Respiratory Training Not Complete.
As of June 10,1982 over 50% of the required Health Physics Level II Training and 70% of the Respirator / Training had been completed. The licensee should have no difficulty in qualifying enough people to support fuel load.
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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (387/81-27-06) Review of Licensee Plant Use of Agastat GP Relays.
The licensee reported a problem with Agastat Type 'GP' Relays installed in diesel generator control circuits which caused the relays to hangup.
The problem is possible with any type GP relay manufactured before August, 1977. The licensee determined that because of this and other problems, with Agastat GP relays, they would be replaced in safety systems with more reliable Agastat type EGP relays, which were specifically designed for class IE service. The replacement is scheduled to be completed before initial criticality. Any defective relays should have been detected during preoperational testing. The inspector will continue to follow this item.
3.
Plant Tour The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas of the plant during normal and backshift hours, The inspector observed work in progress, testing, housekeeping, cleanliness controls, and storage and protection of components and systems.
Findings:
The inspector interviewed four Bechtel Electrical Quality Control Inspectors to ascertain whether the desire to complete the Unit One facility had any affect on the inspector's ability to discover arid followup on potential /
actual deficiencies noted during their inspections. All inspector's inter-viewed stated that they were not under any pressure from their management to complete inspections per a time table, and that they were always supported by their management when discrepancies were noted. All inspectors stated that to their knowledge no Quality Control Inspector had ever been told by QC Panagement to hurriedly do an inspection just to meet a timetable.
No unacceptable items were identifie.
4.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followup IE Bulletins listed below were reviewed to verify the following:
(a) Bulletins received by PP&L corporate management were forwarded to appropriate individuals within the organization, including station management, for information, review and/or corrective actions as required.
(b) PP&L bulletin responses were submitted to the NRC within the specified time period.
(c) Licensee review and evaluations of bulletins are complete and accurate as supported by other facility records and by inspector observations of installed plant equipment.
(d) Corrective actions specified in licensee bulletin responses have been completed and/or responsibilities have been assigned for completion.
Bulletin 82-01, Rev. 1, " Alteration of Radiographs of' Welds in Piping
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Subassemblies."
The licensee reviewed Bechtel and General Electric records and deter-mined that the only piping supplied by Associated Piping and Engineering Corporation was for portions of the recirculation system risers.
PP&L performed a 100 percent review of all radiographs and reader sheet records related to this material. The inspector reviewed the results of this audit which were documented in a PP&L Nuclear Quality Assurance Checklist for Radiographic Examination dated April 15, 1982.
No evidence of tampering with the 4T hole in the penetrameter to en-hance sensitivity was found by the licensee and the radiographs were considered acceptable per ASME Section III, Class I.
This bulletin is closed.
-- Bulletin 80-16, " Potential Misapplication of'Rosemount, Inc. Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters With Either "A" or "D" Output Codes."
The licensee detennined that 17 of the defective pressure transmitters were used in safety related functions. These were all replaced under purchase orders FDR-UR2-501-3, FDI-WJKD, and Bechtel NCR-5988.
This bulletin is closed.
IE Circulars (IEC) listed below was reviewed to ensure that:
(1) The circular was received by licensee management.
(2) A review for applicability was performed.
(3) For circulars applicable to the facility, appropriate actions have been taken or are scheduled to be taken.
These circulars are closed:
-- IEC 80-21 - Regulation of Refueling Crews.
IEC 81-13 - Torque Switch Electrical Bypass Circuit For Safeguard Service
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Valve Motors.
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5.
Review of Action Taken To Correct Construction' Deficiencies Identified By The Licensee l
a.
(Closed) Construction' Deficiency (387/81-00-10): Lack of Separation in PGCC Cables.
This item was left open during previous NRC Ins 387/82-15 because work associated with Field Change Notice (FCN) pection No.
2015 was not yet completed.
Work Authorization 308.1 Revision 21F1 which documents work specified in FCN 2015 was reviewed and the work is complete.
b.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-36; 388/81-00-36): Failure of LPCI Injection Valve.
The disposition of Bechtel NCR-8486 required a hole to be drilled through the pin nut and stem, and a lock wire to be installed which will prevent the nut from backing off. This work is done.
c.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-30; 388/81-00-30): Manual Reset Required Following Loss of Power.
Design Change Packages (DCP) 8.43, 451.1, 451.2, 451.3 and 451.4 were changed to correct this deficiency before the changes were implemented.
Because this potentially serious error had slipped through the Bechtel design and review process, tile licensee requested Bechtel to perform an investigation of the incident. Bechtel reported the results of this in-vestigation to the licensee in a letter (BLP-19710 dated March 29,1982)
which stated that Bechtel design and review procedures were followed and that this was an isolated case.
The letter also stated that Bechtel held training sessions for their Electrical Group and Sub-Group leaders which stressed the importance of both the designer and checker verifying the entire review process, d.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-25): Replace Motor to Shaft Keys in Limitorque SMB-4 Operators.
This work was completed for Unit i under the disposition to Bechtel NCR-8178 and DCP 552.1 and documented on Work Authorizations WA-U-21406, 20220, 20208, 21000, 20342, 21076 and 21011.
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(Closed) Construction ' Deficiency (387/81-00-37; 388/81-00-37): Defects in Single and Dual Bailey Alarms.
Bechtel NCR-8300 documented an inspection of the contact fingers of all alarm units which may have had the deficier..y.
Thirteen of the units were found to be defective and were replaced, f.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-15): Improper' Orientation of Isolation Dampers in HVAC System.
The disposition to Bechtel NCR-7199 and Startup Work Authorization (SWA)
9033 were reviewed. The corrective action completed was to:
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mark drawings to indicate potential steam flow.
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under the red arrow on the dampers put sign saying ' steam flow
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direction'.
The work was completed in September 1981.
g.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-23; 388/81-00-23): Stripped Threads on Lug Fasteners of Agastat GP Series Relays.
The disposition of PP&L NCR 81-392 required replacement of all Agastat GP relay bases supplied by COMSIP Customline.
Relay bases were replaced per Work Authorization U13949 and U14283.
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(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-29): Relay Scheme Allows Lockout Feature to Preclude Restart of Swing Bus Motor-Generator (M/G).
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Design Change Package (DCP 630.1) was prepared to correct this problem by:
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adding a time delay relay to delay tripping the LPCI swing bus M/G
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on under frequency for 17 seconds, which allows time for the diesel generators to come up to speed.
changes the transfer time delay on the Auto Transfer Switch (IAT5219)
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from 3 to 6 seconds which allows the generator to come up to voltage.
i removed undervoltage trip device from circuit breakers feeding the
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M/G set.
This work was accomplished under Work Authorization S-21186, i.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/80-00-03; 388/80-00-03):' Pacific Swing Check Valve Disc / Body Interference.
The valves were inspected and the problem was determined to be improper assembly of the stuffing box internals and use of improper packing material.
These problems were corrected and documented under Bechtel NCR Nos, 5913, 6226, and 6688.
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(0 pen) Potential ~ Construction Deficiency'(387/81-00-01):~ Excessive' Wear.-
l of Valve Hinge Prevents Pacific Valve Co. Check Valves From closing Properly.
The licensee informed NRC that the problem was only associated with non-safety related valves and was therefore not reportable (PLA-916 dated August 27,1981). The basis for this conclusion was documented in Bechtei Management Corrective Action Report 1-66, Revision 1 which states that the vendors QC program may eliminate this problem for 'Q' valves. The inspector disagreed with the conclusion that 'Q' valves are not subject to this wear problem. The inspector asked the licensee representatives to do one of the following:
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(1) provide a conclusive analysis of the cause for wear in the non 'Q' valves which were affected and provide the specific vendor QC inspection steps which eliminate this problem for
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safety related valves.
(2) determine the hours of operation before the wear problem is ex-hibited from a review of the data for failed non 'Q' valves, and reinspect all safety related Pacific Check Valves for the wear problem when they have been operated long enough to exhibit the problem.
It was noted that these valves had their discs and hinge pins replaced in response to Bechtel NCR-8302. Operating hours should be counted from the installation date of the new internals. Although the licensee has already agreed to inspect the 'Q' listed valves after fuel load, some inspections may be required before fuel load.
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(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-09): Failure of Disc in Pacific Check Valves.
The licensee determined that the HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust valves should be replaced with lift type check valves in order to dampen the slamming effect. This work was done under Design Change Package DCP 626, Revision 0.
Bechtel NCR 8302 also required replacement of all discs, hinges, nuts and washers made from ASME SA-351, GR.CA-15 material. This work was completed on May 13, 1982 for Unit 1.
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(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/80-00-23): Loose Mounting Screws -
Selector Switch Contact Blocks in J0-5 Panels Furnistrated by COMSIP.
This problem was corrected under Work Authorization WA-U-14142,14295, 21027, 21090, 21103, 21243, 21259, 21395, 21410, and 21427.
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(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-31): Undersized Flanges in Main Steam Relief Valves.
The defective flanges were replaced under Bechtel NCR No.!s 8177 and 8204.
The inspector checked the thickness of 4 of the flanges. All had in excess of the minimum thickness (1.88 inches).
n. ~ (Closed) Construction ' Deficienc_y (387/80-00-16; 388/80-00-16): Rosemont 1151 Pressure Transmitters Have Possibility of Ambiguous Outputs.
This item was the subject of Bulletin 80-16 which is closed out in paragraph 4 of this report, o.
(Closed)' Potential Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-12; 388/81-00-12):
Miscellaneous Steel Received Fron Bloomsburg Metal Co.
The licensee informed the NRC that this item was determined to be not re-portable, (PP&L letter to NRC PLA-1121, dated June 8,1982). The licensee's evaluation of the potential problem and justification for the conclusion
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that there was no safety impact were reviewed and appeared adequate.
Licensee review identified acceptable and unacceptable potential uses of the steels involved, and sampling checks found no instances of unacceptable use.
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(Closed) ' Construction ' Deficiency ~ (387/82-00-02): ' Recirculation Pump
' Support Lugs Failed LPT.
The defective welds were repaired per ASME Section XI as documented in the disposition of Bechtel NCR 8929, General Electric Co. Field Deviation Disposition Request KR1-300, Revision 1.
The work was performed in accordance with Bechtel Procedure FCI-M-220, Revision 0, " Instructions for Section XI Rework / Repair of Unit I Reactor Recirculation Pump A & B Lug Welds."
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(Closed? Construction ~ Deficiency (387/81-00-32, 388/81-00-32): ' Agastat GP
_ype Re',ays Fail to Close When Deenergized.
The suspect. Agastat GP relays were all returned to Amerace Corporation for replacement or repair. This work was completed under PP&L NCR's81-255 and 81-364 and Work Authorization WA-U-21067.
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6.
TMI Items a.
The following NUREG 0737 Three Mile Island Items were reviewed to verify licensee committments:
(1) Item II.B.4 - Mitigation Core Damage Training.
(2) Item II.K.3.2 8 - ADS Accumulator Qualification.
(3) Item II.K.3.30 - G.E. Analysis of Small Break LOCA Procedures.
No unacceptable conditions were noted, b.
The following TMI Items had discrepancies as noted:
(1) Item II.F.2 - Instrumentation For Detection of Inadequate' Core Cooling.
The licensee has incorporated a computer display format using existing instrumentation to facilitate detection of inadequate core cooling as committed. This format completes the items needed prior to issuance of an operating license. The licensee is still discussing with NRC:NRR the incorporation of in-core thermo-couples into the reactor vessel.
This item is presently scheduled for completion by June 1983 in accor-dance with Regulatory Guide 1.97.
(2) Item I.D.1 - Control Room ~ Design Changes.
On June 2 and 10 the disposition of the NRR Human Factors Engineering Branch control room design review was inspected.
Pre-OL items identified by the Human Factor Review Team were either corrected by PP&L, or planned for corrected by issuance date of the Operating License with the following exceptions:
(a) Bailey meters on outer panel OC681 have not been changed to left/
right convention.
(b) Five pushbutton switches with automatic features do not have white lights to indicate the pumps / valves are in automatic, (c) Labeling termed unconventional during the review had not been corrected.
These discrepancies will be further reviewed by the NRC.
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7.
Preoperational Test Program References:
-- SSES Final Safety Analysis Report;
-- Regulatory Guide 1.68, Initial Test Program for Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants; Startup Administrative Manual;
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Startup Technical Manual.
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(a)
Preoperational Test Program Implementation The inspector met with the Integrated Startup Group (ISG) Supervisor and other ISG personnel, and discussed the preoperational test program status testing progress, test witnessing and evaluation cf test results.
Discussions included the changes and resolutions to the revised Cold Functional Test, P100.1 Revision 1, as well as tests remaining to be conducted.
Findings:
As a result of these discussions with the licensee's representatives and review of the referenced documents relative to the preoperational test program, no discrepancies were noted and the inspector had no further questions on these items at this time.
(b)
Test'Results~ Evaluation The following preoperational test procedures were reviewed to ascertain whether unifoim criteria are being applied for evaluating completed pre-operational tests to assure their technical and administrative adequacy:
P58.1 Revision 2, approved March 2, 1982. Test results reviewed
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and evaluated June 4, 1982.
React 7r Protection System.
P79.2D Revision 2, approved March 16, 1982. Test results reviewed
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and evaluated April 22, 1982. PERMS System Off-Gas Treatment Sub-system.
P30.1 Revision 1, approved April 29, 1981. Test results reviewed
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and evaluated June 4, 1982.
Control Structure HV System.
P56.1C Revision 1, approved June 3, 1981. Test results reviewed and
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evaluated June 4, 1982.
P83.1A Revision 2, approved February 23, 1982. Test results reviewed
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and evaluated April 30, 1982. Main Steam Nuclear Steam Supply Shut-off System.
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P83.1B Revision 2, approved July 7, 1981. Test results reviewed
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and evaluated April 30, 1982. Main Steam ADS / Safety Relief System.
P49.1 Revision 2, approved February 18, 1982. Test results reviewed
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and evaluated June 4, 1982. Residual Heat Removal System.
P30.2 Revision 1, approved October 24, 1980 Test results reviewed
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and evaluated June 4, 1982 Control Structure Chilled Water.
P51.1 Revision 2, approved February 2,1982. Test resuits reviewed
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and evaluated April 30, 1982.
Core Spray System.
P70.1 Revision 3, approved March 30, 1982.
Test results reviewed and
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evaluated June 4, 1982. Standby Gas Treatment System.
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P45.2 Revision 2, approved January 29, 1982. Test results reviewed
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and evaluated May 11, 1982. Feed Water Control.
P59.2A Revision 3, approved January 26, 1981. Test results reviewed
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and evaluated May 14, 1982. Local Leakage Rate Testing.
P79.1 Revision 2, approved February 23, 1982. Test results evaluation
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approved May 28, 1982. Area Radiation Monitoring System.
P51.1A Revision 1, approved December 30, 1980. Test results evalua-
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tion approved April 23, 1982.
Core Spray System Pattern Test.
P79.2C Revision 2, approved January 29, 1982. Test results evalua-
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tion approved March 14, 1982.
PERMS System Air Intake Ventilation Exhaust.
P79.2E Revision 1, approved April 2, 1980.
Test results evaluation
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approved May 28, 1982 PERMS System Liquid Radwaste.
P50.1 Revision 2, approved September 30, 1981. Test results evalua-
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tion approved May 28, 1982.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.
P79.2I Revision 0, approved April 26, 1982.
Test results evalua-
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tion approved May 28, 1982. Area Radiation Monitoring - Containment Accident Range.
P83.1C Revision 1, approved September 23, 1980. Test results evalua-
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tion approved April 28, 1982. Main Steam Leakage Control.
P78.4 Revision 2, approved November 6, 1981. Test results evalua-
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tion approved May 13, 1982. Traversing Incore Probe System.
P83.1D Revision 1, approved September 23, 1980. Test results evalua-
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tion approved May 11, 1982. Steam Leak Detection System.
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The inspector reviewed the test results and verification of licensee evaluation of test results by:
Review of test changes;
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Review of test exceptions;
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Review of test deficiencies;
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Review of "As-Run" copy of test procedure;
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Review of QC inspection records; and,
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-- Verifying that the test results have been approved.
Findings:
The following exceptions were noted in the review of these procedures:
Procedure Title Unresolved Exceptions P58.1 R2 RPS 007, 008, 009, 010, 011 P79.2D R2 OGT 001, 002 P30.1 R1 CS HV 001, 004, 005, 010 P56.1C R1 RWM 003 P83.1A R2 MS-NSSSS 001, 004 P83.1B R2 MS-ADS /SR 001, 003, 004 P49.1 R2 RHR 001, 003, 014, 015, 016, 017, 023, 025, 027 t
P30.2 R1 CS-CWS 001,012 P51.1 R2 CSS 005, 006, 007 P70.1 R3 SGTS 001, 002, 003, 004, 005 P45.2 R2 FWC 008, 009 P59.2A R3 LLRT 001 The above listed procedures will be examined on subsequent inspections for resolution of the listed exceptions and approval by the licensee.
Thisisaninspectorfollowupitem.(387/82-17-01)
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8 Preoperational Test Witnessing On June 7 the inspector witnessed portions of Technical Procedure TP2.17 Revision 0, " Remote Shutdown Panels." The testing included operating valves and control switches from both the remote shutdown panel, and the control room. The testing was required to verify proper operation of valves con-trolled by the remote shutdown panel. Two problems were noted during the test.
Reactor core isolation coolent (RCIC) valve HV-1F022 valve shut indication did not function on the remote shutdown panel. This problem was identified to be a bad light socket. A second RCIC valve HV-1F062 also did not indicate in the shut position when control was transferred to the remote shutdown panel. This problem was identified as an open states link in the control circuitry.
No unacceptable items were identified.
Welder Qualification Practices In order for a welder to maintain his qualification to perform certain types of welds, he must periodically demonstrate proficiency by performing that weld process.
If the process is to be performed on a safety related system, the weld will be thoroughly evaluated and the welder is identified in several records of the weld. However, if the weld is on a non-safety system, the inspections and records of the welds are not required. The method of keeping track of welds made by an individual on non-safety systems consists of noting that weld rods were issued for a specific process. Therefore it is possible that a person receives proficiency credit for a weld on a non-safety system even if he does not do the weld. This item is unresolved pending development of licensee procedure to adequately monitor ' proficiency' welds made on non-safety systems. (387/82-17-02)
10.
Emergency Notification ~ System Operability Test On June 4 the inspectors witnessed the initiation of the Emergency Notification System (ENS) from both the Luzerne and Columbia County Civil Defense Emergency Operation Centers. These initiations were performed to verify operability of the ENS system, used to alert people within a ten mile _ radius of the plant, i
The system contains 110 sirens. located throughout the area within~a ten mile radius of the plant. When the system was initiated from Luzerne County six sirens failed to operate, and when initiated from Columbia County eight sirens failed to operate. The licensee is investigating the causes of the siren failures and has committed to taking corrective action to have them fixed.
No unacceptable items were identified.
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11. Meetings a.
NRR Management Site Visit
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On May 10, 1982 the resident inspector participated in a site visit to Susquehanna Steam Electric Station by members of NRC/NRR Management.
Personnel who attended this site visit are designated in detail in Section 1.
b.
Site Distribution Under-Voltage Problem-On May 24 the resident inspectors met with members of the licensee staff, NRC Region 1 personnel, and NRC:NRR personnel to discuss undervoltage problems experienced at the Susquehanna site during preoperational testing.
The licensee committed to furnishing both Region I and NRC:NRR with a report detailing the problem, and the licensee solution. The licensee also stated that additional testing would be performed prior to the Cold Functional Test to fruther analyze whether the licensee solutions were
adequate.
12, Staff Training
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The inspector witnessed Health Physics II Retraining, Respiratory Training, and Escort Training during this inspection period. The instructors used lesson plans, and administered written tests to assure participants had received required knowledge. Personnel receiving respiratory training also were required to perform pulmonary functioning tests, and prove they could get a proper respirator fitup. No unacceptable items were identified.
13, Unresolved Items Unresolved items are mutters about which more information is required in
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order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or Violations. An
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unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Detail 10.
14.
Exit Interviews During the course of this inspection, meetings were held with facility manage-ment to discuss the inspection and findings identified. Those personnel attending these meetings are indicated in Section 1 of this report, i
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