IR 05000387/1980028
| ML17138B831 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1981 |
| From: | Gallo R, Koltay P, Mccabe E, Rhoads G, Walton G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17138B830 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-80-28, NUDOCS 8103060505 | |
| Download: ML17138B831 (22) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR, REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
Report No.
50-387/80-28 Docket No.
50-387 License No.
CPPR-101 Priority Category Licensee:
Penns lvania Power 8 Li ht Com an 2 North Ninth Street Allentown Penn's lvania Facility Name:
Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection At:
Salem Townshi Penns lvania Inspection Conducted:
October 14 - November
1980 e ~.c.Se>.
4.
R.
M. Gal o, envoi Res>dent nspector g C.h ~L G.
G.
Rhoads, Res>dent nspector P. J.'
tay, eactor
. nspector
>I cl ei date
>(4lal date i
d da e Approved by:
G.
A. Malton, Reactor Inspector Ebe C.
McCabe, Chief, Reactor ProspectsSection II, R08NS Branch da e
) lgl+i date
~IS Ins ection on October 14 -November
1980 Re ort no. 50-387/80-28)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine anspectlon by the resident inspectors of:
preoper-atsona test program implementation, comparison of FSAR to as-built plant and preoperational test witnessing.
The inspectors also performed plant tours and reviewed licensee actions on previously identified items.
An allegation concerning weld cracks was also investigated by a region-based inspector.
The inspection involved 118 inspector-hours. during regular-and.-backshift periods..by the NRC'esident inspectors and 10 hoiirs by region-based inspectors.,
No items of non-compliance'..-were Qentified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 1977)
g103060 6
- DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an
.r L. Adams, Plant Supervisor of Operations R.
Byram, Plant Supervisor of Maintenance T. Clymer, Site gAE J.
Edwards, Plant Personnel and Administrative Supervisor E. Figard, Assistant ISG Supervisor E. Gorski, Plant guality Supervisor J,
Graham, Plant Assistant
- J.
Green, Operations guality Assurance Supervisor C. Jaffee, ISG gual.sty Control H. Keiser, Superintendent of Plant P.
Kyner, Resident gAE L. O'eill, Plant Technical Supervisor J.
Rimsky, Plant I8C/Computer 'Supervisor D. Thompson, Assistant Superintendent of Plant R. Mebster, ISG Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed other PPRL employees, as well as employees of Bechtel and of General Electric Company.
2.
Plant Tour The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas in the plant during normal and backshift hours.
During these tours, the following items were evaluated:
Hot Work:
Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures used.
Fire Equipment:
Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment.
Housekeeping:
Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of requi.red cleanliness levels of systems under or following testing.
Equipment Preservation:
Maintenance of special precaution'ary measures for installed equipment, as applicable.
Component Tagging:
Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety, equipment protection and jurisdictio Instrumentation:
Adequate protection for installed instrumentation.
Logs:
Completeness of logs maintained.
Security:
Adequate site construction security.
Cable Installation:
Adequate precautions taken to prevent damage to installed cables.
Communications:
Adequate public address system.
Equipment Maintenance and Controls:
Corrective maintenance is performed in accordance with approved procedures, no unauthorized work activities on systems or equipment, no uncontrolled openings in previously cleaned or flushed systems or components.
No unacceptable items were identified.
3.
Status of Previous Ins ection Items ao (Closed)
Unresolved Item (387/79-41):
Protection of installed mechanical snubbers.
The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions regarding the lack of protection of installed mechanical snubbers from construction activities.
The inspector reviewed the following documentation relative to the above:
Bechtel Nonconformance Report (NCR) No. 4989 closed July 11, 1980.
PAL Deficiency Report (DR) No.
103 closed July 17, 1980.
Bechtel Internal Correspondence:
IOM-213 dated March 19, 1980 CMO-2585 dated April 8, 1980 IOM File 40.d dated April 23, 1980 CMO-2643 dated April 24, 1980 gAL-904 dated May 14, 1980 Corrective actions included reinspection of specific snubbers for damage and routine surveillance of installed items.
On October 30, 1980, the inspector toured Unit 1 containment and observed 54 mechanical snubbers.
All were protected as described in the licensee's internal commitments.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter at this tim b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (387/80-14-03):
Personal work/experience history record of quality supervisor.
The inspector reviewed the guality Supervisor's revised Form AD-00"017-1.
,This Form was revised to agree with the work/experience history record required, by AD"00-051.
The guality Supervisor stated that he
'ad filled out Form AD-00-017-1 without reviewing his military records.
The inspector reviewed the guality Supervisor's DD 214 Form "Report of Separation From Active Duty" and his NAMPERS 601-5 Form "History of Assignments" to verify that the guality Supervisor actually had the military experience claimed.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter at this time.
c.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (387/80-14-04):
Personal work/experience history re'cord did not document basis for certification.
The inspector reviewed the subject inspector's certification form required'y AD-00-051.
The form had been revised to include a
statement that the individual was a high school graduate.
The inspector reviewed a
GED certificate No.
111550 dated February 28, 1979 for the individual.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter at this time.
4.
Prep erational Test Procedure Review Reactor Core Isolation Coolin RCIC S stem (1)
References (a)
Preoperational Test P50.1 Revision 0 Draft copy (b)
FSAR Section 14.2.12.
(c)
FSAR Section 5.4.6 (d)
FSAR Section 7.4 (e)
Regulatory Guide 1.68 Revision
(2)
The inspector reviewed reference (a) and compared it to the requirements of references (b) through (e).
The inspector noted some discrepancies during this review.
(a)
Section 3 of reference (a) does not list as references FSAR secton 7.4, FSAR section 14.2. 12. 1 or Regulatory guide 1.68 Revision 1 although these sections do not contain information applicable to the RCIC syste (b)
FSAR Section.5.4.6.2.1.3 states there are four keylocked valves in the RCIC system.
These keys are not tested for
..proper operation/interlocks during the preoperational test.
I (c)
FSAR Section 5.4.6.2. 1.3 states there exists a fifteen second time delay associated with valve HV 1F045.
This tittle delay is not tested in the preoperational test.
(d)
FSAR Section 5.4.6.2.2.2(4) lists valve operation requirements,
. and states requirements of valves to open/close,. within.certain time constraints, against a full differential pressure condition.
This testing is not performed under the full differential pressure condition in the preoperational test.
(e)
Acceptance criteria 2(24) of reference (a) states that the manual initiate switch must be armed prior to initiation.
FSAR Section 5.4.6.2.4.3(2)
states that the system can be started by manually pushing the RCIC "Hanual Initiate" push button.
It makes no reference to arming 'the switch.
These comments were given to the Plant Assistant on October 17, 1980 for the licensee to evaluate and respond.
The NRC will review the licensee's response during a subsequent inspection (387/80-28-13).
b.
Core S'a CS S stem 1)
References (a)
Preoperational test P51.
1 Revision 0, Draft (b)
FSAR Section 14.2.12.1 (c)
FSAR Section 7.3. 1 (d)
General Electric (GE) Document number 22A3053, Revision 0-Core Spray System Specification (e)
GE Document 22A2271AN Revision 0, Appendix 8, Section GE-12-Low Pressure Core Spray (f)
GE Drawing Number 79lE419MJ sheet 3 Revision 2.
The inspector reviewed references (a) through (f) to ascertain whether the licensee was meeting all FSAR commitments in the preoperational testing of the RCIC system.
During the initial review of references (c) through (f) the inspector noted a discrepancy between documents as to the actual automatic initiation circuitry configuration for the syste C.
Reference (d) paragraph 4.6. 1 states the automatic startup of the core spray system shall be initiated by the nuclear boiler instrumentation system low reactor water level indication of high drywell pressure indication.
Reference (e) paragraphs B12.3.9, and B12.3. 10 discuss testing to demonstrate the ability of the core spray system pump to start, open the injection valve, and deliver rated flow to the reactor.vessel in the required time interval with an automatic initiation signal.
Section B12.3.9 initiates the system with Reactor low water level signal'and B12.3. 10 initiates the system with high drywell pressure.
Reference (f) shows the initiation parameters for automatic start of core spray pumps to be either reactor vessel low level or high drywell pressure.
Reference (c) figure 7.3-9 shows that a confirmatory reactor low pressure signal is needed with the high drywell pressure signal to start the core spray pump.
Section 7.3. 1. la. 1.5.6 Redundancy and diversity states that core spray is initiated by either reactor vessel low level and/or drywell high pressure coincident with a reactor low pressure permissive signal.
On October 22, 1980 the inspector discussed the discrepancy in the initiation circuitry with the Plant Assistant.
The preoperational test cannot be accepted until the discrepancy is cleared.
The NRC will review the preoperational test, and the results of the licensee review of the FSAR.
IFI (387/80-28-01)
.
Primar Containment Instrument GAS (1)
References (a)
Preoperational Test P25. 1 Revision 1, Approved June 13, 1980
'e (b)
FSAR Section 14. 2. 12. 1 (c)
FSAR Section 7.3. l. lb.8.3 (d)
FSAR Section 9.3. 1. 5 (e)
FSAR Section 3.13 (f)
Regulatory guide 1.68 Revision
(g)
Regulatory guide 1.80 Revision
(2)
The inspector reviewed reference (a) and compared it to the requirements of references (b) through (g), noting the following discrepancie (a):
FSAR Section 3. 13 states the primary containment instrument gas system will be tested i.n accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.80 Sections C. 1 through C.6.
Paragraph C.3 of Regulatory guide 1.80 states that, during the preoperational phase testing, the safety and/or relief valves should be verified operational.
This was not written into P 25. l.
(b)
FSAR Section 9.3. 1.5. 1 states that the safety related nitrogen storage system contains adequate gas in storage for, 30 days after a postulated DBA.,This is not tested during the preoperational test.
(c)
These comments were given to the ISC Coordinator on October 10, 1980 for resolution.
The NRC will review resolution of the comments during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(367/81-38-02)
(3)
Section 7.3.7.3(23)
provides a test which demonstrates that Primary Containment Instrument g'as isolation valves HV-12603, SV-12651, and SV-12605 will not receive an isolation signal for automatic closure when control of the valves is transfered to remote shutdown panel 1C-201.
The inspector reviewed FSAR 7.4. 1.4.2. 1, Postulated conditions during the evacuation of the Main Control Room, and noted the following:
(a)
Paragraph c) states that Design Basis accidents, such as LOCA, do not occur when the control room is uninhabitable.
(b)
Paragraph g) states in part that all automatic functions of the ESF systems will continue to operate in their proper manner.
On October 27, 1980, the inspector discussed this situation with the Assistant ISG Supervisor who stated the matter would be reviewed.
The NRC will review the licensee's findings and resolution during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(387/80-28-03)
(4)
FSAR Section 3. 13 'states that loss of air testing will be done in the various systems preoperational tests.
On October 17, 1980 the inspector asked the Operations guality Assurance Supervisor about the verification that all individual valves were being tested in the various systems.
He stated this item would be reviewed.
The NRC will inspect the resolution during a subsequent inspection.
(307/80-28"04)
5.
Prep erational Test Witnessin h
On October 26, 1980, the inspector witnessed a portion of preoperational test P60. 1, Revision 2, Containment Atmosphere Circulation.
The portion of the'est observed was Section 7.3.3 "Drywell Cooling Fans Under LOCA Mode of Operation - Loop A".
The,inspector noted that a guality Control inspector was present to witness this portion of the test.
The inspector noted no deviation from the test procedure, The inspector reviewed the Temporary Modification Log for Startup System 60,.Containment Atmospheric Circulation and found that, of 12 items entered, severa1. had been restored on. October 23,. 1980.
- The responsible, Startup Engineer provided Startup Field Report (SFR)
Numbers identifying these items for ultimate resolution.
The SFR's involved were Nos:
1187, 1230 and 1531.
The inspector noted that Section 7.1 of the test procedure
"Temporary Installations" stated that there were none.
The inspector noted this inconsistency and stated that the validity of the test results would depend. on the final approved changes.
The inspector stated the results of'60.1 should be reviewed with the temporary modifications being con-sidered.
The results of P60. 1 will be reviewed during a future inspection (387/80-28"05).
6.
Control Room Desi'
Review The inspector accompanied the NRR Division of Human Factors Safety, during their onsite review of the Susquehanna Control Room design.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's
"Preliminary Human Factors Engineering Recommendations" dated October 20, 1980.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followu a.
Discussion IE Bulletin and Circulars issued to PAL were reviewed to verify the following:
(1)
bulletins and circulars,received by PAL corporate management were forwarded to appropriate individuals within the organiza-tion, including station management, for information, review and/or corrective actions as required.
(2)
PP8L bulletin responses were submitted to the NRC within the specified time period.
(3)
licensee reviews and evaluations of bulletins and circulars are complete and accurate, as supported by other facility records and by inspector observations of installed plant equipmen (4)
corrective actions specified in licensee bulletin responses or internal circular evaluation memoranda have been completed and/or responsibilities have been assigned for completion.
b.
~Findin n
(1)
The inspector reviewed actions taken by the licensee relative to IE Circular 77-13, "Reactor Safety Signals Negated During Testing".
The inspector reviewed the following references:
PP8L Internal Letter, ER-100450, File 840-4, dated May 4, 1978 PP8l Letter PLI-8498 dated June 3, 1980 The inspector found that the licensee had not fully addressed the following issues:
The circular states that facility procedures should specif-ically identify limitations and restrictions on. surveillance testing activities; No means of i'dentification. of such lkmitatfons. and -r.estri,.ctions was evident.
'
The 'circul'ar states that management controls should be strengthened to assure adherence to administrative proced-ures involving reviews, approvals and communications regarding surveillance testing activities.
No means of identification of such management'ontrols was'vident.
The inspector noted that TMI Task Action Plan Numbers I.C.3 and I.C.6 address shift supervisor responsibilities and procedures for verification of correct performance of operating activities.
Task Action Plan No. I.C.G is expanded upon in a September 5,
1980 letter to Applicants for Operating Licenses.
The inspector stated that this Circular would remain open pending confirmation of licensee actions relative to these issues.
(2)
The inspector reviewed actions taken by the licensee relative to IE Circular 78-13 "Inoperability of Service Mater Pumps."
The inspector reviewed the.following refer-ences:
PLI-3496 dated August 22, 1978 Startup Field Report (SFR)
1550 issued October 16, 1980
Susquehanna Environmental Report Volume 2, Chapter
Draft Environmental Statement NUREG 0564, Section
FSAR Sections 2.4. 11 and 9.2.7 The inspector determined that the ultimate heat sink (the spray pond)
had been constructed to minimize the effects of silt and ice as discussed in FSAR Section 9.2.7.
The inspector determined that a potential problem existed at the river intake due to recent identification of silt deposits.
SFR-1550 documents conditions identified by 'the licensee s underwater inspection.
The SFR has been submitted to Bechtel Engineering for action.
The inspector stated that this circular would remain open pending reply to SFR-1550.
(3)
The inspector reviewed actions taken by 'the licensee relative to'E Bulletin 80-09 "Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies."
The inspector reviewed the following references:
PPLL Letters PLA-464 dated March 28, 1980 PLI-7854 dated April 22, 1980 PLI-8360 dated May 28, 1980 PLA-500 dated July 2, 1980 PLB-11570 dated July 9, 1980 PLI-9363 dated August 21, 1980 PLB-11777 dated August 21, 1980 PLA-521 dated August 25, 1980 Bechtel letter BLP-12860 dated August 5, 1980 Buffalo Forge letters to Bechtel dated July ll, 17, and 22, 1980 Bechtel Material Requisition M-336A, Revision
Bechtel Drawings M-178, V-12-11, and V-21-10 ITT - General Controls letter to NRC dated December 7, 1979 The inspector informed the licensee that additional problems with dampers and Hydramotor Actuators had been reported to the NRC.
The problems identified were the failure of the WH-90 series Hydramotor Actuator to return its associated damper to the failsafe position on loss-of power.
The actuators, when disconnected from the damper, still would not return to the failsafe conditio (4)
8.
Fire The inspector asked the licensee if the Hydramotor Actuators at Susquehanna would be tested to verify that they return to the failsafe condition.
The licensee's Integrated Startup Group representative informed the inspector that a component test procedure would be developed.
This Bulletin remains open pending review of licensee component testing.
Protection a.
Fire Protection Review Team Site Visit The Region I Fire Protection inspector accompanied the NRR fire protection review team on site.
The team evaluated the licensee's separation criteria for redundant safety related systems required for safe shutdown and the associated electrical cabling.
The team identified concerns about inadequate separation between redundant electrical cables in the following fire zones (as defined in the PAL fire protection review report):
1-3A, 1-3B, 1-3C, 1-4A and 1-5A.
The team's evaluation is based on a 20 ft. minimum separation criteria between redundant systems.
The team also identified concerns regarding the separation of redundant station battery banks and the fire resistance rating of, wallboard constructed fire barrier walls.
None of the conerns were resolved during the site visit.
The licensee will evaluate the areas of concern and prepare corrective actions as necessary.
The inspector noted that the identification windows of the main fire annunciator panel, located on control room panel OC650, lack descriptive detail; therefore, control room operators may not be able to readily identify the location of a fire or system trouble.
The licensee indicated that the window description will be revised.
The licensee s
corrective actions regarding'the annunciator panel will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(387/80-28-06)
b.
Halon S stem The inspector noted that FSAR Section 9.5. 1.2.5.
Refers to General Electric Topical Report NEDO-10466 dated February 1972.
The inspector reviewed three revisions of NED0-10466, as delineated below, and found that only revision 2 dated March 1978 addressed GE's commitment to using the Halon 1301 in the Power Generation Control Complex.
The licensee's Fire Protection Engineer confirmed that PP&L had actually committed to Revision 2 of the NEDO document and that the FSAR would be revised to reflect the licensee's commitment.
The FSAR change will be reviewed during a future inspection.
(387/80-28-07)
9.
Containment Pur e and Vent Valve 0 eration
~0e eat ion a.
The inspector reviewed the Susquehanna Plant design procedures relative to the operation of containment valve operation.
By letter dated October 23, 1979, Reactor licensees, NRR documented the NRC's Interim Containment Purging and venting.
and operating purge and vent to.Operating Position on b.
C.
The inspector discussed the interim position with licensee personnel and. reviewed licensee purge and vent valve design and the system operating procedure.
The inspector reviewed appropriate FSAR sections and the system operating procedure to determine if purge and vent valves greater than 3 inch nominal diameter are normally closed.
The inspector reviewed the following:
'SAR Section 6.2. 5 FSAR Table 6.2-12 Operating Procedure - OP-73-001 Revision
The following discrepancy was identified.
FSAR Table 6.2-12 lists containment purge and vent valves as normally closed valves.
OP-73-001 Check off List Op-73-001-018 lists the 24 inch diameter Orywell to standby gas treatment system 'isolation valves gV 15713 and HY 15714}
and the 18 inch diameter suppression pool to standby gas treatment system isolation valves(HY 15703 and KV 15714);as open"valves'.
The inspector discussed valve lineup conventions with licensee representatives,who stated that the standard system at Susquehanna was for the valve check off list to show the shutdown condition of the system and the procedural steps directing when to open or shut valves.
The OP-73-001-018 check off list does not agree with that convention although the steps in Section 3. 1 of the procedure do provide appropriate directions.
The Revisi'on to the OP-73-001-18 check off list will be reviewed during a future inspection.
(387/80-28-08)
The inspector reviewed the systemoperating procedure to determine if purging and venting times were as low as achievable.
One discrepancy was identifie The inspector determined that certain valves could be opened following a 60 minute time delay after an isolation signal.
Certain containment isolation valves and associated
.two inch bypass line valves are provided with this time delay function.
The valves are:
'ontainment Penetration No.
X-26 X-202 Orawings reviewed included:
, HV"15703 HV-15705 Size 24 inch 2 inch 18 inch 2 inch M-157; E-171, Sheets 3, 8,,and 19; E-184, Sheet
Plant Operating Procedures OP-73-001 Revision
The licensee agreed to review the operation of these valves and provide appropriate procedures guidance relative to operation following the 60 minute time delay.
This item will be reviewed during a future inspection.
(387/80-28-09)
d.
The inspector reviewed selected drawings to determine if the aforementioned containment isolation valves isolation signals are inhibited by other signals.
One discrepancy was identified.
Time delay relay 62-15700B2 is listed as "non"g" on Bechtel Drawing E-40, Sheet 5F.
This time delay relay, as shown on drawing E-171, Sheet 8, maintains the closed isolation signal to the valves, identified in paragraph c above, for 60 minutes.
The inspector expressed his concern that the failure of this "non-g" relay could allow premature or inadvertent operation of the containment isolation valves.
The inspector asked the licensee to review the classification of this relay as "non-g".
This item is unresolved pending that review.
(387/80-28-10)
e.
The inspector reviewed selected drawings to determine if the containment purge and vent valves would remain operable during a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
One discrepancy was identified.
The inspector determined that Bechtel purchase order P-31, revision 5, included containment isolation valve functional test requirements and refers to valve operating times as defined on attached valve data, sheets.
The valve data sheets attached to the purchase order did not include valve operating time Vendor valve test records for valve HV-15703 and HV-15713 provide documentation of LOCA condition tests.
The test records provide actual operating times but the acceptance standard is listed as
"same".
The inspector asked the licensee to resolve the discrepancy between the P-31 purchase order and the attached valve data sheets.
The inspector also asked the licensee to explain the meaning of "same" as an acceptance standard on the valve tests records.
This matter is unresolved pending licensee response to these questions.
(387/80-28-11)
10.
Control Rod Drive - Stub Tube Meld Evaluation On October 28, 1980 a region-based inspector and the Resident Inspector witnessed ultrasonic examinations of 3 CRO housing to Stub Tube welds.
The examinations were performed to d'etermine reproducabi.lity and allow
. the.NRC.to directly evaluate the pr'evieusly,.recorded indications.
The indications were of concern because'n 'allegation that these welds
.contained cracks had been. made to the NRC.
,
The examinations were performed by General Electric Company using a USN-2 ultrasonic instrument coupled to a 3/4 inch diameter focused transducer, operating at 2.25 MHz frequency.
The examinations were performed in accordance with the instructions specified in G.
E. procedure 160A8515 Revision 2 using calibration block number 160-78c-0278.
The recordable information was plotted on calibration data sheet numbers PPL-1, PPL-2, PPL-3 and PPL-4.
The previously recorded indication plots were used to compare with the re-inspection plots to determine the validity of the first examination.
The comparison was good on 2 welds.
The third weld, 18-51, gave some different responses, however the general number and amplitude compared favorably.
As viewed on the cathode ray tube, the si'gnals did not appear to be cracks, in that the orientations and lengths did not traverse in a direction in which cracks would occur.
However the data does not completely substantiate that the signals are not cracks.
The licensee and his consultants are presently sectioning test samples which also show ultrasonic signals to determine the nature of the reflector.
The sectioning and evaluation of these will determine the disposition af the production welds.
The stub tube weld issue has been previously identified in a letter from Region I to the licensee dated April 16, 1980 and in Combined Inspection Report 50-387/80-23 and 50-388/80-15.
This item is open pending resolution of weld adequacy (387/80-28-12).
ll.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations-Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 9..d.
and e.
12.
Exit Interviews At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with facility management to discuss inspection scope and finding I J
0