IR 05000387/1980019
| ML17138B618 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1980 |
| From: | Durr J, Mcgaughy R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17138B614 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-80-19, 50-388-80-13, NUDOCS 8012080406 | |
| Download: ML17138B618 (6) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION ANO ENFORCEMENT 50-387/80-19 R
N
. ~30-388 80-13 50-,387
N CPP.R-101
N.~R-l Region I Priority 50-387/B Category 50-388/A Licensee:
Pennsylvania Power and Li ht Com an 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility Name.
Susquehanna Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Berwick, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
urr, July 22-25, 1980 cJ eactor nspector d
e signed date signed Approved by:
.
W. McGaughy, Chief, P ojects Section, RC8ES Branch date signed ate signed Ins ection Summar
Unit No.
Ins ection on July 22-25.
1980 Re ort No. 50-387/80-19)
Areas Ins ecte
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee s corrective action on previous y identified inspection findings, Construction Deficiency Reports, pipe welding and electrical installation.
The inspection involved 16 inspector-hours on-site by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified in three of the areas inspected a~n one item of noncompliance in one area (Defi'ciency - Failure to provide tray softeners fot safety related electrical cables paragraph 2}.
(Unit No.
Ins ection on.Jul 22-25e 1980 Re ort No. 50-388/80-13 Areas Ins ected:,
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee s corrective action on previous y identified inspection findings, Construction Deficiency Reports, pipe welding and electrica1 installation.
The inspection involved 16 inspector-hours on
~
~
~
site by one regional based inspector.
Results:
No items-of noncompliance were identified in the four areas inspected.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77) 801S080
DETAILS Persons Contacted Penns lvania Power and Liaht Com an
- S. L. Denson, Project Construction Manager
- P. R, Kyner, Resident Nuclear guality Assurance Engineer R. J.,Prego, Electrical Project Engineer Electrical NgA
- A. R, Sabol, Manager, Nuclear guality Assurance
- P. J. Zaprazny, Resident Engineer Bechtel Cor oration
- M. A. Drucker, Lead guality Assurance Engineer N.
D. Griffin, Assistant Project Field Engineer C, Headrick, Assistant Project FACE R. Holzman, Valve Engineer
- H, F. Lilligh, Project OAE
- J. T, Minor, Project Field Engineer
- W. Mourer, Project Superintendent Construction
- J. E. O'ullivan, Assistant Project Field Engineer
.D. Roof, Valves Field Assistant
- K. G, Stout, Project Field FACE J,
Waddington, Assistant Lead Engineer Electrical gC NRC
- R. M. Gallo, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those persons present at the exit interview.
Plant Tour (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector toured the Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings, primary con-tainment, and the four emergency diesel generator rooms.
He observed work in progress for any obvious deviations from approved procedures and regulatory requirements.
Unit 1 electrical cable trays were examined for defects in wiring insulation and proper installation.
The following cable trays were observed to have wiring insulation in contact with or in proximity to sharp edges:
~Tra No.
Elevation
- F1PH63 FlK364 E1K115 F1PG31 ElKS14 FlKS10 The major conditions noted 683 670 719 (containment)
670 719 (containment)
719 (containment)
were:
(1)
Cables that dropped from trays over the edges of tray rungs.
(2)
Cables exiting up and over a tray rail or edge.
(3)
Cables formed around 90o 'turns against the sharp edges of tray rungs or bottoms.
The Cable Wiring and Installation Procedure, drawing E-59, Revision 10, paragraph 2. 12, requires that "Tray softeners shall be installed on all sharp edges of cable trays that could cause damage to cable jackets either during pulling or after installation of cables."
The failure to provide tray softener-,protection on the above listed safety related cable trays is an item of noncompliance (387/80-19-01).
Licensee Aetio~ on Previousl Identified Items (Closed)
Unresolved Item (387/80-17-01).'ipe support nut and bolt material.
It was determined by the inspector that the drawing note which specified SA193 gr.
B-7 bolts and SA-194 gr.
2H nuts referred only to the load bolts of the support.
The licensee provided Field Change Notice No, F-664, dated February 19, 1979, which allows the use of A-307 gr.
B clamp bolts.
The inspector interviewed a pipe support field quality control inspector who was awa're of the Field Change notice F-664 and what the appropriate bolting materials are.
He also discussed the assembly of pipe supports with a craftsman and his supervisor in the "combo" shop.
Everyone involved was cognizant of the requirements for pipe support bolting materia,
'icensee Action on Construction'eficienc Re orts (Open) Construction Deficiency Report.-:-'9-"-,.',
>>'-'.".
Staking of Limitorque Valve Operator Stem Nuts.
The inspector reviewed. the Nonconformance Report 3424, dated January 31, 1979, which documents the deficiency and lists the affected valves.'e observed the staking operation on valves B31F032A and B31F032B.
He discussed the staking activities with the respon-sible field engineer and determined that staking is only performed in the presence of a quality control inspector and the field engineer.
A survey of twenty installed Limitorque valves was made to verify the accuracy of the quality control list of affected valves.
All valves identi-fied in the field were found on the list.
Seventeen of the over eight hundred valves affected remain to be staked.
The staking activity cannot be completed at this time.
Some valves are in storage or are still at the vendor's shop.
All valves in Unit No.
1-are completed.
The remaining valves will have quality control "hold tags" affixed to properly identify them for staking.
This item remains open pending tagging of the valves.
Primar Containment Concrete Re airs Unit'
Craftsmen were observed making repairs to the Unit No.
1 primary contain-ment concrete shell.
The containment structural integrity test (SIT)
has been completed on Unit No.
1.
The inspector examined the programmatic controls which assure that concrete repairs to the containment are evaluated to preclude voiding the SIT.
The inspector reviewed the FSAR commitment, paragraph 3.8. 1.7. 1 and Regu-latory Guide 1.18.
These documents prescribe the requirements of the SIT and the need to evaluate repairs.
The licensee presented Field Pro-cedure FP-C-9, Revision 1, Procedure. for Concrete Defect Report and the concrete defect reports generated against Unit No!. 1.
Theee reports were reviewed:
391-W-01A, 01B, and 02.
The Field Procedure, FP-C-9, paragraph 2.3, requires that all major concrete defect reports be forwarded to the project engineer for his information.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matte.
Reactor. Coolant Loo Pi in
- Observation of Weldin 7.
The inspector examined the 20" diameter.,
nuclear class 1, Residual Heat Removal pipe weld joint DCA-208-1-FWS.
He verified the joint fit up, alignment, gas purging, weld record data, and the initial root weld passes were in accordance with selected-requirements of the ASME III
. Code, the Bechtel Ouality Assurance Manual - ASME III, and regulatory
= requirements.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Exit Interview
\\
The inspector met with representatives of the licensee, denoted in paragraph 1, at.the conclusion of the inspection on July 25,. 1980., He discussed the scope and findings of the inspectio I,