IR 05000387/1980024
| ML17138B726 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1980 |
| From: | Gallo R, Mccabe E, Rhoads G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17138B722 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-80-24, NUDOCS 8101150861 | |
| Download: ML17138B726 (27) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I D
k II License No.. CPPR-101 Licensee:
Prior ity er 8 Li ht Com an Category B
2 North inth Street Allentown Penns 1 vania 18101 I
Facility Name:
Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection at:
Salem Township, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:
September 8 - October 10, 1980 a. uA
.
M.
Ga o, Sensor Ress ent nspector oa s, ess en nspec or J5 Z 8o ate signed I b So date signed Approved by:
Q C.8 C'4 e
.
c a e, ie
,
eac or rojectsSection II, R08NS Branch date signed IO I sa/so date signed Ins ection Summar:
...
" Ins ection'on Se tember 8October'0; '1980'(Re ort'No. 50-387 80-24)
'Areas 'Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of: preoperational est review, preoperational test witnessing, preoperational testing quality assurance, fire protection system, surveillance of installed components.and:.bulletin.and cir-cular followup;
~
The inspectors also performed plant tours and reviewed licensee actions-on previously identified items.
The inspection involved 146 inspector-hours during both regular, backshift, and weekend periods by the NRC resident in-spectors.
Results:
Of the six areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified.
~pe sc>eocy - Failure of the Test Review Board to follow procedures)
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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Persons Contacted DETAILS'enns lvania'Power'and Li ht'Com an 2.
L. Adams, Plant Supervisor of Operations R. Byram, Plant Supervisor. of Maintenance H. Keiser, Superintendent of Plant E. Garison, Simulator Supervisor T. Clymer, Site gAE T. Dalpiaz, Startup and Test Group Supervisor D. Dunn, Resident Engineer J.
Edwards, Plant Personnel and Administrative Supervisor R. Featenby, Assistant Project Director E. Figard, Assistant ISG Supervisor M. Fulkerson, Startup and Test Field Engineer E. Gorski, Plant guality Supervisor J.
Graham, Plant Assistant J.
Green, Operations guality Assurance Supervisor P. Kyner, Resident gAE G. Lazarowitz, Resident Engineer W. Lowthert, Plant Training Supervisor K. Mertes, Startup and Test Field Engineer L. O'eill, Plant Technical Supervisor J. Rimsky, Plant ISC/Computer.Supervisor D. Thompson, Assistant Superintendent of Plant R. Webster; ISG Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed other PPSL employees, as well as employees af Bechtel, and General Electric Company.
Licensee Action on Previousl
'Identified Items (Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (387/80-20-01).
Standby Liquid Control Sys-tem (SLCS) Preoperational Test.
During a review of the SLCS preoperational test P53.1, Revision 1, the inspector noted some discrepancies between the test and the FSAR and Regulatory Guide commitments.
These discrepancies were ex-plained to the General Electric STO Lead Engineer who had the comments incor-porated into Revision 2 of the test procedure.
The inspector has reviewed the approved Revision 2 of P53. 1.
All comments made by the inspector have been properly incorporated into the test.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matte.
Plant Tour The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas in the plant during normal and backshift hours.
During these tours, the following items were evaluated:
Hot Work: Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures used.
Fire Equ'ipment: Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment.
Housekeeping:
Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanliness levels of systems under or following testing.
Equipment Preservation:
Maintenance of special precautionary measures for installed equipment, as applicable.
Component Tagging:
Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety, equipment protections and jurisdiction.
Instrumentation:
Adequate protection for installed instrumentation.
Logs:
Completeness of'ogs maintained.
Security:
Adequate site construction security.
Cable Installation:
Adequate precautions taken to prevent damage to in-stalled cables.
Communications:
Adequate public address system.
Equipment Maintenance and Controls: Corrective maintenance is performed in accordance with approved procedures, no unauthorized work activities on systems of equipment, no uncontrolled openings in previously cleaned or flushed systems or components.
No unacceptable items were identified.
4.
Prep erational Test Procedure Review a.
Reactor Manual"Control System (RMCS)
(1) Refe'rences
(a)
Preoperational Test P56.1A Revision 1 approved September 5,
1980 (b)
FSAR Section 14.2.12.1 (c)
FSAR Section 7.1.2a.1.6 (d)
FSAR Section 7.7.1.2 (e)
Regulatory Guide 1.68 Revision
,(2) The inspector reviewed reference (a) to verify the procedure assured that the RMCS was designed to meet the requirements of references (b)
through (d) and address all items identified in reference (e).
The inspector noted the Section 7.3. 10. 1(6) listed three light emitting diodes (LEDs) which were supposed to energize within certain time con-straints.
The time constraints were given in thousands of a second.
A note under this section states that it is not necessary to verify the times shown down to the provision given.
The inspector questioned what the acceptable provision should be for timing the LEDs.
This comment was referred to the ISG Coordinator on October 7, 1980.
The resolution will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(387/80-24-01)
b..
Containment Atmosphere Ci,rculation S stem (1) References (a)
Preoperational Test P60. 1, Revision 1 approved July 31, 1980 (b)
FSAR Section 14.2.12.1 (c)
FSAR Section 9.4.5 (d)
FSAR Section 3.13.1 (e)
Regulatory Guide 1.68 Revision
(f)
Regulatory Guide 1.7 Revision
(2)
The inspector reviewed reference (a)
and compared it to the require-ments of references (b) through (f).
The inspector noted discrepancies between the FSAR and the preoperational test commitments as listed be'-
low:
, (a)
FSAR Table 9.4-9 note (b) states that all coolers will auto-matically stop during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal.
This feature was not to be tested during the preoperational test.
(b)
FSAR Section 9.4.5.2 states each fan is capable of 8000 cubic feet per minute (cfm).
This flow rate is not measured during the pre-operational test.
The following discrepancy was noted during review of step-by-step pro-cedure.
The circulation fans automatic start on high temperature fea-ture was tested by heating the temperature elements with a hot air gun.
During this verification a check was not performed as to what the temp-erature setpoint was when the fans started or stopped.
This list of comments was given to the ISG Coordinator on October 7, 1980 for resolution.
The comments were returned with the following statements:
(a)
A TCN will be added to procedure to test the LOCA signal automatic stop feature of the cooling fans.
(b)
A TCN to the procedure will be added to verify that the flow rate is in excess of 8000 cfm following the final flow balancing.
(c)
The temperature elements used to activate the circulation fans are scoped into another system.
A TCN will be issued to verify setpoints of these temperature elements when that system is turned over.
These items will be reviewed for completeness in a subsequent NRC in-spection.
(387/80-24-02)
(3)
The inspector reviewed FSAR 3.13.1 which commits to requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.7 Revision 1.
Regulatory Guide 1.7 Revision 1, Part C, Paragraph 3, states in part that the combustion gas control systems and the provisions for mixing should meet the design, quality assurance, redundancy, energy source, and instrumentation requirements for an engineered safety feature.
FSAR Section 6.2.5.2 states that the post-LOCA mixing of the drywell atmosphere is accomplished by the safety related portion of the containment ventilation system.
FSAR Section
9.4.5.5 describing the instrumentation requirements of the contain-ment ventilation system states in part that the fan starter switch cir-cuit for the safety related coolers are safety related.
All other con-trols and instrumentation including alarms are not safety related.
This appears to be in conflict with the Regulatory Guide requirements.
This item will remain unresolved pending further review by the NRC.
(387/80-24-03)
(4) The inspector reviewed FSAR Section 9.4.5.2.
This section states that all impellers are subjected to a 125/ overspeed test.
The inspector reviewed a certification of NDT testing from Joy Manufacturing Company dated March 15, 1977; order number 25-13-73-1 which stated the im-pellers were tested at 125% and that the records of these tests were on file at the Joy Manufacturing Company office in New Philadelphia, Ohio.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
c.
Main Steam-Nuclear Steam Supply Shutdown System (NSSSS)
(.1) References (a)
Preoperational Test P83. 1A Revision 1 approved September 6,
1980 (b)
FSAR Section 14.2.12.1 (c)
FSAR Section 6.2.4.1 (d)
FSAR Section 8.1.6.1 (e)
FSAR Section 5.4 (f)
FSAR Section 1.2.
(g)
Regulatory Guide 1.68 Revision
(2) The inspector reviewed reference (a) to verify that the preopera-tional test procedure addressed all requirements established in references (b) through (g).
The following discrepancies were noted:
(a)
FSAR Section 5.4.4.2 states that the air cylinder is capable of opening the Main Steam Isolvation Valve (MSIV) with a maximum differential pressure of twenty pounds across the poppet.
This is not tested during the preoperational tes (b)
The preoperational test does not include an operability check from the control room of opening/closing the MSIVs with the Re-mote Shutdown panel transfer switch in the emergency position.
These comments were given to the ISG Coordinator on October 7, 1980.
The resolution of these comments will be reviewed in a subsequent NRC inspection.
(387/80-24-04)
d.
Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)
(.1) References (a)
Preoperational Test P49. 1 Revision 0 - Draft (b)
FSAR Section 14.2.12.1 (c)
FSAR Section 5.4.6.1.1 (d)
FSAR Section 5.4.7 (e)
FSAR Section 6.3.2.2.4 (f)
FSAR Section 7.3.1. 1A.1.6 (g)
Regulatory Guide 1.68 Revision
(2) The inspector reviewed reference (a) to ascertain whether design and operational commitments made in references (b) through (f) were ade-quately tested.
The inspector also compared reference (g criteria with the preoperational test to assure these commitments were incor-porated into the test.
The inspector noted that the procedure did not test all FSAR design limits as listed below:
I (a)
Test did not test relief valve capacities/setpoints as described in FSAR Section 5.4.7.
(b)
Test did not include spray nozzle bench testing as described in FSAR Section 6.2.2.2.
(c)
Test did not include interlock testing of containment cooling isolation valves as described in FSAR Section 7.3. 1. lc. 1. (d)
Test does not verify process modes C1 and C2 listed on FSAR Figure 5.4-141.
(e)
Test does not show that RHR valve operable from the remote shutdown panel cannot be operated from the remote shutdown with the control transfer switches in the normal position on panel IC201.
(f)
FSAR Figure 7.3-10 Sheet 1 provides a block diagram of the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) initiation train.
According to this figure a low reactor pressure signal is needed in combination with a high dry well pressure to give a LPCI initiation.
This signal is not tested in Test Pro-cedure Section 7.3.4 while testing LPCI initiation logic.
These comments were given to the Plant Assistant on October 3,
1980.
The resolution to these comments will be reviewed by an NRC inspector during a subsequent inspection.
(387/80-24-05).
e.
Fire Protection Water System (1) References (a)
Preoperational Test P13.1 Revision 1 approved August 22, 1980 (b)
FSAR Section 14.2.12.1 (c)
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code 20, Chapter
(2) The inspector reviewed reference (a) to assure that the requirements of references (b) and (c) were incorporated into the procedure.
The inspector noted that certain acceptance criteria established in reference (c)
had not been incorporated into the preoperational test.
The missing testing included:
(a)
Ten manual and ten automatic starts of the fire pump (b)
One hour operational test of each pump motor (c)
Performance of a field acceptance test and comparison of results to manufacturer's pump characteristic curv (d)
Verification of electric motors rating by comparison of name plate data to operational data for full load amperage, running, voltage and amperage.
The inspector gave his comments to the Integrated Startup Group Co-ordinator on September 26, 1980, for resolution:
Resolution of these comments will be reviewed in subsequent NRC inspection.
(387/80-24-06).
On October 6, 1980, the inspector reviewed written comments, dated July 16, 1980, regarding Preoperational Test P13.1, submitted by the PPKL Fire Protection Engineer.
The inspector noted the many of the comments made by the Fire Protection Engineer were similar to comments made by the NRC inspector.
On October 7, 1980, the inspector asked the PP&L Plant Assistant why the Fire Protection Engineer's comments were not resolved prior to the test'eing approved.
The Plant Assistant stated the TRB had thought all. comments had been resolved prior to the TRB recommending the procedure be approved by the Superintendent of Plant.
The inspector reviewed Administrative Procedure AD-00-002 Revision 0 which states in part, that the ISG Test Direc-tor will resolve the comments and/or indicate a lack of resolu-tion on the review form and forward a copy to each TRB member.
The TRB Chairman shall then schedule a meeting of the TRB to review the comments/resolutions and resolve any open items.
On October 7, 1980, a guality Assurance Action Request (gAAR No.
SO-80-1)
was initiated asking for a resolution of why P13. 1 Re-vision 1 was approved without incorporating comments made by the Fire Protection Engineer, and requesting action be taken to pre-vent recurrence.
The inspector told the Plant Superintendent on October 10, 1980, that AD-00-002 Revision 0 had apparently not be followed in resolving the comments made by the PPSL Fire Protection Engineer, and that this was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
(387/80-24-07)
5.
Preo erational Test klitnessin a.
VDC System Preoperational Test P75. 1, Revision 1, approved August 22,
The inspector observed the running of Section 7.3.4, Battery 1D-670 Division 1 - Service Test on September 30, 1980.
The inspector ob-"
served that the test was being run in accordance with the preoperational test, that adequate personnel were present to perform the test, and that a guality Control Inspector was present to verify the test was being performed properly.
The inspector observed Electrical Maintenance Personnel taking specific gravities, temperatures, and individual cell voltages of the 1D-670 battery during the service test.
No unaccept-able conditions were identified.
r b.
Reactor Vessel Internals Vibration Test The inspectors observed selected segments of the reactor vessel internals vibration test conducted in accordance with Technical Procedure 2.16.
The inspectors observed the following:
single pump operation; dual pump opera-tion;: jet pump indication; loop flow indication; recirculation pump con-troller operation.
On September 15, 1980, during the initial stages of the vibration test flow indication for jet pump no.
10 was lost and recircula-tion loop B flow indication was noted to be about 205 below loop A.
In addition, an unexplained noise was noted near the loop B Recirculation Pump Suction Valve.
As a result of these indications the vibration test was postponed until a determination of the cause of these events could be determined.
As a result of subsequent reactor vessel internals inspection it was found that a shroud ledge temporary access cover and its attachment devices dislodged and was drawn into the loop B recirculation pump suction piping.
In addition during removal of the reactor vessel head it was found that several head "0" ring retainer clips had been displaced and resulted in indentations on both the reactor vessel head and reactor vessel flange sealing surfaces.
The inspector asked the licensee to review these occurrences and any necessary repairs for reportability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The licensee acknowledged this request and stated that a review was in pro-gress.
Documentation reviewed by the inspector relative to this occurence included:
PPSL. Nonconformance Reports80-251, 252, 260, 261, and 263 General Electric letters EAG-3095 dated October 2, 1980 and EAG-3090 dated September 29, 1980 Bechtel Letter N-1-1953 dated September 25, 1980 Bechtel Nonconformance Report 6531 G.E.
I8SE Letter 80-78638 dated September 26, 1980 Supplier Deviation. Disposition Request No.
The licensee's disposition of the discrepancies identified regarding potential damage to the reactor vessel will be reviewed by the NRC during a subsequent inspection.
(387/80-24-08)
c.
Reactor Vessel and Associated Piping Hydrostatic Test The inspector observed selected segments of the reactor vessel hydrostatic test conducted in accordance with'Bechtel Field Construction Instruction M-169.
The inspector observed reactor vessel head installation including stud tensioning; vessel level, pressure and temperature monitoring during stud tensioning and vessel fill;vessel temperature recording during pres-suration; hydrostatic test pump installation; containment tours during intermediate and final inspections at various pressure plateaus; attainment of 1610 psig for 10 minutes as read on the official test gauge.
Additional inspection activities of the hydrostatic test by the NRC are documented in Inspection Report 387/80-26.
The inspector considered the above evolutions in reference to 10 CFR 60, Appendix B and licensee comnitments in the PSAR, Appendix D.
No unaccept-able conditions were identified.
6.
Preo erational Testin
- ualit Assurance
'a ~
During a previous inspection, the inspector identified an unresolved item (387/80-20-04)
regarding TRB -review of alarm testing.
The inspector con-ducted further review of this matter relative to guality Control inspection
.
of this area.
The inspector determined that there was no routine guality Control inspection of alarm testing activities but, that there were guality Assurance activities which would verify on an audit basis that records were available documenting the completion of alarm testing.
The inspector de-termined that Integrated Startup Group component checkout procedures ad-dressing initial instrument calibration (AD6.5) and initial electrical testing (AD6.13) did not include any guality Control inspection activity.
The inspector was informed that these activities were not routinely inspected by guality Control.
PPSL guality Assurance Procedure, SP-13, Revision I, states that inspections of preoperational testing activities are to be accomplished by inspections, reviews of documents and procedures and moni-toring.
However, the procedure does not delineate which activities are to be inspected.
The inspector stated the component checkout activities should be included in the guality Control inspection program.
The licensee committed to inspection of these activities.
The inspection of component checkout activities by site guality Control is considered unresolved pending licensee implementation of an inspection program.
(387/80-24-09)
b.
The inspector determined that work being done by Bechtel Nonconformance Report No.
6452 was being accomplished without a Startup Work Authorization (SWA).
The inspector was informed that Startup Administrative Procedure AD-6.4 Revision 6 no longer required an SWA for work that does not effect system operation or safety.
The work in question required regrouting of the RCIC pum'p'aseplate.,
'-'.
The inspector expressed a concern that without an SWA there appeared to be no programmatic notification of Bechtel guality Control that Bechtel work was being accomplished on a safety-related system that was turned over to PPSL.
The inspector also expressed a concern that without an SWA there would be no routine notification to the PPEL Shift Supervisor who is re-sponsible for-isolating and safety tagging equipment to be worked on.
The licensee's gA representative stated that gA had not accepted AD6.4, Revision 6, and that the procedure was to be changed to require an SWA for all Bechtel work on safety-;related components.
The revision to AD6.4 is considered unresolved pending NRC review.
(387/80-24-10)
7.
Fire Protection The inspector examined the control room, the lower relay room and the lower cable spreading room relative to fire protection equipment installation.
The inspector examined fire alarm installations, extinguishing equipment actuating.
controls and operability of fire fighting equipment.
The in'spector also reviewed the results of fire inspections performed by the Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool.
References for this inspection included:
FSAR Section 9.5.1 Regulatory Guide 1.120 Susquehanna Fire Protection Review Report dated January 18,. 1978 Appendix A to the Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 "Guidelines For Fire Protection For Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976" Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool, MAERP, Inspection Reports of October 4, 1979 and June 16-17, 1980 Bechtel Drawings M-122 and M-178 PPSL Letters PLI-6809 dated January 17, 1980; PLI-7598 dated March 31, 1980; and PLB-11113 dated April 9, 1980
The inspector identified the following discrepancies:
No drawing was identified which shows the connecting piping between the C02 system as shown on drawing M-122 Sheet 4 and the CO> operated fire dampers.
FSAR Section 9.5. 1.2.6 discusses the installation of C02 opera-ted fire dampers.
The inspector was informed that PPSL letter 'to Bechtel, PLB-11113, had been written to direct Bechtel to review the design and installation of the COq system.
The response to PLB-11113 will be reviewed during a future inspection.
(387/80-24-11)
The inspector observed that the C02 system manual spurt actuating push-buttons were not presently installed in the control room as discussed in FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.6.
The inspector was informed that actuating push-buttons would be installed in the control room.
Prior to the completion of this inspection, the inspector observed that installation work for control room pushbuttons had commenced.
The inspector had no further
'questions on this matter at this time.
FSAR Section 9.5. 1.2.8 states that control room panel pC-65) contains
"five!'ump start'witches and annunciators to alarm "five" pumps.
The licensee reviewed this sentence and informed the inspector that there were two fire pumps that could be started from panel gC-659 and that the FSAR should read "fire" pump start switches and annunciators to alarm "fire" pumps.
The inspector asked the licensee to correct the FSAR.
The revision to FSAR Section 9.5. 1.2.8 will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(387/80-24-12)
FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.5, regarding the Halon System used in the Power Generation Control Complex, references a General Electric Topical Re-port',
The inspector asked if the licensee had as-built drawings to show the Susquehanna Halon System.
The inspector determined that certain General Electric drawings were available onsite.
However, one GE drawing, No. 865E241, was not readily traceable to a Bechtel
'rawing number.
In addition the inspector was informed that there was a installation, operation and maintenance manual (IOM) issued by the vendor, Fenwall, but that a Bechtel drawing number for that manual was
.
not readily available.
This matter is considered unresolved pending
'icensee review of the Halon System drawings.
(387/80-24-13)
The inspector noted that the manual spurt C02 system was isolated at the CO storage tank and at a valve station in the turbine building, near tIe control room.
Temporary operating instructions for actuating the C02 system had been provided by the ISG Startup Engineer to control room personnel.
However, it was observed that the system solenoid valves, normally protected by glass, were covered with an unlabeled piece of masonite.
The temporary instructions did not address removal of the masonite cover,- which would require a screwdriver.
The Plant Staff Safety Engineer issued a memorandum, dated October 7, 1980, to control room personnel identifying the requirement to remove the mason-ite cover.
The Safety Engineer requested the Startup Engineer to re-place the masonite; however, as of October 10, 1980, the masonite had not been replaced.
The operability of the C02 system will be reviewed during a future inspection.
(387/80-24-14)
b.
On September 22, 1980, a water leak occurred in a fire protection system in the lower cable spreading room.
Water spilled through spreading room floor openings into the lower relay room.
Water damage was noted in the lower relay room.
Several relay room cabinets, including termination cab-inets ITC 621, 622, 623, were affected by the water.
Bechtel Nonconformance Report No.
6509 and PPSL Nonconformance Report No.80-271 document conditions noted due to the water leak.
The disposition of the aforementioned Non-conformance Reports will be reviewed by the NRC during a subsequent inspec-tion.
(387/80-24-15)
8.
Surveillance of Installed Com onents The inspector stated that recent concerns by Region I inspectors regarding dis-crepancies in surveillance of installed components were based on anticipated housekeeping improvements during the preoperational testing phase.
IE Inspec-tion Reports 387/80-01, Paragraph 12; 387/80-06, Paragraph 5; 387/80-13, Para-graph 2 and 387/80-25 discuss various aspects of surveillance of installed com-ponents.
The inspector reviewed FSAR Section 17.2, Table 17.2-1 and determined that PPSL had committed to Regulatory Guide 1.39, Revision 2 which endorses ANSI Standard N45.2.3-1973
"Housekeeping During The Construction Phase of Nu-clear Power Plants."
ANSI N45.2.3, Section 3.5(4) states that surveillance over installed items should ensure maintenance of protection, preservation of precautionary signs, preservation of item identity, and protection from fire, weather, movement of materials or equipment and other factors which may result in damage to installed items.
Regulatory Guide 1.39, Revision 2, Regulatory Position C.3 states that the requirements of the ANSI standard are considered to be applicable for housekeeping activities occurring during the operations phases that are comparable to those occurring during the construction phas The inspector stated that Plant Administrative Procedure AD-00-048, Revision 0, Housekeeping/Cleanliness Control, Section 3.0 references Regulatory Guide 1.39 and ANSI N45;2.3.
AD-00-048, Section 7.5 "Inspections and Examinations" addresses surveillance over installed items, but does not specify who does the inspections, what frequency inspections are done nor does it specify or reference what installed items are.to be inspected.
The inspector acknowledged that FSAR gA Program commitments were not yet.implemented.
but stated that the standard industry practices found in ANSI N45.2.3 were necessary during the preoperational testing phase.
The implementation of a surveillance program for installed items is considered unresolved p'ending review by the licensee.
(387/80-24-16)
9.
IE Circular Followu a.
Discussion IE Circulars issued to PP8L were reviewed to verify the following:
(1) Circulars received by PPSL corporate management were forwarded to appropriate individuals within the organization, including station management, for information, review and/or corrective actions as required.
(2) Licensee reviews and evaluations of circulars are complete and accu-rate, as. supported by other facility records and by inspector obser-vations of installed plant equipment.
(3) Corrective actions specified in internal circular evaluation memoranda have been completed and/or responsibilities have been assigned to specific individuals for completion.,
b..
~Findin s
The circular listed below, along with applicable references, have been satisfactorily dispositioned by the licensee and the inspector had no further comments on them.
IEC 79-12 - Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem (1) PLI-5433 dated July 6, 1979 (2) PLI-6578 dated December 11, 1979 This circular describes a potential failure mode of turbochargers used on Electro-Motive Division (EMD) diesels.
The Susquehanna emergency diesels were manufactured by Cooper-Bessemer.
PPSL reviewed this circular and be-lieve the problem is of no concern to Susquehanna.
This circular is close.
Townshi Emer enc Plannin Meetin
~
~
On October 9, 1980, the inspector attended an Emergency Planning Indoctrination Meeting held by PPSL for the local township officials.
The meeting was to in-form the township officials of requirements for emergency plans required by various government agencies, and a brief synopsis of PPSL's emergency plan and organization.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
ll.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to as-certain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or devia-tion.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in para-graphs 6.a, 6.b, 7.a and 8.
12.
Exit Interviews At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with facility management to discuss inspection and findings.