IR 05000361/1980017
| ML19351E456 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1980 |
| From: | Chaffee A, Faulkenberry B, Andrea Johnson, Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351E452 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-80-17, NUDOCS 8012100147 | |
| Download: ML19351E456 (6) | |
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U. S. !:UCLEAR FIGUIATORY COMMISSIO!!
OcFICE OF I!:SPECTIO!! A!!D ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No.
50-361/80-17 Docket No.
50-361 License No.
CPPR-97 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 racility Name:
San Onofre Unit 2 Inspection at:
San Diego County, California Inspection zonducted:
, September 19 to October 16, 1980
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Inspectors:
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A. D. Johnson,f eactor Inspector Date Signed R
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R. J. Pat [e ior. Resident Inspector
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//fbj $b A. E. Chaffe'e, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved Ey:
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B. H. 7aulkenberry, Chief, R'sactor Projects Section 2, Date Signed Reactor Operations a%Iuclear Support Branch S u=na ry :
Inspection on September 19 to October 16,1980 (Report flo. 50-361/80-17)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee's preoperational test program and procedures and independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 145 inspector-hours onsite by three flRC inspectors.
Results: flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
RV Form 219 (2)
341g100 W 7
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
- H. B. Ray, Project Manager
- =K. A. Slagel, Startup Supervisor
- J. C. Wait, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer
+*H. E. Morgan, Unit 2 Station Superintendent
- +*=P. R. Belhumeur, Startup Quality Supervisor
+*G. A. Chaves, Project Startup Supervisor
- +*=P. A. Croy, Site Projects Quality Assurance Supervisor
- =D. E. Nunn, Quality Assurance Manager
- R. M. Rosenblum, Startup Engineering Supervisor
- +P. R. King, Operet4.'s Lead Quality Assurance Engineer
C. R. Horton, Stirtup Quality Assurance Engineer
+K. E. Mosley, Ptoject Fire Marshall b.
Bechtel Corporation
=L. W. Hurst, Project Field, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- +*=D. W. Strolman, Startup Quality Assurance Supervisor
- +=J. E. Geiger, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
W. E. French, Project Startup Quality Assurance Engineer In addition, construction and maintenance craftsmen, engineers and foremen were contacted during the inspection.
=Denoter attendees at Management meeting on September 26, 1980.
- Denotts attendees at Management meeting on October 2,1980.
+ Denotes attendees at Management meeting on October 9,1980.
- Dcnotes attendees at Management meeting on October 16, 1980.
2.
Plant Status This licensee reported the Unit 2 construction to be 95 percent complete as or October 5, 1980.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspectors examined actions taken by the licensee on previous inspector identified concerns as follows:
a.
(Closed)
Follow-up Item (50-361/80-16-06): The inspector was concerned with the apparent uncontrolled use of extention levers on control and isolation valves.
In response to this concern, a station order (S023-0-15) was issued pro-hibiting uncontrolled use of extention levers on valve operators.
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(Closed) Follow-up Item (50-361/80-11-03):
The proper interpretation of the Jegulatory Guide 1.68 as it applies to the testing of electrical circu; breakers was questioned by the bspector.
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I The NRC position requires that suffiddd aerlap between tests be maintained to assure the overall system is tested. The inspector deter-mined that sufficient overlap between tests did exist for startup proce-dures 2PE-430-01 and 2AC-406-01.
c.
(Closed) Follow-up Item (50-361/80-12-01):
Changes to the FSAR that
were included in design change packages (DCP) were not being implemented in a timely manner.
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The inspector reviewed this item with the licensee and determined that all newly committed changes to the FSAR are being implemented into design documents.
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..losed) Enforcement Item (50-361/80-12-03): The turnover package for the Safety Injection System apparently was not reviewed by the Startup QA organization as required by procedure WPP/QCI-800, Rev. 2, and subse-quently, several errors were found in the package which required correction.
Startup QA personnel reviewed all the completed startup turnover packages that had been submitted to the records storage center. All packages found without the Startup QA signature were reviewed and corrected as required.
The Procedure WPP/QCI-800 was revised to assure all startup turnover packages were reviewed by Startup QA prior to submittal to the records center.
The inspector had no additional questions.
4.
Preoperational Test Program Implementation The inspector exarained implementation of selected portions of the preopera-tional program to determine the effectiveness of the established administrative ccntrols.
The test program supervisor explained the program and responsibil-ities assigned to startup personnel.
Records pertaining to test scheduling; qualifications of test personnel; construction turnovar document packages to startup for reector regulations, component cooling,fater, and containment spray to verify jurisdictional control, were examined.
In addition, component tagging of the containment spray system was observed.
The inspector also held discussions with celected personnel relating to the established method
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for:
(a) ensuring test procedures are current prior to use, (b) changing test procedures, (c) identifying and correcting problems, and (d) coordina-tion between the different groups during conduct of tests.
The inspector observed and informed the licensee that the yellow and green tags used to denote whether Bechtel startup of SCE startup has jurisdictional control of items was not being strictly followed. The licensee representa-tives explained that since the Bechtel and licensee startup groups are func-tioning as a single group, the need for and use of different colored tags
will be re-evaluated.
This area will be reviewed in a future inspection.
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(50-361/80-17-01)
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-3-No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review The inspectors examined test procedures 2AC-211-03, Rev. O, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control, 2PE-448-01, Rev. 8,125 Volt, d.c., Batteries, Chargers and Distribution Buses (Class IE) and 2PE-101-01, Rev. O, Primary Reactor Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (PRCILRT).
The inspector determined the need for the licensee to make several changes to 2PE-101-01 (PRCILRT) to reflect currently acceptable methods. The licensee committed to make the changes and provide the revised procedure for later review by the inspector prior to the actual test.
This area will be reviewed in a future inspection.
(50-361/80-17-02)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Preoperational Test Results The inspector examined the records of the Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Test.
The inspector observed that one of the test exception reports identified two items for evaluation and action. Although the exception report had not been closed, the inspectors expressed the opinion that one of the items appeared to have been overlooked because of the attention given the other item. The licensee assured th: inspectors that this was not the case and that both items required resolutio i prior to clor.ing the test exception report (TER). The licensee representative, howeve,, stated that the same TER was the subject of a recent instruction issued on September 25, 1980. The instruction required that only one item be the subject of a TER to avoid oversight as postulated by the inspectors.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Observation of Preoperational Test The following tests were observed by the inspectors:
PE-250-02, Secondary Cold Hydro PE-101-02, Local Containment Leak Rate Test (Penetrations 9 and 77 only)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Valves The four isolation valves for the LPSI system were disassembled for inspection when one of the valves was found to travel three turns past the lower stop.
Three of the four valves had damage which included broken or cracked seats,
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-4-broken valve stem and broken weld on back seat.
One of these valves also had the operator fail during the reactor coolant system hydrostatic test.
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See Report No. 50-361/80-16.
The cause of the damage is not known.
Based on preliminary results, the licensee advised that the damage to the valve stem and seats may be due to vibration induced fatigue.
The licensee management stated that the analysis results will be made available to the resident inspector.
9.
Fire Protection
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The administratite controls for fire protection were reviewed.
The fire brigade is manned by Bechtel Construction personnel.
There is onsite fire fighting capability with arrangements for backup by the local fire department.
The reports of the fire '. durance inspector for 1979 and 1980 were reviewed.
There was a list of recommendations that SCE could take to improve their insurability.
Several items on this list had been recommended in 1979 and no action had been taken. Failure by SCE to follow the insurance inspector's recommendations did not result in any significant safety hazard.
There are not applicable NRC regulations in tnis area.
The NRC fire prevention regula-tions become applicable with the arrival of nuclear fuel onsite.
A tour was made of the Unit 2 containment, penetration building, control room, and cable spreading room. Numbers,-types and condition of the fire extinguish-ing equipment appeared to be adequate. The hose fittings were compatible with the local fire department equipment.
The housekeeping in all the areas was adequate except in the west end of the 64-foot elevation in the penetration building.
A wood scaffold constructed about 20 feet above the floor was found co;ered with trash, i.e. old magazines, cigarette butts.
The area appeared to have been used as a construction worker hide-a-way.
Due to the abundance of wood and paper, the inspector identified the area as a fire hazard that required corrective action.
The licensee management personnel committed to take appropriate corrective action.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
10.
Plant Tour
The inspector toured Unit 2 several times during the report period. Particular attention was directed to observing welding and burning activities, house-keeping, equipment preservation, maintenance activities and work on completed systems.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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11.
Management Interview On September 26, October 2, 9 and 16, 1980, the inspectors met with the l
licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1 to discuss the scope and
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findings of-the inspection. No commitments were made by the licensee other than those described in Paragraphs 4, 5, and 9.
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