IR 05000361/1980009
| ML13323A405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1980 |
| From: | Eckhardt J, Elin J, Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A404 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-80-09, 50-361-80-9, 50-362-80-06, 50-362-80-6, NUDOCS 8009020267 | |
| Download: ML13323A405 (6) | |
Text
U. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-361/80-09
REGION V
Report No. 50-362/80-06 Docket N q_162 License No. CPPp-97 ppp-q Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern.California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Unit 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conduct d: April 28-May 1, 1980 Inspectors:
_,
_!/
J.- Eckhardt, Reactor inspector ate Signed E 0. Elin, Reactor Inspector I Dhte Signed Date Signed Approved By:
_____-_______--__7_
R. C. Haynes, Qri[PRator Projects Section, Date Signed Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:
Inspection on April 28-May 1, 1980 (Report Nos. 50-361/80-09 and 50-362/80-06)
Areas Insoected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspector of construction activities including: previous open items, and equipment storage and maintenance. The inspection involved 48 onsite inspector hours by two NRC inspector Results:
Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. One unresolved item was identified concerning equipment storag RV Form 219 (2)
8009020 5t67
DETAILS 1. Individuals Contacted a. Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
- P. A. Croy, Site Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
- D. B. Schone, Site Project Engineer
- T. 0. Gray, Construction Lead QA Engineer V. A. Gow, QA Engineer J. Hosmer, Assistant Project Engineer b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- R. L. Rogers, Project Engineer R. H. Cutler, Project Field Engineer
- C. A. Blum, Project Field QC Supervisor
- J. E. Geiger, Project QA Supervisor
- L. W. Hurst, Project Field QA Supervisor
- W. D. Nichols, Assistant Project Field Engineer E. Hatzler, Electrical Engineering Group Supervisor
- Denotes those attending exit intervie. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Noncompliance (50-361/79-29/03) Capping of instrumentation line SCE issued a report to the NRC Regional Office dated March 4, 1980, describing the deficiency and the corrective action taken. The inspector performed a surveillance in Unit 2 and Unit 3 and found no instances where instrument sensing lines were open. The inspector confirmed that the licensee has apparently taken adequate steps to control this activity. This item is considered close (Open) Followup Item (50-361/79-23/02) Short circuit protection of medium voltage electrical containment penetration The FSAR in Table 8.1-1 states that the 6900 volt penetrations can withstand a fault current of 62,900 amps (symmetrical) for 0.5 seconds (30 cycles). The qualification test report for medium voltage penetra tions (S023-304-1-48-4) does not support this statement in that it shows leakage of a penetration after 56,700 amps (symmetrical)
for 10 cycles. The licensee stated that there was a later revision to the qualification document that shows qualification in excess of the FSAR requirement of Table 8.1-1. The licensee plans to submit a FSAR change to Table 8.1-1 to increase the fault current withstand capabilities listed. However, this later-revision to the qualification document was not available for review at the time of the inspection. This area will be reviewed during a future inspectio c. (Open) Followup Item (50-361/79-29/04) Seismic support of loss of turbine load trip Class IE cable The FSAR (figure 032.10-1) specifies that in compliance with IEEE 279, section 4.22, the electrical cable and raceway associated with the plant protection system function, "Loss of Turbine Load Trip",
should be "Class 1E, color-coded, (with) raceway and cable supported by seismic category 1 raceway supports."
During this inspection it was noted that conduit for this system had been installed in Unit 2 although Class 1E cable had not been pulled. The conduit installed in the turbine building was supported by the turbine building which is not a seismic category 1 structure. The licensee stated that an FSAR change would be submitted to clarify the structural support requirements for Class 1E cables in seismic category 2 structure This item will be reviewed during a future inspectio d. (Open) Followup Item (50-361/79-24/04) Separation criteria for electrical cabl FSAR (Paragraph 8.3.3.3.1(A)) defines a minimum horizontal separation of 3 feet or installation of a fire barrier between redundant division On a previous inspection, the inspector noted a horizontal separation of approximately 20 inches between instrument cables installed in flexible metallic conduit for pressure transmitters 2PT-0101-1 and 2PT-0106-4 (different channels).
The licensee stated that FSAR in section 8.3.3.3.1 defines separation by use of "metallic conduit". The licensee committed to clarify the FSAR regarding flexible metallic conduit as identical (for fire protection and separation purposes) to rigid metallic condui (Open) Followup Item (5O-361/79-23/03) FSAR depiction of preferred power (figure 8.2-3).
FSAR figure 8.2-3 is a physical arrangement drawing of the SONGS Unit 2-3 preferred power supply. The preferred power system as installed differs from this drawing in that: (1) common supporting structures are used for various power lines and (2) various power lines crossover each othe The licensee previously committed to update this drawing to reflect as built conditions. An FSAR change had been submitted. Although it denoted the common tower situation, it did not show the line crossover The licensee will submit additional changes to note the potential of common circuit failure caused by these crossover (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-361/80-01/02)
Clarity of design change notices (DCNs).
Thirteen DCNs were reviewed to determine that technical and construction details were clear and that clarity existed regarding which DCN was applicable. The inspector had no questions regarding the DCNs examined and it appears that the DCN examined during inspection 50-361/80-01 was not representative of DCNs. The inspector had no further questions on this matter at this tim. Inspection of Material/Equipment Storage The equipment and material storage area was examined to ascertain conformance with ANSI N45.2.2-1972, "Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of Items for Nuclear Power Plants", Reg. Guide 1.38 "Quality Assurance Requirements for Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of Items for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants", and Bechtel Procedure WPP/QCI-008 "Material Receiving, Pre-Installation, Storage, and Handling."
Storage.conditions in the permanent warehouse were found to meet or exceed the requirements of the standards. However, storage conditions in temporary shelters did not appear to meet the requirements of ANSI N45.2.2-1972 for the following items:
a. Storage battery cells, designated as Level B storage items, were stored in a plastic covered wood frame structure with a dirt floo No provisions for temperature control or monitoring were eviden ANSI N45.2.2, in paragraph 6.1.2 "Levels of Storage, Environmental Conditions for Items Classified as Levels A, B, C, and D", and Bechtel Power Corporation WPP/QCI-008, in paragraph 4.5.2.2 state:
"Level B items shall be stored within a fire resistant, tear resistant, weathertight, and well ventilated building or equivalent enclosure. Precautions shall-be taken against vandalism. This area shall be situated and constructed so that it will not be subject to flooding; the floor shall be paved or equal, and well drained. Items shall be placed on pallets or shoring to permit air circulation. The area
-4 shall be provided with uniform heating and temperature control or its equivalent to prevent condensation and corrosion. Minimum temperature shall be 40F and maximum temperature shall be 140F or less if so stipulated by a manufacturer."
b. Two Unit 3 emergency generators were stored in a plastic covered wood frame structure again with a dirt floor. These generators were resting on dunnage and drainage had been provided. Provisions had been made to control temperature between 40F and 140F by energizing equipment space heaters and providing forced air heaters which turn on/off automatically at preselected point One of these forced air heaters had failed to turn off when temperature increased and had continued to blow heated air into the generator internal The inspector found parts of this machine warm enough to preclude prolonged hand contact. The licensee monitored air temperatures in the structure at 115F. No contact temperatures were take These temperature control problems were corrected during the inspectio The above problems apparently resulted from lack of definition in the procedures including what conditions are acceptable when the "paved or equal" and "temperature control or its equivalent" provisions of ANSI N45.2.2 paragraph 6.1.2 are invoked. Storage area personnel understood that a well drained gravel surface was equal to paved surfaces for Level B storage. Additionally, storage area personnel understood that the area's natural temperature variation meet the temperature control requirements without further control or monitoring. Their understandings were based on verbal instruction It should be noted that the inspector did observe that the permanent warehouse appeared to fully comply with ANSI N45.2.2-1972 requirement Additionally, two Unit 3 emergency diesel engines were classified and stored as Level D (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 Receiving Inspection Data Report for Permanent Plant Materials No. 10844).
ANSI N45.2.2 generally specifies level D as applicable to mechanical items of stationary nature such as "tanks, piping, reinforcing steel, etc." that are less sensitive to the environment. This standard states that Level C classification is applicable to "pumps, valves, compressors, etc." or mechanical equipment that requires protection from exposure to the environment, but where condensation of water is not as important as in electrical item The observed storage conditions of the emergency diesel engines were those of Level D items (storage outdoors, in well drained area on cribbing)
with the addition of a covered-roof, open-sided structure. Level C items require indoor storage on a paved surface similar to Level B items without the control of temperature required for Level B item.5 The licensee stated that the Level D designation had been established by a receiving inspector based on verbal statements from a manufacturer's representative that Level D storage was adequate. The purchase specification required storage per the requirements of ANSI N45.2.2. For this item it appears that control of the storage level designation was inadequat The protection afforded Level B material and equipment stored in temporary shelters requires further review to ascertain whether the protection provided is consistent with the intent of ANSI N45.2.2-1972. Further, the site receiving and storage procedures lack guidance reaarding what is considered to be equivalent for certain ANSI N45.2.2 requirements and who is authorized to establish the storage level designation for material and equipmen This item is considered to be unresolved (50-362/80-06-01).
4. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph. Management Interview The inspectors-met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on May 1, 1980. The scope of the inspection and of the inspector's findings as noted in this report were discussed.