IR 05000206/1980019
| ML13323A815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1980 |
| From: | Faulkenberry B, Miller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A813 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-80-19, NUDOCS 8008220145 | |
| Download: ML13323A815 (7) | |
Text
U. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report N Docket N License N DPR-13 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company Facility Name:
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station #1 Inspection at:
San Onofre, California Inspection conducted:
June 2-27, 1980 Inspectors:
______________________
/g L.-Miller, Re sdent Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
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_/'V40 B. H. Faulkenberry, Chieft*-Rector Projects Section Z Date Signed Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Summary:
Inspection on June 2 - 27, 1980 (Report No. 50-206/80-19)
Areas Inspected:
Routine,.resident inspection of plant operations during refueling outage, monthly maintenance and surveillance observations, followup on licensee event reports, on licensee responses to Notices of Violation and on IE Bulletin 79-27, and independent inspectio The inspection involved 76 inspector-hours by one NRC inspecto Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie RV Form 219 (2)
80 08220//
DETAILS
@1. Persons Contacted
- R. Brunet, Superintendent, Unit 1
- M. Wharton, Supervising Engineer, Unit 1
- D. Dunn, Project QA Supervisor
- W. Frick, Nuclear Engineer H. Bentz, SCE Outage Coordinator J. Salizar, Instrument Foreman E. Bennet, Health Physics Foreman The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees on the maintenance, security and operations staffs during this inspectio *Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on June 27, 198. Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed tests for diesel generator operability, checks of the area radiation monitoring system, and valve alignment for cold shutdow Surveillance activity was relatively low. The activities observed were performed in accordance with the appropriate procedures. Limiting conditions for operation were met where applicable. Logs and records of these tests were kept, and were reviewed independently. No test deficiencies were identified by the license No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Monthly Maintenance Observation The inspector observed portions of the following maintenance:
Steam generator eddy current testing, tube plugging and removal, Containment spray actuation system modifications and testing, Containment isolation system modifications and testing, Main steam line weld repair, Reactor vessel head reassembly, Reactor coolant pump reassembly, In plant paging system testing, Source range nuclear instrument troubleshooting, Auxiliary feedwater pump reassembly, Charging pump reassembly, and Instrument air system desiccant remova These activities appeared to be conducted in accordance with the applicable written procedure or technical manua The limiting conditions for operation were met as required; clearances to perform the work were obtained where necessary; records of the work performed were made; qualified personnel performed the work; and appropriate radiological and fire prevention measures were observe The inspector also observed that operators identified malfunctioning equipment promptly to the maintenance department for repai Following completion of the maintenance observed on the charging pumps, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properl No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Inspection of Plant Operations During Refueling Outage The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed logs and instrumentation, and discussed the plant status with operators and maintenance personne The inspector toured throughout the facility, including the controlled areas. During the plant tours, it was noticed that the potential fire hazards and poor housekeeping cited in Inspection Report 80-16 no longer existed. Housekeeping was adequate in all areas inspected, and no fire hazards were observe The inspector verified the operability of the residual heat removal and component cooling water systems (in part), and reviewed clearance and CAUTION tags that were in effec The inspector observed early in this period that minor discrepancies in the use of the yellow "CAUTION" tagging system existed. For example, on June 2 and 9, 1980, these tags remained hanging on main steam stop valves and main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves for hydrostatic tests completed earlier in the outage. Also, on June 15, 1980, the Control Operator's log (Generating Station Log) did not indicate that the suction valves on both safety injection pumps were still shut from a previous lineup, that the refueling water pump breakers d.c. voltage was deenergized for a test, or that the pressurizer heater breakers were racked out. The latter conditions were, however, indicated to the operator directly at the affected control switch in the control room. The inspector stated his concern that the I
licensee's present guidance on control of plant status had been insufficient to prevent the irregularities noted. A licensee representative agreed that a careful review of the present tagging system would be performed to consider appropriate means of minimizing such discrepancies. (80-19-01)
The inspector observed that the physical security plan appeared to be properly implemented, and that radiation protection controls were in effec The inspector noted that since April 14, 1980 the licensee had recorded fifty-two instances of personnel skin contamination, all of which were successfully decontaminated to background levels or les Of these instances only eleven involved skin contamination levels of 9,000 CPM or greater. The inspector referred this information to the regional radiation specialist inspection branch for followu No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Followup on Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector discussed the following LER's with licensee personnel, and verified by direct observation or review of records, that the reportability requirements had been met, the immediate corrective actions had been accomplished, and the corrective actions to prevent recurrence were completed or in progress. Comments specific to an LER are included below where applicable:
-3 a. LER 80-10: Wiped Thrust Bearing on South Charging Pump (Closed).
b. LER 80-11:
Pressurizer Relief Tank Ruptured Rupture Disc (Closed).
The inspector noted that the relevant procedure, S-3-2.1," Nitrogen Blanketing of the Pressurizer Relief Tank and Normal Operation," had been appropriately revise c. LER 80-12:
No. 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Failure (Open).
The inspector determined that the licensee's review of the vault drainage system was continuing at the time of the inspectio d. LER 80-13:
Improper Fusing of Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (Closed).
e. LER 80-15:
Loss of All AC Power (Onsite and Offsite) (Open).
The inspector reviewed with a licensee representative the correct interpretation of "operable" as it refers to offsite and onsite power sources. This licensee identified item remains open pending the licensee's Technical Specification change reques f. LER 80-16:
Flooded Reactor Cavity Fails Both Source Range Channels (Closed).
g. LER 80-17: Contamination of Primary Makeup Tank/Erroneous Boron Concentration Calculation (Open).
This item remains open pending removal and capping of line 8028. The inspector verified that the procedural modifications agreed to had been complete h. LER 80-18:
Damaged Incore Instrumentation Guide Tube (Closed).
Licensee personnel stated that no quantitative analysis was done to determine that the remaining instrument locations would be sufficient to achieve accurate core mapping. The inspector stated that the licensee's evaluation of the incident was adequate pending the determination of the Systematic Evaluation Program of the operability requirements for the incore instrumentation system, currently scheduled for 198 LER 80-19: Missing Component Cooling Water System U-Bolt (Closed). LER 80-20:
Failed Hydraulic Snubbers (Open).
Licensee personnel stated that one of the two snubbers which failed, 1-SW-393-1, had failed at least once previously, in October 1978 due
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to a sheared rod nut. This report remains open pending visual reinspection of snubbers inside containment as required by Technical Specification 4.14.A in 12 month k. LER 80-21:
Degraded Feedwater System Piping Supports (Open).
This report remains open pending repair of the affected supports by the license. LER 80-22:
Indication in Seal Injection Piping Weld (Closed).
m. LER 80-24:
Indications in Main Steam Piping Welds (Open).
This report remains open pending the submission of an evaluation of the code acceptability of the defects identified in the welds by the licensee to Region V of the NR. Followup on Responses to Notices of Violation The inspector reviewed with licensee personnel the responses to the following Notices of Violation to verify that the immediate corrective actions had been accomplished, and the corrective actions to prevent recurrence had been completed, except where noted:
a. 79-17-01 Failure to report operation in a permitted degraded mode (Closed).
b. 80-04-01 Failure to report reactor protection instrument settings less conservative than those established by the Technical Specifications (Closed).
c. 80-09-01 Operations outside of the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the Salt Water Cooling System (Open).
d. 80-09-02 Failure to Follow Safety-Related Procedural Requirements during Loss of Salt Water Cooling Events (Open).
This item, and item c.above, remain open pending the licensee's review and revision, as necessary, of all emergency operating instruction e. Notices of Violation and Deviation dated January 16, 1980 resulting from the NRC Management Inspection of San Onofre on February 5-16, 1979 (Open).
The inspector verified that the corrective action proposed by the licensee in its response dated February 6, 1980 had been completed and was adequate, except as noted below:
1) Station procedures and polices which fully meet the requirements and recommendations of ANSI N18.7-1976, Sections 5.1 and 5.3 were still under development. The licensee restated its commitment that these procedures and policies will be completed by November 30, 198 ) Procedures which required that the Fire Hose Inspector conduct inspections at San Onofre had not been prepared in accordance with the Quality Assurance Manual requirements. The licensee had identified this in its Corrective Action Requests (CAR's)
P-220 and P-271 and was taking action to prepare the required procedur ) The training program for retraining maintenance personnel was still being developed. The licensee stated that this program will be developed and implemented by November 30, 1980, as previously stated in its response to the Notices of Violatio ) Station Procedure, S-I-1.14, "General Maintenance Procedure,"
had not been revised, as previously stated in its response to the Notices of Violation. The licensee had identified this in CAR P-272 and was taking action to prepare the required procedure (80-19-02).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Followup on IE Bulletin 79-27 The inspector reviewed the new San Onofre Operating Instruction, S-3-5.37,
"Loss of a Vital or Utility Bus" (Preliminary Copy).
The procedure included diagnostic indicators, use of alternate circuitry, methods for restoring power to the affected bus, and methods to be used to achieve cold shutdow The procedure appeared to adequately describe the necessary actions upon loss of a 120 vac bus. In addition, the inspector reviewed the licensee's operator training program on this procedure in discussions with the Training Coordinator and a review of training records. The program also appeared adequat This bulletin remains open pending further review of the acceptability of the licensee's interpretation which limits the scope of the bulletin to 120 vac buses onl No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Independent Inspection The inspector continued the review of the salt water cooling event in March, 1980. Maintenance orders on the north and south salt water pumps were reviewed for trends and evidence of repetitive component or system failure. A licensee representative stated that the south salt water pump shaft had not failed previous to the March 1980 failure; the maintenance and operating records were reviewed, and appeared to confirm this. The most common maintenance documented was packing replacement. Previous solenoid valve failures had occurred, but not on the valve which malfunctioned in March 1980 (POV-6, the south salt water pump discharge valve).
The licensee was unable to provide a part or style number for the north and south salt water pump discharge valve solenoid valves installed at the time of that event, but the inspector observed that presently the north pump has an ASCO Catalog No. 8344B66MO type solenoid valve installed. The inspector determined that as a result of continued evidence of residual desiccant in the instrument air system, the licensee was expanding its -program to blowdown the instrument air lines to ensure that no desiccant remains in lines where it might later affect the operation of safety-related equipment. This review remains open pending completion of this progra No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Exit Interview At the conclusion of this inspection, the inspector met with licensee personnel (paragraph 1) to summarize the scope and findings of this inspection.