IR 05000361/1980016
| ML19345C282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1980 |
| From: | Faulkenberry B, Miller L, Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345C278 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-80-16, NUDOCS 8012040329 | |
| Download: ML19345C282 (5) | |
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U. S. I;t' CLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSIO i 0FFICE OF I ;SPECTIO t A!!D E!!FORCEME!.~r REGIO 1 V Report 1;o.
50-361/80-16 50-361 License rio.
CPPR-97 Safeguards Group Docket tio.
Southern California Edison Company Licensee:
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosenead, California 91770 San Onofre Unit 2 Facility riame:
San Diego County, California Inspection at:
August 16 - September 18, 1980 Inspection ponducted:
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Inspectors:
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L.~F. l1 iller, Reactor Insp.ector Date Signed
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R. J. Pate,< Senior Res4 dent Inspector
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Approved Ey:
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.- / - " /< ' <l- / t B. H. Faulkenberry, Chief, Reactor Project Section 2, Date Signed Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch S u=na ry :
Inscection on August 16-Secterr.ber 18,1980 (Report t'o. 50-361/80-16)
Areas Insoected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee's preoperational test program and procedures and independent inspection effort.
The inspection involved 48 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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RV Form 219 (2)
8012040 32_9
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OETAILS-1.
Persons Contacted a.
Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
+*K. A. Slagel, Startup-Supervisor J. C. Wait, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer
+*H. E. Morgan, Unit 2 Station Superintendent
- P. R. Belhumeur, Startup Quality Supervisor
+G. A. Chaves, Project Startup Supervisor K. E. O'Connor, NSSS Test Operations Supervisor
+*P. A. Croy, Site Project Quality Assurance Suoervisor
+D. E. Hunn, Quality Assurance Manager
- R. M. Rosenblum, Startup Engineering Supervisor
- P. H. Penseyres, Supervising Engineer
+*P. R. King, Operations Lead Quality Assurance Engineer
+C. R. Horton, Startup Quality Assurance Engineer-b.
Bechtel Corcoration L. W. Hurst, Project Field, Quality Assurance Supervisor K. E. Hess, Startup Project Enginaaring Supervisor
+*D. W. Strolman, Startup Quality Assurance Supervisor
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+J. E. Geiger, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor W. E. French, Project Startup Quality Assurance Engineer In addition, construction and maintenance craftsmen, engineers and foremen were contacted during the inspection.
- Denotes attendees at lianagement raeting on September 4,1980.
+ Denotes attendees at Management meeting on September 18, 1980.
2.
Plant Status This licensee reported the Unit 2 construction to be 95% complete as of September _17,1980.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspectors examined actions taken by the licensee on a previous inspector identified concern as follows:
(Closed) Follow-upItem(50-361/80-12/02): The procedures WPP/QCI and TI-17 were not clear as to when the station. management must sign turnover -
packages.
The station management personnel committed to sign all. future turnover packages and to revise the procedures as necessary.
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Preoceration Test Procedure Review The inspectors completed review of the following licensee approved preoperation test procedures:
2PE-202-01, Rev. 0 - Containment Spray Dry Pipe Air Flow Test 2PE-25~,-01, Rev. 0 - RCS Cold Hydrostatic Test No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Operating Procedures Review The inspector reviewed two of the licensee's draft operating procedures:
5023-3-1.1, Rev. 1, " Reactor Startup", and S023-3-1.2, " Reactor Shutdown".
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In addition, the Units 2 and 3 Operating Instruction Index (dated March 5, 1980) was reviewed.
The inspector observed that neither of the ope'ating procedures contained
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a means to document the determination that the prerequisites had been met, as would be required by ANSI 18.7-1976, "Adminie trative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants",
Para. 5.3.4.1(1).
A licensee representative stated that subsequent acoroved revisions of these procedures would comprehensively contain sucn documentation-(50-351/80-16/01).
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The inspector further observed that the reactor startup procedure contained no checkoff list for confirming the completion of major steps in their proper sequence, nor were the minimum operable nuclear instruments required as a prerequisite specified. The inspector stated that the procedure did not include or reference detailed instructions for the calculation of estimated critical rod position, nor was it specific about how the operator should verify that the Reactor Regulating System, Steam Bypass System and Plant Protection System were all " operating properly". Licensee personnel stated that these observations would be considered and appropriate changes made before issuing the aoproved copy of these procedures.
(50-361/80-16/02).
The inspector compared the referenced operating instruction index with the requirements of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, " Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors". At the time of the inspection, the operating instruction indu of the licensee was-incomplete. The inspector noted that the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.33 must be met before issuance of un operating license.
(50-361/80-16/03).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie !
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Preocerational Testino Ouality Assurance The inspector reviewed the qualifications of the SCE and Bechtel Startup OA/QC personnel to verify compliance with the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6.
The records packages for the Bechtel personnel selected for review were in compliance with the ANSI M45.2.6 requirements.
The records packages for the SCE perscnnel selected were comolete except there were no current records for physical examinations for three OA engineers.
SCE management personnel agreed to review the records oackages for the SCE personnel and update as appropriate.
(50-361/80-16/04).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Observation of Precoerational Test
- The irplementation of preocerational test procedure 2PE-250-0;., Rev. O was observed on Septemoer 15 and 16, 1980. On September 15, 1980, the required test pressure of 3110 psi was not achieved due to a component failure in the operator for one of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) isolation valves.
The failure occurred when the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure was greater than 3000 psi.
The valve failure cllowed high pressure water from the RCS to over pressurize the LPSI line.
The extent of overpressurization has not been determined, but inouts to tne plant computer indicated that the pressure exceeded the 600 psi design pressure. As a result of this event the inspector requested the following.
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The extent of overpressure in the LPSI system and possible piping degradation be determined.
2.
Determine whether there was a water harm:er in the low pressure system.
If there was a water hammer, assess the capability of the system to meet the intended service.
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Determine the cause of the valve operator failure and proposed corrective action.
4.
Steps to be taken for the repeat hydrostatic test of the RCS to protect connecting low pressure systems.
SCE management personnel agreed to provide the requested information.
(50-351/80-16/05) The test procedure was changed to address Item 4 above before the repeat hydrostatic test was performed. All the low pressure systems connecting to the RCS were protected with open lines (removed valves) or a minimum of 2 one-inch vent and/or drain valves open. The open lines provided positive protection for a single component failure.
However, two one-inch open valves did not provide protection for a component failure.
SCE considered this to be adequate due to the low probability of another valve failing. Single valve protection is current industry practice and is not addressed by the applicable codes, standards or Federal regulations.
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-4-ersonnel, the Through interviews with plant operating and startup p(Target Rock 8-inch inspector determined that the LPSI isolation valves globe) were tightened with an extension lever at a test pressure above 2400 psi to reduce the leakage through the valves. The use of extension levers was not included in the test procedure.
The inspector discussed the use of extension levers on safety related valves in general with SCE management personnel, and requested that a written policy statement be orovided by SCE describing the use of extension levers in a manner so as to preclude damage to the valves. (50-361/80-16/06).
The repeat cold hydrostatic pressure test of the RCS was observed on September 16, 1980, ilo items of noncomoliance or deviations were identified.
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Plant Tour The inscector toured Unit 2 several times during the reoort period.
Particular attention was airectea to ooserving weiding and burning activities,
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housekeeping, equipment preservation, maintenance activities and work on completed systems.
"o items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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?1anagement Interview On Septemoer 4 and September 18, 1980, the inspector met with licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1 to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee made commitments as described in Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.
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