IR 05000361/1980024
| ML13323A425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1981 |
| From: | Dodds R, Eckhardt J, Elin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A423 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-80-24, 50-362-80-13, NUDOCS 8103030521 | |
| Download: ML13323A425 (6) | |
Text
U. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-361/80-24
REGION V
Report N /80-13 Docket N /362 License N CPPR-97/98 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Unit 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conducted:
December 16-19, 1980 Inspectors:,
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Eckhardt, Reactor Inspector bate Signed (___
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- % i J. 0. Elin, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
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R. T. D,dds, Section Chief, Engineering Support Section, -Date Signed Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:
Inspection on December 16-19, 1980 (Report No. 50-361/80-24 and 50-362/80-13)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of construction activities involving licensee action on previous inspection findings and 50.55(e) reports. The inspection involved 46 onsite inspection hours by two NRC inspector Results:
Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie RV Form 219 (2)
810 3080
DETAILS Individuals Contacted Southern California Edison..Company (SCE)
- D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
- P. A. Croy, Project QA Supervisor
- D. R. Hoffman, Project Construction Engineer
- E. Prabhu, Lead Site Engineer
- L. A. Pfandler, QA Engineer Trainee H. B. Jones, Mechanical Engineer Site Representative Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- E. Geiger, Project QA Manager
D. Nichols, Project Field Engineer
- L. W. Hurst, Project OA Engineer H. Campos, Electrical Engineer
- Denotes those attending exit intervie. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following item a. (Open) Followup item (50-361/78-13): Containment shrinkage crack An SCE report "Evaluation of Effect of Containment Shrinkage Cracks on Re-enforcement Steel Integrity, SONGS, Units 2 and 3",
dated June 16, 1980, was reviewed and indicates that the maximum crack width in Unit 2 containment was 0.013 inche The report also indicates that cracks up to 0.013 inches width are acceptable from a re-enforcing bar corrosion standpoint. These cracks were measured shortly after tendon tensioning. Review of the structural integrity test (SIT) data (completed December 5,.1980) indicates cracks in the containment dome of 0.050 inches both before and after the test. These cracks are in a different location than those previously measure During discussion with the licensee and Bechtel, the licensee committed to analyze the SIT data, make further measurements of the cracks, survey the entire dome, and provide analysis of the new data. This item will remain open pending this stud (Closed) Followup item (50-361/79-10/02): Environmental qualification of splice connections on containment electrical penetrations The licensee stated that environmental qualification of connections would be included in a report to NRC Environmental Qualification Branch scheduled for February, 198 The licensee will show these splice connections to be qualified per NUREG 058 This item is close (Closed) Followup item (50-361/79-22/03): Exceedin.the minimum bend radius during cable pull operation This item was addressed by the licensee at the time of the response to item of noncompliance 50-361/79-22/04 and discussed and closed in Inspection Report 50-361/79-30. The licensee has made appropriate changes to CS-EOl, "Installation of Electric Cables in Conduit and Duct Banks" and CS-E02, "Installation of Electrical Cables in Cable Trays" to reflect requirements of minimum bend radius, use of rope "mare's tail", and proper cable pull calculations. Communi cations of cable pull instructions to pull crews concerning exit directions was improve This item is close (Closed) Followup item (50-361/79-22/02): Use of "mare's tail" in place of a pulling grip or a basket grip while pulling cabl A change to CS-EOl, "Installation of Electric Cables in Conduit and Duct Banks" was made to include provisions for use of a rope "mare's tail" either at the end or at an intermediate point in the cabl This item is close (Closed) Followup item (50-361/79-10/01): Environmental qualification of Amphenol and Cannon connector The licensee stated that environmental qualification of Amphenol and Cannon connectors would be included in a report to NRC Environmental Qualification Branch scheduled for February, 198 The licensee will show that these connectors are qualified per NUREG 058 This item is close (Closed) Followup item 50-361/79-23/02):
Short circuit testing of medium voltage penetration The FSAR in Table 8.1-1 states that the 6,900 volt penetrations can withstand a fault current of 78,000 amps symmetrical for 0.5 seconds (30 cycles). This has recently been increased from 62,900 amps. The inspector discussed with the licensee a letter from Westinghouse, dated June 5, 1980, explainina the Westinghouse Test Report PEN-TR-76-29 which showed that a similar penetration with 500 MCM cable (1 conductor per phase) was demonstrated to perform satisfactorilly at 33,544 amps short circuit current (Isc) symmetrical for 10 cycle The penetrations installed utilize 750 MCM cable (2 conductors per phase).
Each conductor is capable of 45,250 amps Isc symmetrical for 10 cycles. The 78,000 amps symmetrical for 0.5 seconds is based on ratings from IPCEA 32-382 (Insulated Power Cable Engineers.Association Standard). The licensee stated that the penetrations were short circuit tested per FSAR table 3.11-3 on page 3.11-2 This item is close.
Licensee Action on 50.55(e) Items a. Taylor Forge Pipe Defects Linear indications at the surface adjacent to longitudinal seam welds on carbon steel pipe from Taylor Forge were.detected by Bechtel while radiographing a field circumferential weld in the mai.n steam line. In a subsequent review, other pipe lengths were identified to contain surface defect The licensee issued a 50.55(e) report January 23, 1979. This report was evaluated by the NRC IE Division of Reactor Constructio This item is considered close Lubrication Problems with Square D NEMA Size 3 Starters and Contactor Tacky lubrication was reported on rubber bumpers on certain Sauare D NEMA size 3 starters and contactor The licensee reported that these starter rubber bumpers were replaced at Unit 2 and 3 with new part This item is close Splices in GE and Rockbestos Cable The licensee stated that all GE supplied 600 volt power cable with neoprene jacket and ethylene propylene rubber insulation (Neoprene/EPR) will be removed from safety related applications inside Unit 2 containment and replaced by GE "Vulkene Supreme" cable qualified to IEEE 323 of 1974. At the time of the inspection approximately 85% of the GE cable in Unit 2 had been replaced. Completion is scheduled for January 15, 1980 with specific cable runs documented on NCR 156 The inspector observed some cable replacement activities in progress in Unit No problems were note The licensee stated that Rockbestos cable with manufactured splices would be qualified per IEEE 38 Initial LOCA testing has been performed. Additional LOCA and post LOCA tests are to be performed by April 15, 198 The environmental qualification of GE Vulkene Supreme Cable and the Rockbestos cable will be reported to the NRC Environmental Oualification Branch in February, 1981, to show compliance to NUREG 058 This item is close Lack of "As-Received" Documentation for Measuring and Test Equipment Sent to Vendors for Recalibration The final 50.55(e) report, submitted December 14, 1979, was reviewed. Documentation of the corrective action associated with this item was also reviewed and indicated five related nonconformance reports are still open pending completion of rework. The licensee's QA conducted an extensive audit of this area August 11-21, 1980 and the results of this audit were reviewed. The inspector had no further question This item is considered close.
Possible Submergence Problem with Electrical Class IE Equipment Durinq a site tour the inspector noted that two air operated valves (2HV9204 and 2TV0221) were located below the hypothetical loss of coolant accident submergence level in Unit 2 containment buildin These valves are letdown system isolation valves. Mounted on these valves are electrical Class IE components which do not appear qualified for submerged operation. These components are identified as 2HY9204 and 2TY0221 (ASCO solenoid pilot valves controling 2HV9204 and 2TV0221);
and 2ZSH9204-2, 2ZSL9204-2, 2ZSH0221-1, and 2ZSLO221-1 (NAMCO EA180 series limit switches).
-5 The licensee stated the qualification of these components for submerged operation will be addressed in the February 1981 submittal detailing environmental qualification of electrical Components per NUREG 058. Management Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on December 19, 1980. The scope of the inspection and the inspectors'
findings as noted in this report were dicussed.