IR 05000361/1980019
| ML13323A419 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1981 |
| From: | Dodds R, Eckhardt J, Hernandez G, Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A418 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-80-19, 50-361-81-19, 50-362-80-12, NUDOCS 8102190102 | |
| Download: ML13323A419 (8) | |
Text
.ZCLLAR RECULATORy COMMISSION OFFICE OFl I -PECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
50-361/80-19 Report No. q0-262/8n-1?
Docket N /362 License M CPPR-97/98 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Unit 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Construction Site, San Diego County, California November 4-7, 1980 Inspection conducted:
Inspectors*
R c inspect J H. Eckhardt, Reactor InspectorSined Ki ch, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Hernandez, Reac(cQ Inspector S
Approved Ey:
_,,_,__( Dodds, Chief, Support Section 1Dae SIgned Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:
Inspection on November 4-7, 1980 (Report N /80-19 and 50-362/80-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of construction activities including: licensee action on previous inspection findings, electrical cables, electrical components, instrumentation components and systems, pipe welding, and tank welding. The inspection involved 72 onsite inspection hours by three NRC inspector Results:
Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie RV Form 219 (2)
1 0219
DETAILS 1. Individuals Contacted a. Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
- D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
- H. B. Ray,.Project Manager
- P. A. Croy, Project QA Supervisor
- J. J. Wambold, Construction Manager
- T. 0. Gray, Construction Lead QA Engineer V. A. Gow, QA Engineer A. H. Chan, QA Engineer N. Ferris, QA Engineer J. J. Fenelon, QA Engineer D. C. Stonecipher, QA Engineer b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- R. Patterson, Division QA Manager
- J. E. Geiger, Project QA Manager
- J. H. McCarty, Project QC Manager
- 4. D. Nichols, Project Field Engineer
- Denotes those attending exit intervie. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following item a. (Closed) Deviation (50-361/80-06/01): Storage of high strength bolt Corrective action committed to in the licensee's response (May 28, 1980)
to the Notice of Deviation was reviewed and verified by direct observatio A storage shed for bolts has been provided at the Jap Mesa storage area, and the bolting material is in this structure to eliminate exposure to weather. All corroded bolts were observed to be in a segregated area. This item is close (Closed) Followup Item (50-361/80-06/04): Dissimilar metals on reactor coolant pump seal bleedoff flowmete The design of the flange was reviewed by SCE and Combustion Engineering as documented in SCE NCR S023 F-26S (March 18, 1980) and CE letter S-CS-2546 (July 28, 1980). These documents conclude that the flange is conforming as designed and will perform its intended function. This item is close c. (Closed) (361/80-15/01) Unresolved Item:
Internal wiring of
"third-of-a-kind" load transfer switc The discrepancy had been documented by Bechtel NCR (No. E-2143)
and SCE NCR (N F-292) and was determined to be applicable to Units 2 and 3 panels 0004 and 000 It was further determined that the problem was unique to switchboards provided by one particular contractor for use in 4 kv applications, and, therefore, was not generic in natur The inspector examined the NCR's and the Field Change Notices specifying the resolution. Although the work specified by the FCN's was not completed, the resolution was placed into the licensee's system to assure work completio The inspector had no further question d. (Closed)'362/79-07/ 02) Followup Item: Protective channels for housing instrument tubing lines in the event that minimum channel separation distance cannot be maintaine The inspector examined drawing 56461-3 (Tubing Barrier) which specified the design of a protective channel to house instrument tubing in lieu of the required 18-inch separation distance. The design appeared sufficiently substantial to take the place of the 18-inch separation distance. The inspector had no further question e. (Open) Deficiency (50-361/79-06/ 01): Control of pink drawings in the field:
Discussions with licensee personnel determined that licensee surveillances in three areas has detected a number of drawings in the field which do not reflect the latest change, revision and/or associated DCN's as listed in the weekly document log. Accordingly, the licensee issued Corrective Action Requests (CAR) addressing the findings in the area of distribution and control of design and field generated documents. The CAR's requested that Bechtel Identify the cause of the problem and take corrective action to prevent recurrence. Additionally, the licensee has approved a Procedure Change Notice (PCN) No. 23 to WPP/QC1 No. 019 which provides for a monthly audit of all uncontrolled area stick files and document files and the establishment of a training program for the construction area clerk This item will remain open pending a future inspection to examine the Bechtel response to the CAR's, the programmatic changes to and implementation of WPP/QC1 No. 01.
Electrical (Cables and Terminations)
a. Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector examined the following Unit 3 activities for compliance with license procedures, PSAR commitments, Regulatory Guide 1.75 and IEEE-384:
(1) Termination activities in progress on two cables in the main control board being conducted by two craftsme (2) About 70 completed terminations in the main control board cabinets 3CR52 and 3CR58 and one 4 KV safety-related breaker cabinet 3D00 (3) Cable tie down criteria and activities on the floor of Unit 2 and 3 main control board Bechtel personnel determined, in response to the inspector's questions on main control board cable bundle tie down criteria, that a Procedure Change Notice (PCN) was advisable to provide adequate reference to cable support procedures. This PCN was written and approved. Final tie down of cable bundles to the floor of the main control boards had not been completed and was planned for completion after all cable installations had been complete The inspector'had no further question No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie Review of Quality Records The following quality records were examined to verify compliance with licensee quality documentation requirements:
(1)
Cable pull cards and termination cards for 3 power cables and 12 instrumentation/control cable (2)
About 20 electrical-related nonconformance reports generated by both the licensee and Bechte (3) Three licensee electrical-related audit (4) Qualification documentation for two termination craftsme (5) Certification of calibration for two terminating tool Pursuant to examination of NCR's, particular emphasis was placed on assuring that nonconformances applicable to a particular unit had been appropriately evaluated for applicability to the other uni No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Electrical (Components and Systems)
a. Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector examined the following Unit 3 work activities:
(1) The mounting and anchorage of two main control board panels (3CR52 and 3CR58) and two auxiliary relay cabinets (3L71 and 3L188) for compliance with installation drawing (2) Four Limitorque motor-operated valves for compliance with preventive maintenance criteria (Valve Nos. HV-9202, 0337, 9339 and one valve with no identification markings).
Two valves (the unidentified one and HV-9202) were located on the floor of a Unit 3 containment level and observed to have unenergized motor heaters. The licensee took immediate action to establish heater power and to determine why the valve was unidentifie The documentation of preventive maintenance performance was examined for the three identified valves and appeared satisfactory. The licensee's system for valve preventive maintenance from receipt on-site to installation was examined and appeared satisfactor The licensee explained that valves HV9202 and the unidentified valve had been transferred to site from the storage warehouse shortly before the recent strike and that the valve identifier most probably was lost during the one-month laydown period in the containmen Since the safety significance of the deenergized heaters-appears to be minimal (the motors are totally enclosed in closed housings and the containment area provides for moisture-free storage),
no other instances of unenergized heaters or unidentified valves were observed and preventive maintenance records indicated that the heaters were energized and lubrications complete when placed on the containment floor, the inspector considers this an isolated occurranc No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Instrumentation (Components and Systems)
a. Review of Quality Records The licensee identified that at least one instance existed in Unit 2 where redundant channel pressurizer instrument lines had been observed to violate the separation criteria. This had been identified by SCE audit No. PBCS-35-80 and Corrective Action Request No. F-949 was issued to Bechtel requiring resolution. The licensee's representative pointed out that the problem had stemmed from the fact that the safety-related instrument lines had a "T" connection from which one
instrument line went to a safety-related instrument and one line was routed to an instrument that was classified as non-safety related. The lack of separation was identified by the licensee to have occurred in the path of the instrument tubing routed to the non-safety related instrumen Examination of the situation in the field and discussions with licensee personnel identified the following:
(1) All portions of the instrument line which was routed to the safety-related instrument appeared to be appropriately color coded and separated. The licensee noted that these portions of the lines and the instruments were subject to the quality assurance criteria of 10CFR50, Appendix B, and therefore, appropriately inspected and verified to conform to specified quality criteri (2) Those portions of the instrument line routed from the "T",
includinq the instrument, classified as non-safety related were not appropriately color coded or separated. The licensee representative noted that those portions of the instrument line, and instrument, which were classified as non-safety related were not subject to the quality assurance critiera of lOCFR50, Appendix B, and therefore not inspected and verified to conform to the same critiera as the safety-related portio (3)
A failure in the non-safety related tubing and instrument could possibly negate the safety-related performance of the safety-related instrument channels since the non-safety related portion did not appear to be isolable from the safety-related portion. Furthermore, it appeared that a single failure of either (1) certain non-safety related instrument lines or (2) non-safety related instruments could possibly negate the performance of two redundant safety-related instrument In view of the above findings, it was not clear how the installed condition of certain instruments and tubing conformed to Criterion 21 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to 10CFR5 This item is unresolved and will be examined during a future inspectio (361/80-19/01)
-6 6. Safety-Related Pipe Welding Observations of Work and Work Activities In process piping installation and welding activities were observed in Unit 3 and in the laydown area Fab Shop for compliance with licensee procedure, specifications and PSAR commitments. These observations included pipe storage, cleanliness, rigging, fit-up, tack welding and grinding. A total of 8 pipe welds were examine The pipe welds examined:
Unit No. 3 Containment System Weld Number (1) S3-1201-ML-660 P(c)
(2) S3-1203-ML-141 SP (3) S3-1203-ML-074 N
(4) S3-1203-ML-287 B
Fabrication Sho System Weld Number (1) S3-1212-ML-117 BB (2) S3-1204-ML-001 Z(R-1)
(3) S3-1204-ML-001 MA(R-1)
(4) S3-1203-ML-076 K
All welding observed appeared to be conducted in accordance with the applicable procedures and the welders were observed using the specified filler metal and were qualified for the process and positions being employe No items-of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Tank Welding Three tanks installed in Unit 3 were examined to ascertain compliance with ASME B&PV Code welding requirements. Both the tank and support welds for the purification ion exchanger and two boric acid makeup tanks were inspected. These tanks were manufactured by P. F. Avery Company and supplied by Combustion Engineerin No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph. Management Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on November 7, 1980. The scope of the inspection and of the inspectors'
findings as noted in this report were discussed.