IR 05000333/1987019
| ML20235V840 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1987 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson, Meyer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235V512 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-87-19, IEB-80-25, NUDOCS 8710150343 | |
| Download: ML20235V840 (12) | |
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U.S._ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
E Report No'..
87-19 Docket No.
50-333 Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P.O. Box.41 Lycoming, New York 13093 L
. Facility:
J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant L
Location:
Scriba, New York Dates:
- July.1,1987
. August 31, 1987:
Inspectors: 'A. J. Luptak, Senior' Resident Inspector,
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'FitzPatrick
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J G. W. Meyer, Project Engineer
- Reviewed by:
mmi idl@
G 7W. MeyeT, Project Engineer Date
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Approved by:
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J. R. JohnsMi, Chief, Reactor Ja t'e Projects Section'2C, DRP Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July I', 1987 - August 31, 1987 (Report No.
50-333/87-19)
' Areas Inspected:
Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours of Licensee Event Report review, operational safety verification, surveillance observa-tions, maintenance observations, followup of a plant trip, IE Bulletin followup and' review of periodic and special reports. This involved a total of 123 inspection-hours which included 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of backshift and 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> of weekend inspection coverage. Backshift. inspection was conducted on July 16, 31, and
. August 18,.1987. Weekend inspections were conducted on July 12 and August 23, 1987.
Results During this period, no violations were identified.
The licensee demonstrated a. conservative approach to operations by voluntarily testing safety. relief valves (section 10).
In addition, thorough reviews were
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~ conducted to support operating with only three main steam lines and in support of an emergency Technical Specification change (section 6).
Several examples of a lack of attention to detail were noted in the performance of surveillance testing and High Pressure Coolant Injection system maintenance (sections 6 and 14,respectively). The discovery of unsealed electrical penetrations (section
'.13), the lack of annunciation for nitrogen pressure (section 9), and the Lsetpoint for high SRV discharge temperature annunciator are items which
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require additional information to determine acceptability (unresolved items)
I and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
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B710150343 8710077 gDR ADOCK 05000333 I
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' DETAILS 1., Summary of Plan't Activities The3 inspection period began with the plant operating at full power.
Power-was' reduced toLnear 70% on July 10, 1987, to investigate the A reactor
. feed' pump control circuit and returned to full power on July 12.
From~'
July l13 to 31 the plant operated at reduced power (95-98%) due to vacuum 1 restraints caused by high lake temperatures.
From August 1 to 7 the plant
. operated near 75% power due to the availability of only 3 of the 4 main
- steam lines.
Power was raised to 88% on August-7 following' analysis of'3
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steam line operation.. After approval of an emergency Technical Specifi-o i *u cation' Amendment,.the. plant returned to normal 4 steam line operation on August 20 and was at full power on August 23. On August 28 a_ reactor
,i scram occurred following a turbine trip due to a generator load reject.
.The reactor was restarted on August 31 with special generator instrumen-l[
tation install _ed.
'Aj 2.
Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (78-05-08).
Technical Specifications (TS)'do not preclude the startup of recirculation pumps from a natural circulation condition.
TS. require the reactor be placed in hot shutdown within-12 hours if neither recirculation loop is in ~ service. Therefore, a-startup of a recirculation pump is allowed within the.12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The inspector discussed this item with NRR, who indicated this was permissible provided'other;. required precautions are taken when starting the pump and that while in the natural circulation condition, no thermal hydraulic instabilities exist.
The inspector verified that the licensee's TSs and procedures contained necessary requirements for startup of recirculation pumps and monitoring of the thermal hydraulic stability. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved and Inspector Followup Items (82-16-02 and 84-15-03).
These items involve various records and their review and have been closed within the NYPA open item system based on documented evidence. As an independent check the inspector reviewed the closeout of item 84-15-03 in which NYPA now reviews'all Occurrence Reports for repetitive problems within the Plant Performance and Reliability Group.
The inspector reviewed Plant Standing Order (PS0) 28 and the 1986 file of reviewed Occurrence Reports to verify the NYPA documented closecut.
(Closed) Unresolved and Inspector Followup Items (81-21-05, 82-15-13, 83-28-08, and 85-05-01).. These items involve equipment design and repair and have been closed within the NYPA open item system based on documented evidence. As an independent check the inspector reviewed the closecut of item 83-28-08 in which the discharge check valve for the A emergency service water (ESW) pump was replaced. The inspector found that the work was done under Work Request (WR) 52185 and was completed on February 26, 1987.
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(Closed) Unresolved and Inspector Followup Items.(79-17-08, 83-04-07, and
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83-21-01).. These items' involve equipment testing and have been closed
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withinlthe NYPA open item system based on documented evidence. As an s
- independent check,'the inspector reviewed the closecut of item 83-21-01 in
.which NYPA committed to perform periodic evaluations of surveillance test technicians ~and.the instruments used to verify correct execution of surveillance' tests,.The inspector reviewed :I&C Standing Order (ICS0) '7, Surveillance Testing Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) Usage Evaluation, and the file of' completed usage evaluations.
The inspector found-that four usage evaluations had been performed in b'oth May 1987 and June 1987
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and. concluded that the evaluations appeared to be effective reviews of surveillance' testing and the M&TE used.
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.(Closed) Unresolved and Inspector Followup Items (82-08-03, 82-08-04,~and 83-15-04),
These items involve resolution of events and have been closed within the NYPA open' item system based on documented evidence. A an independent check ~the inspector reviewed the closecut of item 82-08-03, in which damage had occurred within the residual heat removal (RHR) system
.due to slamming of the discharge check valve.
The inspector reviewed NYPA memo JTS-87-0214 which documented that the cause of the problem was the close proximity of the check valve and the upstream orifice.
Plant Modification F1-82-052 revised the orifice design and moved the ori_fice-location farther upstream of the check valve.
Subsequent to the modifi-l cation, no'similar events have occurred due to the check valve.
3.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The1 inspector reviewed LERs to verify that the details of the events were
clearly reported.
The inspector determined that each report was adequate-
to assess the event,-the cause appeared accurate and was supported by
details,. corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, and generic' applicability to other plants was not in question.
. During this inspection period, the following LERs were reviewed:
LER 85-28-01 is a supplemental LER reporting the results of the manufac-turer's investigation of a trip unit which caused several High Pressure
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Coolant' Injection System isolations in December 1985.
LER 86-13-01 is a supplemental LER reporting the licensee's actions i
regarding the identification and replacement of PK-2 test blocks.
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'LER 87-01-01 -is a supplemental LER reporting the failures found while j
conducting local leak rate tests during the past refueling outage.
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'LER 87-08 reported a reactor trip which occurred on June 10, 1987 due to low reactor vessel level.
Details of this event are discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-333/87-12.
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'LER 87-09Jreported automatic: starting of the Emergency Diesel Generators due.to a momentary degraded: voltage condition.
Details of this event are discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-333/87-12.
'LER 87-10 reported'the High Pressure Coolant 1 Injection System inoperable due' to degraded auxiliary oil pump performance (see section 14).
LER 87-11 reported the' discovery'of 224 unsealed fire barrier electrical penetrations (see section 13).
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No' discrepancies were. identified.
4.
JEmergency Notification System Reports (ENS)
'The inspector reviewed the.following events which were reported to the NRC via.the Emergency Notification System as required by-10 CFR 50.72. The
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review included a determination that'the' reporting requirements were met,
'l that appropriate corrective actions had been taken, and that the event had been, evaluated for possible generic ~ implications.
.The_following reports were reviewed:
Event Date ~
Subject July 23,1987 '
The High Pressure Coolant Injection System was declared inoperable when it failed to automatically start during surveillance testing (see section.14).
August-28,-1987 Reactor scram due to turbine trip on generator load reject (see section 8).
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Operational Safety Verification a.
Control Room Observations Daily the inspector verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operation.
Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being l~'
taken.
The inspector observed shift turnovers biweekly to ensure proper control room and shift manning. The inspector directly observed the operations listed below to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
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Routine power operations.
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Plant startup on August 31, 1987.
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.' Issuance of-Radiation Work Permits' and Work Request / Event /
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Deficiency forms.
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.No violations were identified.
b.
Shift'LogsandOperating' Records Selected. shif.t logs and operating records were; reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and -
trends in. performance, detect.possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements, determine that records are-being maintained and reviewed as required,'and assess the effective -
ness of the communications provided by the logs.
No violations were identified.
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Plant Tours o
During th' %spection period, the inspector made observations and conducted wars of the plant.
During the plant tours, the inspector conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment'.
and the isolation valves for. leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual' valves were shut, capped and locked when required and,that motor operated valves were not mechanically blocked. The inspector also. checked fire protection, housekeeping and cleanliness,. radiation protection, and physical security
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conditions.to ensure compliance with plant procedures and regulatory requirements.
No violations were identified.
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d.
Tagout Verification The; inspector verified that the fo'llowing safety-related protective tagout records(PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves:
PTR 871605 on High Pressure Core Injection System.
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-PTR 871562 on Containment Atmosphere Dilution System.
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PTR 871720 on drywell radiation monitor.
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No violations were identified.
e.
Emergency System Operability The. inspector verified operability of the following systems by ensuring that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was in the correct position, by confirming that power supplies and breakers
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1 were properly aligned for components that must activate upon an initiation signal, and by visual inspection of the major components which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements:
High Pressure Core. Injection System.
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Standby Liquid Control System.
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No violations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operations were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testing.
TOP-49, Cycling of Safety Relief Valves during Power Operation,
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Rev. O, dated July 16, 1987, performed July 16, 1987.
F-ST-4B, High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Rate / Pump
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Operability / Valve Operability, Rev. 29, dated June 3, 1987, performed July 23, 1987.
F-ST-348, Reactor Building Exhaust Monitors Instrument / Isolation
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Logic System Functional and Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, Rev. 19, dated May 21, 1987, performed August 20, 1987.
l F-ISP-22-1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Turbine Exhaust
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Diaphragm High Pressure Instrument Functional Test, Rev. 10, dated November 5, 1986, performed August 11, 1987.
The inspector also witnessed all aspects of the following surveillance test to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to specification requirements and had been properly approved, limiting conditions for operation for removing equipment from service were met, testing was performed by qualified personnel, test results met technical specification requirements, the surveillance test documentation was reviewed, and equipment was properly restored to service following the test.
F-ST-4B, High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Rate / Pump
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Operability / Valve Operability, Rev. 29, dated June 3, 1987, performed July 26, 1987.
During the performance of ST-34B, the inspector raised several questions concerning the test procedure.
These issues did not affect the adequacy of the test but involved steps which added confusion to the test proce-dure.
The Operations Superintendent concurred with the inspector's comments and is evaluating procedure changes.
In addition, during the performance of the test, the inspector questioned an operator when he failed to correctly position a valve during the test.
This was not a critical step in the test and would most likely have been detected during
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i system verification following completion of the test. This error involving lack of attention to detail, was discussed with the Operations
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Superintendent who counseled the individual involved.
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l On August 1, 1987, during the performance of surveillance test 18, Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Fast Closure, the C outside containment MSIV closed in 2.35 seconds.
Technical Specifications require MSIVs to close within 3 to 5 seconds.
Efforts to adjust the MSIV closing speed using normal adjustment valves failed to bring it within the specifications.
NYPA declared the MSIV inoperable and took the required actions of closing one valve in the C steam line.
Power was maintained below 75% until completion of a safety evaluation which evaluated plant operation utili-zing only 3 steam lines. Analysis indicated ti,e plant could safely operate up to full power with 3 steam lines, ho5ever an administrative limit was placed to limit the steam flow to a measured 90 psid to provide a sufficient margin from the 108 psid high steam flow MSIV isolation limit.
To add additional conservatism, the plant operated at 80 psid which resulted in about 88% power.
Repairs to this. valve were not attempted due to high temperature and high radiation conditions in the area where workers would be required to remain for an extended period.
Based on the plant's power restrictions, the inaccessibility of the area, and the fact that the situation could not be avoided with prior knowledge, NYPA applied for an emergency Technical Specification change as allowed in 10 CFR 50.91 (a) (5).
The amendment, requested for the remainder of Cycle 8, allows a minimum MSIV closure time of two to five seconds for one of the four steam lines.
The amendment was approved and issued on August 20, 1987.
Following an unrelated August 28 reactor trip, the affected MSIV was repaired and met the three to five second requirement.
No violations were identified.
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7.
Maintenance Observations a.
The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, that these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for opera-tion, that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, that approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills of the trade," that appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, that ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and that equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
b.
During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
WR 23/59516 and 23/59524, troubleshoot and repair High Pressure
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Coolant Injection system.
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WR 07/64458, inspection and testing of spare Transversing Incore
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Probe indexers.
WR 76/55015, sealing of fire barrier penetrations.
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No violations were identified.
8.
Followup on Plant Trip At 1:57 p.m. on August 28, 1987, the reactor scrammed from full power due to a turbine trip on generator load reject. The cause of the generator load reject was not determined during the inspection period and will be further reviewed as part of the LER review.
The plant systems generally functioned as designed following the trip.
Specifically,.the rapid closure of the turbine stop valves caused a pressure spike up to approximately 1100 psig. This caused the lifting of safety relief valve (SRV) D followed shortly by the lifting of SRV C, also on the same steam line.
The setpoints of these SRVs are 1105 psig and 1140 psig, respectively.
The 2 SRVs with 1090 psig setpoints did not lift. As discussed in Inspection Report 87-05, SRVs have previously been observed to lift out of order due to dynamic effects within the steam lines during transients.
SRV D did not fully reseat and needed to be manually cycled to reseat.
T ie inspector reviewed the process computer alarm printout, the post-trip log, various chart recorders, and the completed data sheets for procedure No. PS0 53, " Post Trip Evaluation".
Based on these reviews, the inspector determined that the operator's actions during the event were proper and in accordance with approved procedures and the plant responded as designed (except as noted above).
On August 31 the reactor was restarted. As the cause of the generator load reject had not been determined, the exciter differential relay and the generator field ground relay were instrumented to measure any anomalies.
However, no problems were found during the synchronization of the generator to the grid.
After the end of this inspection period another trip occurred due to generator load rejection on September 7.
This will be reviewed in the next Inspection Report.
I 9.
Followup on IE Bulletins a.
Bulletin 80-25, Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves at BWRs.
This bulletin remained open as stated in Inspection Report 50-333/81-07 pending modification of the pneumatic supply i
i system. The inspector reviewed the completed modification package F1-81-14, which installed two relief valves to the nitrogen supply system and modified the wiring of a pressure switch to provide an alarm for both high and low pressure.
The inspector verified that
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both the relief valves and the pressure switch providing the alarm have been recently calibrated and are in a periodic calibration program.
However, the inspector noted IEB 80-25 requires that " appropriate operating procedures shall be provided to guide operator response to such an occurrence of high or low supply pressure".
In addition, the NYPA response dated March 19, 1981, stated " implementation of Annunciator Response procedures is expected during the fall 1981 outage." The high and low pressure alarms are a common alarm which is annunciated on the process computer.
There are no procedures for alarms received on the computer.
The licensee has proposed a modi-fication to install a control room annunciator with an appropriate response procedure.
The item is unresolved pending review of NYPA's actions during a subsequent inspection. (333/87-19-01)
10.
Safety Relief Valve Testing On July 10, 1987, NYPA and the NRC were informed that the cause of the failure of two Target Rock Safety Relief Valves (SRV) to lift during manual operation at the Brunswick 1 facility was excessive use of loctite in the solenoid air operator.
NYPA was informed by the valve manufacturer that this condition was caused by an inexperienced technician who rebuilt the Brunswick 1 operators.
During the past refueling outage ending April 1987, all of FitzPatrick's SRV solenoid operators had been rebuilt; I
however, the manufacturer indicated that a more experienced technician had rebuilt NYPA's operators.
Based on the safety significance and the concern that a similar condition may exist, NYPA voluntarily tested the operability of the SRVs.
On July 16, 1987, NYPA individually operated seven of the eleven SRVs from the control room.
The valves tested perform the Automatic Depressuriza-tion System function and were chosen as a representative sample to assure that a problem similar to Brunswick's did not exist. All valves opened satisfactorily during the tests.
The inspector witnessed the test and verified the proper indications of the SRVs opening.
The inspector verified the operation of the acoustic monitor including alarm printout and operation of the temperature recorder.
However, the inspector noted that no alarms were received as a result of high SRV discharge temperature. A process computer alarm is currently disabled and the setpoint of the control room annunciator appears to be set higher than the temperature that would be reached for a leaking or a short duration lift of an SRV.
The licensee is reviewing the setpoints which activates the control room annunciator and preparing a modification to change the setpoint.
The item is unresolved pending review of NYPA's actions during a subsequent inspection (333/87-19-02).
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Discussion with Senior Plant Manager Concerning Sleeping Allegations On August 20, 1987, the inspector discussed with senior plant management the seriousness and significance of recent events concerning operator sleeping / inattentiveness at another reactor facility.
The Resident Manager stated there have been no instances or allegations of inattentive-ness at FitzPatrick since this event occurred.
Although no formal mechanism exist for raising employee concerns, the Resident Manager has an open door policy which has been discussed at meetings with all plant personnel.
Also, in training sessions personnel are instructed to raise concerns either to their supervisors, the Quality Assurance Department, or the Resident Manager.
In addition, the Resident Manager agreed to notify the NRC through the senior resident inspector of any instances or allegations of inattentiveness to licensed or regulated duties.
12.
Bypassing of Nonessential Diesel Trips The inspector reviewed the bypassing of nonessential diesel generator trips in accordance with Region I Temporary Instruction (TI) 87-04.
The diesel generators have bypasses on the trips for low lube oil pressure and high cooling water temperature when the diesel generators start under a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal. There are no such bypasses for other start signals including Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). The inspector reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and found its description of the bypass consistent with the above.
The inspector reviewed operating procedures for the diesel generators (F-0P-22) and the wiring diagrams for the bypass (ESK-11BC and referenced diagrams) to verify that the above information was correct.
The inspector noted that the nonessential trips have no other design features (e.g., coincidence of inputs) to increase
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I their reliability.
The bypasses are tested on each of the four diesel generators once every operating cycle under surveillance test F-ST-9E.
The inspector reviewed the test procedure and the data sheet from the last completed test (April 19,1987). Also, the inspector reviewed the wiring diagrams for the bypass to verify that the test procedure was correct.
Based on the above review, the inspector concluded that the bypass of nonessential diesel generator trips was consistent with the FSAR and that i
plant documents were accurate.
I No violations were identified.
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13.
Unsealed Fire Barrier Electrical Penetrations During the performance of Maintenance Procedure MP-76.11, Electrical Pene-tration Seal ' surveillance Inspection, 224 out of 16,000 fire barrier electrical ?anetrations were found not to be sealed.
The majority of these penr crations were in small bore unscheduled conduit runs used for
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lighting, security and communications circuits.
The inspector verified g
the licensee applied proper compensatory measures in accordance with Technical Specifications for the unsealed barriers. The licensee immediately began sealing the affected penetrations.
This issue is unresolved and will be reviewed in a followup inspection. (333/87-19-03)
14. High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperability During the performance of F-ST-48, High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Rate / Pump Operability / Valve Operability Test, the turbine stop valve would not open with the steam line pressurized.
The valve did open slower than normal when steam pressure was removed.
Maintenance personnel first disassembled and inspected the stop valve hydraulic relay valve.
Minor scoring was found and the valve cleaned and reassembled.
Post-work testing revealed the stop valve still would not open with steam pressure applied.
During this testing it was found that the auxiliary oil pump discharge pressure was 40 psig, which is substan-tially less than the design of 85-90 psig.
This parameter was apparently overlooked or misread during initial troubleshooting.
The auxiliary ell pump was replaced and normal discharge pressure obtained. However, after balancing oil flows, the stop valve opened slower than allowed by the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Reinspection of the.stop valve hydraulic relay valve found scoring and nicks in the piston ring which are believed to be a' result of improper maintenance during the previous reassembly. After replacement of the piston rings and cleaning l
of the relay valve, the stop valve operated properly.
Disassembly of the removed auxiliary oil pump found the casing was worn due to a failed bearing.
The bearing had been replaced about four months prior to this event.
NYPA could not determine if the bearing failure was due to improper installation, material problem or other factors.
The licensee discussed these issues in the LER submitted.
NYPA demonstrated weak maintenance practices and lack of attention to detail in troubleshooting the initial cause of this event and damaging the hydraulic relay valve.
Corrective actions include review of the event with applicable maintenance personnel to emphasize proper maintenance practice and incorporation of this event into the training program.
No violations were identified.
15.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports
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Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports.
The review included the following: inclusion of infor. nation required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and deportability and validity of report informa-tion. The following periodic reports were reviewed:
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June-1987 Operating Status Report, dabjd July 9,1987.
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July 1987 Operating Status Report, dated A'! gust 7, 1987.
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i No unacceptable conditions were noted.
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16.
Exit Interview s
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At periodic intervals during thd course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
In addition, at thejend of the period, the ' inspector met with i
Mr. Converse, the> Resident Mandger, and summarized the sco?e and findings i
.of the inspection vis they are described in this report.
Based on the NRC Segion i review,of, thisareport and discussions held with
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NYPA' representatives during.the exit. meeting', it was determined that this report does ~.not contain information, subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions, s
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