IR 05000333/1987012
| ML20236K128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1987 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson, Meyer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236K126 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.K.3.28, TASK-TM 50-333-87-12, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-1, IEB-86-3, NUDOCS 8708060422 | |
| Download: ML20236K128 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-333/87-12
Docket No.
50-333 License No.
DPR-59 Category C
Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility:
J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Dower Plant Location:
Scriba, New York Dates:
May 6, 1987 - June 30, 1987 Inspectors:
A.J. Luptak, Senior Resident Inspector, Fit 7 Patrick W. L. Schmidt, Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point (
Reviewed by:
,k.
3 47yX7 u. W. Meyer, Pre' ct Engineer Date '
A hM $
Approved by:
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R'. Johnson, Chiff Reactor Date ProjectsSection$:,,DRP Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 6. 1987 - June 30, 1987 (Report No.
50-333/87-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine and reactive inspection during day ano backshift hours of Licensee Event Report review, operational safety verification, surveillance observations, maintenance observations, followup of a plant trip, followup of a licensee event, TMI Action Plan Item followup, IE Bulletin followup, and review of periodic and special reports. This involved a total of 151 inspection hours which included six hours of backshift and eight hours of weekend inspection coverage.
Backshif t inspection was conducted on June 25, 1987.
Weekend inspections were conducted on May 25 and June 20, 1987.
Results: During this period, no violations were identified. The licensee conducted a thorough review of significant events (plant trip and diesel start)
during this inspection period. An area of concern regarding discrepancies found between electrical distribution drawings is discussed in paragraph 5.e.
This issue is unresolved and currently under licensee review.
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iGS ABen 8585llp G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted During this inspection period, the inspector interviewed or held discussions with operators, technicians, and maintenance, contractor, engineering, administrative and supervisory personnel.
2.
Summary of Plant Activities The inspection period began with the plant operating at near full power after recent completion of a startup from a refueling outage.
A plant trip which occurred on June 10, 1987, was caused by low reactor vessel level due to the loss of the "A" reactor feed pump. A plant startup was begun on June 10, 1987 and power maintained about 65% (the capacity of I feed pump).. Full power operation was resumed on June 14, 1987. The plant remained near full power throughout the rest of the inspection period.
l 3.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review l
The inspector reviewed LERs to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported.
The inspector determined that each report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by
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details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, and l
generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
During this inspection period, the following LERs were reviewed:
LER 87-06 reported the automatic actuation of the Core Spray Systems and Emergency Diesel Generators during the performance of a Primary Contain-
ment Integrated Leak Rate Test.
Details of this event are discussed in j
Inspection Report No. 50-333/87-10.
i LER b/-07 reported the inoperability of reactor vessel head vent piping i
due to missing pipe supports. Details of this event are discussed in i
Inspection Report No. 50-333/87-10.
LER 87-03-01 is a supplemental LER concerning broken bolts found during the overhaul of the High Pressure Coolant Injection Turbine Throttle Valve. Metallurgical evaluation concluded.that the bolts failed as a result of stress-corrosion cracking caused by improper heat treating of I
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the bolts.
In addition, the use of an antiseizure compound containing copper may have contributed to the craching by produc'ng pitting for crack initiation. A review of this report was conducted by a Region I i
inspector who concluded the cause of failure was accurate.
The licensee is reviewing this incident' for 10 CFR 21 deportability in accordance with procedure NGP-10, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.
The inspector will review the licensee's determination during a subsequent inspection (333/87-12-01).
4.
Emergency Notification System Reports (ENS)
The inspector reviewed the following events which were reported to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
The review included a determination that the reporting requirements were met, that appropriate corrective actions had been taken, and that the event had been evaluated for possible generic implications.
The following reports were reviewed:
Event Date Subject June 10, 1987 A plant trip from full power due te low r': actor vessel level. (see Paragraph 8)
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June 11. 1987 An Engineered Safety Feature actuation (Emergency Diesel Generator start) occurred due to a
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momentary degraded voltage condition during a
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transfer of houseloads during a plant startup.
(see Paragraph 9)
5.
Operational Safety Verification a.
Control Room Observations Daily, the inspector verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operation of the plant. F.lected lit
" annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify
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that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
The inspector observed shift turnovers biweekly to ensure proper control room and shift manning. The
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inspector directly observed the operations listed below to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
Routine power operations.
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Plant startup on Jure 11, 1987.
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Issuance of Radiation Work Permits and Work Request /Even / Deficiency forms.
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No violations were identified.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records Selected shift logs and cperating records were reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and trends in performance, detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements, determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as required, and assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs.
No violations were identified.
c.
Plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspector made observations and conducted tours of the plant.
During the plant tours, the inspector conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. Tnis included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated valves were not mechanically blocked. The inspector also checked fire protection, housekeeping and cleanliness, radiation protection, and physical security conditions to ensure compliance with plant procedures and regulatory requirements.
No violations were identified.
d.
Tagout Verification The inspector vorii ed that the following safety-related protective l
tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves:
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PTR 871328 on Reactor Water Cleanup System.
PTR 871330 on "A" Control Rod Hydraulic Pump.
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I PTR 871447 on the Environmental Enclosure Air Conditioning Unit
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for L-16 switchgear.
No violations were identified.
e.
Emergency System Operability The inspector verified operability of the following systems by ensuring that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was in the correct position, by confirming that power supplies and breakers
'cre properly aligned for components that must activate upor an initiation signal, and by visual inspection of the major components which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements:
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Conta"nment Atmosphere Dilution System.
Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil and Air Start Systems.
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"B" Residual Heat Removal System.
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120 VAC Electrical Distribution System.
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The inspector conducted the walkdown of the 120 VAC electrical distribution systems, comparing the plants Operating Procedures (0P)
drawings to the distribution panel breaker position. The OP drawings are controlled drawings, originating from the as-built drawings and used by operators throughout the plant.
The inspector found one case where the OP drawing indicated that a load (Post Accident Sample Station Fanel) was attached to a breaker and the breaker was found open.
It was determined that the OP drawing was in error and that a modification had made this a spare breaker. However, the inspector found additional cases where breakers indicated as spares on the OP were shut.
The licensee's policy is that spare breakers remain open.
In attempting te determine why the breakers were shut, the inspector compared the OP drawings to the electrical as-built drawings and found numerous discrepancies between these drawings.
The inspector was informed that the ' licensee is in the process of having a licensed shift operator verify the 120VAC distribution panels.
For the past year, during shift and relief duties, this
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individual has been verifying the panels by inspecting the cable labels-on each-panel and using as-built and modification drawings to determine the current loads on each panel.
This verification effort was begun to verify the loads for the startup electrical check list and to develop operator aids for the distribution panels describing the loads off each breaker, i
The inspector provided the licensee with the list of discrepancies, and the licensee determined which drawing was correct and submitted changes to update the incorrect drawings.
Errors were found in both the OP and as-built drawings and were the result of a failure to properly update drawings following modifications.
Breakers which were indeed spares were opened.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's program may eventually provide an accurate account of tne distribution panels. However, with only one individual, the time frame to complete the task is unclear and may be excessive.
In addition, better methods are needed to assure electrical drawings are updated following modifications to maintain these drawings accurate.
This item is unresolved pending further review of licensee's drawing program (333/87-12-02).
6.
Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testing.
F-ST-48, High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Rate / Pump Operability /
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Valve Operability, Rev. 27, dated November 5, 1986, performed May 26, I
1987.
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F-ISP-66-4, Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Water Level Transmitter Calibration, Rev. 5, dated April 24, 1987, performed May 29, 1987.
F-ST-26M, Reactor Water Cleanup System Valve Testing, Rev. S, dated
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September 10, 1986, performed June 23, 1987.
The inspector also witnessed all aspects of the following surveillance test to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to technical
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specification requirements and had been properly approved, limiting conditions for operation for removing equipment from service were met, testing was cerformed by qualified personnel, test results met technical specification requirements, the surveillance test documentation was reviewed, and equipment was properly restored to service following the test.
F-ST-5B, Average Power Range Monitor Instrument Functional Test, Rev.
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7, dated June 4, 1986, performed June 25, 1987.
No violations were identified.
7.
Maintenance Observations a.
The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, that these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation, that required administrative approvals and tagouts were l
obtained prior to initiating the work, that approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills of the trade," that appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, that ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and that equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
b.
During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
WR 03/55340, overhaul "A" Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Pump.
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WR 27/53865, troubleshoot Containment Atmosphere Dilution System Trouble Alarm Circuit.
WR 23/55274, troubleshoot High Pressure Coolant Injection
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Turbine Speed Indication.
No violations were identified.
8.
Followup on P* ant Trip At 12:34 a.m. on June 10, 1987, the reactor tripped from full power due to low reactor vessel level. The low level occurred when the "A" Reactor Feed Pump tripped. As reactor water level decreased due to the feed pump trip, operator action was taken to reset the recirculation motor generator scoop tube speed controls which have been kept locked up due to flow
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oscillations while operating near full power.
Resetcing the scoop tubes allowed the recirculation pumps to runback to 44% speed, thereby reducing power within the capacity of one feedpump.
The operator observed that the
level appeared to stabilize and then began increasing when the low level scram occurred.
All plant systems functioned as designed following the trip.
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The cause of the feed pump trip could not be determined by indications or i
annunciators. However, following the trip, the inboard pump seal was j
found to have failed on the A feed pump; it is believed that this failure i
resulted in a pump suction pressure transient tripping the pump. The l
licensee found that the low suction pressure computer alarm setpoint was about one psi lower than the feed pump turbine trip setpoint.
In addition, the licensee concluded that operating with the scoop tubes locked up may have contributed to the magnitude of the level transient. A modification to correct the scoop tube control problem is in progress and expected to be installed during the next refueling outage, September 1988.
The inspector reviewed the process computer alarm printout, the post-trip log, various chart recorders, and the completed data sheets for procedure No. PS0 53, " Post Trip Evaluation".
Based on these reviews the inspector determined that the operator's actions during the event were proper end in accordance with approved procedures and the plant responded as designed.
No violations were identified.
9.
Followup on Emergency Diosel Generator Actuation On June 11, 1987, while conducting a plant startup following a plant trip on June 10, 1987, all four Emergency Diesel Generators (both trains)
started due to a momentary degraded voltage condition. As per plant
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startup procedure OP-65 after placing the main turbine generator on the
grid, operators were in the process of transferring 4160v house loads from offsite power to the main turbine generator output.
The offsite power cupply (115kv) has a normal operating range as per the plant's Final
Safety Analysis Report between 117kv to 122kv'. A minimum voltage of 116kv i
is expected, however a voltage of 115 kv is also considered in the
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analysis.
During the refueling outage ending in April 1987, the licensee made their degraded grid voltage protection system operational.
The protection system initiat2s if the 4160v bus voltage decreases below 3780v for greater than 9 seconds. After the diesels start and reach 76%
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of rated voltage, if bus voltage has not returned to normal, the normal bus supply breakers are automatically opened and the EDG output breakers closed.
During the transfer of house loads, offsite voltage was approximately 116ky which results in about 3850v on the house load centers.
The lower than normal voltage condition is not uncommon and occurs during warm daylight hours.
The transferring of house loads is accomplished on four separate electrical busses.
The 10100 and 10200 busses supply the recirculation system motor generators and are transferred first. The 10300 and 10400 busses supply the rest of the plant loads including the safety-related busses (10500 and 10600). The degraded voltage condition is measured on the. safety-related busses.
To match voltage between the offsite power supply and the output of the main turbine generator, a transformer adjustable load tap changer is used.
As noted above, safety-related bus voltage supplied by offsite power was about 3850v prior to the transfer evolution.
The operator transferred the 10100, 10200 and 10400 busses without incident adjusting the load tap changer prior to each transfer operation to match voltages between the power supplies. After completing the transfer of the 10300 bus, and therefore having all busses on the generator output, the operator began increasing the voltage with the load tap changer.
As the operator began to increase voltage, all four diesels started because the voltaga had decreased due to the transfer.
However, in the 10 seconds for the diesels to reach rated voltage, the t s voltage had increased sufficiently resetting the logic and preventing swapping of power supplies to the safety-related busses. Although the operator was aware that voltage was low, no annun-ciators exist to inform the operator that he has reached the degraded voltage conditions.
The licensee's corrective actions include procedural changes and
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additional training to increase the operators' awareness of this possible condition, addition of an annunciator circuit to inform the operator when the timer has started, and re-evaluation of the degraded voltage setpoint and time delay to possibly achieve a larger margin from anticipated transients.
The inspector will review the licensee's corrective actions when completed. (333/87-12-03)
No violations were identified.
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l 10.
Licensee Actions on IE Bulletins a.
Bulletin 86-01, Minimum Flow Logic Problems That Could Disable' RHR Pumps.
This bulletin requests that the licensee determine whether a failure of a single minimum flow recirculation valve could cause the loss of more than one train of the Residual Heat Removal System i
(RHR).
The licensee submitted.the results of their review by letter dated June 4, 1986. The inspector reviewed FSAR sections, operating and surveillance test procedures, and logic diagrams for RHR.
Based on this review the inspector determined that a single failure of an
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RRR minimum flow recirculation could not cause loss of more than one train and found the licensee's evaluation to be satisfactory.
This L
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bulletin is closed.
b.
Bulletin 86-03, Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air Operated Valves in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line.
This bulletin requests the licensee to evaluate the possibility of a i
single failure of a minimum flow recirculation valve affecting another train of an Emergency Core Cooling System.
The licensee conducted this review for the Residual Heat Removal System as
requested by Bulletin 86-01 (see above).
The licensee's response to Bulletin 86-03 was by letter dated November 14, 1986.
The inspector reviewed this response, FSAR sections, operating and surveillance test procedures, and logic diagrams for the Core Spray System (CS).
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Based on this review and the closure of Bulletin 86-01, the inspector l
determined that a failure of a single minimum flow recirculation valve in either the CS or RHR Systems could not cause the loss of more than one train in these systems and that the licensee's evaluation is satisfactory.
This bullctin is closed.
i 11. TMI Task Action Plan Item Followup II.K.3.28 Verify Qualification of Accumulators on Automatic Depressurization System ( ADS) Valves In letter number JPN-85-24, dated April 1, 1985, the licensee stated that the ADS accumulator system would be upgraded during the 1986 refueling outage to remain functional for periods up to 100 da.s following a postulated accideat.
In a letter dated July 24, 1985, t.? found the licensee to have sufficiently verified the ADS accumulato ustem, including the commitment to upgrade the system, for icng t.
.,2 ration.
Based on a review of the modification package (No. F1-84-72) and
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observations during plant tours, the inspector verified that this modification of the ADS accumulator system was completed during the 1987 refueling outage. This modification included installation of a new supply line and upgrading the existing supply line to ensure adequate pneumatic supply to the ADS valves for 100 days following an accident.
This item is closed.
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12.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports.
Thv review included the following: inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and deportability and validity of report information.
The following periodic reports were reviewed:
-- April 1987 Operating Status Report, dated May 8,1987.
-- May 1987 Operating Status Report, dated June 9, 1987.
-- Cycle 8 Startup Testing Report dated, May 29, 1987.
No unacceptable conditions were noted.
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13. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. The unresolved item identified during this inspection is d4scussed in paragraph 5.e.
14.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
In addition, at the end of the period, the inspector met with licensee representatives and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report.
I Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives during the exit meating, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.
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