IR 05000333/1987003
| ML20207T364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1987 |
| From: | Gray E, Kaplan H, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207T359 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-87-03, 50-333-87-3, NUDOCS 8703230483 | |
| Download: ML20207T364 (5) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-333/87-03 Docket No. 50-333 License No. OPR-59 Licensee:
power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: -Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted: January 26-30, 1987
' Inspectors:
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J/9/87 E. H. Gray, Lead R r Engineer date aen sMr7 H. J. Kaplan', Lead Reactor Engineer
' date Approved by:
Jd/B7
[y'.R.Strosnider, Chief,Materialsand date V Processes Section, EB, DRS Inspection Summary:
Routine, unannounced inspection on January 26-30, 1987 (Inspection Report No. 50-333/87-03)
Areas Inspected:
Inservice testing program, containment head, Welding Section, Core Spray valve replacement, Quality Assurance, Feedwater Piping and Refuel Bridge.
Results: No violations-were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Power Authority of the State of New York S. Bhalla Materials Engineer
- N.
Chapman
. Weld Engineer
- R. Converse Resident Manager
- T. Dougherty Director, BWR Operations and Maintenance
- W.
Fernandez Superintendent of Power
- J.
Lafferty Nuclear Operations and Maintenance
- R. Patch QA Superintendent
- R. Penny ISI Coordinator
- D. Sancic Manager, Nuclear Planning
- V. Walz-Technical Services Superintendent U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- A. Luptak, Senior Resident Inspector r
The inspector held discussions also with other licensee employees during-the course of the inspection.
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting held on January 30, 1987.
2.
Containment Head During a plant tour the inspector examined the flange of the containment pressure boundary (drywell) head which had been removed for refueling activities. The containment head sealing flange is of a tongue and groove design with two concentric rubber "0" rings. The condition of localized rust on the flange and tongue was noted as was the presence of an elastic.
material between portions of the tongues.
The inspector reviewed portions of the procedure titled " Reassembly of Reactor Vessel," MP-4.2 but did not identify controls to provide for rust prevention or use of an elastic material on the flange or tongue surfaces of the drywell head.
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The inspector also noted that Procedure MP-4.2, paragraph 7.10.28 requires a bolt tension change to 200,000 ft-lbs from the 3000 ft-lbs. of paragraph 7.10.27 with a bolt rotation of h turn. This increase in torque value does not appear consistent with the specified bolt rotation, considering the fine threading of the bolt. The concerns of gradual degradation of the drywell head flange surfaces by ambient condition rust formation i
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during outages, presence of an elastic compound of unknown origin on the flange surface and a possible procedural problem with bolt torque require-ments were brought to the attention of the licensee. The foregoing items l
are considered unresolved pending licensee determination that adequate l
procedural controls exist to assure proper preservation of the containment head flange and that the correct torquing values are specified.
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(333/87-03-01)
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3.
Refuel Bridge The bolted and welded structural and non-structural connections of the existing refuel bridge were examined by the NRC inspector to determine the integrity of the bridge. Several missing nuts and bolts were observed although these were from nonstructural components that were not from locations over the fuel pool. Some small nuts and washers were observed on the refuel floor adjacent to the refuel bridge track.
Refcel bridge bolting nuts were observed to not be lock wired. The inspector concluded that the licensee has not fully implemented steps to prevent the possi-bility of loose parts from the refuel bridge from entering the fuel pool.
This item is unresolved pending verification of adequate refuel bridge maintenance practices. (333/87-03-02)
4.
Welding The inspector witnessed a portion of a repair to a Category I carbon steel isolation valve (12-RWC-46) in the reactor water cleanup system which had been damaged in transportation at the site.
Repair involved removal of the two stainless steel by pass nipples which were previously bent, and their replacement. The work was performed in accordance with B31.1.
The inspector reviewed the applicable socket weld procedures (SS-8/8-8 and BM-8/1-B), welder qualificacion records, and filler metal requisitions, and found no discrepancies.
The inspector observed that the proper grades of filler material had been obtained from storage and that the welders were very careful during the fit up and tacking stages to assure the presence of the 1/16 gap at the bottom of the socket.
Review of the QC inspection records revealed that the affected areas had been liquid penetrant inspected after removal of the bent pipe nipples.
The inspector examined one of the completed socket welds and found it to have been ground smooth and free of visible defects. The work was performed in the presence of the licensee's responsible engineer and Pipe Fitting Supervisor, and a representative of the valve manufacturer (Anchor Darling). The presence of the valve manufacturer was requested by the licensee to assure the serviceability of the valve after repair.
No violations were identified.
A review of a proposed buttering procedure CS-But-Auto disclosed that type 308L filler material was to be used to prepare carbon steel welds for transition to stainless steel.
It is common knowledge that this combination of materials is susceptible to the formation of brittle martensite due to weld metal dilution.
Discussions of this with the licensee's weld engineering staff resulted in a change to 309 which is more tolerant of dilution.
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The inspector's review of the licensee's welding program indicated that all site welding was being effectively controlled by the licensee's Welding Engineer as verified by a document review of various records as required by JAF Site Manuals WAp-01&O2. All welding activities were under the direct control of the licensee except for hiring. This activity was handled by CBI. The inspector also observed various automatic welding and cutting equipment which were being operated for training purposes. These included equipment for producing stainless groove welds, weld overlay, and cutting and machining weld preps.
No violations were identified.
The inspector examined three completed carbon steel welds involving the replacement of Valve 14-MOV-5B in the core spray system. The work was authorized by Mod No. FI-85-009 in accordance with ASME XI requirements.
Portions of two welds (4" and 5") were not smooth ground resulting in slight stress concentrations in the transition zones between the weld and adjoining base metal. The licensee subsequently corrected the condition with a pencil grinder. The inspector also reviewed the applicable weld procedure (CS-1/1-A), welder qualification records, and weld data sheets and found no discrepancies.
The inspector reviewed the second set of radiographs taken of 3W2315278, welds 3, 4 and 5 prior to their submittal to and acceptance by the licensee.
The following deficiencies were noted with respect to conformance to the ASME Code Section V and the RT procedure UST-RT-EG:
(1) 2T holes were not clearly discernable, (2) a wide variation in density including one film which failed to meet minimum requirement (1.50 versus 2.00), and (3)
sharpness was not defined.
The licensee indicated that these radiographs were the initial radiographs produced by the subcontractor in the current outage, and agreed that significant improvement was required to assure quality radiographs. The licensee acknowledged the radiographic problem and has provided for QA-QC coverage in resolution of the radiographic contractor start-up problems.
5.
Quality Assurance The inspector reviewed the planned Modification FI-78-034 covering the removal and capping of the recirculation by pass line with regard to QA involvement. The records showed that QA had reviewed FI-78-034 and incor-porated numerous comments on December 3, 1986. The inspector also veri-fied that PORC (Plant Operation Review Committee) had reviewed the subject modification and that their comments were resolved or incorporated by the responsible engineer of the Technical Services Group. Work was scheduled for the week of February 2, 1987.
The inspector also verified that Quality Control signatures were recorded for five hold points under Modification FI-85-009 as discussed above.
No violations were identified.
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6.
Feedwater Inlet Line 58 Through' Wall Defect
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The inspector examined a 3/8" long transverse defect in the carbon steel weld (WFP-401-168) that.was found by the licensee to be leaking water.
This weld joins a 20" pipe to a 22" x 20" reducing elbow in the feedwater (FW) system which connects to the E-5B FW heater. Wall thickness ' measure-ments were taken by the NRC inspector of this weld, the pipe and elbow for comparison to the data in the licensee report dated December'15, 1986.
The measurements of 0.770" to.780" for the pipe, 0.690" for the weld and 1.32" for the elbow indicated that no significant general erosion or cor-rosion had occurred in the vicinity of the leak. The NRC measurements were consistent with the licensee findings. The licensee plans to eval-uate the defect including removal of a metallurgical sample. Subsequent to this inspection, the presence of thirteen similar defects, although subsurface, were identified.
7.
ISI Program Activities The inspector reviewed the scope of the outage Inservice Inspection (ISI)
examinations for comparison to the ASME Code Section XI and NUREG 0313, Revision 2 Guidelines. Qualification records of NDE personnel were selected and reviewed for conformance to procedural and SNT requirements.
The MINAC, a high dose rate X-ray machine was proposed as the method for examining six welds in the RHR system. The inspector attended a MINAC planning meeting and reviewed the safety procedures and licensee controls applicable to use of this radiographic equipment.
No violations were identified.
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 2 and 3.
9.
The inspector met with licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1, on January 30, 1987 to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection.
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.
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