IR 05000333/1987001
| ML20210V433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1987 |
| From: | Hawxhurst J, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210V421 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-87-01, 50-333-87-1, NUDOCS 8702190019 | |
| Download: ML20210V433 (5) | |
Text
__
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
REGION I
Report No. 50-333/87-01
Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59 Priority Category C
Licensee:
New York Power Authority P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 i
i Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted: January 12-15, 1987 f
Inspector:
b.
Ft/~. /o, /SF7 l
J. (J. Haw 2urst, Emergency Preparedness date '
Specialist
'
Approved By:
et W 4 e p '
_f e
W.' La7,4fus, Se): tion Chief,
' dat'e Emergency PVeparedness Section (
Inspection Summary: Inspection on January 12-15, 1987 (Report No. 50-333/87-01).
!
l Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced emergency preparedness inspection. The inspection areas included: Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program, Equipment, Audits, Training (which includes Table top scenario discussions with
,
i some emergency response personnel); and followup on previous inspection
'
findings, Results: Two previous inspector followup items were closed. No violations i
l were identified.
i
!
l g?/GES EEh??
O L
. - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - - -_ _ ___ ___ __
v
.
e i-
}
1.0 Persons Contacted
i
- R. Patch, QA Superintenrient i
j
- R. Converse, Resident Manager
- T. Teifke, Security Superintendent j
- W. Fernandez, Superintendent of Power
'
j
- D. Linsey, Operations Superintendent
- E. Mulcahey, RESS i
- A. Zaremba, Acting EPC R. Makt, Shift Su pervisor
i D. Squires, Shif t Supervisor R. Locy, Ass istant Operations Superintendent i
i T. Coffey, Software Specialist
!
D. Ackley, Emergency Planning Trainer i
M. Prarie, Assistant Emergency Planning Coordinator
.
!
J. Halley, Security Supervisor
M. Warchol, Security Coordinator
<
- Denotes those present at exit interview
2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings i
a)
CLOSED (50-333/86-07-01): The licensee presently has no policy or
guidelines for what emergency equipment modifications may be made, or i
i
!
by who se authority during emergency situations.
"
The inspector noted that the licensee has modified EAP-13, " Damage
'
Contrel" procedure providing for emergency equipment modifications
}
and appropriate documentation including the authorizing individual.
)
b)
CLOSED (50-333/84-10-04): Meteorological monitoring program, i
j i
Provide a complete description of the FitzPatrick (Niagara Mohawk)
i
!
meteorological monitoring program in FSAR Section 2.2 in the next i
revision.
<
l The meteorological monitoring system is described in Section 7.3.3.7
'
of the Emergency Plan. Wind speed, wind direction, and temperature i
sensors are installed on a tower at 30,100, and 200 foot elevations i
above plant grade.
The data collected by these sensors are tele-
metered to the Control Room and TSC and are continuously recorded on I
strip charts.
This data is also available in the EOF.
'
i i
!
As a backup to the primary system JAFNPP has an onsite meteorological
!
i tower (pole) with the capability to measure the wind speed and di-
!
rection and an indication of atmospheric stability at the 90 foot j
level. A 30 foot inland tower is also maintained as an additional source of meteorological data.
'
I
.
i
-
!
!
n-
,
,. - -,,... - - - - - -
... _,,. _
-.__
,., _, - -. - _ _ - _ _ _ - -
. -, _ _ _ _ -., - -.
... - -..
.
_
.
.
JAFNPP has implemented surveillance procedures which provide for remote interrogation of the meteorological monitoring system.
SAP-9, IDAC (Initial Dose Assessment Calculation)/MMRAS (Meteorological Monitoring and Radiological Assessment System) Surveillance Proce-dure, dated October 1, 1986 provides instructions for the proper surveillance of IDAC and MMRAS. The surveillance procedure is performed biweekly at an MMRAS station, i.e. Control Room, TSC or EOF.
SAP-10, Meteorological Monitoring System Surveillance, dated October 9, 1985 provides for a biweekly operation and inspection check on the meteorological recorders located in the Control Room and TSC with computer output from the Niagara Mohawk-NYPA meteorological Systems.
In addition, the strip chart paper shall be replaced once per month.
This procedure aho provides for a routine inspection of Niagara Mohawk's Site Weather Station Instrument Surveillance Reports.
The inspector determined that this area was adequately addressed.
3.0 Operational Status of tha Emergency Preparedness Program
'
3.1 Audits The inspector examined an independent audit report on the emergency preparedness program for 1986. The audit was conducted in compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(t) requirements.
The audit team consisted of two Quality Assurance auditors and one specialist.
The NRC inspector reviewed the scope and audit findings. The licensee audit appeared complete, covering the following areas: equipment, EP procedures, interfaces with state and local government, training and discussions with persons in the emergency organization.
The licensee auditors identified four areas of possible non-conformance.
The licensee adequately tracked all audit concerns, including both areas of non-conformance and improvement items. No inadequacies were identified.
3.2 Equipment and Facilities The inspector toured the Control Room, Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility.
Selected equipment was checked for operability, calibration, and maintenance. The inspector identified three minor problems:
operational display for certain meteorological parameters in the TSC was an hour behind; the dose assessment ter-minal-computer interface (modem) has a bad connection, preventing the TSC dose assessment operator from immediately accessing the MMRAS syste,, and; the 708 data acquisition system could not initially trend data.
The 708 data acquisition system software was modified to
.
.
o
fix the problem with trending prior to the inspection exit.
In general, all other equipment checked was found to be well maintained, calibrated and operable. The licensee agreed to correct the problems discussed above. No inadequacies were identified.
3.3 Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures The inspector reviewed changes submitted to Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) for 1986. The inspector verified that changes made to the Emergency Preparedness Program have not adversely affected the licensees overall state of emergency preparedness. No inadequacies were identified.
3.4. Training and Walk-Throughs The inspector checked records of key emergency response personnel on a sampling basis to verify they had been appropriately trained.
The inspector noted that the records had been computerized, which made the audit process easy and efficient. A system was in place to notify personnel who needed re-training and track those individuals until training was complete or they were removed from the emergency organization.
The inspector interviewed a small select sample of individuals in the emergency organization. Five senior licensed individuals who may be called upon to act as an Emergency Director (ED) were chosen. A similar scenario was discussed with each individual assuming they
-
were acting as the on-shift ED. Their knowledge of the basic func-tions, such as: detection of the problem; stabilization of the plant; classification of the event; and, notification of offsite authori-ties, were clearly evident. Also, dose assessment and protective action decisionmaking were considered by all. Although final recommended actions were different, the inspector determined all actions were acceptable, and concluded that the weakest area, based on the scenario given, was the safeguards / safety interface.
The training of the ED appeared to be effective in the areas discussed except as noted.
The licensee agreed to consider providing practical refresher train-ing during the implementation of On-Shift Training Procedure No. 24.
The introduction of short scenarios will develop more consistency and help maintain emergency response skills.
The inspector identified a weakness in the interface between safe-guards and operational safety during radiological emergencies.
The following areas were of concern:
no triggering mechan. ism to susoect._ sabotage;
-
no guidelines to verify the security of other safety systems; and,
-
no procedures specifying the type of counter measures to
-
conside _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _
.
..
The licensee agreed to consider the findings and recommendations made in NUREG/CR-4093, " Safety / Safeguards Iterations during Safety-Related Emergencies at Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities". No inadequacies were identified and the licensee agreed to take the appropriate actions for improvement in this area.
4.0. Exit Meeting The inspector met with the licensee personnel denoted in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection.
The licensee was informed that two pre-viously open items were closed and no new items were noted. Also, no violations had been identified. The inspector also discussed some areas for improvement and the licensee acknowledged the findings and agreed to consider them.
At no time during this inspection were written materials given to the licensee.
-_
%
b e
?
e
/
,
b Y
W
/