IR 05000327/1989029
| ML20006D948 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1990 |
| From: | Jenison K, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006D945 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-89-29, 50-328-89-29, NUDOCS 9002150291 | |
| Download: ML20006D948 (26) | |
Text
p
'
ta
.,..,,m'.
su
.
I
- gn Ab4'o
UNITE 3 STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
, [
_
REotONil
101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
-
'g
,,
,
~*
'#'
ATLANTA. oEoRot A 30323
'
\\,...../
.
.
.
Report Nos.:
50-327/89-29 and 50-328/89-29
,
licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place L
1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.:
,
facility Name:
Sequoyah 1 and 2 L
' Inspection Conducted:
December 5, 1989 - January 9, 1990 Lead Inspector:
oNdEML,8tuddat 2v
/!$/fo
'
K. Jenison,fSenior Resi#ent Inspector Oath S/gned Inspectors:
P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector D. Loveless, Resident Inspector
'
Approved by:
O /d4b
/ / /d Linda J. Watf6n, Chief Dath Sfgned TVA Projects Section 1 TVA Projects Division Office of Special Projects
!
SUMMARY Scope:
This announced inspection involved inspection effort by the Resident Inspectors-in the area' of operational safety verification including control room observations, operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection, safeguards,. and housekeeping inspections.
Other areas inspected included maintenance observations, surveillance testing observations, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of ev.ents, review of ' licensee
,
identified items, and review of inspector follow-up items.
'
.Results:
One event, the failure of several Refueling Water Storage Tank level indicators Edue 'to - freezing, involved a failure to adequately correct a known plant
,
'a-condition, as cited in VIO 327,328/89-29-01, Failure to Follow Administrative
' Instruction (AI)-12, Corrective Actions.
.
-The Unit 1 RHR pumps were found to have a pump-to pump interaction problem l
which'.was ' causing deadheading of the weaker pump. This particular issue was the subject of NRC Bulletin 88-04.
The cause for this condition and the corrective actions to resolve it are still under review.
~9002150291 900130 i
PDR ADOCK 05000327
.,
O PIIC
{
Mi r
.
,.
i-,
.
...
4"
.
,W
,.
ls
o n
. In general, the areas of Operations, HP,- and Surveillance were. adequate and
~ fully. capable'to support current plant operations. The observed activities of
'
the control room operators were professional and well executed during two of
.
the plant transients:that occurred during this inspection period. The control
' room operators' cognizance of illuminated control board annunciators continued-
<
to.be an' area of concern.
The area of Maintenance was found to be adequate. However, the maintenance and material condition of secondary plant equipment caused or contributed to a
' reactor trip and a turbine generator runback that occurred during this-inspection period.
The~ area of security was capable to support current plant operations. However, the material condition of equipment in the Central Alarm Station was degraded,
,
and several security organization related deficiencies were identified.
- One violation was identified:
VIO 327,328/89-29-01, Failure to Follow AI-12, paragraph 7.d.
- Two noncited violations (NCV) were identified:
NCV 327,328/89-29-06, Fuel Contract Compliance with 10 CFR 21, paragraph 5.
'
'NCV 327,328/89-29-07, Upper Head Injection Maintenance, paragraph 4.e.
Four unresolved items (URI)* were identified:
URI. 327,328/89-29-02, Security Related Issues (with-four. examples),
paragraph 2e.
'
URI 327,328/89-29-03, Compliance with 10 CFR 50.59 (with two examples),
paragraphs 7 a and 7.d.
URI 327,328/89-29-04, NRC Bulletin 88-04 Response, paragraph 7.a.
URI, 327,328/89-29-05, Graded QA Approach and the Release from QC Hold Points, paragraph 4.d.
.
'
Two-inspector followup items (IFI) were identified:
IFI 327,328/89-29-08, Safety Related and Secondary Plant Maintenance, r
paragraphs 4.b.,
4.c., 7.b., 7.c, and 7.e.
IFI 327,328/89-29-09, Power Ascension and Assistant Shift Supervisor Relief, paragraph 2.d.
No deviations were identified.
- Unresolved items are matters which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
,
.
m C :,
s.
$ 3,
'
s b(
L,
___ __
REPORT DETAILS
,
!
h 1.
Persons Contacted i
Licensee' Employees J. Bynum,'Vice President, Nuclear Power Production
L W. Byrd, Acting Site Director
'#*C. Vondra, Plant Manager T. Arney, Quality Control Manager
'
,
!>
- R. Beecken, Maintenance Manager
- M. Burzynski, Site Licensing Manager
- M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager
- S. Crowe, Site Quality Manager
- T. Flippo, Quality Surveillance Supervisor
- J. Gates, Technical Support Manager
- W. Lagergren, Jr., Operations Manager
- M. Lorek, Operations Manager
.R. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Group Supervisor R. Rogers, Supervisor Engineering Support Section M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Manager
- S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer C..Whittemore, Licensing Engineer 4;
NRC Employees:
,
- B. A. Wilson, Assistant Director, TVA Projects, ADSP, NRR-
l
- Attended exit interview on January 5, 1990
'
- Participated in telecon for exit interview on January 9, 1990
,
!
Acronyms.and initialisms used-in this report are listed in the last l
Jparagraph.
j 2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
l
!
a.
Control Room Observations The inspectors conducted' discussions with control room operators, verified that proper control room staffing was maintained,. verified
'
that access to the control room was properly controlled, and.that.
operator behavior was commensurate with the plant configuration and i
plant activities in progress, and with on going control room
!
operations.
The operators were observed adhering to appropriate, f
approved procedures, including Emergency Operating Procedures, for l
.j
[L,
e l
e
,;
.
!!!it
s
the~on-going activities.
Additionally, the frequency of visits to
>
,
e the control room by upper management was observed and was determined to be adequate.
The inspector also verified that the licensee was operating the plant in' a normal plant configuration as required by TS and when abnormal conditions existed, that the operators were complying with the appropriate LC0 action statements. The inspector verified that leak rate calculations were performed and that.the results of the leakage
rate calculations were within the TS limits.
l The inspectors observed instrumentation and recorder traces for
!
abnormalities and verified the status of selected control ' room annunciators to ensure that control room operators understood the status of the plant, In two instances, the operators did not appear
-
to have complete familiarity with illuminated annunciators within the control panel horseshoe area. The two indications involved a control valve for the Unit 2, #3 Heater Drain Collection Tank and seal flow i
for the Unit 1, #1 Reactor Coolant Pump.
In each case the operator was able to brief the inspector on the issue within an hour.
'
However, each of these illuminated annunciators had been long standing and the level of activity in the control room had been low for an extended period of time. The NRC had previously identified a weakness in the professional inquisitiveness of control room-
!
operators in IR 327, 328/89-27.
!
'
i Panel. indications were reviewed for the nuclear instruments,- the emergency power sources, the safety parameter display system and the i
'
radiation monitors to ensure operability and operation within TS limits, Two indications of Rod Position Indication ma'lfunctions occurred during this inspection period.
In both cases the operators-were knowledgeable and took adequate corrective actions.
l
!
No violations or deviations were identified.
!
i i
b.
Control Room Logs j
f The inspectors observed control room operations and reviewed
' applicable logs including the shif t logs, operating orders, night order book, clearance hold order book and the configuration log to obtain information concerning operating trends and activities.
The l
TACF log was reviewed to verify that' the use of jumpers and lifted a
leads causing equipment to be inoperable was clearly noted' and i
understood.
No issues were identified with these specific logs.
Plant chemistry reports were reviewed to confirm steam generator tube integrity in the secondary and to verify that primary plant chemistry was within TS limits.
[
l
f7 i
c = y}
p.
.
q a
.
,
,
'
t 3-
.
.
.
- --
,,.
In addition, the. implementation of the licensee's sampling program
"b was. observed-Plant. spectfic monitoring systems including seismic,.
-
y meteorological and - fire detection indications. were reviewed for operability. A review of surveillance records-and tagout logs was performed to confirm the operability of the RPS.
No violations or deviations were identified.
l c.
ECCS System Alignment
>
e The inspectoM walked down accessible portions of the following
,
safety-related systems on Units 1 and 2 to verify operability, flow -
path, heat sink, water supply, power supply, and proper valve and breaker alignment:
Units 1 and 2 Essential Raw Cooling Water
'
.In addition, the inspectors verified that a selected portion of the
- containment isolation lineup was correct.
- No deviations or violations were identified,
!
d.
Plant Tours-(1) Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine buildings, and exterior ' areas were conducted to observe plant
'
equipment conditions, potential fire hazards, control of
. ignition sources, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations ~, missile hazards and plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions. The plant was observed to be clean and in adequate condition.
The inspectors verified that maintenance work orders had been-
'
submitted as required and that followup. activities and
.;
prioritization of work was accomplished by the licensee.
(2) During a control room tour conducted on December 21, 1989, the inspector observed portions of-power ascensions being conducted
on both units.
Management presence in the control room was observed. On Unit 2 there was an apparent disagreement between the SOS and the AS0S. The SOS informed the ASOS and the Unit 2 Operators that the SOS had relieved the ASOS of the function of raising reactor power.
This issue was discussed with the licensee on several occasions between: December 22, 1989 and January 5, 1990.
On January 5, 1990, a discussion was held among the Acting Site Director; Sequoyah Plant Manager; Operations Superintendent; Sequoyah
.
Quality Surveillance Manager; NRC Assistant Director for Inspection Programs, ADSP, NRR; Senior Resident Inspectors K. Jenison and P. Harmon, and Resident Inspector D. Loveless.
!
1'
-t
yxfr
'
- ,
,
y
I
.
'
-During_this discuss _1on the licensee was asked if any conclusions had ' been reached concerning the issue. Because no TVA Sequoyah j
line management or QA conclusions had been documented, the r
licensee was requested to provide information for NRC review in
'
the following forms:
A documented line management review in accordance with-F
-
Sequoyah Standard Practice SQA-186, Root Cause Assessment A documented QA review in accordance with Sequoyah Standard
-
Practice SQA-186, Root Cause Assessment Documentation of whether or not administrative actions had
-
been taken with respect to the ASOS The licensee agreed to provide the above information on Monday January 9, 1990.
On January 9, 1990 the licensee provided a portion of the requested information in the form of a documented QA review in accordance with SQA-186, that was countersigned by the Operations Superintendent, Plant Manager, and acting Site Director (11-90-01, RIMS S53 900108 885)
and a
letter (Lagergren/Vondra) dated January 5,1990 (no RIMS).
The inspector reviewed the provided information and interviewed
,
the SOS, ASOS, lead U0, Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator,
'
Operations Duty Manager, Plant Manager, and other control room personnel.
The inspector reviewed the issue to evaluate licensee management control over power increase rates, the
possible relief of an Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor from certain licensed duties, the relationships of the line management with the licensed operators, and the quality of line management and QA review of the issue.
On January 12, 1990, subsequent to the exit, a discussion was held among the Acting Site Director;. Sequoyah Plant Manager; Operations Superintendent; Sequoyah Quality Surveillance Manager; NRC Assistant Director for Inspection Programs (IP),
ADSP, NRR; Section Chief 1, IP, ADSP; and Senior Resident Inspectors K. Jenison and P. Harmon. During this meeting the licensee discussed the adequacy of the previous review, the impact of their administrative review on future fitness for duty decisions, and the impact of the NRC auditing this issue.
No safety issues were identified and the inspector' had no further questions concerning this discussion.
The licensee is performing a second review of this issue. The licensee's second review of this issue will be tracked as IFI 327,328/89-29-09, Power Ascensions and Assistant Shift Supervisor Relie n-m
--
i
-
p
>
.
j m
F
-
.-
'
,
e.
Safeguards' Inspection
'
(1) In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included'
,
a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed
in the : conduct of daily activities includi.,g: protected and
.
vital area access controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors; badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols
-;
and compensatory posts.
.
(2) The inspectors-observed protected area lighting, and protected and vital areas barrier integrity.
The inspectors verified interfaces between the security organization and both operations and maintenance.
The inspectors visited the central. alarm station (CAS) and determined that the access to the central alarm station was degraded and to be repaired under WR B778775.
}
The availability of this access is a continued problem existing intermittent 1y' over a period of approximately three years. The material condition of the monitoring equipment within the CAS was degraded, including removed electronic modules, paper instruction stickers to the operators on the control panel,
-
cabling strung from the overhead without hold order or maintenance request control and cabinet doors removed from the rear of control panel to prevent overheating.
The adequacy of the material condition of the CAS will be tracked as example 1 of unresolved item (URI) 327,328/89-29-02, Security Related Issues.-
(3) The inspectors observed a calibration of one of the elevation
'685 portal explosive detectors (Ion Track). The calibration of the detectors was being performed by a vendor's technical representative who-was assisted by a licensee -technician. The work was being performed under work request 8760486, which
'
stated only that the licensee technician was to assist the vendor.
The inspector questioned the vendor's technical representative and determined that he was not using a licensee approved procedure or instruction to perform work.
In addition he was consulting a vendor's manual that had not been validated
.
through the licensee's process. As a result of the inspector's i
discussions with the Work Control. Shift Manager and the Acting Site Director, the licensee declared three of the four explosive detectors inoperable. This is a repeat of a previous failure to control on site vendor activities. The issue will be tracked as example 2 of URI 327,328/89-29-02, Security Related Issues.
(4) During a plant tour the inspector identified that several large containers of Boric Acid were being transferred into a vital
.
area. Approximately three of the commercially sealed containers had been opened by the licensee and not controlled.
Prior to transferring these opened containers into the vital areas a
,
'
search was performed by the licensee.
However, the search
,
was not comprehensive and did not determine that no threat was l
m7
.
'
't
4 :-
e 6-
!
present. As~ a result-of the inspector's discussions with the i !
Shift Security Manager, a guard was placed on the containers and the containers were eventually removed from the vital area. The
'
licensee took immediate. programmatic corrective action.
This issue will be tracked as example 3 of URI 327,328/89-29-02, Security Related Issues.
,
(5) On two separate plant tours the inspectors identified security officers that appeared to be not fully attentive to the performance of surveillance activities. In each case the issue was discussed. with licensee. security management. -This issue will be tracked'as example 4 of URI 327, 328/89-29-02, Security Related Issues.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Surveillance Observations and Review (61726).
Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that surveillance of safety-related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with'TS requirements.
.The inspectors verified that:- testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were-identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the
,
testing were properly reviewsd and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The following activities were observed / reviewed with no deficiencies identified:
SI-90.12A, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Quarterly Functional Test SI-90.72, Functional Test of Delta T/ T Average, Channel IV SI-7, Electrical Power System, Diesel Generators For the portions of the above surveillances observed, the performances were adequate, and the personnel involved appeared to be comfortable with and. knowledgeable of their responsibilities. The inspector had no further questions.
Positive trends were identified in the area of surveillance performance during this inspection period.
The area of surveillance scheduling and management was observed to be adequate.
The management of the TS SI program was a routinely scheduled, adequately managed plant operation support activity, which is undergoing Sequoyah Plant Manager revie g=
m L,.
'y 0 'L'
r
,
- c
y
-
L4, Monthly Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)
,
I Station maintenance activities 'on safety-related -systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with TS,
,
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met while components or systems were removed' from service; redundant
'
'
components were operable; approvals.were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair records accurately reflected the activities; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points were established where required and were observed; fire prevention controls were implemented;- outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively -
pursued,
.
a.
The following work requests were observed / reviewed and were determined to be-adequate:
WR S252464, Component Cooling Water System Booster Pump 2B WR B793340, Source Range Nuclear Indication Channel N-31 WR B790749, Pressurizer Spray Temperature Indication WR B781595, Main Feed Pump Controller PDS 046 b.
8270992, Unit 1 Turbine TV/GV. Transfer and Offset The inspector was reviewing contributing factors to a turbine runback initiated reactor trip that occurred on December 10, 1989 (described in paragraph 7.b, of this report). While observing these activities, the inspector determined that the technician performing the work was using uncontrolled drawings, test setpoint data, valve position setpoint data, and control transfer point data.
This was a failure to follow the licensee's administrative requirements for the performance of maintenance and the control of calibration data.
Following a discussion with the Sequoyah Maintenance Superintendent, adequate corrective actions were implemented.
The safety significance of this activity was low because the turbine was not in service, the turbine. is not considered a critical safety system component, and specific adequate corrective action was initiated by
'
f, ( q '
,.
.
-
t L
the licensee.
This issue will be tracked as example 4 of IFI 327,328/89-29-08, Safety Related and Secondary Maintenance.
Other ' events related to secondary maintenance, which occurred during this inspection period are described in paragraphs 4.c, 7.b 7.c and 7.e., and are being tracked as examples of IFI 327,328/89-29-08.
,
c.
Following-the review / observation of the below listed maintenance activities, the licensee was questioned on the adequacy of post maintenance testing, acceptance criteria, maintenance history data, first line management review, and configuration-control. -These
,
maintenance activities were discussed with the Maintenance Superintendent on December 15, 1989, who took immediate action. to
-
' address the issues.
Because of the availability of licensee
'
personnel and plant operating schedule demands, resolution of these issues was not achieved prior to the end of the inspection period.-
WR B252951, Lower Compartment Cooler i
WR 0789097, Portable Air Filtration
.
WR B265592, Condensate Booster Pump WR B256116, Feedwater Heater B-1
'
WR B781791, RCS Sample Line WR B252264, Main Feed Pump 1A Recircu~ tion to Condenser WR 8252640, Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Bearing WR B271829, #3 Heater Drain Tank (HDT) Pump WR B797295, Steam Generator Wide Range Level
WR B793427, Level Control Valve LCV-3-164A WR B271047, Feedpump Turbine Control Block WR B261323, Steam Generator Level LI-172A WR B781786, #3 HDT Level LCV-6-106V Resolution of the above questions with respect to the indicated maintenance activities will be tracked as example 1 of Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 327,328/89-29-08, Safety Related and Secondary Maintenanc D{
n_, _
Q
[
.,
-
h
.
_
d.
WR.B795397, ERCW Electrical Connections
'
During a review of this work activity the inspector determined that QC inspection activities were waived to support nonemergency schedule
'!
' driven requests.
This was discussed with the ' Site QA Manager on December.29, 1989.
The inspector was referenced to Administrative Instruction 20, QC Inspection Program, section 5.
This section states that:
QC inspection hold points may be waived by the Site Quality Manager (SQM) or his designee based upon such considerations as ALARA, " Graded Approach", industrial safety, post maintenance or
!
post modification testability, and complexity / uniqueness of the work performed.
l s
This section further states that:
,
!
The designated Sequoyah Duty QA Manager may waive inspection points provided that the SQM or his designee has been contacted
'
and the verbal concurrence documented on the appropriate work instruction data sheet by the SOM representative.
The consent from the SQM or his designee to proceed may be received verbally by the cognizant engineer /craf t foreman but shall be documented
_
by the SOM or his designee no later that the next working day on
the work instruction data sheet, i
!
The inspector questioned whether this inspection was appropriately l
waived - because the " Graded Approach" has yet to be approved by the
]
NRC and AI-20 does not allow an inspection to be waived based solely on the availability of inspection personnel. ' Secondly, the inspector
questioned whether the rational for. the waived inspection was
,
adequately documented and tracked to support future decisions and
,
management review.
l
,
Upon further review by QA management it was determined that the
'{
waived QC hold point was' not correctly documented and an entry was i
made on the work instructions that stated:
Inspection waived based upon determination of low probability'of incorrect work performance and availability of personnel.
There was no safety significance associated with the specific QC
inspection.
However, the acceptability of waiving QC inspections l
based on the " Graded Approach" or the availability of personnel is at question and will be tracked as URI 327,328/89-29-05, Waived QC
]
Hold Points.
e.
WR B290786, Upper Head Injection The inspector reviewed documentation related to the replacement of a
level indication sense line for level switch 1-LS-087-0022.
This
,
I
g"
,M.
L'
.
f-L i-
i line was physically installed in 'the field in June 1988.
However,
!
.the documentation of this installation did not get reviewed by the licensee until December 1989. The review and storage of QA records is a generic problem which was identified in NRC inspection report 327,328/88-09. The licensee had an ongoing program to retrieve and
+
review old QA documents one of which was this WR, This WR had been retrieved and reviewed by the licensee prier to being inspected by the inspector.
The inspector and the Maintenance Superintendent identified, in parallel, that certain QC inspections were not performed or documerited in accordance with Modification and Alteration Instruction (M and AI)-23, Installation, Inspection and Documentation of Instrumentation Features.
The sense lines were reinspected by QA on January 3,1990,. and determined to be acceptable and operable.
The Maintenance Superintendent initiated a CAQR on January 3,1990, to identify the root cause of this specific case and to evaluate the potential for a generic situation. Because there was no safety significance, the problem was partially identified by the Maintenance Superintendent, the licensee has a generic program g
implemented in response to a previous and outstanding NRC violation and the licensee implemented immediate corrective action in this l
specific case, this issue meets the criteria' specified in Section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and will be tracked as example 2 of noncited violation NCV 327,328/89-29-07.
Corrective action in this specific case was acceptable and this NCV is closed.
5.
NRC Inspector Follow-up Items, Unresolved Items, Violations (92701, 92702)
(Closed) URI 327,328/88-35-02, Fuel Contract Amendments
- q As a result of a sepcrate issue involving the shutdown margin following a reactor trip, an NRC inspector reviewed the fuels and analysis service J
. contract (68p-84-TI) between TVA and Westinghouse.
This contract was l
reviewed to determine if the requirements of 10 CFR 21 regarding vendor responsibility were applicable.
The inspector determined that-the original contract, dated in 1968, was issued prior to the January 6,1978 date specified in 10 CFR 21.
However, this contract had been amended several times since 10 CFR 21 first became applicable.
None of the y
contract amendments. reviewed referenced 10 CFR 21 explicitly but did
contain language requiring all NRC rules and regulations both current and j
future to be applicable. The licensee was requested to evaluate the fuels
contract and determine if.it should be amended to specifically state that 10 CFR 21 applied.
[
i As a result of this URI the licensee performed a review and determined j
that no CAQ existed because, the contract predated 10 CFR 21 and had
'
appropriate language in it to encompass future NRC rule changes.
In l
addition, the licensee made contract clarifications that updated the
!
Westinghouse contract with a contract supplement dated August 23, 1988.
This contract supplement specifically identified the applicability of 10 CFR 21 for both the Sequoyah and Watts Bar contracts.
J
pr p
7, c,
E g;
-
a.
...
.
~
-
..
This issue had low safety significance because, the licensee took prompt
,
corrective action, the wording of the original contract appeared to meet the intent of 10 CFR 21, and no instance involving deficient fuel-occurred where 10 CFR 21 reporting requirements were not met. This issue will be
' tracked. as a noncited violation - (NCV) 327,328/89-29-06, 10 CFR 21.
Corrective actions are adequata to correct the fuel contract 10 CFR 21 documentation.
This URI and its associated NCV 327,328/89-29-06 are closed.
(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-48-02, Test of AFW Without Procedure.
On October 20, 1988 the Unit 1 TDAWf pump tripped four times unexpectedly on electrical and mechanical overspeed when the pump was started during SI-719, Calibration of TDAFWP Controls.
On October 21, 1988 without formally exiting SI-719 the test director had the instrument technicians re-land two electrical leads that had been lif ted in accordance with 51-719 and attempt another run of the pump.
This action was performed outside of the instruction in SI-719.
TVA management informed the test director that he did not have the latitude to take such an action without officially changing: and reviewing the surveillance instruction.
The individual apparently misinterpreted the guidelines of AI-47, Conduct of Testing, to allow him to make such
. changes. A survey of other qualified test directors verified that this-was not a wide spread interpretation of the requirements of AI-47.
Additionally, NRC review of - testing during other startup activities of Unit I showed no-additional incidents of improper testing, r
This-violation is closed.
(Closed)
URI 327.328/88-36-02, AFW Sample Sink Isolation Valve,
-2-FCV-3-824, Out of Position.
During the walkdown of the AFW system, conducted in NRC inspection 327,328/88-36, the inspector identified that valve 2-FCV-3-824, isolation valve to a sample sink, was open as opposed to the SOI required configuration of closed.
This was reported immediately to the U0 who placed the valve in the configuration log as out' of position. The valve was later'placed in the proper position.
Review of the event, the licensee response to configuration control issues already in progress at.the time, additional walkdowns, and control of the valve since that time leads to the conclusion that this was an isolated case.
This URI is close p# #
%
- -
K o
2. 9
,
,
~
.,
~$l p'
"r p
6..
Essential. Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) Building Access and Foundation Drilling
!:
Activities The inspector observed and reviewed the results of drilling activities -
r L
that the licensee performed on the access to and foundation of the ERCW.
building.
During this inspection the following documents were reviewed:
'
b Drawing SON-DC-V-1,1
"-
Drawing 31W211-9-DNE Calculation and Foundation Investigation, dated November 7, E
1989 (no RIMS number)
DCN M01312A
.WP 01312-01 r
PRD SQP 890642P Special Maintenance Instruction SMI-0-400-6, ERCW Pumping Station and Roadway Access Foundation Cells Evaluation Instruction Change ICF 89-0641 dated August 21, 1989=
TVA letter (Ray /NRC) dated July 10, 1989, RIMS L44890710 328
.
TVA letter (Gridley/NRC) dated October 20, 1988, RIMS L44 881020 800-TVA letter (Gridley/NRC) dated December-28, 1988, RIMS L44881228 807.-
Drilling activities were observed on three occasions. These activities appeared to be carefully performed and the samples appropriately stored:in
'a core sample box unique to that particular. core sample. For those areas j
where gravel was encountered during the drilling operation, colored grout Lj was ' injected into the core hole. The gravel was entrained in the grout,
'
'
i 1 retrieved from the core hole and placed into the sampic box. Excess grout was discarded.
Initial floor core samples (not foundation samples) were not required by the licensee's sampling program to be maintained. 'For those core. drilling operations observed by the inspector the licensee's-activities appeared.to be accurate and accountable. The inspector did not evaluate the composition or acceptability of the core samples,- However, the inspector did verify that the licensee was-storing core samples in sample boxes for core samples taken in the ERCW building access and foundation. The inspector was aware of one core sample which was lost by
the licensee and then recovered, j
Drilling activities in the foundation area were originally scheduled to d
last' into early 1990.
However, the' licensee was setting up a second drilling rig during this inspection period, which may improve this schedule.
'
The inspector had no further questions.
I
,
7.
Event Follow-up (93702)
l
!
a.
On November 29, 1989, TVA determined during ASME Section XI pump
!
testing that the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps for Unit 2 did not meet acceptance criteria for individual pump differential.
Specifically, the iB RHR pump differential was in excess of 200 psid, and the acceptable range was between 165 and 184 psid. The licensee
)
.
I
r
- <
[; G.
(
6..
,
.-
n?
I e
!
.
dispositioned the problem through an engineering evaluation that
[
_'
concluded the stronger pump was not preventing flow in the weaker pump (deadheading).
After reviewing the test data and the disposition of the deficiency, the NRC resident staff requested the licensee to ensure that the.
Unit 1 RHR pumps could also meet minimum flow requirements when both
'
pumps were running. On December 5, 1989, the licensee performed a test run with both pumps on line and recirculating to the RHR pump suctions. This test determined that the 1A pump was not developing ?
-
flow, and was being deadheaded by the stronger IB pump. Since both pumps are started and discharge to a common line when initiated by a Safety Injection (SI) signal, a possibility existed that the 1A pump
.
could be deadheaded during an SI initiation.
TVA's-initial disposition of this problem was to place the IB pump _in Pull-to-lock to prevent its starting under SI conditions, and to enter the appropriate TS LCO. Previous evaluations had determined.that the RHR pumps could be 'run without flow (deadheaded) for as long as 10-minutes without sustaining damage.
On December 6,1989, TVA revised Emergency Instruction E-0, Reactor
+
Trip or Safety Injection, to require operators to reset an SI signal and then stop.both RHR pumps if the RCS pressure at that time was
<
above 180 psig. This revision, revision 7, constituted.a substantial change to Emergency Instruction E-0 in that the resetting of the SI signal occurred earlier in the procedure than previously, and RHR
pumps were to be stopped without first verifying RCS pressure constant or increasing.
This revision would actually require operators to stop the RHR pumps even if RCS pressure was falling due to a LOCA. The previous E-0 revision 6 allowed the operator to reset
,
.the SI signal and stop the RHR pumps if the RCS pressure was
'
increasing or stable and the RHR' pumps were not injecting due to high RCS pressure.
Revision 7 was implemented af ter performance of a Safety Assessment which determined that a Safety Evaluation was not required to implement the procedure change.
NRC staff expressed concern with this change after hearing of its implementation and the assessment performed to support it.
During a telephone conference
,
between NRC and TVA plant staff on December 6, 1989, TVA plant staff agreed to address the above stated NRC concerns.
On December 8, Emergency Instruction E-0 was again revised.
This revision, revision 8, changed the provision that stopped both RHR pumps per revision 7, 'and required the operator to stop only one of the RHR pumps.
Revision 8 was implemented af ter completion of a Safety Evaluation which determined that the change was safe, did not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) per 10 CFR 50.59, a TS change, or a change to the SAR. The Safety Evaluation further stated that a Safety Evaluation was not required but was being performed due to the complexity of the problem. The Safety Evaluation stated that the Safety Assessment portion of the Safety Evaluation would have been sufficient to evaluate E-0, revision 8, but a full Safety
%g
')
'
L t.
A.,
y
.
,
._ % ;
w
,
.
'
Evaluation was conducted to address concerns identified by NRC. The licensee was requested to perform a full Safety Evaluation for E-0 revision 7.-
Review of the conclusions of the Safety Evaluations for E-0 revisions 7 and 8, and the Safety Assessments for E-0 revisions 7
-
and 8 will be tracked as example 1 of URI -327,328/89-29-03, Compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.
NRC Bulletin 88-04 identified the potential for deadheading SI, RHR and other safety related pumps which could develop pump-to pump interaction - during miniflow operation.
TVA responded to this bulletin in August of 1988. The respo'nse submitted by TVA concluded that the potential problem identified in the bulletin did not exist.
at Sequoyah.
This conclusion was based on an inadequate review of
_
the RHR pump test data.
Instead of comparing individual pump differential pressures, average pump differentials were-compared.
Simultaneous testing of_ both RHR pumps was. not performed.
The
,
adequacy of the bulletin response, licensee corrective action based upon-the information provided in the bulletin and closure of the bulletin will be tracked under UR1 327,328/89-29-04, _ Bulletin 88-04
Response.
b.
On December 2, 1989, Unit 1 performed a reduction in power to support
a TS required ice condenser surveillance and to perform some secondary maintenance.
During the reduction in power several secondary performance anomalies occurred, The performance anomalies included the failure of at least six secondary. components and required the operato.as to take manual feedwater control and reduce power to approximately 60% in order to regain control. Many of these
-
failed components appeared to have maintenance related problems.
Thist event will be tracked as example 2 for IFI 327,328/89-29-08, Safety Related and Secondary Maintenance.
c.
On December 10, 1989, at approximately 10:51 a.m. Unit'1 experienced an automatic reactor trip resulting 'from a turbine' generator trip.
The turbine generator trip was caused by High-High Level in #3 SG.
The event was initiated by upset conditions on the. secondary J
condensate and feedwater systems.
,
Prior to the trip, a turbine runback to 80% via the turbine governor valve position limiter was automatically initiated when water level in the #3 Heater Drain Tank increased to the high level point.
The high level caused the #3 Heater Drain Tank (HDT) recirculation valves 2-6-105 A and B, to open to recirculate condensate back to the C condenser hotwell. Opening the 105 valves also initiated a turbine runback.
During the turbine runback, several secondary controls did not function correctly.
Specifically, Main Feed Pump A did not control feed pump speed and dif ferential pressure, and the #3 SG 1evel control was not ef fective.
The control room operators attempted to
W; E ;g.
s
i: D
,
'L n'
$
y l
-
,
-
E, control feed pump speed and #3 SG level, but were unable to do so.
,
The down power transient caused the #3 SG' level to swing to
-
approximately 18 percent (as compared to approximately 23*4 on the other SG levels).
After the level control system attempted to correct the low levels, the #3 level controls overfed the #3 SG causing the level to increase to 75 percent. At 75 percent SG level a High-High Level Turbine Generator (TG) Trip occurred. A TG trip with reactor power above 50'. initiated a Reactor Trip.
Operator-actions in attempting to control the transient and prevent the trip for the Unit 1 event were also reviewed by the inspector and were
!
considered to be very well executed and timely.
Even though a trip did occur, operators did a commendable job responding to the transient.
.
The licensee's initial investigation concluded that the normal control valves for the #3 HDT,1-FCV-6-106 A and B, malfunctioned,
'
causing the. initiating high level in the drain tank.
Maintenance activities on the valves,. controllers and positioners had recently been performed and the valves themselves were rebuilt.
The possibility of improper or inadequate maintenance as a contributor to the event is being pursued by the licensee.
Anomalies during the trip included a rod bottom light on rod F-14 that failed to illuminate.
This caused the operator to emergency borate. The emergency borate flow indicator showed no flow through.
the emergency borate valve. The operator began borating through the
~
normal borate path.
The requirement to emergency borate was terminated. when the rod. was determined to be on the bottom by -
instrument mechanics at the rod position cabinet.
The. emergency borate valve was later tested and proper flow established. Cause of the initial-lack of flow was determined to be a boron plug that later dislodged. The plant trip response in other respects was normal, and Tave did not fall below 547 F.
Unit I was restarted on December 13, 1989.
Several of the secondary anomalies appeared to be related to maintenance activities. This event will be tracked as example 3 of IFI 327,328/89-29-08, Safety Related and Secondary Maintenance.
d.
RWST Level Transmitter Freezing At 3:57 a.m.
on December 15, the Unit 1 RWST wide range level transmitters failed due to freezing ambient temperatures.
At approximately 8:00 a.m. both Unit 2 wide range transmitters were also declared inoperable due to freezing.
The wide range transmitters provide post-accident monitoring and also initiate automatic switchover of the RHR pump suction to the containment sump after depletion of the RWST following a LOCA. LCO 3.3.2.1 requires that a total of four channels be operable with the units in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Action statement 18 of that specification allows one of the channels to be out of service.
LCO 3.3.3.7 requires that two channels be operable with the units in Modes 1, 2 or 3.
The Action Statements for the TS allos 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to restore at least one
U ^~
iT
?.
rL
-
L
iy
e inoperable channel when no channels are operable. As a result of the n
inoperable level channels, Action Statement 18 was exceeded for both L
. units.
Consequently, LCO 3.0.3 requires corrective action to be
performed within one hour or that the unit be placed in at least Hot Standby within the following six hours.
The licensee requested discretionary enforcement for this event to allow the -level channels to be thawed and returned to. service.
As interim compensatory measures, operators were instructed to use
"f indications of adequate' sump levels as guidance if sump switchover was required, provide an alternate method of monitoring RWST level until the wide range levels could be restored, and follow up with a written report to the telephone call which requested the TS relief and discretionary enforcement.
The alternate level verification i
method involved removing the RWST manway on top of the tank and visually verifying.the tank full, i
Discretionary enforcement and TS relief were granted for a period not to exceed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> by telephone conversation with B. D. Llaw, Director, TVA Project Division and other members of the ADSP staff at 5:50 a.m.,
on December 16, 1989.
Subsequent investigation by the plant staff determined that the cause of the loss of the level transmitters was that the installed _ strip heaters-inside the transmitter enclosures had been disconnected.
The heaters were disconnected by DCN M01138 and M01139 in response to a CAQR which identified a problem with the seismic qualification of the heaters'
i thermostats.
The CAQR, SQP 880260 documented that failure of the j
thermostats due to a seismic event could cause the heaters to energize and heat the' transmitter enclosures to greater than the 140 F rating of the transmitters.
The electric heaters and thermostats were subsequently disconnected. This condition left the transmitters without adequate freeze protection.
The' lack of adequate freeze protection was identified as early as October 3, 1989 as noted in the plant's Action Item List issued at the daily-staff meeting. However, there was no CAQR written to address this issue.
Instead, the action item called for DNE to evaluate the need for freeze protection by December 15.
The calculation performed by DNE to support the original DCNS referenced above, was SQN APS2-039.
- This calculation actually verified the maximum temperatures of the-transmitter enclosures with the heaters failed in the on position at an ambient temperature of 5 F.
In the process of researching the issue, this calculation was mistakenly used as justification that the
..
enclosures would remain above freezing with ambient temperatures at (;
5 F.
Therefore the assumption was made that heaters were not needed.
The assumption was clearly not justified since the original heater installation was made in 1982 because of previous failures of the transmitters due to freezing.
Inadequate research of the issue and the mistaken impression that calculation SQN APS2-039 demonstrated the transmitters would remain above freezing when in fact the calculation actually was for maximum temperatures with the heaters
y 4 @a
'..'
.g.
i i
<
.
i
_
_
'
,
failed in the ON position resulted in the event.- This issue will be
!
tracked as example 2 of URI 327,328/89-29-03, Compliance with l
h The question of whether freeze protection was needed should have been
dispositioned under the CAQR as specified in AI-12, Adverse
'
Conditions and Corrective Actions, rather than an Action Item List.
l This would'have required a higher level of review, a timely period of i
evaluation for safety significance and adequate disposition of the
>
issue.
AI-12 establishes the program and requirements for the
!,-
corrective action program at Sequoyah in accordance with 10 CFR 50 l
'
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions.
Part III of AI-12 f
establishes the criterion for determining whether -
adverse L
an
,
condition should be classified as a Condition Adverse to Quality.
!
(CAQ), anc' the process to be usec' to track and correct CAQs. Other j!
corrective action administrative methods are identified as e
alternative methods for corrective action tracking and disposition.
P
,
Among these alternative methods are LERs, Drawing Discrepancies, Radiological Awareness Reports, Security Degradation Reoorts, etc. -
Circumstances listed in AI-12 Part III to identify whether a CAQ
exists includes 7 separate determinants in section ^2.1.1.
The lack of heat tracing and control of the RWST level transmitters was a
'i condition that was identified on the Action Item List but met the t
definition of a CAQR and should have been identified, tracked and
,
corrected according to the licensee's corrective action program, as t
implemented by Al-32.
This is identified as a violation,
!
L VIO 327,328/89-29-01, Failure to Comply with AI-12.
l
-
e.
On December 18, at 10:48 p.m. Unit 2 experienced a transient which-
!
required operators to reduce power to 80*4. This event was similar to
'!
p the Reactor Trip event for Unit 1 discussed in item "c" above. -The
'
Unit 2 event was also precipitated by failure of the #3 heater drain i
tank level control system.
'
The transient began when operators received Condensate Booster Pump Low Suction Pressure alarms.
Operators immediately began reducing j
power to 80*4 and began closing the #3 heater drain tank outlet flow i
u control valves to restore level in the #3 heater drain tank.
Operators suspected and later verified that the level control valves
FCV-106 A and B had failed open, causing the drain tank pumps to
lower = the tank levels to a point where cavitation began.
Throttling
,
the drain tank outlet valves allowed tank level to recover. At the
'
same time, load was reduced to approximately 83*f, which prevented the n
}.
feed pumps from losing suction.
Unit load was subsequently reduced to 65*4 power and the 106 A&B valves were inspected.
The inspection f
L revealed that the valve disk for valve 105 A had become disconnected
from the valve stem.
This :llowed the disk to fall into the full open position.
Investigation of the events concerning the control valves for both Unit 1 and 2 is underway.
> - -
?
i i9
f4
. o.
o
..
<
"
g
'
!
L
,
I
'
'serator action for this transient was exceptionally prompt and effective, and prevented an unnecessary plant trip.
r Several of the secondary anomalies appeared to be related to maintenance activities. This event will be tracked as example 5 of IFI 327,328/89-29-08, Safety Related and Secondary Maintenance.
l Ls'
- 8.
Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)
.
The inspector selected two minor modifications in the' plant for examination.
The review included installation and testing of the
!
H modifications. A limited verification of the items by direct observation
"
.
combined with the examination of the documentation was performed.
>
Additionally, the post modifications tests were observed and independently
,
verified by the inspector.
'
i i
'
f a.
The inspector observed work in. progress on the installation of WP
!'
1285-01.
This work plan was issued in support of DCN-1285 which was L
issued to revise certain hangers to meet the new requirements
,
. generated by the Civil Calculations Regeneration Program at Sequoyah.
L The specific work reviewed was the installation of a kicker on hanger
- 47A464-2-163 in the Component Cooling System.
t
'
- I-The installation included the fitup and welding of ASTM A-36 1/2 inch (
metal plate to ASTM A500 5x5x0.5 inch square tubing. ~The inspector
!
verified that the welder was qualified under' TVA performance
!.
qualification test SM-4-B-3-H, and that his continuity records were up to date.
Also, the procedure was verified as being qualified
-
under TVA Detailed Weld Procedure SM-P-1.
A review of the AWS Structural Welding Code also verified that SM-4-B-3-H qualified the c
welder to the procedure SM-P-1.
The inspector. reviewed.the AI-19 Part VI modifications paperwork and i
determined that the work had been approved, a:d was being conducted in accordance with drawing # 47A464-2-163. The double bevel welds
.
'
were performed with an E 7018 3/32 inch SMAW rod utilizing multiple l
passes. Each weld was properly documented and received the required VT-3 final QC inspection.
,
Additionally, the inspector determined that all materials were
'
documented in the-weld record by Heat and Lot number and that the low hydrogen rods were not out of the oven for greater than the allowable 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
The. welder number was also properly recorded.
Minor p
dimensional errors were documented and approved by engineering.
L The inspector had no further questions.
,
z
!
'
!
>
i
...m
.
_ _ - _ _ -_
g v.
.-
Y
L
i
+,
e b.
The inspector reviewed the installation and testing of TACF 0-89-69-063, which reconnected thermostats and strip heaters for the
,
RWST level transmitters. A discussion of the events causing these
-
thermostats to be disconnected and the resulting freeze problems was addressed'in paragraph 7 of this report.
l i
n The inspector verified the laydown of the cable connections for the Unit I _ RWST under WR B 758072 including the wiring continuity, termination integrity and appropriate separation.
This work was
,
'
performed and verified by electrical maintenance.
The post
!
F modifications test required that the heaters be verified to be
,
'
warming the lines. The inspectors verif ted this condition to exist.
,
The panels and boxes were verified to be reclosed and properly
'
,
sealed.
n i~
After being thawed, the-level transmitters were calibrated utilizing SI-98.1, Channel Calibration for Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation.
The inspector had no further questions about the a
'
installation of the TACF.
K 9.
Fitness For Duty Training (TI-2515/104)
The inspector observed licensee initial fitness for duty training to i
p determine whether required training was being conducted by the licensee to
,
-
implement a fitness for duty program.
The rule requires licensee's to i
!
train current licensee employees prior to January 3,1990 in the aspects j
'
of their FFD program. specifically, policy awareness, requirements for escorts, and the authcrities and responsibilities of supervisory and managerial personnel.
I
!
On December 8, 1989 the inspector observed -licensee training session FFO-002, General Employees Fitness For Duty Training (Non-Supervisory) and
-on December 12,1989, FFD-004, General Employees Retraining on Fitness For Duty.
The original course given to licensee employees was given
!
approximately two years ago prior to implementation of the final rule.
Therefore, both FFD-002 and FFD-004 were required to meet the requirements i
..
'
of the final rule.
]
The licensee is somewhat unique in that all individuals having protected area access are also authorized as escorts.
Therefore, the above mentioned courses met both the policy awareness' and the escort training
. requirements of the final rule.
h*
Both courses consisted of video taped lectures lasting less than one hour.
The following areas were generally addressed in these sessions:
Licensee policy and procedures and their implementation.
-
Hazards associated with drug and alcohol abuse.
-
I i
'
_
'
,
[{.
'
-
.
,
n L,
E i
The effects of legal drugs and diet on job performance and on drug
-
,
screening results.
,
The availability and use of the Employee Assistance Program.
)
-
,r
,
The consequences of FFD policy violations.
-
.
The procedure for reporting FFD violations to supervisors and nuclear
-
,
security.
,,
.
i
The techniques for recognizing drugs and indications of drug use.
-
,
The_ techniques for recognizing aberrant behavior.
'
.
The inspector noted a weakness in that the environment and set-up of the course was not conducive to the asking and satisfactory answering of i
employee questions.
On December 15, 1989 the inspector observed the licensee's initial training for supervisors in the aspects of the Fitness for Duty program.
This program was standardized and presented for all supervisors at
-
Sequoyah, Browns Ferry, Bellefonte and Watts Bar nuclear plants, along with those supervising employees not located at a nuclear site who could,
,
p by the nature of their jobs, affect the safe operation of a nuclear facility.
E This program discussed all of the general topics discussed in the general
'
employee training only in more detail, with the following additional
areas:
Supervisor's role and responsibilities in implementing the program.
-
The -roles and responsibilities of Medical Services Human Resources,
-
Employee Assistance Program, Site Directors and others responsible for implementation and support of the program.
F E
Behavioral observation techniques for detecting and documenting
-
degradation in performance, impairment, or changes in employee
' behavior.
Procedures for requesting a fitness for duty evaluation, for cause
-
drug screening and referral to the Employee Assistance Program.
F
'The inspector noted that the program did not include several of the topics
~
suggested by appendix B of this temporary instruction.
The topics that were not part of the licensee's FFD training program were; a description
.
of drug paraphernalia, methods and places normally used to hide drugs, or n = '
techniques for recognizing the sale or possession of drugs and alcohol, i
o i
Additionally,.although covered by the FFD program this training session did not discuss actions to be taken if an employee refuses drug testing or the-supervisors role in the Employee appeal process. These comments were e
JW e s
+
g w cy r-
.
- e
'
.
.
L s
,m-
-=
'
discussed' with licensee representatives.
With these exceptions the inspector determined the general quality and content of the training to be r
excellent.
-
'
.
t F-Temporary Instruction TI-2515/104, Fitness for Duty: Inspection of Initial-
'
[
Training Programs, is closed for-Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, f
';
10.
Exit-Interview (30703)-
f k
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 5 and 9,
L 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The Senior Resident
'
Inspector ' described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the
.
,,
inspection findings listed below.
The licensee acknowledged the
inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any of the
"
,
. material reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection, r
c F
E Inspection Findings:
p One violation was identified:
l
.
VIO 327,328/89-29-01, Failure to Follow AI-12, paragraph 7.d.
I L
t Two Noncited Violations were identified:
[
NCV '327,328/89-29-06, Fuel Contract Compliance with 10 CFR 21,-
f r
paragraph 5.
r p.-
t'
NCV 327,328/89-29-07, Upper Head Injection Maintenance,
,
paragraph 4.e.
.
i i
'
H Four unresolved items were identified:
URI 327,328/89-29-02, Security Related Issues (with four examples),
i-paragraph 2e.
'
<
,
'
URI 327,328/89-29-03, Compliance with 10 CFR 59.59 -(with two j
c-examples), paragraphs 7.a and 7.d.
-'
URI 327,328/89-29-04, NRC Bulletin 88-04 Response, paragraph 7.a.
URI-327,328/89-29-05, Graded QA Approach and the Release from QC Hold'
'f
>
Points, paragraph 4.d.
r
s.
- Two inspector followup items were identified.
IFI. 327,328/89-29-08, Safety Related and Secondary Maintenance, paragraphs 4.b, 4.c, 7.b, 7.c and 7.e.
IFI 327,328/89-29-09,. Power Ascension and Assistant Shif t Supervisor
-;
'
Relief, paragraph 2.d.
!
i
,
Phk. p a
.
,
22-o
.
No deviations were identified.
!
During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the
,
acting _ Site Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning
-
'
inspection findings.
,
h 11.
List of Acronyms and Initialisms r
ABGTS -
Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment Syatem L,
ABI Auxiliary Building Isolation-
.
-
L ABSCE -
Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure Auxiliary Feedwater AFW r
"
-
Administrative Instruction AI
-
i F.
A01 Abnormal Operating Instruction
-
P AVO Auxiliary Unit Operator
-
-
Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor i-ASOS
-
American Society of Testing and Materials L-ASTM
-
,
Boron Injection Tank
.
BIT
-
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
!
BFN.
-
. Control and Auxiliary Builoings C&A
-
,
Conditions Adverse to_ Quality Report
~t CAQR
--
Component Cooling Water System CCS
-
,
'
Centrifugal Charging Pump CCP
-
Corporate Commitment Tracking System CCTS
-
Code of Federal Regulations
.'
CFR
-
Cold Overpressure Protection System
!
COPS
-
'
CS-Containment Spray
-
-
CSSC Critical Structures, Systems and Components
-
Chemical and Volume Control-System CVCS
-
Containment Ventilation Isolation CVI
-
.
Direct Current
!
-
-Design Change Notice f
DCN'
-
Diesel Generator DG
-
,
Division of Nuclear. Engineering
_
,
-
ECN Engineering Change Notice
?
--
,
=ECCS
-
k EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
~
-
Emergency Instructions-EI
-
.
Emergency Notification System ENS
-
Emergency Operating Procedure l
r
~E0P
-
'
Emergency Operating Instruction EO
-
Essential Raw Cooling Water ERCW
-
,
Engineered Safety Feature
!
-
Flow Control Valve FCV
-
Final Safety Analysis Report
-
General Design Criteria
!
_GDC:
-
General Operating Instruction GOI-
-
GL Generic Letter
>
--
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning HVAC
-
Hand-operated Indicating Controller HIC
-
.
. -
f f
('
.
L
m ' d?Gj
.;
..
e
~
,
.
-
.
.HO Hold Order
-
HP Health Physics
-
ICF Instruction Change Form
-
IDI
-
Independent Design Inspection IN-
. NRC Information Notice IFI Inspector Followup Item
-
w IM Instrument Maintenance
-
L IMI Instrument Maintenance Instruction
-
IR
Inspection Report
-
i
KVA
Kilovolt-Amp
-
[
KW
Kilowatt
-
L
KV
Kilovolt
-
l
LER
Licensee Event Report
-
L
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
-
!
LIV
Licensee Identified Violation
-
L
Loss of Coolant Accident.
-
Main Control Room
'
-
MI
Maintenance Instruction
-
MR.
Maintenance Report'
-
-
NB
NRC Bulletin
-
-
NQAM
Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
-
NRC.
Nuclear, Regulatory Commission
--
OSLA
Operations Section Letter - Administrative
-
OSLT- -
Operations Section Letter - Training
o
' OSP
Office.of Special Projects
-
,
Precautions, Limitations, and Setpoints
-
Preventive Maintenance
-
PPM.
Parts Per Million
-
PMT-
Post Modification Test
-
G
.PORC
Plant Operations Review Committee
-
PORS- -
Plant Operation Review Staff
Problem. Reporting Document
!
-
i.
PRO-
-Potentially Reportable Occurrence
-
Quality Assurance
-
,
F
Quality Control
-
Radiation Control Area
-
RCOT
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
+
-
Reactor Coolant Pump
--
..
-
"
Regulatory Guide
-
i
-
f
Radiation Monitor
--
Reactor Operator
I
-
Rod Pc:ition Indication
-
RPM-
Revolutions Per Minute
-
F
RTO
Resistivity Temperature Device Detector
-
Radiation Work Permit
-
'
Refueling Water Storage Tank
-
..
~
ce~
%
4-
.*
-
!
Safety Evaluation Report
-
l
-
Surveillance Instruction
-
i
SMI
Special Maintenance Instruction
-
501
System Operating Instructions
-
505
Shift Operating Supervisor
-
,
Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance
'
SQM
-
SQRT
Seismic Qualification Review Team
-
SR
Surveillance Requirements
-
Senior Reactor Operator
-
SSOMI -
Safety Systems Outage Modification Inspection
SSQE
Safety System Quality Evaluation
-
,
'
SSPS
Solid State Protection System
-
-
h
Special Test Instruction
-
.
TACF
Temporary Alteration Control Form
-
L
TAVE
Average Reactor Coolant Temperature
-
TDAFW -
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
T1
Technical Instruction
-
TREF
Reference Temperature
-
TROI
Tracking Open Items
-
Technical Specifications
TS
-
Tennessee Valley Authority
-
UHI
Upper Head Injection
-
UO
Unit Operator
-
I
Unresolved Item
-
USQD
Unreviewed Safety Question Determination
-
VDC
Volts Direct Current
-
Volts Alternating Current
VAC
-
WCG
Work Control Group
-
WP
Work Plan
'
-
Work Request
-
(
!
,
_