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Insp Repts 50-327/89-25 & 50-328/89-25 on 891006-1108. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification Including Control Room Observations,Operations Performance,Sys Lineups,Radiation Protection & Safeguards
	ML19332F755
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	12/05/1989
From:	David Loveless, Linda Watson; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML19332F753	List: IR 05000327/1989025; ML19332F752; ML19332F754;
References
	50-327-89-25, 50-328-89-25, NUDOCS 8912180217
	Download: ML19332F755 (20)
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UNITED STOTES

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g'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$lON j_

f REGION ll 101 MARitTTA STREET,N.W.

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ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

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Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

'6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga,-TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:

50-327 and 50-32S License Nos.:

DPR-77 and DPR-79

Facility Name:

Sequoyah Units I and 2

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Inspection Conducted: October, 1989 thru November 8, 1989 Lead Inspector:

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):n Ded l'/f'l D. /..Lovele%, '/~

U Dat'e Signed A(ting Senior ResVdent Inspector Contributing Inspector: P. E. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector Accompanying Personnel: L. Zerr, Reactor Engineer Approved by:

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/A _6 M Linda J. Waf/ son, Chief

"Ta't - Igned TVA Project %. Section 1 TVA Projects-Division

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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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SUMMARY

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Scope:

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This announced inspection involved inspection effort by the Resident Inspectors in the area of operational safety verification including control room observations, operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection, safeguards, and housekeeping inspections.

Other areas inspected included

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maintenance observations, surveillance testing observations, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up 'of events, review of licensee identified items, and review of inspector follow-up items.

Results:

Management strengths observed during this inspection period included management response to the event described in Violation 327,328/89-25-01, paragraph 3.a, and the presence of plant management in the plant during several plant evolutions and throughout the inspection period.

One event, the failure of both Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators, included a failure to promptly classify the event as an NOVE as cited in VIO 327,328/89-25-04.

This item is identified as a repeat violation and is associated with several additional items currently being tracked by the NRC.

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8912180217 891207 PDR ADOCK OS0003u

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J Additionalilicensee attention should-be directed toward correcting the overall:

. problems-with event classification and ENS. reporting.

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In' general, the: areas of 0perations,' Maintenance, HP, Security an'd Surveillance =

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were adequate and ; fully capable to support current plant operations.

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Threeviblationswereidentified.

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VIO.327,328/89-25-01, Failure toLFollow SI-137.2, Reactor Coolant System. Water

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~ Inventory, paragraph 3.a.

LVIO: 327,328/89-25-02 Failure 'to Inform the150S of an Out-of-tolerance Analysis' -

for,. Unit 2 RWST Boron Concentration, paragraph 3.b.

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VIO ~ 327,328/89-25-04, Failure. to Properly' Classifya Both Unit 2 EDG's1Being1

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Inoperable as a Notification of Unusual Event, paragraph 7.

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One unresolved item * was identified.

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L URI 327,328/89-25-03, Review of;TI-11,, Chemical Analytical Methods, for the '

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Proper. Selection of. National Boron Concentration Standards and Recalibration and Restandardization of Mettler-Titratory, paragraph 3.b.-

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No; deviations or inspector: follow-up items were identified.

7* Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required tot determine whether they are acceptable.or may involve violations or deviations, h

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E REPORT DETAILS 1.-

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees h

J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power Production

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LaPoint, Site Director

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C. Vondra,. Plant Manager n

T. Arney, Quality Control Manager

R. Beecken, Maintenance Manager L-L. Bush, Acting Maintenance Manager

M. Burzynski, Site Licensing Manager

M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager D. Craven, Superintendent Instrumentation and Control

S. Crowe, Site Quality Manager

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J. Gates, Technical Support Manager.

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J.. Holland, Corrective Action Program Manager W. Lagergren, Jr., Operations Manager M. Lorek, Operations Manager R. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Group Supervisor R. Rogers, Supervisor Engineering Support Section M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Manager S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer NRC Employees

B. A. Wilson, Assistant Director, TVA Projects

L. J. Watson, Chief, Project Section 1

K. M. Jenison, Senior Resident Inspector

Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are listed in the last paragraph.'

L 2.

Operational Safety Verification (71707)

a.

Control Room Observations

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The inspectors conducted discussions with control room operators, verified that proper control room staffing was maintained, verified that access to the control room was properly controlled, and that operator behavior was commensurate with the plant configuration and

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L plant activities in progress, and with on going control room operations.

In general, the operators were observed adhering to appropriate, approved procedures, for the on going activities.

Exceptions are discussed in paragraphs 3.a and 3.b.

Additionally, the frequency of visits to the control room by upper management was observed for adequacy.

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7 The inspector also verified that the licensee was operating the plant-in a ncrmal plant configuration as required by TS and when abnormal conditions - existed, that thel operators were - complying with the

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-appropriate LCO action statements.

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Then inspectors observed instrumentation' and recorder traces for abnormalities and verified the status of selected control room annunciators to ensure that control. room operators understood,the'

status of the plant. Panel indications.were reviewed for the nuclear instruments, the -emergency power sources,. the L safety' parameter.

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display system and the radiation monitors to ensure operability and =

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operation within TS limits.. Data from Trend' Recorder 2-UDR-760,

'which trends VCT and pressurizer levels was examined in detail.

No violations or deviations were observed.

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Control Room Logs

.The. inspectors observed control room. operations and reviewed

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applicable logs including the shif t logs, operating orders, night -

order book, clearance 1.old order book, and the configuration log to obtain information concerning operating trends and activities.

The TACF log was. reviewed to verify that the use of jumpers and lif ted -

leads causing equipment to be inoperable was clearly noted and-understood.

The licensee is. actively pursuing correction to conditions' requiring TACFs.

No issues were identified with these specific logs.

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Plant ' chemistry reports were reviewed to confirm steam generator tube integrity in the secondary and to verify that primary plant chemistry-was within TS limits.

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In-addition, the implementation of the licensee's ' sampling orogram was observed.

Plant specific monitoring systems including seismic, meteorological and fire. detection indications were reviewed for operability. A review of surveillance records and tagout logs was performed to confirm the operability of the reactor protection

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system.

No violations or deviations were observed.

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ECCS System Alignment The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following equipment on Unit 2:

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Safety Injection pumps High Head Injection Pumps

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Boron Injection Tank

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Residual Heat Removal. System

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Upper Heacf: Injection System

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b Cold Leg Accumulators

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In. addition, the-inspectors ' verified that a selected portion of the -

e containment isolation lineup was correct.

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No deviations or violations were identified.

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Plant ^ Tours =

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Tours of. the diesel generator, auxiliary, control,. and turbine buildings, and exterior areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, potential fire hazards, control of ignition.._

sources, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, missile hazards and plant-housekeeping and cleanliness conditions.

The plant was observed to be clean and in adequate condition.

The inspectors -ver_ified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that follow up activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the licensee.

Examples of control room WR's reviewed were:

B792967. - 1-LI-62-242, Boric Acid Tank Level Indication, is Drifting.

B263070 - Repair Unit 2 Upper Compartment Heaters 2B, 2C

& 2D.

The inspector' visually inspected the mcjor components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and any general condition that might prevent fulfilling their fu1ctional requirements.

The following housekeeping items in the auxiliary building were notable and were discussed with the licensee:

' Air handling unit cooling water leaks in five of the six

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charging pump rooms required temporary routing of drains through hoses throu0 out the 669' elevation. This caused the breaching h

of seven fire doors.

The licensee indicated during the exit that actions were being taken to correct these leaks.

Additionally, raw river water (ERCW) was observed to be dripping on the IB-B CCP.

The Unit 2 UHI water tank had multiple large strings of boron

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deposits running down the side of the tank.

Several large pieces of equipment (i.e. welding power supplies,

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industrial buckets and floor polishers) were not tied down for seismic purposes.

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A dirty sight glass has prevented the determination'of the level

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of oil in the: gear box of the 2B-B CCP since June 21, 1989 as evidenced by WR B265380.

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The inspector observed ' shift turnovers and determined that,necessary

informati.on.concerning the status of plant systems was addressed.

No violations'or deviations were' observed.

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Radiation Protection

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The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation

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of' radiation protection controls.

On a regular basis, RWP's were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the

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activities were being conducted :in accordance with the applicable

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RWP!s. ; Workers were observed for proper frisking upon exiting

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radiation protection instruments were verified operable and

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calibration frequencies were reviewed. The following RWP was reviewed in detail:

RWP 89-01-188, Unit 1, VH1, LLRT on 1-FCV-87-7 and 1-FCV-87-8.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Safeguards Inspection

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In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a

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review of the ' licensee's physical security program. The performance of various' shif ts of the security force' was observed during the

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conduct of ' daily activities including: protected and vital area

access controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of

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visitors; badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols and compensatory

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posts.

-r In addition, the inspectors observed protected. area lighting, and i

protected and vital areas barrier. integrity. The inspectors verified interfaces between the securii.y organization and both operations and

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maintenance.

Specificalay, the Resident Inspectors:

(1) interviewed individuals with security concerns (2) visited central and secondary alarm stations (3) verified protection of Safeguards Information

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(4) verified onsite/offsite communication capabilities No violations or deviations were identified.

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Conditions Adverse to Quality The inspectors reviewed selected items to determine that the licensee's problem 4dentification system as defined in AI-12,

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Corrective Action, was functioning.

CAQR's were routinely reviewed l

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for adequacy in addressing a problem or event. Addit'lonally a sample of the following documents was reviewed for adequate handing:

(1) Work Requests (2) Potential Reportable Occurrences (3) Problem Reporting Documents (4) Correct-on-the-Spot Documents (5)

Licensee Event Reports Of the items reviewed, each was found to have been identified by the licensee with immediate corrective action in place. For those issues that required long term corrective action the licensee was making adequate progress.

No violations or deviations were observed.

No trends were identified in the operational safety verification area.

The lower number of control room maintenance and modification items shows a marked improvement over previous months.

Radiation protection and security are adequate to continue two unit operations.

3.

Surveillance Observations and Review (61726)

Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that surveillance of safety-related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS requirements.

The inspectors verified that: testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.

For completed tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.

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The following activities were observed / reviewed with no deficiencies

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L a.

SI-137.2, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory.

At approximately 10:00 a.m.

on October 18, 1989, the Resident

Inspector reviewed the completed performance of SI 137.2. The Unit 2 i

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I stated that it had been completed at 7:26 a.m., on October 18, 1989.

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The UO stated that the package was complete and acceptance criteria i

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were met.

The inspector reviewed the package and noted that there i

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was a negative unidentified leakrate calculated and only two hours of data were collected. To meet the acceptance criteria of SI-137.2 for

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negative leakage, at least three hours of data have to be taken.

The inspector discussed the procedure with the ASOS, who stated that he had not reviewed the package and was not familiar with the ICF to the procedure.

The ASOS then reviewed the ICF and agreed that the procedure required the taking of additional data. The Unit 2 ASOS immediately initiated a new SI-137.2 to :neet the requirements of the original procedure.

TS 6.8.1 states that, written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment.51-137.2, ICF 89-0758 section 4 4 i e the associated flow chart, requires that if unidentified leakage calculates to be negative, then the calculations will be reperformed using a minimum of one hour of additional data. On October 18, 1989, the Unit 2 operators completed the performance of SI-137.2 at 7:26 a.m and determined that the unidentified leak rate was negative.

However, they did not take additional data as required by section 4.9 in ICF 89-0758. This is a violation of TS 6.8.1 and is identified as VIO 327,328/P5-25-01.

The inspector noted that the surveillance package nad not completed the QA and management review cycle.

However. 6he operators should have realized that the results were outside of the acceptance criteria and that additional testing was required. Additional QA or management review would not have been able to improve the quality or acceptability of these inadequate test results, because the testing processes had been completed and system alignments changed, b.

SI-51, Weekly Chemistry Requirements.

At 2:00 a.m on October 20, 1989 the licensee sampled the Unit 2 RWST

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for the weekly performance of SI-51, Weekly Chemistry Requirements.

This SI provides for the verification of the RWST boron concentration per TS Surveillance Requirements 4.1.2.5.a.1, 4.1.2.6.a.1 and l

4.5.5.a.2.

The procedure requires that a boron sample be taken per TI-37, Radiochemical Laboratory Sampling and Logsheets, and analyzed

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per TI-11, Chemical Analytical Methods, and that the results be i

recorded on SI-51, Data Sheet 1.0.

This data sheet states that the

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RWST boron concentration acceptance criteria for modes 1-4 is 2000-2100 ppm boron and directs the performer to "immediately notify the SOS /SR0" should the data be outside this acceptance criteria.

TI-37, Radiochemical Laboratory Sampling and Logsheets, provides the sampling and data taking method for the RWST in Appendix A, Log sheet

39. This logsheet indicates that if the RWST boron concentration is less than 2000 or greater than 2100, log sheet #39 action IV should be performed.

Action IV requires corrective actions as specified in l

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the TS or NPDES permit. Appropriate actions are identified in the affected sis or TI-37 logsheets.

Additionally, TI-37, page 11, Nonradiological Program Flow Chart, shows that if the acceptance ' criteria are not met that the technicians should resample to confirm the out-of-acceptance criteria condition.

If the resample results do not meet the acceptance criteria, the flow chart requires that the actions required in the SI be performed, i.e, to notify the SOS /SRO.

At 6:30 a.m. on October 20, 1989, the 2:00 a.m. sample was analyzed.

The analysis indicated a boron concentration of 1952 ppm Boron. A second analysis was performed and the boron concentration was determined to be 1971 ppm Boron. At this time the 100 and 3000 ppm Boron standards were checked for the Titrator and determined to be within specifications.

At 7:30 a.m. a second sample was taken from the Unit 2 RWST. At 8:15 a.m. the boron concentration of this sample was determined to be 1971 ppm Boron. Following this analysis the secondary chemistry manager questioned the validity of the results based on the wide range between the 100 and 3000 ppm standards. He ordered that a 1000 ppm Boron standard be tested.

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At 8:19 a.m. the daytime chemistry Shift Supervisor called the SOS and informed him that there was a problem with the Unit 2 RWST boron analysis and that the analysis would be reverified.

The TVA final Event Report (number 11-89-076, RWST 2 Boron Analysis), states that the SOS was not aware that these results were based on a second sample being out of specification and he would have required entry into LCO 3.5.5, if he had been aware of it.

The inspector noted that at this timn two samples had been taken and

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analyzed as outside of TS limits. Additionally, the standards in use

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at the time were determined to be within acceptable tolerances for the Mettler Titration and acceptable for use under the approved procedures. No additional technical information or analyzed data had been considered during the sampling process and the evaluation of the

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two initial samples.

TS 6.8.1 states that, written procedures shall be implemented

covering surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment.

On October 20, 1989, by 8:15 a.m.,

the licensee drew 2 samples from the Unit 2 RWST and determined the Boron concentration to be below 2000 ppm and did not inform the SOS of this fact as i

required by TI-37 and SI-51. This is a violation of TS 6.8.1 and will be identified as VIO 327,328/89-25-02.

At approximately 8:45 a.m.

the licensee analyzed a 1000 ppm Boron standa rd and determined it to be 956 ppm, which is below the 1%

contrcl limit.

By 10:00 a.m.

the licensee had performed a full l

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- recalibration of both Boron titrators; prepared new pH buffers; and, restandardized the NaOH titrant. Both the 2000 ppm and the 3000 ppm Boron standards were_ analyzed to be'within specification._on the high side.

'At 10:25 a.m.Lthe 2:00 a.m. sample was reanalyzed.by the licensee and-

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-determined-to be 2048 ppm boron on titrator #83 and 2025 ppm boron on

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~ titrator #82.

Theluse of ' the 1000 ppm versus; 100 ppm boron standard -per TI-11,

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Chemical Analytical Methods, the proper techniquers in recalibration-

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and restandardization 'of Mettler. Titrators and proper-- laboratory.

procedures will be reviewed by the-Region 11 chemistry inspectors.at '

a'~1ater date.- This item will be tracked as URI-327,328/89-25-03.

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Diesel Generator.lA-A.0utage'Surveillances n

The inspector observed the following surveillances:

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SI-7,. Electrical Power System:

Diesel Generators - Unit 0.

SI-7.3, Diesel Generator IA-A Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Performance m

Test.- Unit 0.

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SI-10P, E/M, Diesel Generator Monthly Electrical Inspection,

- Units 1 and 2..

SI-166.36.1, Diesel Starting Air Valve Test for EDG Set IA-A, Time

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Frame A.

No issues were identified.

No trends were identified in the area of surveillance performance

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The area of surveillance scheduling

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and management was observed to be adequate. The management of the TS j.

SI program-appears to have progressed from a reactive type process to a routinely scheduled, adequately managed plant operation support

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4.

. Monthly Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)

a.

Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.

The following items were considered during this review:

LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;- activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair records accurately reflected the activities; functional u

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. components orisystems to service; QC records were maintained;

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activities 1 were accomplished by qualified personnel; ' parts and-materials used were properly certified; radiological controls: were -

-implemented; QC hold points were established where required and were

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.' obse rved; fire' prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the.

approved QA' program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.

b.

WR B758347, Temperature Deviation Between Loop 3 Tavg and.0ther-Channels.

The inspector observed troubleshooting activities in progress under'

WR B758347.

The Tavg/Auct' Tavg deviation _ annunciator on-panel-

-XA55-5A window 6 had alarmed, and checks of redundant instrumentation showed no problem.. _ During the performance of IMI-99 CC 11.528, Online/Offline Channel Calibration of Delta T/Tavg Channel I, Rack 2,.

(T-68-'2), all four loop Tavg control room indicators were lost and

-.the pressurizer backup, heaters energi:ed.

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technicians were performing step 5.7.1.4, which directed them to unplug temperature monitor TM68-67P (TY442C) AC power cable in R13.

Review of the prints showed that each of the previous three steps unplugged-the power cables for separate Tavg indicators.

It was assumed that the operators simply failed to notice _ the loss of

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indication on the first three channels.

Following the loss of the-fourth indicator _ the operators -immediately de-energized the heaters and directed the technicians to back out of the procedure.

The planner of the job had utilized procedures which had not-previously been performed in Mode 1.

The procedures did not adequately address the condition of the plant in this mode.

The-procedure stated that the auctioneered delta T/Tavg components can be removed from service in any mode.

However, it did not advise the

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performer nor the operator of the loss of control room indication.

This loss affected the programmed pressurizer icvel and subsequently energized the pressurizer backup heaters.

TVA is in the process of improving a substantial portion of their procedures.

The current phase of this program is addressing problems of low safety significance.

Maintenance Instruction (MI)-21.2.068.02, Revision 0, Channel Calibration of Auctioneered Tavg Instruments, addresses the loss of Tavg indication and the effect on pressurizer heaters, but had not yet been implemented for L

Unit 2.

The procedure is waiting craf t review.

The revision will

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correct this particular problem.

The inspector determined that the procedure was technically adequate for the performance of the calibration, but was deficient in that it did not. inform the operator of the effects on control room instrumentation and equipment.

There was no safety significance to the event. No transient occurred, and the loss of indication is part.w nc A

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ofr the proper performance of. this procedure.

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further questions.

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The following work requests were observed.in' progress and/or reviewed i

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with no problems identified:

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B 758146 Troubleshoot'2A-A EDG'to Determine the Cause of the Blown Fuse Alarm, j

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B 775730, Repair EGTS Filter Housing Doors, and Test in.

e Accordance with $1-142.

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B 265380,' Replace-or Clean the Gear Drive 011 Level Gauge.

B 263070, Repair Upper Compartment Heaters 2B, 2C & 20.

B' 792967,1-LI-62-242, Boric Acid Tank C Level Indicator, is Drifting, d,

Temporary Alterations The following TACF was reviewed:

2-84-2039-3:

Remove the Hand Indicating _ Controllers on

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the Bypas.s Feedsater Regulating Valves-and Replace with Level. Indicating Controllers.

No problems were identified.

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Hold Orders The inspectors reviewed the following H0 to verify compliance with AI-3, revision 38, Clearance Procedure, and to ascertain that the H0s contained adequate. information to properly isolate the affected

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portions of the ' system being tagged.

Additionally the inspectors

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inspected the affected equipment to verify that the required tags

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were installed on the equipment as stated on the H0.

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2-89-032 Upper Compartment Heaters 28, 20 & 20.

No violations or deviations were identified in the area of Maintenance.

No trends were noted in the area of maintenance, and the program is adequate to support two unit operations.

5.

Management Activities in Support of Plant Operations TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the NRC l

inspectors. Resident Inspectors observed that planning, scheduling, work control and other management meetings were effective in controlling plant activities.

First line supervisors appear to be knowledgeable and

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involved in the day to day-activities of the plant. First line supervisor

' involvement in the field has been observed'and, with'the exception of the

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. RWST boron concentration surveillance activity described in paragraph 3.b -

y above, appeared to be adequate.

Management - response. to _ those plant

' activities 'and events that occurred during this inspection period appeared -

timely and effective. Examples of this management action were:

f The Management response to _ the finding that.. operators failed to

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follow;SI-137.2 appeared to be timely and ' effective.

The ~ surveil-

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lance was repeated in 'a timely manner and the Plant Manager directed a' root cause' analysis be performed to evaluate the situation..

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The Site Director was observed in the control room during' a power reduction' on - Unit _2.

Additionally, _ the new Plant Manager was observed in the plant numerous times.

6.

Engineered _ Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)

The inspector performed a detailed walkdown of the accessible portions of'

the Unit 2 UHI. system.

The.following documents were reviewed:

Drawing CCD 1,2-47W811-2, revision 5'

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SOI 87.1,' Upper _ Head Iniection Accumulators

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- As a result of the inspection the inspectors noted that there were large runs of boric acid crystals on the side of the water tank.- This was previously addressed in paregraph 3.d.

No vioistions or deviations were identified.

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Event Follow-up (93702)

On : October 25, 1989, at 4:57 a.m., the 18-B 6.9 KV emergency atesel generator (EDG) was declared inoperable and Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1.1, action a, was entered when the EDG was removed

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from' service to perform routine maintenance activities. At 5:48 p.m. on

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k October 25, 1989, control room operat' ions personnel were alerted to a problem with the 2A-A EDG by the blown fuse annunciator alarming. Action d of LCO 3.8.1.1 and the action of 3.0.5 (note: Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B-B was already inoperable for surveillance testing) were immediately entered, and attention was directed to returning EDG 1B-B to operation.

Action d of LCO 3.8.1.1 requires the licensee to verify offsite power operability within one hour and to restore either both A or both B train EDG's ~ to operable status within two hours or place the reactor in hot standby within _ the next six hours.

SI-7.1 was. completed by operations H

within the required one hour at 6:08 p.m.

te ensure offsite power p

availability as required by the LCO action. At 5:54 p.m., LC0 3.0.5 was exited when the 2B-B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was declared operable. At i

i 10:53 p.m., -the 1B-B EDG was restored to operable status after 51-7 was l

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completed, thereby. allowing action d.of LCO 3.8.1.1 to be exited while

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remaining in action a for the inoperability of.the 2A-A EDG.

Work Request (WR) B75B146 had been initiated and efforts were underway to troubleshoot, EDG 2A-A-to determine:the cause of the. blown fuse. It was determined that the cause of the blown fuse was that diodes internal to a

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motor-operated. potentiometer :(MOP) had shorted causing a short circuit

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between the positive and negative buses of the 125 VDC control power. The-J MOP provides a variable resistance connected to.the voltage regulator and.

L serves as a method to control EDG output voltage.. By adjusting the MOP, i

the EDG output voltage can be matched to the grid, thereby allowing the

EDG to be synchronized to the grid and loaded for monthly functional L

testing.

The MOP serves no function when the EDG is operated in the isochronous mode as it would be during emergency conditions.

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A replacement MOP was obtained from TVA Power Stores and installed exactly like the one removed. However, during functional testing of the new MOP, it was discovered that the EDG output voltage responded opposite to that of design requirements (e.g., placing the handswitch in a position to

' raise EDG output voltage actually caused the voltage to be lowered).

The wiring terminated on the new MOP was confirmed to be correct.

Subsequently, another M0P was obtained from Power Stores. After comparing the. old M0P with the new one, it became obvious that the wires to

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Terminals 5 and 7 had been swapped on the old MOP, L

At 4:10 a.n...on October 26, 1989, during the performance of $1-7.1 per LCO i

3.8.1.1.a, the 2B-B EDG became inoperable when a fuse that supplies power to numerous control functions opened. At this time, both the 2A-A and the 2B-B emergency diesel generator sets were inoperable. The fuse blew when an Assistant Unit Operator (AUO) was replacing the indicating lamp for

" POWER ON" which apparently created a short circuit. LC0 3.8.1.1, action

- d, was immediately entered when the 28-B EDG was declared inoperable.

After replacing the blown fuse, SI-7.1 was successfully completed for EDG 2B-B, the EDG was declared operable, and action d of the LCD was exited at 5:22 a.m. while remaining in action a.

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At - 6:15 a.m.

on October 26, 1989, the REP was entered when it was discovered that an NOUE was required when both EDG sets on either unit are inoperable according to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPIP-1.

Notifications to the NRC were made at 6:45 a.m. on October 26, 1989.

Technical Specification 6.8.1.e states that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering site Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) implementation.

EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Logic, implements these require-ments, and requires that, the NP Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in its logic is detected.

The SOS is responsible for declaring the emergency and providing the initial activation.

The logic of EP1P-1 states that both unit-related emergency diesel generators (EDGs)

inoperable simultaneously by

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unscheduled outage or failure as determined by the shift engineer is a Notificatico of Unusual Event.

At 4:10 a.m. on October 26, 1989 the 2B-B EDG becane inoperable while the 2A-A EDG was also inoperable, and the SOS did not declare an NOUE nor provide for initial activiation for over two hours.

This violation is similiar to VIO 327,328/88-33-01, and will be identified as VIO 327,328/89-25-04.

As a result of the above inspection activity, the inspector reviewed several open items involving failure to appropriately classify and report events at Sequoyah.

These items were:

VIO 327,328/88-33-01, Failure to Implement the REP in a Timely Manner-Because of Doubt of the Validity of Seismic Alarms.

IFI 327,328/88-57-01, Failure of the Shif t Operating Supervisor to Recognize Explosion as an Entry into the Emergency Classification Logic.

IFI 327,328/88-57-02, Event Notification Sheet Not Used for NRC Notification in Accordance with AI-18.

IFI 327,328/89-19-06, Inaccurate ENS Report on the Source Range High Flux Level Reactor Trip.

I FI 327,328/89-21-03, Failure to Make an Adequate ENS Telephone Report on the NOUE Entered by Having All Four EDG's Technically Inoperable.

The licensee is requested to discuss corrective actions for the above items in the response to VIO 327,328/89-25-04. The above listed items are administratively closed and corrective ections will be reviewed under closure of the violation.

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NRC Inspector Follow-up Items, Unresolved Items, Violations (92701, 92702)

(Closed) Violation 327,328/87-68-03, Corrections to Quality Assurance (QA)

Records.

This violation identified that contrary to the requirements specified in NEP 1.3, Revision 0, Records Control, corrections to QA records were not properly made by drawing one line through the incorrect information, the correct information entered and the entry initialed and dated.

The licensee indicated compliance with this violation would be achieved by July 18,1988 by issuing a directive to Division of Nuclear Engineering branches and projects to emphasize the importance of procedure compliance in this are '.

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The inspector reviewed 72 Quality Assurance records which were generated during the 1989 time frame which included documents in RIMS and hard copies from Sequoyah, Browns Ferry, Watts Bar and Knoxville engineering.

The records were found to be of good quality (with minor exceptions) and in compliance with the licensee's procedure NEP 1.3.

The inspector noted that corrections made to these documents were made with black ink, single lined thru the incorrect information, and correct information was entered and the entries were initialed and dated.

Based on the above the violation is closed.

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(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-33-01, Failure to Implement the REP in a Timely Manner Because of Doubt of the Validity of Seismic Alarms.