IR 05000327/1989022
| ML19327C119 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1989 |
| From: | Jenison K, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19327C118 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-89-22, 50-328-89-22, GL-83-28, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8911200153 | |
| Download: ML19327C119 (16) | |
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NUCLEAR H.GULATORY COMMISSION t
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REGION il
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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Report Nos : '50-327/89-22, 50-328/89-22 Ocensee: Tennessee Valley Authority'
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6N 38A Lookout Place'
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Chattanooga,-TN' 37402-2801
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- Docket N'os.:
50-327 and-50-328 License Nos.:
DPR-77:and DPR-79 p
f1 Facility Name:
Sequoyah. Units 1 and 2
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~ Inspection Conducted: ~ Sept mber 6, 1989 thru October 5, 1989 Lead Inspector:
N NoV 7 lM1
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K.'Jenis96, Senior Residant I spector Date Signed l
. Inspectors:
'P 'Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
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D. Loveless, Resident Inspector Approved by:
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//!7!87 L. J. Watf6n, Chief, Project Section 1 Dat6 S/igned
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TVA Projects Division,
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SUMMARY Scope:
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This announced inspection involved inspection effort by the Resident Inspectors in Lthe area of operational safety verification including control room
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observations, operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection,
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safeguards, and ' housekeeping inspections.
Other areas inspected included l
maintenance observations, surveillance testing observations, review of
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previous inspection findings, follow-up of events, review of licensee
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identified. items, and review of inspector follow-up items.
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- L Results
Management focus on TACF resolutions was considered aggressive and effective during! the reporting peried. The site goal for resolving long-standing TACFs
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was met a's a result of management attention in this area.
One: weakness regarding management handling of the RCS backleakage to the BIT
was noted in paragraph 5.
n.
The areas of Operations, Maintenance, and Surveillance were adequate and fully capable to support current plant operations. The observed activities
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'of the control room operators were professional and well executed.
"' 8911200153 891107
'x PDR ADOCK 05000327
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- ) Unresolved items are matters which more information is required to. determine w;
'whether they are acceptable or may involve violutions or deviations.
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
' J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power Production
- J.
La Point, Site Director C.:Vondra, Plant Manager-
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T.'Arney, Quality Assurance Manager
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'"R. Beecken, Maintenance Superintendent M. Burzynski, Site Licensing Staff Manager
- M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager D. Craven, Plant Support Superintendent
'S. Crowe, Site Quality Manager R. Fortenberry, Technical' Support Superintendent J. Holland, Corrective Action Program Manager W. Lagergren, Jr., Operations Manager
- M. ' Lorek, 0perations Superintendent
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R. P.ierce,. Mechanical Maintenance Group Supervisor A. Ritter, Engineering Assurance Engineer
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- R. Rogers, Supervisor Engineering Support Section M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Superintendent S', Spencer, Licensing. Engineer h
C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer
'NRC' Employees
- L. J. Watson, Chief, Project Section 1
- B. A.~ Wilson, Assistant Director for Inspection Programs
- Attended exit' interview Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Control Room Observations The inspectors conducted discussions with control room operators,
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verified that proper control room staffing was maintained, verified that access to the control room was properly controlled, and that operator behavior was commensurate with the plant configuration and plant activities in progress, and with on going control room operations.
The operators were observed adhering to appropriate, approved procedures, including Emergency Operating Procedures, for the on going activities.
The inspector also verified that the licensee was operating the plant in a normal plant configuration as required by TS and when abnormal
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conditions cxisted, that the operators < were complying with the'.
- appropriate LCO ' action statements. The inspector verified that leak A
rate calculations were performed.and that leakage rates were within
~ the TS limits,
.The" inspectors observed instrumentation - and recorder traces for
.
s abnormalities and verified the status of selected control ~ room.
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annunciators - to ensure that control-room operators. understood the status of the plant. Panel. indications were reviewed for the nuclear
. instruments,..the emergency power sources, the ' safety parameter N
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display system and..the radiation monitors -to ensure operability.and
,gL operation within TS limits.
No violations or deviations were observed.
b.
Control Room Logs
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The inspectors _.-observed control room operations and reviewed applicable logs including the shif t logs, operating orders, night.
order. book, clearance hold order book, and the configuration log to obtain information: concerning operating trends and activities.
The TACF log was reviewed to verify that the use of-jumpers and lif ted leads-causing equipment to be inoperable was clearly noted - and '
understood.
The ' licensee.i s actively pursuing correction to
- i conditions requiring TACFs.
No issues were identified with these
l specific logs.
Plant chemistry reports were reviewed to confirm steam generator tube l
. integrity in the secondary and to verify that primary plant' chemistry
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was within TS limits.
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LIn addition, the implementation of the ' licensee's sampling program was observed. Plant specific monitoring systems, including seismic, i
meteorological and fire detection indications, were reviewed for operability. A review of surveillance records and tagout logs was performed to confirm the operability of the RPS.
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No violations or deviations were observed.
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Safety-Related System Alignment The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the Vital Battery I, Vital Inverter I and. Associated Battery Boards on Units 1 and 2 to verify operability, power supply, and proper breaker alignment.
In
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o addi ti on,-- the inspectors verified that a selected portion cf the
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containment isolation lineup was correct.
No deviations or violations were identified.
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1 Plant Tours
- Tours' of' 'the ' diesel generator, auxiliary, control, ' and turbine
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U buildings, and exterior areas were conducted to observe plant M
equipment ^ conditions, potential fire hazards, control of ignition
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sources, fluid leaks, excessive-vibrations, missile ' hazards, and
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plant housekeeping' and cleanliness conditions.
The plant was.
observed to; be clean and in adequate condition.
The inspectors
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s verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and-'that followup activities and prioritization. of ; work was-accomplished by the licensee.-
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Several instances; of unsecured welding 'and test. carts - located p,.
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,throughout the: auxil.iary building were brought to the-attention of-plant management. -These items were properly secured.or removed.
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.TheLinspector visually inspected the major components for leakage,
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proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and any general condition 1 (J that might prevent. fulfilling their functional require'ments.
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The inspector observed shift turnovers and determined that necessary
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information concerning the plant systems status was addressed.
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.No' violations or deviations were identified.
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Radiation Protection s
The' inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation
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of radiation protection controls.
On a regular basis, RWPs-were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the
activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable E
RWPs.
Workers were observed for proper frisking upon ex1 ting
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contaminated areas and the radiologically controlled area. Selected
radiation' protection instruments were verified operable and
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calibration frequencies were reviewed.
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.The inspector reviewed efforts ' to determine the cause of high radiation levels in the holaup tanks (HUT) and the HUT rooms. The rooms' and tanks had increased from a nominal level of approximately 10 mr at tank contact and less than 5 mr for the tank rooms to 100 mr
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at tank contact and 40 mr for the general room on or about g'
August 26, 1989. At the time of the increase, RCS back-leakage into the BIT discharge lines as described in paragraph 5, was being conducted.to the HUT.
The tanks were sampled to verify that spent
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resins flushed to waste processing two days previously had not
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inadvertently entered the HUT. Cover gas from the Waste Gas System
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was also sampled. Results of the licensee's investigation determined y
that the high activity levels in the tanks and rooms were caused by b
higher than normal activity in the cover gas being supplied to the
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tanks, and introduction of RCS water directly to the HUT without benefit of the degassing effec'ts when the VCT is receiving all RCS liquids.
The activity levels gradually decreased over the next
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This m
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- investigation" appeared thorough and well planned. The inspector had a
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Safeguards-Inspection
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i In the-course' of. the monthly activities, the inspectors included a
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review of the;11censee's physical security program.' The performance
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of variousL shif ts of the security force was observed in 'the conduct -
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of: daily activities including: ' prot'ected and vitali area a' cess-
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.contr'ols;.. searching ~of personnel and packages; escorting of v+
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badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols and compensatory posts..
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In. addition,. the : inspectors observed protected-area lighting, and
protected and vital areas barrier. integrity. The inspectors verified t
interfaces between the security organization and both operations and l
maintenance.
Specifically, the Resident Inspectors:
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witnessed firearms traininq'and qualification 2.
interviewed: individuals with security concerns 3.
visited central.and secondary alarm station j
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4.
verified protection of Safeguards Information
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verified onsite/offsite communication capabilities
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licensee's problem identification system as defined' in AI-12,
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Corrective Action, was functioning.
CAQR's were routinely rev sewed
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for adequacy in addressing a problem or event.
Additionally, a
sample of the-following documents were reviewed for adequate
handling:
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Work Requests 2.
Potential Reportable Occurrences
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3.
Radiological Incident Reports
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Problem Reporting Documents
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Correct-on-the-Spot Documents 6.
Licensee Event Reports l
Of the items reviewed, each was found to have been identified by the licensee with immediate corrective action in place. For those issues
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that required long term corrective action the licensee was making
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adequate progress.
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No violations or deviations were observed.
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No trends were identified in the operational safety verification area.
General conditions in the plant were adequate.
The number of control room maintenance and modification items is staying fairly constant.
Radiation f-protection and security are adequate to continue two unit operations.
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3.
Surveillance Observations and Review (61726)
Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that surveillance of safety related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS requirements.
.The inspectors verified that; testing was performed in accordance with
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adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; test results met acceptance criteria and were eviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and, system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified-individuals.
Licensee personnel performing surveiliance routines on area radiation monitors determined that source checks were being performed with a light emitting diode (LED) type check source conducted directly into the detectors'
photo-multiplier.
TS 3.3.3.1 requires operability determinations which include source checks.
Source check is a defined term in TS and specifies that the channel sensor is to be exposed to a radioactive source. The licensee made the initial determination that the detectors which use LEDs as source check devices were inoperable and'
entered the appropriate action statements for those instrument circuits.
After further' review, the licensee determined that certain other radiation monitors used installed check scurces which did not check the entire channel.
Instead of exposing tne check source to the sensor's crystal, the check source coupled to a secondary source crystal then to the sensor's photo-multiplier tube.
The sensor's primary crystal was not involved when the source check occurred.
As a result of these determinations, the licensee disassembled those detectors having LED check sources in order to perform an adequate Channel Functional Test. A radioactive test source can then be presented at the detectors' cry stal.
The technical resolution of the radioactive type source checks is still being pursued by the licensee. According to the licensee, at least 35 other nuclear plants have the same type detectors with similar source check arrangements, therefore, this issue may have generic implications. The licensee is presently considering options which include requesting TS amendments, design changes to the affected detectors, or justification for continued use of the present radioactive source check method.
All of the detectors involved are provided by the same manufacturer.
Resolution of the operability of plant systems monitored by the detectors and handling of the potential generic aspects will be tracked by URI 327,328/89-22-0 '*
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'The following activity was observed / reviewed with no deficiencies identified:
SI-130.1.1, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S Quarterly -
Operability Test. (also see paragraph 4)
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with T.S.
,
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met while. components.or systems were removed from service; redundant
. components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used.were adequate to control the i
activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair
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records accurately reflected the activitir s; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by j
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;
)
radiological controls were implementea; QC hold points were established where required and were observed; fire prevention controls were
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implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively
pursued.
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The following work requests were reviewed:
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a.
'WR B758901, Governor Valve 1-VLV-1-51 Stuck.
I l
On September 25, 1989, the licensee performed SI-130.1.1, Turbine l
Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S Quarterly Operability Test -
i Unit 1.
The Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater pump only achieved l
approximately 800 rpm. The ASOS declared the pump inoperable and LC0 j
3.7.1.2 was entered. Later that day, the inspector observed the work i
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in progress under WR B758901.
Governor valve 1-VLV-1-51, which governs the main steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary
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feedwater pump, stuck during the initial run.
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Initially the WR allowed for a test run of the pump to troubleshoot
the problem. Af ter manually werking the valve, the pump came up to I
i speed and appeared to function properly. However, following the pump run, the governor valve did not come back to its normal neutral position. The valve was almost fully closed. From this position the
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pump would not start and operate properly. The WR was replanned to (
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disassemble the linkage between the stem and the servo. The engineer observed a " rusty spot" when the linkage was removed.
This was
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lubricated and replaced.
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During the' PMT, the governor valve still would not return to its proper ' position, but the pump would restart and operate properly.
'After several iterative replannings of the WR, portions of the valve and the _ servo were torn down, cleaned and lubricated under MI-46.1, Disassembly, Inspection, and Reassembly of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine.
This was accompanied by contact with the vendor.
On October 27, 1989 the governor valve was freed, the null voltage was adjusted and the governor valve worked properly.
The licensee performed SI-130.1.1 satisfactorily and the pump was declared operable, b.
WP 12665, Install Piping and Instrumentation as Specified per ECN L5609
,
The inspector reviewed the new sample panel installed in the New Make-up De-Ionized Water Facility at the plant under WP 12665. The review was conducted to verify corrective actions associated with the issues described in PRD SQF880104P. The PRD stated that the process description and the manufacturer's information on the new sample panel at the new makeup water treatment plant at Sequoyah do not agree. The process description states that the Conoflow backpressure regulating valve should be set at approximately 25 psig and that the
. sum of all flows will be 800 ml/ min. The manufacturers data lists 17 gallons per hour (1070 ml/ min) for a set point of 25 psig.
The corrective action proposed and agreed upon was to provide this information to Operations, and request that system operating procedures (S0Is) include an instruction to set the pressure regulators for the required flow values.
The information was provided to Operations on December 15, 1988, however, the 501s
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associated with the system will not be generated for the system until the WP har been closed.
The inspector reviewed the design of the panel with respect to the question of over pressurization.
Upon entering the panel, sample flows (of which none are greater than 200 psig) pass through a Conoflow brand pressure regulating valve model IR401 which is designed to accept an input pressure of up to 3000 psig and break it down to less than 100 psig.
Following the pressure reduction the sample flows travel through their respective Wallace and Tiernan flow controllers and associated purge meters (rotameters) where flows are adjusted. These rotameters have a design pressure rating of 250 psig. The flow is then directed through the back pressure regulator valves.
These rotameters are adjusted by the operators to achieve a flow rate of approximately 300 cc/ minute.
The operator's manual states that
flow initiation should be accomplished by adjusting the pressure reduction valve to 30 psig. The back pressure flow regulator should be set to 25 psig.
Then, the flow to each instrument should be set according to the manufacturer's requirement : %.
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The manufacturer's (TVA's) requirements are to adjust flow into the
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conductivity cell to 300 cc/ min and establish a bypass flow of 500 cc/ min.
The operators stated in interviews that although the manual stated a sample flow pressure of 35 psig, the pressure required to achieve an adequate flow rate in all sample flows is 40-45 psig.
The actions taken by the operators to achieve the flow is the same as what is anticipated in the issuance of a new S01. The inspector noted that
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45 psig was about as high a pressure as the operators could achieve.
The - designer / manufacturer of the panel was TVA, and therefore, changes to the operations of the system can be approved by TVA as the vendor. The inspector had no further questions.
5.
Management Activities in Support of Plant Operations TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the NRC inspectors. Resident Inspectors observed that planning, scheduling, work control and other management meetings were effective in controlling plant activities.
First line supervisors appear to be knowledgeable and involved in the day to day activities of the plant. First line supervisor involvement in the field has been observed and appeared to be adequate.
Management response to those plant activities and events that occurred during this inspection period in general appeared timely and effective.
In the instance described below, management oversight and control was not considered effective:
a.
Unit 2 RCS Leakage through BIT Injection Check Valves On April 6,1989, Unit 2 experienced unidentified RCS leakage above normal but within the TS LCO. At the same time, high pressures were noted in the BIT injection lines between the BIT outlet and the RCS injection check valves. The licensee concluded that the check valves were leaking, and that the normally shut BIT isolation valves were also leaking. This resulted in RCS water leaking back to the BIT, and due to the BIT to BAT recirculation, caused dilution of the nominal 20,000 ppm boron in the BIT and BAT. This was confirmed by sampling the BIT and the BAT.
On April 11, the licensee stopped the BIT / BAT recirculation in an effort to reduce the dilution effect of the RCS backleakage.
This was performed without a proper safety evaluation being performed.
The inspector questioned the validity of this lineup, and the licensee responded by restoring the BIT recirculation to normal. The improper change to the BIT recirculation lineup cat'ed the BIT to be inoperable for the time period the recirculation was stopped.
This issue was pursued as part of the escalated enforcement for improper
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safety evaluations in IR 3 /, 328/89-1 i W'
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On April.25,'1989, the'lic'ensee attempted to reduce the leakage past
. the - BIT. isolation valves by increasing, the seating torque on the
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valves. This involved de-clutching the motor operators for the BIT
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-outlet valves,o FCV 63-25 and FCV 63-26, engaging the valves' manusi
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' operating handwheels, and applying additional closing torque on the
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valve? stems.
Af ter applying this additional-closing torque, the
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handwheels' were' disengaged and the motor operators. reengaged.
The
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. inspector 11nformed the : Operations Manager that; the BIT isolation -
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valves should be. considered inoperable since they had been manually:
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tightened, which invalidated the valves'- stroke time test.
The Operations Manager agreed.
The stroke time tests were reperformed
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with satifactory results.
x After restroking the BIT isolation valves, the RCS leakage gradually
- t increased. A system alignment change was initiated which provided' a
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path' to reroute the RCS leakage from the BIT injection lines to the
HUTS. 2 This effectively equalized the differential pressure across
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the BIT outlet' valves, and' conducted the RCS leakage, via the ECCS
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' check valve test header, directly to the HUT.'
This leakage was now-being directed to the Holdup Tank, which effectively resolved the
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BIT / BAT dilution problem, but had no appreciable effect on the leak rate from the RCS.
'On August 25, the RCS leakage had reached 1.9 gpm identified leakage and was, trending upward at a fairly constant rate of approximately 1~
0.03 gpm/ day.
The inspector discussed several concerns with the
.4 Plant Manager that day. The concerns included:
(1) the increasing leakage, which indicated that the affected check valve leakage was probably causing erosion of the seating surface; (2) a perception
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that plant management was willing to accept the leakage without a y
clear idea of which of the four RCS loops' check valves were actually j
leaking; (3) using a lineup for an extended period of time to route the leakage to the HUT which introduced the possibility of several
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additional leakage paths to be involved in the leakoff without the operators' awareness; (4) the increased leakage that was occurring
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from cold leg accumulators into the test header requiring refill of the loop 4 accumulator once per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shift; and, (5) that any
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reduction in margin for intersystem LOCA events was a matter of
' concern to the NRC, and the lineup involved had reduced the barriers between the high pressure RCS and the low pressure RHR to a single isolation valve (although the potential intersystem leak path was through a 3/4 inch line).
The Plant Manager agreed to revisit the
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issue and address the concerns presented.
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c On August 26, licensee personnel entered containment and determined that RCS loops 3 and 4 were leaking through.
On August 29, the plant returned the system alignment to normal and monitored the BIT outlet pressure indicator and BIT boron concentration for indication o.f continuing backleakage from the RCS.
The results of this series of actions determined that the leakage through the check valves had stopped. Apparently, due to the valve
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cycling and line flushing that preceded the lineup change to a normal configuration, the check valves had been restored to a tight seal.
-In addition, leakage from the cold leg accumulators had stopped.
- Although plant management responded to the inspector's concerns, there appeared 'to be a willingness on the part of management to accept an abnormal lineup with several inherent problems, and a lack of concern with the deteriorating conditions evidenced by the increasing. leakage. While the safety analysis performed to support the abnormal lineup was adequate and the leakage was well within the 10 gpm allowed by TS,'there was no apparent effort to investigate the actual leak path or to find an alternative to the solution in place.
6.
NRC Inspector Follow-up Items, Unresolved Items, Violations (92701, 92702)
(Closed) URI 327,328/88-47-09, Inadequate Maintenance This URI involved maintenance activities which resulted in a reactor trip of Unit 2.
The investigation into this event concluded that the practice of allowing long-standing TACFs to accumulate had reduced the effectiveness of the plant's configuration control measures.
Discussions with plant management resulted in a commitment to reduce the long-standing TACFs to a manageable number by the end of the fiscal year. The goal for total Unit 1, Unit 2 and Common pre-1988 TACFs was 27 by 30 September.
This represents a reduction from 80 at the beginning of the fiscal year.
The TACF program was reviewed in IR 327,328/88-50.
The wot k off and g
closure rate were considered acceptable in that report.
The inspector
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reviewed the actual progress of this program on September 25, 1989. The licensee had 29 pre-1988 TACFs still open and 57 total. A large number of
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the remaining TACFs involve the UHI system which is tentatively scheduled to be removed during the next refueling outage.
The concerns regarding i
the large numbers of TACFs and the lack of an aggressive program to reduce j
the number have been adequately addressed.
l URI 327,328/88-47-09 is closed.
(Closed) IFI 327, 328/86-11-01, Followup of the Licensee's Response to NRR for Post-Trip Review
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This issue has been acceptably resolved between NRR and the licensee to
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satisfy the requirements of GL 83-28, Item 1.2: Post-trip Review.
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Problems with the implementation of the post-trip review procedure were f
identified in inspection 327, 328/88-35 in relation to the excessive
post-trip cooldowns experienced during the resart of both units in 1988.
The post-trip review implementation issue is being tracked under violation 327, 328/88-35-01.
Therefore, this IFI is closed.
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(Closed) INF 327/80-21-01 Failure to Have Procedures for Bulletin 79-14
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Walkdowns
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During the closure inspection for J'~
o bulletin 79-14 (IR-327, 328/88-48), the; inspector observed that procedures
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used;to accomplish the walkdowns associated with.the licensee's 1988 79-14-
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bulletin. submittal < appeared adequate.
This. item is closed.
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7.'
Inspection of Suspected Unauthorized Rad Waste Disposal Area On September: 11,.1989', the' inspectors visited a rural' area in Sequatchie-County which had been described by an anonymous caller.
The ~' caller ' had
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.been target shooting at illegally dumped trash, bottles and cardboard.
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. When. he. walked up to the cardboard he had shot, he saw a: placard describing hazardous ' materia 1L warnings,mincluding radioactive materials.
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He-was concerned that he had been exposed to radiation, and called the
. resident office'after'he got back home. The inspectors found the site and
~ l the placards' in question.
The placards appeared to be old warning signs
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for transporting or storing hazardous ruaterials. The placard was intended
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toi-allow ~ a common sign to stipulate whether the contents were poi.sonous, acid, explosive, or' reactive. A marking scheme allowed the contents to be identified by type of. environmental hazard, including radioact'ive material. The signs were marked to indicate that no hazardous ~ materials were present.L The inspectors surveyed the signs and the general area with a-hand held digital' ratemeter (Xetex 305B) and observed no radiation levels above' background. The inspectors had no further questions.
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 5,~ 1989, with
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those persons indicated in-paragraph 1.
The Senior Resident Inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail' the inspection findings listec; below~
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings
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and did not. identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
Licensee management had no comment on -
any of the findings presented.
Inspection Findings:
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No violations were identified.
One unresolved item was identified, concerning the adequacy of the source check methodology for radiation monitors, URI 327, 328/89-22-01, paragraph g
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No deviations, or inspector follow-up items were identified.
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One weakness regarding management handling of the RCS backleakage to the l
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BIT was noted in paragraph 5.
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91 List o'f Acronyms and Initialisms
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-ABGTS-
. Auxiliary. Building Gas Treatment System
' 'ABI i-Auxiliary Building Isolatior
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' ABSCE-Auxiliary Building.Seconda.
Jontainment Enclosure AFW
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Auxiliary 3eedwater
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- AI Administrocive Instruction
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AOI Abnormal Operating Instruction
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AVO
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Auxiliary Unit Operato"
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ASOS -
Assistant Shift Operatina Supervisor
. ASTM -
~American Society of Testing and Materials BIT. -
Boron; Injection Tank BFN Browns Ferry Nuclear flant
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C&A. -
' Control and Auxiliary Buildings CAQR -
Conditions ~ Adverse to Quality R m rt CCS Corponent Cooling Water System
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- CCP
. Centrifugal Charging Pump
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CCTS.-
Corporate Commitment Tracking System
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CFR
. Code of Federal Regulations
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- COPS -
Cold Overpressure protection System CS.
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CSSC
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Critical Structures, Systems and Components
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CVCS'-'
Chemical and Volume Control System
'CVI Containment Ventilation Isolation
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DC'
Direct Current
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DCN Design Change Notice
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DNE -
Division.of Nuclear Engineering ECN Engineering Change Notice
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-ECCS --
Emergency Core Cooling System EDG Emergency 91esel Generator
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EI Emergency Ins &uctions
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ENS-Emergency Notification System
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E0P Emergency Operating Procedure
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Emergency Operating Instruction E0:
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ERCW -
Essential Raw Coolin'g Water
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ESF Engineered Safety Feature
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FCV~ -
Flow Control Valve FSAR
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Final Safety Analysis Report GDC' -
General Design Criteria
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.GOI- -
General Operating Instruction
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GL Generic Letter
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Hand-operated Indicating Controller
. HIC
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Hold Order H0'
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Health Physics J
HP-
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Holdup Tank
- r ii HUT e HW.C -
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
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ICF Instruction Change Form
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IN NRC Information Notica
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IFI Inspector Followup Item
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IM Instrument Maintenance
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Instrument Maintenance Instruction IMI
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IR
Inspection Report
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Kilovolt-Amp
KVA
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Kilowatt
KW
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Kilovolt
KV
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Licensee Event Report
LER
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LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
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Licensee Identified Violation
LIV
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LOCA -
Loss of Coolant Accident
M&Al -
Modifications and Additions Instructions
Main Control Room
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MI
Maintenance Instruction
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Maintenance Request
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MSIV -
NRC Bulletin
NB
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NQAM -
Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC
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OSLA -
Operations Section Letter - Administrative
OSLT -
Operations Section Letter - Training
Office of Special Projects
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Precautions. Limitations, and Setpoints
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Preventive Maintenance
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Parts Per Million
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Post Modification Test
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PORC -
Plant Operations Review Committee
Problem Reporting Document
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Potentially Reportable Occurrence
PRO
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Quality Assurance
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Quality Control
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Radiologically Controlled Area
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RCDT -
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
Reactor Coolant Pump
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Regulatory Guide
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Radiation Monitor
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Reactor Operatu.-
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Rod Position Indication
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Revolutions Per Minute
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Resistivity Temperature Detector
RTO
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Radiation Work Permit
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RWST -
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Safety Evaluation Report
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Surveillance Instruction
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Special Maintenance Instruction
SMI
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System Operating Instructions
SOI
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Shift Operating Superviser
SOS
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Segaoyah Standard Practice Maintenance
SQM
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Surveillance Requirements
SR
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Senior Reactor Operator
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S$PS
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' Solid: State Protection System
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.STA
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STI -'
Special Test Instruction
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~TACF
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Temporary Alteration Control Form
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TAVE'-
LAverage Reactor Coolant Temperature
'TDAFW-
. Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
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TI
Technical Instruction
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TREF -
- Reference Temperature
m.
TROI -
Tracking Open'!tems
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Technical. Specifications-
TS
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TVA. -
Tennessee Valley Authority
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Upper Head Injection
UHI
Unit Operator
UO-
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.URI
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. Unresolved Item.
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USQD -:
Unreviewed. Safety Question Determination
Volts Direct Current
VDC
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VAC ~ -
Volts Alternating Current
Work Control Group.
WCG
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WP.
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Work Plan
Work Request
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