IR 05000324/2016007

NRC Component Design Bases Inspection Report 05000325/2016007 and 05000324/2016007

ML17006A054
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	01/05/2017
From:	Bartley J NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2
To:	William Gideon Duke Energy Progress
References
IR 2016007
Download: ML17006A054 (19)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ary 5, 2017

SUBJECT:

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000325/2016007 AND 05000324/2016007

Dear Mr. Gideon:

On December 15, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Karl Moser and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 05000325, 05000324 License Nos.: DPR-71, DPR-62

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000325/2016007 and 05000324/2016007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Dockets: 50-325, 50-324 Licenses: DPR-71, DPR-62 Report Nos.: 05000325/2016007, 05000324/2016007 Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, Inc.

Facility: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: Southport, NC Dates: November 14, 2016 - December 15, 2016 Team Leader: E. Stamm, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Inspectors: R. Patterson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 M. Greenleaf, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 L. Wheeler, Reactor Systems Engineer, NRR Accompanying Personnel: C. Baron, Contractor, Beckman and Associates S. Kobylarz, Contractor, Beckman and Associates Approved By: Jonathan H. Bartley, Branch Chief Engineering Branch 1 Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000325/2016-007 and 05000324/2016-007; 11/14/2016 - 12/15/2016; Brunswick Steam

Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2; Component Design Bases Inspection.

The inspection activities described in this report were performed between November 14, 2016, and December 15, 2016, by three inspectors from the NRCs Region II office, one inspector from the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and two NRC contract personnel. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, or Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,

Significance Determination Process, (SDP) dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements were dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R21 . Component Design Basis Inspection

1. Inspection Sample Selection Process

The team selected risk-significant components and related operator actions for review using information contained in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment. In general, this included risk significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than 1.3 or Birnbaum value greater than 1E-6. The sample included 15 SSCs, 2 SSCs associated with containment large early release frequency (LERF), and 3 operating experience (OE) items.

The team performed a margin assessment and a detailed review of the selected risk-significant components and associated operator actions, to verify that the design bases had been correctly implemented and maintained. Where possible, this margin was determined by the review of the design basis, and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). This margin assessment also considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modifications, or margin reductions identified because of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for a detailed review. These reliability issues included items related to failed performance test results, significant corrective action, repeated maintenance, maintenance rule status, Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0326 conditions, NRC resident inspector input regarding problem equipment, system health reports, industry OE, and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, OE, and the available defense-in-depth margins. An overall summary of the reviews performed, and the specific inspection findings identified, are included in the following sections of the report.

2. Component Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

SSCs

• Unit 2 main steam safety relief valves

• Residual heat removal motor-operated valve 1-E11-F068B

• Nuclear service water pump strainers

• Residual heat removal motor-operated valves 1-E11-F015A/B

• Unit 1 residual heat removal heat exchangers

• Residual heat removal motor-operated valves 2-E11-F008/9

• Unit 2 conventional service water pumps

• Emergency diesel generator #3 governor

• 2A-2 battery

• 2A-1 battery charger

• Nuclear service water pump 2B breaker E4-AL1

• Unit 2 conventional service water pump motors

• Emergency diesel generator #3 load sequencing timing relays

• Emergency bus undervoltage relays

• 480V motor control centers 2PA and 2XB Components with LERF Implications

• Unit 2 control rod drive mechanisms

• Avco scram solenoid valves For the components listed above, the team reviewed the plant technical specifications (TSs), UFSAR, design bases documents, and drawings to establish an overall understanding of the design bases of the components. Design calculations and procedures were reviewed to verify that the design and licensing bases had been appropriately translated into these documents. Test procedures and recent test results were reviewed against design bases documents, to verify that acceptance criteria for tested parameters were supported by calculations or other engineering documents, and that individual tests and analyses served to validate component operation under accident conditions.

Maintenance procedures were reviewed to ensure components were appropriately included in the licensees preventive maintenance (PM) program. System modifications, vendor documentation, system health reports, preventive and corrective maintenance history, and corrective action program (CAP) documents were reviewed (as applicable),in order to verify that the performance capability of the component was not negatively impacted, and that potential degradation was monitored or prevented. Maintenance Rule information was reviewed to verify that the component was properly scoped, and that appropriate PM was being performed to justify current Maintenance Rule status.

Component walkdowns and interviews were conducted to verify that the installed configurations would support their design and licensing bases functions under accident conditions, and had been maintained to be consistent with design assumptions.

Additionally, the team performed the following specific reviews or evaluations:

• The team reviewed the periodic testing of control circuits associated with motor-operated valve 1-E11-F015A to verify that the valve interlocks were fully tested.

• The team reviewed the plants response to a Mode 3 loss of coolant accident during shutdown cooling operations to verify the response of motor-operated valve 1-E11-F015A as well as plant operating procedures.

• The team reviewed the licensing basis, operating procedures, and accident analysis with regard to small break loss of coolant accident mitigation strategy.

• The team reviewed the plant time critical operator actions procedure to verify that selected information was correctly translated from calculations to the procedure.

• The team reviewed motor control center maintenance procedures and the results of periodic maintenance to verify the adequacy of the cable and conduit seals provided to limit moisture intrusion during design basis environmental conditions at motor control center 2XB.

• The team observed a simulator scenario involving time critical operator actions to manually emergency depressurize the reactor vessel following a reactor scram followed by a complete loss of all high pressure water sources to verify the actions could be accomplished as relied upon in design assumptions and the Probabilistic Safety Assessment.

• The team reviewed local manual actions required to align motor control centers 2XB and 2XB-2 for a postulated fire in the main control room.

• The team observed local manual actions required to transfer direct current (DC)control power during a loss of DC power event.

• The team observed local manual actions required to maximize Unit 2 control rod drive flow with the reactor building accessible in accordance with emergency operating procedures.

• The team observed local manual actions required to vent the Unit 2 scram air header for alternate control rod insertion in accordance with emergency operating procedures.

• The team observed local manual actions required to de-energize the 125 volt DC battery charger 1B-1 in accordance with operating procedures.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

3. Results of Reviews for Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed three operating experience issues for applicability at the Brunswick Plant. The team performed an independent review for these issues and, where applicable, assessed the licensees evaluation and disposition of each item. The issues that received a detailed review by the team included:

• NRC Information Notice 2005-30, Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged By Unanalyzed Internal Flooding Events And Inadequate Design

• NRC Information Notice 2008-11, "Service Water System Degradation at Brunswick Steam Plant Unit 1"

• NRC Information Notice 2013-14, Potential Design Deficiency in Motor-Operated Valve Control Circuitry

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On December 15, 2016, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Karl Moser and other members of the licensee staff. Proprietary information that was reviewed during the inspection was returned to the licensee or destroyed in accordance with prescribed controls.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

K. Allen, Director, Design Engineering

J. Anderson, Manager, Electrical Design Engineering

S. Boyce, Nuclear Ops Specialist

J. Brady, Nuclear Licensing Consultant

J. Bryant, Senior Nuclear Engineer

T. Byrne, Nuclear Licensing Consultant

K. Call, Manager, Electrical Systems Engineering

R. Gideon, Vice President - BNP

D. Goins, Manager, Mechanical Design Engineering

L. Grzeck, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

E. Hoerhke, Plant Operator

D. Kronebusch, Plant Operator

K. Moser, Plant General Manager

J. Nolin, General Manager, Engineering

A. Pope, Director, Organizational Effectiveness

E. Ram, Training Supervisor

W. Richardson, Manager, Mechanical Systems Engineering

M. Roberts, Operations Trainer

W. Rogers, Programs Engineering

T. Sellers, Plant Operator

N. Smith, Manager, I&C Design Engineering

D. Watson, Plant Operator

B. Wooten, Assistant Operations Manager

NRC Personnel

M. Catts, Senior Resident Inspector, Brunswick

M. Schweig, Resident Inspector, Brunswick