IR 05000324/2019004
| ML20042E097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick, 07200006  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/2020 |
| From: | Louis Mckown NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Krakuszeski J Duke Energy Progress |
| References | |
| IR 2019002 | |
| Download: ML20042E097 (16) | |
Text
February 11, 2020
SUBJECT:
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000324/2019004 AND 05000325/2019004; 07200006/2019002
Dear Mr. Krakuszeski:
On December 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. On January 27, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Karl Moser and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Louis J. McKown, II, Chief (Acting)
Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000324, 05000325 and 07200006 License Nos. DPR-62 and DPR-71
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000324, 05000325 and 07200006
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000324/2019004, 05000325/2019004 and 0720006/2019002
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-004-0026
I-2019-002-0098
Licensee:
Duke Energy Progress, LLC
Facility:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Location:
Southport, NC
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2019 to December 31, 2019
Inspectors:
M. Bates, Senior Operations Engineer
T. Fanelli, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Schwieg, Reactor Inspector
G. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Steward, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Louis J. McKown, II, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a NRC inspection at Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 7115
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000324,05000325/20 19004-01 Limitorque MOV space heater impact on qualified life 71152 Open LER 05000324/2019-001-00 LER 2019-001-00 for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Automatic Actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System.
71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) and continued to operate there until October 8, when power was reduced to 70 percent RTP due to removal of an off-site power line. Following maintenance on the line, power was restored to 100 percent RTP on the same day where it continued to operate until October 18 when power was reduced to 92 percent RTP for turbine bypass valve testing and control rod operability testing. Following completion of the testing, power was restored to 100 percent RTP on October 19 where the unit continued to operate until November 15 when power was reduced to 65 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange. Following the sequence exchange as well as two follow-on control rod improvements, power was restored to 100 percent RTP on November 21 where the unit continued to operate until December 20 when power was reduced to 82 percent RTP for turbine bypass valve testing and control rod operability testing. Following completion of the testing and one control rod improvement, power was returned to 100 percent RTP where the unit continued to operate until the end of the period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP and continued to operate there until October 3, when power was reduced to 94 percent RTP due to removal of a condensate demineralizer from service. Following restoration of the demineralizer, power was restored to 100 percent RTP on the October 5 where the unit continued to operate until December 6 when power was reduced to 65 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange, turbine bypass valve testing, feed water heater maintenance, and control rod drive system maintenance. Following completion of the testing, maintenance, and one control rod improvement, power was restored to 100 percent RTP on December 9 where the unit continued to operate until the end of the period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) On December 31, 2019, the inspectors completed an evaluation of the site's readiness to cope with external flooding for the following areas:
- Service Water Building
- Emergency Diesel Generator Building
- Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 'A' residual heat removal (RHR) train during a maintenance outage on the 'B' RHR train on November 14, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 'A' and 'B' conventional service water (CSW) pumps as well Unit 2 nuclear service water (NSW) system while the Unit 2 'B' CSW pump was out-of-service (OOS) for planned maintenance on December 17, 2019
71111.04S - Equipment Alignment
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation and Cooling (RCIC) system on November 26, 2019
71111.05A - Fire Protection (Annual)
Annual Inspection (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a smoldering event in the elevator machinery room (elev.
70') of the radioactive waste building (0PFP-RW-01E) on December 10, 2019.
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Unit 1 Turbine Building (20' elevation) air compressor area (1PFP-TB1-01D) on October 10, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 Reactor Building (-17' elevation), RHR A/C pump room, Northeast RHR pump room (2PFP-RB2-01C) on November 14, 2019
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.) (1 Sample)
On December 31, 2019, the inspectors completed an evaluation of internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) Radioactive Waste Building
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
On December 31, 2019, the inspectors completed an evaluation of the readiness and performance of the below heat exchanger:
- (1) Unit 2 'A' RHR heat exchanger
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), Requalification Requirements, of the NRCs Operators Licenses. During the week of October 28, 2019, the inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, the crew simulator operating examinations, and the biennial written examinations in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.02, Requalification Examination Results, of IP 71111.11.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam and biennial written examination completed on September 27, 2019.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room while performing reactivity manipulation in accordance with 0PT-14.1, Monthly Control Rod Exercise Test, Rev. 70 on November 15, 2019
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the Cycle 4 Requal Simulator evaluation on October 23, 2019. This scenario dealt with a failure of an automatic depressurization system valve and an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS).
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) CR 2206596 Unit 1 Drywell Temperature abnormally high for plant conditions on December 31, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 Stator Water Cooling filter chemical cleaning on October 17, 2019
- (4) Unit 2 Intermediate Range channel 'A' detector (2-C51-K601A) calibration and functional testing, following troubleshooting and repair activities on December 31, 2019
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Emergent Failure of Relay 1-E11-K14B (Reactor Vessel Shroud Level Below Low Level) on October 8, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 'B' RHR Pump breaker emergent failure on December 16, 2019
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (2) NCR 2260472: Leak from piping downstream of 2-E11-PDV-F068B on October 31, 2019
- (4) NCR 2303382: Unit 1, 1-SW-140-20-157 Flange Bolt Material Nonconforming to Spec 248-117 on December 2, 2019
- (5) NCR 2301991: Unit 2 RCIC (2-E51-F013) Required in-service inspection not performed on December 31, 2019
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
On December 31, 2019, the inspectors completed an evaluation of the following permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 299232, "Unit 2 Reactor Building Roof Drain Piping Replacement" completed on December 11, 2019
- (2) EC 400467, "1A CSW Pump Replacement" completed on December 31, 2019
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests (PMTs):
- (2) Unit 2 'B' NSW Pump B Discharge Strainer Blowdown Valve, 2-SW-PV-140, on December 12, 2019
- (3) Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control System drain valve (1-C41-V23) following valve replacement under WO 20097108 on December 31, 2019
- (4) Unit 2 Intermediate Range Channel 'A' following maintenance/functional testing per 0MST-IRM25R on December 31, 2019
- (5) Unit 2 'B' RHR pump breaker following breaker replacement under WO 20372008 on December 26, 2019
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01)
(1)0PT-09.2, HPCI System Operability Test (Unit 1) on October 10, 2019
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Emergency Preparedness Drill conducted on October 9,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
On December 31, 2019 the inspectors completed a verification of the licensee performance indicator submittals listed below:
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06)===
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2018 - September 30, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2018 - September 30, 2019)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2018 - September 30, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2018 - September 30, 2019)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2018 - September 30, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2018 - September 30, 2019)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) On December 31, 2019, the inspectors completed a review of the licensees corrective action program looking for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (3 Samples)
On December 31, 2019, the inspectors completed an evaluation of the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (2) CR 2271482, Fire in Unit 2 'B' Heater Drain Pump
- (3) CR 2214514, EQ violation followup
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000324/2019-001-00, Automatic Actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System (ADAMS accession: ML19120A333). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000324,325/2019001-01. This issue involved an inadvertent reactor vessel low level signal that resulted in a temporary loss of shutdown cooling. A Green Non-Cited Violation was issued under the above mentioned report.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees activities related to long-term operation and monitoring of their independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). This inspection included a detailed walkdown of the ISFSI on December 31,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unresolved Item (Open)
Limitorque MOV space heater impact on qualified life URI 05000324,05000325/2019004-01 71152
Description:
The NRC opened an unresolved item (URI) following a review of the corrective actions for non-cited violation (NCV) 05000324, 325/2018011-02 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18176A352). The NCV was specifically for not considering potential degradation from space heaters inside the limit switch compartments (LSC) for Limitorque motor operated valves (MOV). The Appendix B supplier, Limitorque, offered these space heaters (resistors)as an optional accessory for short term storage in damp locations, limited to less than one year, per the user instructions in licensee files (FP-20243). However, the licensee used the heaters in service for 22 years until 1997 when they were turned off. The resistors did not perform any safety function, were not safety related, and were not part of the MOV qualification. As a corrective action in the licensees evaluation, the heat rise value in various Qualification Data Packages (QDPs) was raised to 12 °C from 10 °C. The licensee stated, in part, this value is from our Appendix B supplier, adjusted 20% higher to account for uncertainty. The current licensee position stated, In lieu of a separate analysis to determine actual heat rise, and in absence of any design inputs currently available in our records management system to perform a separate analysis, the licensee used the heat rise value from the NUGEQ Clarification Letter, approved by Limitorque, as design input from our Appendix B supplier and applied this heat rise to all components within the LSC. However, the nuclear utility group for environmental qualification (NUGEQ) supplied the 10 °C and was not an Appendix B supplier. No testing or analysis was provided to substantiate the NUGEQ temperature. The heater surface temperatures specified by the heater manufacturer (Ward-Leonard/Ohmite) indicated they could reach as high as 300°C when operated at full power in open air. The manufacturer specified that the heater temperatures were certified by the underwriters laboratories (UL) which used testing as a verification method. The degrading temperatures effects of the heaters on other components were not verified during Limitorque qualification testing. The original performance deficiency specified, that "the failure to address the degrading effects of space heaters in Limitorque MOVs was a performance deficiency (PD)". Testing or analytical methods for determining the degrading effects of the space heaters would account for the verified manufacturer temperatures (UL verified temperatures)in conjunction with installation configurations, which further affect the temperatures (applied power, ambient temperature rise, enclosure temperature rise, and resistor grouping temperature rise). The installed configurations included 25 watt single resistors and parallel resistors in the 40 to 50 watt range that are inside small unventilated enclosures. The failure to determine the degrading effects of the heaters in their installed configurations by test or analysis in accordance with IEEE 323-1974, Section 6, "Qualification Procedures and Methods," was a performance deficiency.
As described in the prior violation, Information notice (IN) 86-71, Recent Identified Problems with Limitorque Motor Operators, was issued to notify licensees of high temperature damage to MOVs caused by these resistors. The warning and other information was available at the time the licensee evaluated the effect on qualified life of the MOVs in around 1997. The licensee did not correct the prior violation (NCV 05000325/2018011,05000324/2018011-02)in that they neither identified potential degraded conditions inside the LSCs of the MOVs nor adequately evaluated the impact on the environmentally qualified life of the components.
Planned Closure Actions: The inspectors determined more information is needed to sufficiently determine if this issue is more than minor. To support that determination, the inspectors will observe and review the results of the licensees testing of the MOV space heaters currently scheduled during the first calendar quarter of 2020. The testing should provide a reasonable temperature rise from the LSC space heaters that will allow the licensee to complete an evaluation of any impacts to the qualified life of the MOVs. Additionally, the inspectors will review any revisions to the licensees operability evaluation of the MOVs as a result of the planned testing.
Licensee Actions: The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and an initial determination of operability determined the components to be operable. Additionally, the licensee plans to conduct testing of the MOV limit switch compartment space heaters during the first calendar quarter of 2020.
Corrective Action References: This issue has been documented as CR 2214514 in the corrective action program.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: From 2017 to 2019, the licensee failed to maintain the effectiveness of its emergency plan when the licensee failed to utilize a 15-minute average for the data (wind speed and stability class) sent from the metrological tower to the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) in the control room and technical support center. This ERFIS data is used to make protective action recommendations during a plant emergency. The data was instead mistakenly sent to ERFIS as an instantaneous value. Using incorrect metrological data in ERFIS could lead to an inaccurate dose assessment. This issue was discovered by the licensee during the replacement of the metrological tower in October 2019. The licensee immediately instituted compensatory measure upon discovery of the error. The issue was placed into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2296881. The use of a 15-minute average is required pursuant to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.23, Rev. 0 and 1.97, Rev. 2. The licensee formally committed to these regulatory guides in their emergency plan.
Contrary to 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) and 10 CFR 50.54(b)(9), Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP)failed to maintain the effectiveness of its emergency plan by not ensuring the metrological data sent to ERFIS was assembled as a 15-minute average, thereby affecting the licensees ability to provide technically accurate dose assessments.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors evaluated this issue as affecting dose assessment per IMC 0609, Appendix B, Table 5.9-1. The inspectors screened this issue as a Green NCV (Licensee Identified) because the licensee never lost full capability of performing dose projections at the site.
Corrective Action References: CR 2296881
Observation: Semi Annual Trend Review 71152 The inspectors performed a trend analysis on the licensees corrective action program in order to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue.
The inspectors focused their review on repetitive equipment failures, human performance trends, and signs of programmatic weakness. The inspectors utilized daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the 6-month period of July 2019 through December 2019, although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared their results with the licensees analysis of trends. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents that were processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in the condition of structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions.
The inspectors noted some sporadic issues where equipment reliability was a concern. However, the inspectors observed that, in these cases, the licensee aggressively addressed the underlying concerns and integrated an overall plan to address any negative outcomes regarding equipment reliability issues.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 27, 2020, the inspectors presented the NRC inspection results to Mr. Karl Moser and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 3.4.1.1,
2.4.5.2, and 2.4.5.3
External and Internal Flooding
Procedures
Brunswick Nuclear Plant Response to Severe Weather
Warnings
0AOP-13.0
Operation during Hurricane, Flood Condition, Tornado, or
71111.04Q Drawings
D-02525, Sheet
1A
Reactor Building Residual Heat Removal System Piping
Diagram
D-02525, Sheet
1B
Reactor Building Residual Heat Removal System Piping
Diagram
Miscellaneous
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 5.4.7,
Residual Heat Removal System
Procedures
Service Water System Operating Procedure
168
Residual Heat Removal System Operating Procedure
181
SD-43
Service Water System
Procedures
Reactor Core Isolation and Cooling System Operating
System
SD-16
Reactor Core Isolation and Cooling System
Procedures
Fire Drill Program
General Fire Plan
0PLP-01.2
Fire Protection System Operability, Action, and Surveillance
Requirements
AD-EG-ALL-1532
NFPA 805 Pre-Fire Plans
71111.05Q Fire Plans
U1 TB EL 20' Air
Compressor Area
Fire Zone, 1PFP-
TB1-01D
Turbine Building Pre-Fire Plans, CSD-BNP-PFP-1TB
U2 RB 17' EL
Northeast RHR
Room, Fire Zone
Reactor Building Pre-Fire Plans, CSD-BNP-PFP-2RB
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
General Fire Plan
0PLP-01.2
Fire Protection System Operability, Action, and Surveillance
Requirements
AD-EG-ALL-1520
Transient Combustible Control
AD-EG-ALL-1532
NFPA 805 Pre-Fire Plans
Miscellaneous
RHR Heat Exchanger Technical Manual
K
Photos
Photos of the 2A RHR heat exchanger
03/31/2019
Procedures
Administrative Control of NRC Generic Letter 89-13
requirements
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
LORX-15
Simulator Guide
Procedures
0PT-14.1
Monthly Control Rod Exercise Test
AD-OP-ALL-1000
Conduct of Operations
Corrective Action
Documents
NCR 2292147
Unit 1 Stator Cooling Filter exceeds 8 psid limit
Miscellaneous
Database
Maintenance Rule Database
2/31/2019
Industry Guidelines for monitoring the effectiveness of
maintenance at Nuclear
Power Plants
4A
Procedures
IRM Channel A Calibration/Functional Test
Diesel Fuel Oil Tanks Inspection
AD-EG-ALL-1210
Work Orders
20155129,
20119602
20341070-01,
20193450-01
20353993,
20355308
Corrective Action
Documents
NCR 2295055
Emergent Failure of 1E11-K14B
Procedures
BNP Integrated Scheduling
AD-OP-ALL-0201
Protected Equipment
AD-WC-ALL-
200
Online Work Management
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AD-WC-ALL-
250
Work Implementation and Completion
AD-WC-ALL-
0410
Work Activity Integrated Risk Management
Work Orders
20154566
Operability
Evaluations
NCR 2294630
Thru wall leak at flange weld upstream of 1-SW-V110
NCR 2301991
Unit 2 RCIC, 2-E51-F013 Required ISI not performed
NCR 2303382
1-SW-140-157 Flange Bolt Material NCON to 248-117
Procedures
AD-OP-ALL-0105
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
AD-PI-ALL-0100
Corrective Action Program
Work Orders
20356248
Engineering
Changes
299232
Unit 2 Reactor Building Roof Drain Piping Replacement
400467
1A Conventional Service Water Pump replacement
400467
EC 295433 CHILD #5 - 1-SW-1A-CONV-PMP
REPLACEMENT
06/20/2019
Engineering
Evaluations
G0050A-10
BNP UNIT NO. 1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HYDRAULIC
ANALYSIS
Rev. 15
Miscellaneous
238-044
PROCUREMENT OF PRODUCT-LUBRICATED SERVICE
WATER PUMPS - AL6XN
Rev. 12
Procedures
IPT-24.1-1
Service Water Pump and Discharge Valve Operability Test
04/29/2019
Procedures
IRM Channels Range Correlation Adjustment
Residual Heat Removal System Operating Procedure
181
2PT-24.1-2
Service Water Pump and Discharge Valve Operability Test
Work Orders
20341070-02
2-C51-K601A, IRM A Recorder Value low out of tolerance
20364434
Unit 2 NSW Pump B Discharge Strainer Blowdown Line
20364434-03
Unit 2 NSW Pump Discharge Strainer Blowdown Valve, 2-
SW-PV-140, PMT
Procedures
0PT-09.2
Unit 1 HPCI System Operability Test
2
Procedures
AD-PI-ALL-0100
Corrective Action Program
21