IR 05000321/1979011
| ML19208D642 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1979 |
| From: | Dance H, Rogers R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208D634 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-79-11, 50-366-79-15, NUDOCS 7909290162 | |
| Download: ML19208D642 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES
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Report No. 50-321/79-11 and 50-366/79-15 Licensee: Georgia Power Company 270 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Facility Name:
E. I. Hatch Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5
Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia Inspector:
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Approved by:
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Date Signed H. C. Dance, Section ief,pNSBranch SUMMARY Inspection on March 13 - April 6, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 30 inspector-hours on-site of 1 plant operations, Unit 2 startup tasting, technical specification Unit compliance, reportable occurrences, on-site cosucittee meeting minutes and general housekeeping.
Results Of the six areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in four areas; two apparent items of noncompliance were found in two areas (infraction-failure to take effective corrective action on secondary containment doors, paragraph 13); (infraction - failure to take prompt corrective action on NPCI setpoint error, paragraph 14).
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t DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. Manry, Plant Manager R. Nix, Superintendent of Maintenance S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations T. Greene, Superintendent of Engineering Services C. Bellflower, QA Site Supervisor W. Rogers, Health Physicist / Radiochemist Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended management interview.
2.
Management Interview The inspection scope and findings were sumsmrized on March 16, 23, 30 and April 6, 1979 with Mr. Manry. The two notices of violations were identified to licensee personnel on March 16, 1979.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items None identified.
5.
Test Progras Review and Evaluation (Unit 2)
The inspector reviewed the HNP-2-10000 series test sequencing document to deternine the status of startup testing on Unit 2 on a daily basis.
The startup test engineers log, control room log, and shift supervisors log were also reviewed. The inspector observed control room operations to ascertain that operator action:: were in conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative procedures.
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Pipe Anchor Inspection To date Bechtel has analyzed 2,342 wedge and 1860 self-drilling type anchors in which failures were 2 and 699 respectively.
The latter number includes 250 anchors which were reset, without testing, if found in contact with the anchor plate. Of 159 analy us on hangers completed, five hangers are considered to have failed. All five failed hangers are in the RHR System. Analyses performed in the RHR system were primarily centered aroend 200 feet of pipe from the torus and drywell s
Considering these failures, stress values found to date to the pump.
are within code values.
Stress values calculated include dead weight and seismic loads. Experience indicated total stresses, includingAll of dynamic and thermal stresses, will be within acceptable limits.
the anchor problems are located outside of the dryvell and the second isolation valves. The licensee committed to a sampling test of 100 accessible anchors in Unit I to determine if the problem is generic.
7.
Safety Relief Valve Testing (Unit 1)
During the performance of the Hain Steam Isolation Valve Closure Test on February 14, 1979, two of eleven Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) failed Anomolous indications occurred to open at the proper indicated pressure.
on some of the remaining SRVs which were specially instrumented by G.E.
During the transient, reactor pressure remained within accepted limits, but it was suspected that some of these valves may not have opened at their proper setpoints. The licensee decided to pull and calibrated all eleven SRVs prior to a Unit 2 startup.
Unmonitored Release of Radioactivity Within Site Boundarys (Unit 1)
8.
On March 22, 1979, an unmonitored release path for low level radioactive fluids was identified. The pathway was from a feedwater heater to the ground within the restricted area. The pathway was from a 1/2 inch pipe which had been installled during construction to provide a nitrogen blanket on a feedwater heater. Groundwater samples collected from 3 of 5 onsite sampling wells revealed elevated levels of tritius; the maximum level was obtained from a well that was located one foot from the pipe.
The level was 10% of MPC. No radioactivity above background was found in groundwater samples collected offsite. Soil samples collected around the pipe indicated that tritium was the only radionuclide which migrated to the groundwater. An isolation valve was closed the release stopped.
The subject pipe was subsequently cut and capped. The licensee plans to remove the pipe and contaminated earth during the upcoming refueling outage.
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Impact of Three Mile Island Incident During the week following the Three Mile Island Unit 2 incident on March 28, 1979, the inspector met with on-shift operators to assure that they were aware of exactly what happened at the Pennsylvania The inspector made NRC Bulletins and updates available in the resctor.
control room and explained the differences associated with the pressur-ized water reactor plants. The inspector also entertained numerous media requests and discussed with a representative of the County Commission the nature of the problem and how it related to the Hatch BWR design.
10.
Plant Review Board Minutes Review The inspector reviewed the minutes of the Plant Review Board for the period from December 4, 1978 to March 28, 1979. Meeting periodicity, quorum requirements, and minute contents were evaluated against the requirements of Section 6 of the facility technical specifications.
The inspector had no further questions.
11.
Plant Tours The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and that plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
12.
Technical Specification Compliance During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO's) and rer.ults of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, The switch positions, and review of completed logs and records.
licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
13.
Inability to Maintain Secondary Containment Integrity (Unit 1)
The licensee submitted a report dated March 12, 1979 which described several inadvertant losses of secondary containment integrity in vio-lation of Technical Specification Section 3.7.C.1 which states in part that
" integrity of the secondary containment shall be maintained
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.". The report (1.ER 50-321/79-15) further listed other instances
..of occurrances of this type since 1976.
Although numerous attempts have been made by the licensee to install an adequate design, the attempts have resulted in systems of latchs, alarus, solenoids, and/or y
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s-4-lights which have proven ineffective in use. The licensee's continued failure to provide an interlock system which assures that Technical (321/79-11-01.
Specification requirements are met in an infraction.
14.
Inadequate Corrective Action Involving The High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) System (Unit 2)
In December 1978, the licensee reported that the liPCI turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure instrument on Unit I was calibrated with a head correction of (+) 13.8 psig on a dry line which should not have a water head correction (IIR 50-321/78-96). Technical Specifications limit this value to less than or equal to 10 psig.
Actual value was 21.8 psig (8 psig nominal + 13.8 psig correction). This value was noncon-servative and inanediately corrected. The licensee, however, failed to check Unit 2 for the same calibration error until approximately three months later during normal surveillance when it was foud that the same 13.8 psig problem existed in the Unit 2 calibration procedures.
During that period, Unit 2 was operated at power levels up to 100% with HPCI nonconservatively calibrated. The failure of the licensee to pursue problems with generic impact in an aggressive and timely manner constitutes inadequate corrective action and is an infraction (366/79-15-01). This is a repeat infraction of a similar item on inadequate corrective action discussed in IE Inspection Report 50-366/79-09 dated March 23, 1979.
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