IR 05000321/1979021
| ML19253A726 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1979 |
| From: | Dance H, Robert Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19253A724 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-79-21, 50-366-79-26, NUDOCS 7909110066 | |
| Download: ML19253A726 (5) | |
Text
8'ga ascw#'o UNITED ST ATES l'
,, 7f,' 7 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
3c
^'/' $
REGION il o,
fa
[
101 MARIETT A sT., N W., SUITE 310o W
f AT L ANT A, G E oRGI A 30303
.....
Report Nos. 50-321/79-21 and 50-366/79-26 Licensee: Georgia Power Company 270 Peachtree Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Facility Name:
Hatch I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 Inspection at Hatch near Baxley, Georgia Inspected by:
(
(u w 8/
'l 5 H. C. Dance Date' Signed Accompanying Personnel:
. F. Rogers, Resident Inspector (June 28, 1979)
// 7f Approved by:
d.
aM R. C. Lewi(, Acting Chief, RONS Branch Date Sighed SUMMARY Inspected on June 28-29, 1979.
Areas Inspected This special, unannounced inspection involved 11 inspector-hours onsite in the area of malfunctions of the High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.
Results Of the area inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
79og11 0 CQ n..,
-
s.s 9.) m). ~. * ?
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Moore, Assistaat Plant Superintendent T. Greene, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- E. Spell, Senior QA Field Representative D. Brock, Startup Test Director P. Fornel, Senior QA Field Representative General Electric Company M. Wyatt, Startup Engineer Resident Inspector R. Rogers
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 29, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector emphasized the areas of concern as those items included in the Region II letter to Georgia Power Company (GPC) dated June 28, 1979 concerning the HPCI and RCIC malfunc-tions. The Assistant Plant Manager stated a thorough investigation was already underway and that items identified in this inspection would be addressed in the plant review. The GPC investigation results and the planned retect program were subsequently reviewed with the Resident Inspector on July 1 and 2, 1979. Based on this review, concurrence of Unit 2 startup was granted by Region II on July 2 and confirmed by letter to GPC dated July 5, 1979.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
High Pressure Coolant Injection (IIPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Systems Malfunctions
- a gg 3 o~
sie) s j aw o if
.
-2-Following a Unit 2 reactor scram, resulting from the scheduled Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Test from full power on June 27, 1979, the HPCI and RCIC were called upon to automatically start.
Both systems isolated on steam line high differential pressure.
Previously, these two systems had also isolated from different causes on June 3, 1979.
Licensee Event Reports were submitted on these malfunctions.
-
Subsequently on June 28, 1979, NRC Region II telephoned the Georgia Power Company's (GPC) Senir. Vice President and extensively discussed these failures and identi.ied substantial NRC concern. This same date, o Con-firmation Letter was sent to GPC confirming their commitment to investigate all HPCI and RCIC malfunctions at the Hatch site, to review their adminis-trative operating and maintenance procedures relating to HPCI and RCIC, and to develop a comprehensive retest program prior to plant restart.
At the time of this inspection the above investigation was in progress by the licensee and was slated to be completed on July 1, 1979.
The specific cause of the Unit 2 June 27 trip of the HPCI and RCIC due to high steam flow had not been identified. During the inspection Unit I was in a refueling-maintenance outage and Unit 2 startup was awaiting completion of the above investigation.
6.
Reactor Water Level The inspector's review of Unit 2 reactor water level chart in the control room for the June 27, 1979 MSIV closure test indicated the lowest reactor water was approximately minus 40 inches or ten feet above the top of the active fuel. The HPCI and RCIC automatically receive a start signal at about (-38") this same level.
Recovery to the normal level of +37" occurred over the next forty minutes. HPCI and RCIC systems were restarted manually following the above trips.
Observations in the Unit 2 HPCI room were made.
An oil separater was noted operating and circulating the turbine oil system. This was a continuation of the oil purification process following the June 3 water inleakage into the oil system from seal injection and oil cooler.
Commitment to lock the cavity drain valves following the June 3 HPCI trip were noted to have been carried out.
The Resident Inspector had previously identified to the licensee the need to upgrade the means of securing these valves.
7.
Review of Licensee Event Report (LER)
The inspector's review of sixteen Unit 2 LERs for 1978 pertaining to HPCI and RCIC failures indicated two pertinent facts concerning the latest high steam flow isolations.
Two LER's, 78-62 and 78-78, reported HPCI steam line flow trip set a.
points set too high. The later report was also the HPCI acceptance startup test run.
A plant deviation report identifying the high trip setting was resolved on 4/2/79 by stating that the switch being set high would not influence the test. The inspector questioned this
, y o-.
v 0..%.
<
.
.-
'
3-statement and was subsequently informed the switch in question was the instrument down scale trip and not the high stcam flow switches.
Four LER's, 78-62, 78-79, 79-8, and 79-9, reported high RCIC steam line set points. The licensee stated that the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC steam line flow instrument would be recorded during the restart test program. Transducers were being installed.
b.
LER 79-31 discussed several failure of the HPCI and RCIC to automat-ically start during the startup test program in the October-November 1978 period. This LER was submitted following the noncompliance for failure to report these events identified in Inspection Report Nos.
50-321/79-8 and 50-366/79-10.
GPC has since responded to this matter and HPCI/RCIC automatically start failares currently are considered prompt reportable and also requires an automatic start versus a manual start following the repair.
The inspector also reviewed audit results by the plant QA staff of the numerous HPCI-RCIC trips during the last quarter of 1978 which was the basis of LER 79-31.
This period covered the startup testing for these systems and was previously reviewed by the Resident Inspector as noted in the above referenced inspection reports.
8.
Procedure and Drawing Reviews The inspector's review established the following:
a.
Procedure HNP 2-6010, HPCI System Maintenance, isolates the outboard isolation valve for rystem maintenance. DWG 2E41-1021 confirms the outboard isolation valve, F003 is at the same elevation as the inboard isolation valve, F003. The HPCI steam line exits the "C" main steam line at elevatica 153'-9 1/4" whereas the isolation valves are at elevation 141'-0".
A drain line is provided to prevent water accumu-lation in the HPCI steam line between these elevations. As a preventa-tive measure, assurance should be provided that the drain line is open or provisions for verifying that the HPCI line is drained following maintenance. The licensee stated this would be reviewed.
(79-26-01).
b.
Procedure HNP 2-3302-0, HPCI Valve Operability, states acceptance opening time for normally closed HPCI steam inlet valve to be 25 seconds.
Licensee's review of five tests from 9/29/78 thru 6/9/79 indicated an opening time of 13.5 to 14.9 seconds. No problems was noted for this timing.
c.
Drawing 2821-108, Main Steam Lines 'C'
&
'D', indicates the HPCI steam line exits the 'C'
Main Steam Line at an eievation 3' - 7 1/4" higher and upstream of relief valves M(1100 psig), a (1090 psig), and C (1090 psig) which are also located on
'C'.
Valve set points are from drawing HNP 2-6020. Data was not available to indicate the pressure transient in the steam or HPCI lines following relief valve operation.
can s f o u.u.u s -
~
-
~
.
-4-d.
HNP-2-3307-M, HPCI Steam Line Delta Pressure Instrument F. T. & C, specifies trip set point at 19015" H 0 Calculations performed during
the startup test progress indicated tHe 300 percent set point flow to be 213" H O based on pipe diameter and 196" H 0 basea on test data.
2 No problem was identified of this setting.
Step 3.M of this procedure states to open valves that were closed in step F.3.F. The procedure is not clear of the identity of these values.
The licensee stated this would be reviewed and addressed (79-26-03).
Other tilen initial calibration, no surveillance was identified to e.
routinely check the operability of the alarm for the drain pot in the HPCI steam line upstream of F001.
The alarm provides warning of water accumulation. This could be a potential source of a water slug.
Licensee stated this would be reviewed (79-26-02).
e <)- c e e3 dt v6/
v -w
,
.