IR 05000321/1979003
| ML19270F819 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1979 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19270F803 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-79-03, 50-321-79-3, 50-366-79-03, 50-366-79-3, NUDOCS 7903270566 | |
| Download: ML19270F819 (11) | |
Text
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- g8 #f%g UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
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c5 REGION 11
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101 M ARIETTA STRE ET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 3o303 o,s...../
Report Nos.
50-321/79-03 and 50-366/79-03 Licensee:
Georgia Power Company 2', Peachtree Street, N.W.
At anta, Georgia 30303 License Nos.:
DPR-57 and NPF-5 Inspection at:
ant Site North of Baxley, Georgia Inspectors: _,
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f S. Cantrell g '
Dat'e Signed WW
$14 7'l H. L. Whitener Date ' Signed Accompanying Personnel: D.p.Beckham,NRR C
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Approving Section Chief:
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H. C. Dance Da'te Signed SUMMARY Dates of Inspection:
January 8-12, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 44 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations, unresolved items, IE Bulletins, IE Circulars, repairs to Unit 2 steam dryer, previous enforcement items, thermal expansion test results, r.nd pipe support and restraint inspection.
Results Of the eight areas inspected, no apprent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in seven areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (infraction - failure to follow procedures) (paragraph 6.c and 9, IEC 78-19).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Georgia Power Company
- M. Manry, Plant Manager N. C. Nix, Assistant Plant Manager
- S. X. Baxley, Operations Superintendent
- H. W. Dyer, Operations Supervisor
- T. V. Greene, Superintendent Engineering Services R. T. Nix, Maintenance Superintendent G. Brantley, Shift Foreman R. Musgrove, Shift Foreman B. D. Coleman, Shift Foreman P. A. Wolfinger, Shif t Supervisor R. Dewberry, Test Engineer
- P. E. Forne11, QA Field Representative
- J. Peregoy, QA Field Representative Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security force members and office personnel.
Other Organizations General Electric Company B. Downly E. F. Karner
- M. Wyatt D. Drendrell (Phone)
N___R C
- D. H. Beckham
- Attended exit interviea.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 11, 1979, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
Management acknowl-edged the item of noncompliance as discussed in paragraphs 6 and 9 and questioned the applicability of IEB 74-10B to Hatch Unit 1.
See paragraph.
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-2-H. L. Whitener summarized the scope and findings on January 12, 1979, related to the thermal expansion test results, and the pipe support and restraint inspection with Mr. M. Manry and others of his staff.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Noncompliance (Closed) (321/77-51.A.2) Interlocks have been installed on Unit 1 Reactor Building air locks, and interlocks are being installed on Unit 2 air locks.
(0 pen) (321/78-36-01) It appears that action has not been taken to assure that the review of plant operations meets the commitments of Section 13.9.1 of the Unit 1 FSAR (paragraph 6.a.4).
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Plant Status Unit I was operating at near full power.
GPC is evaluating delaying rescheduling the February maintenance outage until April 1979.
Unit 2 was shutdown to modify the steam dryer (see paragraph 7).
6.
Plant Operations The Unit 1 Shift Foreman's Log and the Unit 1 Control Operator's Log were reviewed for the period December 8, 1978, to January 9, 1979, and additional review was conducted of specific events for proper followup and reporting. The following items were noted:
a)
The high pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) isolated auto-matically on ventilation high differential temperature five times.
The isolations occurred when the inlet air temperature dropped rapidly and, generally, required manual operation of the HPCI room cooler about five minutes to clear the isolation signal. A licensee representative stated that a licensee event report (LER) was not submitted, because the isolation signal was operating in accordance with Technical Specifications. After reviewing the number of occurrences, he stated that an LER would be submitted identifying the HPCI being inoperable because of the isolation signal.
In addition, a Technical Specification change request has been forwarded by the plant requesting deletion of this isolation signal as was done in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (per a GPC representative this request was submitted to the NRC Janua ry 12, 1979).
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-3-b)
Noted reference to excessive control air leak on 12/19/78 (paragraph 8, IEB 78-14).
c)
Shift Log Foreman Log showed that the Unit 1 unidentified drywell leakage rate increased from 0.38 GPM to 3.12 GPM between 9:30 and 11:30 p.m. on January 3, 1979. The Log noted that the increase in leak rate coincided with one of the HPCI isolations.
This event was discussed with personnel on duty at the time. They stated that they had previously had problems with a HPCI isolation valve inside containment leaking when isolated, and considered this was the most likely source of leakage. They stated that even though the leak rate was not recalculated within four hours and the reactor was not shutdown as required by plant procedure 1-1050, they were monitoring the problem, and the floor drain sump did not accumulate sufficient water to require pumping. Therefore, the high leak rate was not verified even though the leak rate was not calculated, and the reactor was not shutdown, as required by procedure HNP 1-1050. The requirement to shut down for a GPM increase in uniden ified leakage with 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> was added to the procedure in response to IEB 74-10B.
In the exit interview, a licensee representative stated that GPC had removed the recirculation system bynass lines, and capped the control rod drive return nozzle to the vessel. As a result, GPC did not think that IEB 74-10B should still be applicable to Unit 1.
The inspector stated that the pipe crack study had not been completed, that problems are still being experienced with piping other than the specific piping that was removed from Unit I and that standard Technical Specifications (as issued for Unit 2) specify a reactor shutdown if the leak rate increases by two GPM within four hours.
No action has been initiated by GPC or the NRC to remove this requirement.
The inspector stated that based on his discussions with involver persons that continued operation was apparently justified, but plant records do not document a return to normal leakage until 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> later (noncompliance - failure to follow procedures).
d)
There were no initials or symb'Is to indicate that day supervision routinely reviewed the log books during the period of the inspec-tor's review (review of plant operation records was previously identified as unresolved item 321/78-36-01).
The inspector stated that management probably would have followed up on the items identified in a.1) and a.3) above, if log reviews had been con-ducted as stated in the Unit 1 FSAR Section 13..
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_4 7.
Unit 2 Steam Dryer Repairs The scope of repairs to the Unit 2 steam dryer was discussed with licensee and vendor personnel, and observations were made of work in progress.
Because of damage to a steam dryer of the same design in a foreign reactor, the 1/8-inch thick steel hood on the outer bank of dryers was being replaced with 1/2-inch thick steel hoods, the 1/8 inch thick center end wall between banks of dryers was being replaced with 1/2-inch flat plate, and the 1/2 X 1 inch bank-to-bank tie bars are scheduled to be replaced with 2 X 2 inch tie bars. The only damage reported or observed by the inspector, was that most of the 1/2 X 1 inch tie bars had been deformed. The inspector reviewed records that indicated the steam dryer is not a safety class component even though it is located in the reactor vessel, and that due to the sequences of events that must occur, the likelihood of a failure with unacceptable consequences is negligible. This safety evaluation was discussed with licensee and vendor representatives. The inspector had no further questions.
8.
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEB's)
GPC's action on the following IEB's was reviewed to determine that the IEB was received and reviewed, that the information discussed in the reply was accurate, and that the corrective action was as described in the reply.
Unit 1 Unit 2 78-06 Defective Cutler - Hammer Relays with Closed Closed D.C. Controls - not used in either unit in safety related equipment.
78-06 Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Closed Closed Transfer Tubes - Hatch does not have fuel element transfer tubes, however, a canal is being opened between the Unit I and Unit 2 spent fuel pools.
GPC has related the requirements of the IEB to this canal and plans to make similar radiation surveys when the canal is operational. Similar radiation surveys are made routinely in the drywell at the beginning of refueling operation.
-5-78-09 BWR Drywell Leakage Paths Closed Open Associated with Inadequate Closure.
GPC's reply stated that the Unit 2 procedure was revised to incorporate a requirement of 2400 to 2800 ft-lb's of torque on the head bolts (recommended by the designer).
In reviewing the integrated leak rate test procedure, GPC determined that the test was conducted successfully with 2300 ft-lb's of torque on the head bolts, and the plant has recommended that this value be used until the next ILRT.
A licent;e representative stated that GPC would amend their reply to IEB 78-09 to include this consideration.
The procedure used to install the drywell head, requires inspecting the head gasket, but does not provide any criteria for reuse.
A licensee repre-sentative stated that the procedure would be reviewed and criteria added as appro-priate.
78-10 Bergen-Patterson Hydraulic Open Closed Shock Suppressor Accumulator Springs - None of the suspect suppressors were identified in Unit 2.
A maintenance request has been issued to inspect Unit I during the next maintenance outag.
-6-78-14 Deterioretion of BUNA-N Components in ASCO Solenoids Open Open GPC investigation shows that all of the Unit I components and the spare parts are older than the seven year life recommended by General Electric in SIL 128. However, no operating problems have been identified.
The Unit 2 components will be seven years old in June 1979.
GPC is determining when replacement parts will be available.
The inspector noted a reference to excessive control air leaks from the scram solenoid valves in the Unit 1 Shift Foreman's Log on December 19, 1978; however, following a reactor scram December 20, 1978, most of the leaks had "self-corrected" when repairs were initiated.
9.
Inspection and Enforcement Circulars (IEC's)
GPC action on the following IEC's was reviewed to determine that the IEC was received and reviewed for applicability at the site, and that appropriate action was taken or planned:
Unit 1 Unit 2 77-15 Degradation of Fuel Oil Flow to the Emergency Diesel Generator Open Open A procedure change has been proposed that should verify that each pump has rated capacity. The revised procedure will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio.
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-7-78-02 Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines Closed Closed A lubrication book specifying the proper lubricant for both safety and non-safety related equipment has been developed.
Change for safety related equipment requires Plant Review Board approval (PRB).
78-07 Damaged Components of a Bergen -
Paterson Series 2500 Hydraulic Test Stand.
Open Open This IEC was reviewed by the PRB but no decision made, and no further action has been initiated.
78-08 Environmental Qualifications of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment Open Open IE Report 50-321/78-27 indicates that GPC's design group would make available a report of their review within 3-6 months.
Report due 2/4/79.
78-12 HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending Open Open This circular was reviewed ay the PRB; however, the requestea action has not been completed.
78-14 HPCI Turbine Reversing Chamber Hold Down Bolting Open Closed The requested action has been completed for Unit 2, and is scheduled for Unit I during the next maintenance or refueling outage during Spring 197 ~
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-8-78-15 Tilting Disk Check Valve Failed to Close With Gravity Closed Closed This circular was reviewed by the PRB, and maintenance has investigated orientation of check valves.
No problems identified.
78-16 Limitorque Valve Actuated Open Open This circular is still under review.
78-19 Manual Override (Bypass) of Open Open Safety System Act1ation Signals During the review of this circular, the inspector requested a description of c. the crywell is vented. The method explained, used the two inch post-accident bypass lines around the drywell and torus 18 inch purge valves.
In response to questions, licensee represer tatives determined that the valves in the post-accident bypass lines are not desigred to receive a containment isolation signal.
Furthe. investigation showed that another bypass line is provided around the drywell and torus 18 inch purge valves, and the valves in this line close on a contain-ment isolation signal.
Procedure 1-1500, Primary Con-tainment Atmosphere Control, specifies using this line to vent the containment during normal operations. Plant records show that the drywell (primary containment) is vented through the standby gas traatment system about once per day. On January 8, 1979, the reactor was vented twice. No records were available to show that procedure 1-1500 was followed (noncompliance - failure to follow procedures). During the exit interview, management representatives did not question the noncompliar.ce, and stated the venting procedure would be reviewed.
10.
Review of Nonroutine Events Repor'.ed by the Licensee The following licensee event reports were reviewed in office for potential generic problems, to detect trends, to determine whether the information included in the report meets NRC reporting require-ments, and to consider whether the corrective action discussed in the report appears - opriate. Licensee action with respect to se-
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lected reports was reviewed further at the site to verify that the events were reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by Technical Specifications; that corrective action was taken by the licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting conditions for operations were not exceeded.
The inspector examined selected Plant Review Board minutes, incident reports, logs, and records, and inspected equipment and interviewed selected personnel.
No.
Date of Report Subject 321/
78-45 06/29/78 False High Radiation Alarm 78-45 R1 12/18/78 Hydraulic Snubber Low Fluid
- 78-77 09/25/78 Potential Diesel Restart Problem
- 78-94 R1 12/19/79 Time Delay Relay Improperly Set 78-95 12/18/79 False High Radiation Alarm
- 366/
78-37 09/25/78 Potential Diesel Restart Problem
- Additional review conducted at the site.
Significant findings are discussed in other parts of this report.
11.
Design Problem That Prevents Restart of Diesel Generators During LOCA-LOSP (LER 321/78-77 and 366/78-37)
Design modification that will prevent the reinitiation of the starting relay until the 100 second engine shutdown relay times out have been made on the Unit 2 diesels. A maintenance request has been approved for Unit I diesels and the shared diesel. Work is scheduled for the Unit 1 maintenance or refueling outage. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Plant Tour A tour of accessible areas in Unit 2 was conducted.
During the tour, observations were made regarding plant housekeeping, cleanliness, ongoing activities, and radiation control practices.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
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-10-13.
Thermal Expansion Test The inspector examined installed piping supports and restraints and reviewed test results to verify that the licensee has evaluated test results; examined a sample of data to verify that test results meet acceptance criteria; and reviewed a portion of problem reports to determine that the problems identified were properly resolved and documented.
Examinations of portions of the main steam, feedwater, recirculation, RCIC and relief valve discharge piping supports and restraints revealed no inoperative hangers and restraints or pipin. interference.
Review of related test data from procedures 10417, 10517, and 10617, indicated that the licensee has evaluated plateau data and obtained data evaluation from the architect engineer and nuclear steam system supplier for data points outside the anticipated piping movement. The inspector examined memorandum from the above, stating that data outside expected piping movement had been reviewed and it appeared acceptable to continue heatup and startup testing while monitoring these points.
These memorandum did not indicate the extent of design reviews.
At the exit interview the licensee agreed to obtain a statement of the type and depth of the review for the test record prior to the final PRB approval of thermal expansion testing.
Discussion of test conditions with licensee personnel indicated that due to feedwater heater problems, temperature in some systems was below that which will be obtained in normal operation. The licensee has not yet determined if this condition will be evaluated and justified as a test exception, or if retesting will be performed. This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection.
Since the licensee has not yet performed the transient tests from 100% power, vibration test data was not reviewed at this time.