IR 05000321/1979017
| ML19209C928 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1979 |
| From: | Dance H, Rogers R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19209C915 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-79-17, 50-366-79-21, NUDOCS 7910180483 | |
| Download: ML19209C928 (7) | |
Text
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oq'o, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y }, ", 'd',g c
REGION 11 o, h ' # ' /
101 MARIE TT A sT., N.W., SUIT E 3100
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ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30303
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Report Nos. 50-321/79-17 and 50-366/79-21 Licensee: Georgia Power Company 270 Peachtree Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Facility Name: Hatch I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 Inspection at Hatch Site Near Baxley, Georgia
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Inspector:
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R. F. Roger's
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Date Signed Approved by: [k 7!/7[79 A,4 -
H.' C. Dance', Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on Ma, 12 - June 1, 1979 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 30 inspector-hours onsite of the Unit I refueling outage, Unit 2 startup testing, technical specification compliance, reportable occurrences, I & E Bulletins and circulars, security procedures, and the 1978 annual report.
Results Of the seven areas inspected, no apIarent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in three areas; three apparent items of noncompliance were found in three areas (Infraction - Failure to report, paragraph 9; Infraction - Failure to align an ECCS system properly, paragraph 5; Deficiency - Failure to maintain a quality record, paragraph 6.c.).
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-2-While inspecting the Unit 2 control board on May 30, 1979, the inspector noted that the valve lineup on the A and C RHR pumps was incorrect. The operator immediately corrected the problem by opening the shut mini-flow valve. Had the system been activated automatically, this valve should have opened therefore the system was still operable.
This is an infraction (366/79-21 -02).
6.
Followup on IE Bulletins For the following bulletins, the inspector verified that the response was timely, included the required information, contained adequate commitments, and that corrective action as described in the written responses was comple-ted.
a.
IEB 79-04, Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation The inspector reviewed the licensees response dated May 2, 1979, which indicated that these valves were not in use in either unit at Hatch and had no further questions. This item is closed for both units.
b.
Three Mile Island IEBs The inspector verified that the licensee had received the following information only bulletins:
79-05,79-05A, 79-05B, 79-06,79-06A, 79-06A Rev.1, and /9-06B c.
IEB 79-08, Events Relevent to BWR Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island Incident The inspector reviewed the licensees responses da'.ed April 25 and May 9, 1979, which discussed their actions on this subject.
The inspector, based on review of training records and discussions with operators, verified that operators were generally aware of what happened during the incident and their -esponsibilit.es in similar situations.
The inspector, in conjunction with a team ' rom Region II, reviewed the adequacy of administrative controls controlling ECCS system manipulations, most recent surveillance results on ECC systems, and valve, breaker, and switch alignment procedures against current P & ids for ECCS systems. These items were completed on Unit 2 prior to startup. The P& ID verification and surveillance results review remain to be completed on Unit I which is in a refueling outage. The failure of the licensee to locate the most recent core spray operability test results documentatica is a deficiency (366/79-21-03).
The inspector verified that the test had been performed with satisfactory results f rom log entries.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. Manry, Plant Manager T. Moore, Assistant Plant Manager T. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations R. Nix, Superintendent of Maintenance C. Coggins, Superintendent of Engineering Services W. Rogers, Health Physicist / Radiochemist C. Bellflower, QA Site Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included construc-tion craf tsmen, technicians, operators. mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended Management Interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
3.
Unresolved Items None identified.
4.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 18, May 25, and June 1, 1979 with those persons indicated by an asterisk in Paragraph 1 above. The notice of violation relative to the reporting requirements was identified to the licensee on May 16, 1979. The notice of violation relative to RHR switch lineup was identified to the licensee on May 30, 1979. The notice of violation relative to core spray surveillance was identified to the licensee on May 25, 1979. The licensee took appropriate immediate corrective action on all items of noncompliance where applicable as discussed in the details.
5.
Tours of the Plant (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant equipment was conditions and were alert, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts and on weekends.
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IEB 79-09, Failures of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker in Safety Related Systems The inspector reviewed the licensees response dated May 16, 1979 which indicated that the optional undervoltage trip device which malfunctioned is not incorporated in the breakers at Hatch. This item is closed for both units.
IEB 79-10, Requalification Training Program Statistics e.
The inspector noted that the licensee response dated May 11, 1979, adequately answered this information request. This item is closed for both units.
7.
Followup on IE Circulars For the following circulars, the inspector verified that the circular was received, reviewed, and corrective actions taken or scheduled to be taken if appropriate.
IEC 78-03, Packaging of Low Specific Activity Radioactive Material IEC 78-12, HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending IEC 78-16, Limitorque Valve Actuators 8.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee The following licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic problems, to detect possible trends, and to determine whether corrective action appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported imme-diately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and that the public health and safety was of utmost consideration.
LER No.
Report Date Subject 50-321/79-6 2/8/79 Failure to calculate CMPF Limits 50-321/79-7 2/14/79 Failure of RCIC Minimum Flow Valve to Shut 50-321/79-8 2/7/79 Cooldown rate exceeding 100 degrees F/Hr 50-321/79-9 2/7/79 Failure to Sample Coolant within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 50-321/79-10 2/9/79 Failure to sample coolant during a shutdown 50-321/79-11 2/9/79 Violation of secondary containment 50-321/79-12 2/7/79 Venting of RHR Heat Exchangers i176 218
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-4-50-321/79-13 2/9/79 Short period trip 50-321/79-14 2/8/79 Failure to test SGTS 50-321/79-15 3/12/79 Violatica of secondary containment 50-321/79-17 3/14/79 HPCI turbine speed fluctuations 50-321/79-19 3/26/79 Failure of RWCU flow transmitter 50-321/79-23 4/24/79 HPCI isolation on high room differential temperature 50-321/79-24 5/18/79 Violation of secondary containment 50-321/79-26 5/7/79 MSIV closed in less than 3 seconds 50-321/79-29 5/17/79 Violation of secondary containment 50-321/79-31 5/21/79 Steam line tunnel switch out of calibration 50-366/79-1 1/12/79 Failure of LPCI level switches 50-366/79-2 1/12/79 RPS MG Set voltage setpoint high 50-366/79-3 1/17/79 Reactor pressure switch set high 50-366/79-5 1/17/79 RPS MG set underfrequency trip set low 50-366/79-6 1/17/79 Failure of coil on reactor pressure instrument 50-366/79-8,9 1/24/79 RCIC differential pressure switch setpoint drift 50-366/79-10 2/2/79 Failure of SRV pressure switch 50-366/79-11 1/29/79 Failure to follow procedures on RHR test 50-366/79-14 2/7/79 RPS MG set underfrequency set low 50-366/79-15,16 2/7/79 RPS MG set voltage trips incorrect 50-366/79-17 2/14/79 Failure of hydrogen recombiner 50-366/79-19 16/79 Leaking airlock seal 50-366/79-21 2/19/79 Failure to hold at a testing plateau 1i76 219
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-5-50-36b/79-22 3/5/79 Drain sump flow transmitter errors 50-366/79-23 2/28/79 MSIV closure in less than 3 seconds 50-366/79-24 2/28/79 SRVs C and G failed to open 50-366/79-25 3/5/79 Clevis pin failure in torus 50-366/79-26 3/8/79 Concrete anchor failures 50-366/79-28 3/9/79 HPCI instrument calibration 50-366/79-29 4/4/79 Distortion of SRV discharge line vaccum breakers 50-366/79-30 5/4/79 Failure of recirc pump level trip 50-366/79-31 5/1/79 Failure of HPCI to quick-start 50-366/79-33 5/17/79 Improperly installed operators on SRVs 50-366/79-34 5/21/79 Discovery of non-siesmic meters 50-366/79-35 5/21/79 Late surveillance test 50-366/79-37 6/1/79 RWCU flow transmitter set high 9.
Failure to Meet Report.ing Requirements a.
Lack of Seismically qualified fire protection hangers On May 16, 1979, the inspector was informed of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> immediate reportable occurence on the cable speading room fire suppression system hangers. He was also informed that the design change to correct the problem had already been written, reviewed, approved, and would be implemented the following morning on Unit 2 to support a plant startup.
The inspector questioned the timeliness of the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> reporting and learned that Southern Services, the consultant, and Georgia Power had been aware of the problem for two weeks or more. The licensee stated that they had experienced difficulty in setting definitive answers on the hanger problem from Southern Services for a mimber of weeks.
b.
Failure to report within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Although it was found that six safety related pressure and level instruments were not seismically qualified on May 14, 1979, NRC noti-fication was not made until May 16,1979.
The above two examples constitute an infraction against reporting requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 (321/79-17-01) and 366/79-21- 01). This is a repeat item.
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1978 Annual Report The inspector reviewed the Annual Operating Report required by Technical Specification 6.9.1 dated February 23, 1979, and had na questions or comments.
11.
Technical Specifiction Compliance (Units 1 and 2)
During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO's) and results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct obser-vation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LC0 action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
12.
Refueling Preparations and Activities (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed the licensees preparations and conduct of the Unit 2 refueling which commenced on April 27, 1979. Reviewed and approved procedures were in place for new fuel receipt and inspection, fuel transfer, core verification, inservice inspections, local leak rate tests, and in-vessel maintenance. The inspector toured the refueling floor and verified that fuel monitoring was as required (the core was de-fueled), that secondary containment integrity was as required, that fuel bundle accountability measures were established, that housekeeping efforts were adequate, and that contamination control procedures were effective.
13.
Vital Area Door On May 24 the inspector noted one vital area entrance which had the potential for being defeated. The licensee took immediate action to install a dead bolt lock on the door.
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