IR 05000313/1989032

Insp Repts 50-313/89-32 & 50-368/89-32 on 890816-0930. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Events, Operational Safety Verification,Maint & Surveillance

ML19325E352
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	10/25/1989
From:	Chamberlain D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19325E350	List: IR 05000313/1989032 ML19325E349 ML19325E351
References
50-313-89-32, 50-368-89-32, NUDOCS 8911060307
Download: ML19325E352 (9)

Text

..

.

.c

,

., - g.I

' *

\\

.

e APPENDIX B

,7 U.S. NUCLLAR REGUl ATORY COMISSION i

REGION IV

Inspection Report:

50-313/89-32 Licenses: DPR-51 50-368/09-32 NPF-6

,

Dockets: 50-313 50-368 Licensee: ArkansasPotter&LightCompany(AP&L)

P.O. Box 551 Little Rock.. Arkansas 72203

'

Facility Name: ArkansasNuclear.One(ANO), Units 1and2 Inspection At: ANO Site Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: August 16 through September 30, 1939 Inspectors:

C. C. Warren Senior Resident Inspector Project Section A, Division of Reactor Projects R. C. Haag, Resident Inspector Project Section A. Division of Reactor Projects

Approved:

?

MdN

'

D. p. Ulamberlain, Chief, Project Section A-Date Division of Reactor Projects inspection Summary

' Inspection Conducted August 16 through September 30, 1989 (Report 50-313/89-32; i.

50-365/s9-32 L

!'

Areas Inspected:. Routine, unannounced inspection including followup of events, operationa safety verification, maintenance, and surveillance.

~

L Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to provide timely corrective action, paragraph 7). The licensee's corrective action process continues to identify plant material problems, however.-

)

instances still occur where identified discrepancies exist for inappropriate periods of time. While the correr:tive action process does have weaknesses, the licensee's response;to a design deficiency on the Unit 2 hydrogen analyzer

- system was prompt, well thought out, and aggressive. The thorough resolution of.this item is evidence of an improving licensee attitude toward the resolution of identified deficiencies.

M NO

$

L Q

_

,.

,

-

.:--

-

'

-

',-

(

- 3, h la

'

i

-

..

!

.

.

v.

.-

,

-

2-

,

,

'

.

..

Disconstic Evaluation Team (DET'l Inspection:

From August 21, 1989, through

<

'

'

5eptemer 1, lysy, and f rom Septemer 11, 1989, through September 15, 1989, a 19-man evaluation team made up of NRC and contract personnel was on site to

evaluate licensee performence. The exit meeting for this evaluation was

!

L.

-

I

!

,

.

conducted on October 18, 1989..

!

I

jt, ;~

f

-,

'

,

i r

!

,

V

,

l

!

i I

{

l

-

'

.i

.,

'

i

,

A

!

'

I

.

.

!

>

,

,

'

,

!

'

,,

.

%

4-l.'

{

.

-

/

,

t

- s s.'

I-

,;_

s j;'

ll

_-

~

.

.

.

-

,

3-

-

DETAILS

,

s 1.

Persons Contacted

• N. Carns Dirwetor Nuclear Operations K. Coates, Unit 1 Maintenance Manager A. Cox. Unit 1 Operations Manager

• E. Ewing, General Manager, Technical Support and Assessment

• R. Fenech, Unit 2 Plant Manager'

• J. Fisicaro, Manager, Licensing

'

L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Manager

• L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality

• J. Jacks, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist G. Jones, Engineering General Manager e

J. Kowalewski, Mechanical Engineer R. Lane Engineering Manager

• D. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor J. Mueller, Central Support Manager

• A. Sest,1ons, Central Plant Manager

• J. Vandergrift, Unit 1 Plant Manager i

J. Waxenfelter, Unit 2 Maintenance Manager

• Present at exit interview.

The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.

2.

Plant Status (Units 1 and 2)

Unit I remained at power throughout the period, operating at 74 percent of full power with the "D" reactor coolant pump secured due to excessive oil leakage. Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power but shut down for a scheduled 59-day refueling outage on September 25, 1989. At the close of the inspection period, Unit 2 was in Mode 3 for steam

,

generator hydrostatic testing.

i 3.

Followup of Events (Units 1 and 2)

(93702)

{^

a.

Service Water Piping Pinhole Leak l

While performing routine rounds on September 2,1989, a member of the Unit 1 operations staff noted water weeping slowly from the "A" Decay

'

Heat Cooler service water return line. The leak was determined to L

originate at a pinhole in the piping wall and, on the basis of ultrasonic testing and similar previous industry problems, the t

licensee concluded that the pinhole was the result of microbiologic induced corrosion (MIC).

Tne licensee stopped the leakage by applying a soft patch to the affected area, then conducted ultrasonic testing (UT) on a 10-inch

!

~

L

..

n

~

(

~

T

'

.

,

,

1-

,

,

,

.

.

..

..

,

.

>

r

,

,

,

..

.

,

'

'

k

l

-

,

L i

!

i a

i section of pipe adjacent t'o the pinhole. The licensee had previously

!

a developed a procedure for interpretation of UT results, i

Procedure 1309.14, " Service Water Piping Ultraconic Thickness

'

!.

,

. Trending," which was used to formulate a conclusion based on the UT

!

,

F results. The testing method divided the surface into 1-inch sqvares

'

and used the lowest reading for each square inch for the acceptability i

'

'

calculation. This conservative method yielded en average wall

!

'

I" thickness measurement of.326 inches with no evidence of general

,

material loss. On the basis of these results, the licensee determined j

i that the structural properties of the piping were unaffected by the r

i pitting and that the system was operable. While the results of the

,

average wall thickness analysis meet the requirements of ASME Section l

III for minimum wall thickness, the code does not specifically

'

recognize nor allow pinhole leaks caused by localized MIC. The

!

'

licensee has verbally requested relief from ASME Section !!!

!

.,

'

requirements untit permanent repairs can be completed in the upcoming

'

midcycle outage.

The licensee will provide written documentation to i

the staff requesting relief from the code by November 15, 1989.

Review of licensee data and calculations currently available allows i

,

the staff to :upport this position.

l l

b.

Discrepancies Betweers Facility Electrical Drawings and As-Built U

configuratton I

_,

As the result of electrical drawing walkdown inspections conducted

l

'..during the NRC diagnostic evaluation of Arkansas Nucler.r One (ANO)

!

numerous discrepancies were noted between the as-built configuration

L and the drawings.

Initial followup of this issue showed that the

[

problem existed in both the schematic and connection drawings and

'

that material condition of electrical panels were not up to industry i

i standa rds.

In response to these findings, NRC management in

!

Region IV dispatched a three man reactive team to conduct an indepth

?eview of the licensee's programs and practices in this area. The

s results of that inspection will be documented in NRC Ir:pection i

Report 50-313/89-35; 50-368/89-35.

c.

Inadequate Ventilation for Unit 1 Service Water (56) Pumps

L During the conduct of a veni:ilation system design review on the

L 5>

Unit I service water structure, the licensee made a preliminvy

.;

I determination that inadequate ventilation flow would exist in the

rooms if offsite powert is lost. Because the supply fans for the e

o

@

structure would lose power during a loss of offsite power and because

!

no openings exist to allow for convective air flow through the

'

,

building, the possibility of SW motor overheating and subsequent i

l failure exists.

.

L

l In response to the finding, the licensee immediately took corrective

>

actions to provide adequate airflow for the building by processing a temporary modification which removed the solid door on the

<'

l building's east side and began an analysis to determine SW pump

-

operability.

!

I

's

p~

,

.

-

,

g

[

i

+

'

,,9

.,'

.

y i

".4 A

,

,

I.

,.

,

',n

.y-

,a

t

-

+

-5 ',

.

n

,

,

,e r

3'

'

,

i -

,The licensee's analysis assumed that reasonable operator action in j

S response to annunciated high temperatures and to elevated SW building

.

temperatures would have prevented SW motor damage. The licensee's

engineering analysis of room temperature rise and equipment

,

perforinance, without operator. action and assuming no heat transfer out'

E f

of the structure, did not predict that failure would not occur within 30 days. On the basis of the results of their analysis and assuming reasonable operator actions would be taken, the licensee concluded L

!

that the SW pumps would remain operable for the duration.of this

,

,

y condition.

'

The' inspector has reviewed the licensee responses to this condition-and has,found them to be adequate.

l t

d.

' Ineffective Corrective Action Tracking for Unit 2 Channel "D" Automatic i

'

Reset Feature of Low Pressurizer Pressure Trip Function and a Relief Valve Associated with the Letdown Heat Exchanger

,

'

L During this inspection period there were instances.where.th'e L

licensee's program for tracking known equipment deficiencies f ailed to effect prompt corrective actions.

On July 2,1989, members of the Unit 2 operations staff identified

,

that'the Channel "D" automatic reset feature of the'10w pressurizer m

pressure. trip function did not occur prior to raisir:g reactor pressure above'500 psig. Licensee followup revealed that t'is n

l

~. '

.

condition had been previously detected; however, no nethod of.

'

tracking this equipment malfunction for repair prior to the next

' ;

m shutdown had been initiated.

'

,c

'On May 19, 1988, the Plant Safety, Committee met to consider a f

temporary modification to Unit 2 which installed a relief valve (2PSV4822)'into the ASME Class 2 letdown heat exchanger. The

!

replacement valve was not purchased as an ASME Class 2 valve but was i

the same type as the original. The justification for the temporary

.i modification was to' allow the original valve to be removed for no longer than.90: days for repair.: No effective method of scheduling this. repair existed and as of September 30, 1989, the temporary valve is still installed and the original valve has not been repaired.

>

"

IE is.important,to note thatzfailures of the corrective action

-

process to effect repairs or modifications to known problems is a previously identified condition.

It appears that corrective actions taken to address this deficiency have not been comprehensive in

.

nature and have not adequately addressed this concern. Continuing concerns with timeliness of corrective actions will be addressed with the licensee in conjunction with NRC Inspection Report 50-313/89-35; 50-368/89-35.

<

[

The failure to track these items and effect timely resolutions is an

. apparent violation.

(313; 368/8932-01)

,

.

h h

'

a,.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

-

.

. _,. - -

,"

r

-

-

- --

-

-

-

- -

- - -

---

-

gj

- $x,

' 3n

,

m y

. ;

,

f-l'%,,",

',;

'

,

,

,

,

,

of%ey

,

.

,

>

'

'

.;

,

m

,e

,

,

'

,.f

,

-

':

'

a,

'

.

,

qL

<

I,J ~ v2 Single Failure j

Both Trains of the Hydrogen Monitoring System Inoperable Due to a

~

e.

,

?

'During the perfomance of'a 10 CFR 50 59 review, licensee design

,.,

.

engineering personnel identified a single failure that could disable

'

both trains of containment hydrogen monitoring on Unit 2.

The l..

, failure of the red engineered safety features (ESF) bus subsequent to L*

the receipt of a containment isolation would prevent either hydrogen

"'

analyzer from operating.

Unit 2 is equipped with two redundant hydrogen analyzers which are o

s L

powered from separate (red, green) ESF buses.

Each hydrogen analyzer i

l has independent containment suction and-return lines; however, the

.

H returning inboard containment isolation valves for each train are

H both powered from the red ESF bus. Upon the receipt of a containment isolation signal, the normally open return line isolation valves

l I

would close and.would remain closed until the isolation signal was cleared and the valves reopened to commence sampling. Should the red

,

ESF bus fail prior to the operator establishing sample flow, no power a

-

supply would be available to open either return,line inboard o

isolation valve.' The inability to provide a flow path back to the

'

containment would make both trains of hydrogen analyzers inoperable.

.!

The licensee has determined that this condition places.the facility

!

,

in a condition outside the design basis and that this condition has

.,

.

the original-return line inboard isolation valves (check valves) place existed since 1981. A design change was performed in 1981 to re with

-

motor operated valves. The licensev s root cause evaluation has

'

t determined that an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 review in 1981 led to the

'

-

above condition.

.

.

Althou'h this deficiency places the plant in a condition outside the

~

design basis, the safety significance is minimal. The ANO, Unit 2

.

safety analyses'shows no significant hydrogen generation until

!

-

approximately:3 days postaccident.

On the basis of this information, i

the small window of vulnerability to the single failure mode, the time between the containment isolation signal and establishment of sampling, the. licensee determined that this condition was of minimal safety significance. The licensee has also prestaged the equipment necessary to provide an alternate power supply to the valve from the

-

green.ESF bus and estimates that power could be supplied within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. On the basis of the infomation provided above, the

-

licensee's proposal to correct the condition during the upcoming refueling outage is acceptable to the staff.

-

,

The failure' to perform an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 review appears to be

in violation of 10 CFR 50.59(a)(1). The licensee discovered this design deficiency and took aggressive followup and corrective r

action. A Notice of Violation is not being issued because the criteria of Section Y.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy have been met.

y

,-

()

,

,

'

sc

,

-e*

-

a

. _ _. _... _ _ _. _ - - _ _ _ _. _ - _. _.. - _ _ _ _. _, _ _ _ -

,

,

-

-

- - -

-

-

-

,

..

,

y

.:

+

,

},

"

'

'

<

,

7-

'

-

,

,.

t 4.

- Operationel' Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)

(71'707)

,

The inspectors routinely toured the facility during normal and backshift.

>

' hours to assess general plant and equipment conditions, housekeeping, and adherence to fire protection. security, and radiological control measures.

'

.,

Ongoing work' activities were monitored to verify that they were being f

'

conducted.in accordance with approved administrative and technical procedures and that proper comunications with the control room staff had

'

J been established.. The inspector observed valve, instrument, and

,

electrical equipment lineups in the field to ensure that they were

,

consistent with system operability requirements and ope. rating procedures.

During tours of the control room, the inspectors verified proper staffing, access control', and operator attentiveness. Adherence to procedures and

D limiting conditions for operations were evaluated. The inspectors

!

'

examined equipment-lineup and operability, instrument traces, and status

'I-t of control room annunciators.

Various control room logs and other available licensee documentation were reviewed.

,

.

The inspector observed and reviewed outage, maintenance, and problem I

investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations,

'

procedures, codes, and standards.

Involvemerit of QA/QC, safety tag use, j

personnel qualifications, fire protection precautions, retest j

h requirenents,'and reportability were assessed.

.The inspector observed tests to verify performance in accordance with approved procedures and LC0's, collection and validation of test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.

i

,

Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the reporting period. Standard industry radiological work practices,

,,

conformance to radiological control procedures, and 10 CFR Part 20

,r

,

1 requirements were observed.

'

. Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those

'

. checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers,

.

personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when required.

!

'

.

No violations or deviations were identified.

,

5.c Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

(61726)

The inspector observed the Technical Specification required surveillance testing on the various components listed below and verified that testing

-

was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and-

,

,

-

i y

)

i

,

e v

ew-vw

- - - - - +

-

.

m m

.

.

.

.

.

-

.

-

-

--

_

_

. _.

. _ _

.

__

_ -.

,

,

,,

,

'

l

'

_v

.

,

y, ;.

.,

..

.

\\

.

' ',

'

>

,

,

,

>,,

,

restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results

-

conformed with Technical Specifications'and. procedure. requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly.

i reviewed and tesolved by appropriate. management personnel.

.

~

'The inspector witnessed portions of tha following test activities:

l Procedure 2312.06 Core Protection Calculator Chanrel "D" Monthly Test

-;

Procedure 1304.32?

Power Range Linear Amp Calibration

.

~

t Procedure 1104.32 Weekly' Diesel Fire Pump Surveillance.

Procedun! 1106.06 Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Monthly Test

,

,

Procedure 2104.36 2DG2 Diesel Generator Monthly Test

Procedure 2104.29

. Service Water Pump ~2P-4B Monthly Test

Procedure 2104.02 3P36B Monthly Test

!

Procedure 1104.33 Reactor Building Ventilation Biweekly Test

'

'

During the performance of Procedure 2104.36,

<

20G2 Diesel Generator Monthly Test, there have been minor fires in the exhaust manifold area.

The inspector observed some evidence of exhaust i

l, leakage during the most recent conduct of

>

,

2104.36, but no fire was observed.

l

'

,

,

No violations or deviations were identified.

'

6.

Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

(62703)

j Station maintenance activities for safety-related systems and cwnponents i

were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordanca with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards

-

'

' and in conformance with the Technical Specifications.

,

'

.

'.

'

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed

?

' from service, approvals.were obtained prior to initiating the work,

l activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected ll2 as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior.

l-to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel,

'

L'

parts and material 3 used were properly certified, radiological controls

,

H were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented.

.

e--

,,

m...,

-

-v_.,

-,

-,-

- - - -.

,

._,_ _ _-______-__.____

-

~^

~

,

',

.

,

'e j

1.

j L.

'

.

,

,

)

-

l.

O

,

f Work requests were reviewed 'to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment

,

maintenance which may affect system performance, i

,.

,

No violations or deviations were identified.

• 7. ' Exit Interview a.;

The inspectors met with Mr. N S. Carns Director, Nuclear Operations, and i

r'

other members of the AP&L staff at the end of the inspection. At this

.;

,

meeting, the inspectors sumarized the scope of the inspection and the.

i i-findings. The _ licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material

'

s.

provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors during this inspection.

,

,

!

?

,

)

J l

$

j

'

l

.

l

.

l-

.t f i.-

,

,

,

V

.-

.. ~

--

- -

- - -

.