IR 05000302/1978023

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IE Inspec Rept 50-302/78-23 on 780830-0901 During Which 1 Item of Noncompliance Was Noted:Completion & Verification of Procedures During Review of Sys Realignments
ML20150D224
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/20/1978
From: Dance H, Donat T, Quick D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20062E155 List:
References
50-302-78-23, NUDOCS 7812050076
Download: ML20150D224 (8)


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Report No.: 50-302/78-23 Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 14042, Mail Stop C-4 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection at: Crystal River, Florida Inspection conducted: August 30 - September 1, 1978 Inspectors: D. R. Quick T. J. Donat

/C f Reviewed by: ( / ' Da t'e l

If. C. Dance, Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summarv Inspection on Autust 30 - September 1,1978 (Report No. 50-302/78-23)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection relating to the review of

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l the Unit Jumper (Byptss) Log; Control Room and Supervisor Logs; quarterly performance of Surveillance Procedures; Operator Training on Small Break l

Interim Actions; Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment; review of system realignments; Safety Injection System Reset Features; and tour of plant areas. The inspection involved 40 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspector Results: Within the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were found in six areas. One item of noncompliance was identified concerning completion and verification of procedures during the review of system realignments (Infraction - failure to follow procedures - 302/78-23-01 as stated in paragraph I.5.d).

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-23 1-1 DETAILS I Prepared by: Yg we &au /e/>W T. J. Donat, Rfactor Inspector D'a t e Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspectio August 30 - September 1, 1978

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Approved by: pN4; -

Ms/7p R. D. Martin,' Chief / I%te~

Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Persons Contacted Florida Power Corporation (FPC)

  • G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager W. R. Nichols, Operations Superintendent
  • P. F. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent
  • J. Cooper, Compliance Engineer
  • G. M. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer G. R. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent
  • K O. Vogel, Operations Engineer
  • Denotes those present at the exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings None Unresolved Items None . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on September 1, 1978. The inspector sumnarized as reported in the following paragraphs, the purpose and findings of the inspection. One item of noncompliance was identified concerning proper signing of procedure steps and conducting shift supervisor reviews and signof f of procedure During the course of the exit interview, the plant management made a commitment to delete the systes preparation signoffs which had been r

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-23 1-2 made in OP-202 (Plant Heatup) until the subsystem valve lineups had been reverified and the fill, vent, and initial operation sections of the subsystem Operating Procedures had been complete . Evaluation of Plant Operations Crystal River's Administration Instruction 500 and Technical Specification 6.8.1 and 6.8.2 establish that procedures would be implemented concerning the Administrative Control of Plant Operations, the Performance of General Plant Operations, and the Startup, Operation, and Shutdown of Safety-Related Systems. A review of plant records and documents for the last two months of the refueling outage was performed to verify that they were being performed in compliance with Administra-tive Instruction and Technical Specification requirements. The review was performed against Administrative Instruction Al-500 Sections 2.5, 2.7, 2.12, 2.13 and 2.17, Surveillance Procedure SP-440 Enclosure 3, and Operating Procedure 202 Section Jumper Log Review Jumper Log entries for the months of July and August were reviewed for jumper compliance with all Technical Specification requirements, completeness of information, initiation and review signatures, and installation dating and verification siEnature; and upon jumper removal, removal from the file and signof f in the master list. The inspection identified no deficiencies in the jumper log entries reviewe Review of Reactor Operator and Shif t Supervisor Log The Reactor Operator Daily Log and the Shif t Supervisor Daily logs for the months of July and August were reviewed for completeness, clarity of information, proper handling of late entries and strikeouts, signature of Reactor Operator or Shift Supervisor, and review of log by succeeding shif t personnel as evidenced by initial blocks. The inspector review identified no deficiencies in the logs or their usage, Review of Surveillance Procedures The inspector reviewed surveillance procedures performed during

the months of July and August to ensure that the normal l

surveillance program requirements as well as those required under the Unit Startup Surveillance Plan were being complied with. The

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l review utilized completed Quality Assurance Department Surveillance Procedure Check Sheets, sample surveillance procedures, and the Shif t Supervisor Los entries. No discrepancies were noted in the review.

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-23 I-3 1 1 Review of System Valve Lineup and System Readiness to Support Plant Heatup As part of the review of the plant readiness to conduct a plant beatup on September 3, 1978, various subsystems were selected and their status reviewed. All of the systems selected to be reviewed had been signed off in paragraph 6.1.2 of the Plant Heatup Procedure, OP-202, prior to August 31, 1978 as having been lined up, filled and vented, and placed in the mode required for startup using their respective System Operating procedure The first system selected for review was the Makeup and Purifica-tion System which is controlled by OP-402. Using the initial va!ve lineup sheets for this procedure approximately 40% of this system's valves in the auxiliary building were checked. Two valves were found in positions different from those signed in the valve check list; these were MUV-126 (KU&P Demins, Bypass Vlu)

and KUV-47 (Block Orifice Manual Bypass Downstream Iso. Vlv).

Discussions with the Licensed Operators indicated that these valves had been so positioned because of the plant condition in effect. . A review of the portion of the valve check list per-taining to valves operated and indicated in the control room found that ten valves were not signed to indicate their being in the required position. A further review of the procedure identified that Steps 7.1, 7.6 and 7.7 of the system's startup paragraph concerning respectively the initial valve lineup, tne setting of failed fuel element flow, and the adjustment of makeup tank temperature had not been signed. Also the Shif t Supervisor review and signoff as required by Administrative Instruction 500 had not been mad The valve lineup of the Decay Heat Removal system was checked as well as that of the Nuclear Services Cooling System. No discrepancies were noted between the valves checked and the valve line up lists. A review of the Decay Heat Removal System Operating Procedure, OP-404, showed that various steps in Section (initial conditons), 7.0 (Fill and Vent), and 8.0 (Decay Heat Removal) had been either initialed or marked "NA" but no Shift Supervisor review and signof f had been performed on any of these sections. A similar situation was found upon reviewing OP-408 for the Nuclear Services Cooling System Operating procedure in that all three sections had been marked "NA" but no review and anotation of the reasen for declaring the steps to be "Not Applicable" had been made by the shif t superviso A review was also performed on Operating Procedure OP-405-Reactor Building Spray System. Step 6.1.1 was signed off indicating that the spray systes was lined up for normal standby mode per valve check list I; however, a review of the check list showed that ten

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-23 I-4 control room operated valves had not been verified and signed off as being in the required position. Also steps within Section (Conditions for Modes 1 thru 4) and Section 6.2 (condition for Modes 5 and 6) had not been signed nor had the shift supervisor

- made his signof Two additional pro:edures OP-411 (Instrument and House Service Air System) and OP 416 Domestic Water Supply System) were reviewed and in those cases no problems were identifie The Crystal River Technical Specification in paragraph 6. states that written p ocedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering activities such as the procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.3 Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 includes a procedure covering the review of completed procedures. This was implemented in Crystal River Administrative Instruction Al-500 (Conduct of Operations), which states in part:" Section 2.7 " Procedures" Procedures requiring verification will be handled in the following way:

When the operator has performed an operation or verification of the status of the item as required by the specific procedural step, he initials the space provided for that step in the procedure or on a Check-Off List. Completed procedures are reviewed by Shift Superintendent for completeness and determination of unusual or abnormal conditions. When the review is completed, the Shif t Supervisor signs in the approved space. . ."

The above review demonstrates that the operating staff was not complying with the requirements of AI-500 when making signoffs in OP-202 or when not completing the necessary reviews in OP-402, 404, 405, and 408. This failure to comply with the requirements of AI-500 is considered to be an item of noncomplianc I

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RII Report No. 50-302/78-23 II-1 DETAILS 11 Prepared by:T h m/tchg D. R. Quick, Reactor Inspector ' Da'te-Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: August 30 - September 1, 1978 Reviewed by: C[ u fo/u/g H. C. Danch, Chief / Date Reactor Projects Section Nc 1 Reactor Operations and Nuc' ear Support Branch Persons Contacted Florida Power Corporation (FPC)

  • P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager W. R. Nichols, Operations Superintendent
  • P. F. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent
  • J. Cooper, Compliance Engineer
  • G. M. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer G. R. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent
  • K. O. Vogel, Operations Engineer
  • Denotes those persons at exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings l Not inspecte . Unresolved Items None identified during this inspection, Fire Brigade Training Technical Specification Requirement Clarification Technical Specification 6.4.2 requires training sessions to be provided to the Fire Brigade at least quarterly. This is the subject of unresolved item number 78-21-0 The licensee requested an interpretation of this requirement f rom the standpoint of whether or not all fire brigade members were to be trained at least quarterly. The inspector informed the licensee, initially by telephone on August 22, 1978 and again during this inspection, I

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RII Report No. 50-302/78-23 II-2 that the requirement does in fact mean that all fire brigade members are to attend training sessions at least quarterl The licensee stated that be would comply with the requiremen Unresolved Item 78-21-03 is close . Exit Interview A meeting was held by D. R. Quick and T. J. Donat with C. P. Beatty, J and members of his staff on September 1, 197 Items covered by the inspection, as delineated in the following paragraphs, were discusse . Operator Training in Small Break Interim Actions The inspector reviewed records and interviewed licensee personnel in connection with the licensee committment to NRR, dated June 14, 1978, relating to operator training in the interim actions required during a small Reactor Coolant System break. The inspector confirmed that training of all operating personnel had been completed in accordance with the commitmen This item is close . IE Bulletins and Circulars The inspector reviewed the actions taken onsite by the licensee to verify proper environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment on accordance with IE Circular 78-08. This circular encompasses the following previously issued IE Bulletins: 78-05 and 77-05A (Electrical Connector Qualification); 77-06 (Containment Electrical Penetration Qualification); 78-02 (Unprotected Terminal Block Qualification); and 78-04 (Qualification of Stem Mounted Limit Switches). In addition Circular 78-08 addresses qualification of cables, cable splices, solenoid valves, electrical transmitters, and sequential vs separate effect testing methods. The inspector toured the Reactor Building to verify that items of concern in the listed bulletins were not presen The inspector found no discrepancies onsite during the review or the tour bowever, this item will be inspected further at corporate head-quarters in the near future. This is necessary since all engineering review records and supporting documentation are maintained at that

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j I location. This item remains ope . Safety Injection System Reset Feature The inspector reviewed wiring diagrams and circuit logic with licensee personnel for the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System. This review was conducted to determine possibility of the existance of the i

following PWR concerns:

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RII Report No. 50-302/78-23 II-3 (1) Prevention of automatic safety injection or equipment resequencing once the initial safety injection actuation system signal is rese (2) Ability of certain automatic control equipment to revert from the emergency to the normal operating condition following actuation system rese The inspector determined that these concerns are not valid at this facility due to design to the actuation syste . Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Heat Exchanger Problem The inspector n <tewed licensee actions in connection with the cracked water box on ! E cay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Heat Exchange Initial inspec m notification was by telephone on August 30, 197 The water box was cracked during reinstallation of the water box end-bell following routine maintenance while the reactor was in mode five. The water box is fabricated from cast iron. Since the heat exetroger is safety-related and required for operation in modes one thr agh four operability was restored by accomplishing a temporary repair and initiating an engineering review to provide a permanent solutio The temporcry repair consisted of applying GE-RTV sealant to the crack and installing through rod bolts, through every fourth water box bolt hole, extending from the beat exchanger shell flange to the end bell flange. This applies the stress forces created to the carbon steel shell and shell flange on one side of the water box and to the carbon steel end bell on the other side reducing stress on the cast irc water box. The licensee has evaluated that since the c4ack is Located on the discharge side of the heat exchanger and sufficient room drainage capability exists the system would continue to provide its intended safety function in the event of crack propagation with resulting, leakag The permanent solution is presently thought to be installation of qualified carbon steel water boxes within three to six montht.. This time period is contingent upon availabilit The inspector finds licensee action to be appropriate to dete but will l

continue to follow the progress of this modification during future inspection (78-23-01).

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