IR 05000302/1978020
| ML20062C733 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1978 |
| From: | Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062C731 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-78-20, NUDOCS 7811130412 | |
| Download: ML20062C733 (7) | |
Text
~
,.
. -.
pp K8Cg UNITED STATES c
o, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
[
k REGloN 11 3.}-
~
.
,.,
,
i 101 M ARIETTA STREET, N.W.
- i
f ATL ANTA. GEORGI A 30303 o
_i s,
.-
.....
Report No.:
50-302/78-20 Docket No.:
50-302
-
License No.:
DPR-72 Licensee:
Florida Power Corp.
Facility Name:
Crystal River Inspection at:
Crystal River Site P. O. Box 1228 Crystal River, Florida 32629 Inspection conducted:
August 10-11, 1978 (
Inspectors:
H. L. Whitener E. H. Brooks,
.
Approved by:
//YhfAp//b
/r/4/pf R. D. Martin, Chief Da t'e ~
Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summary Insnection on August 10-11, 1978 (Report No. 50-302/78-20)
Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection of the surveillance activity including program, procedures, test schedule, test results and visual examination for safety related piping support and restraint systems and inspector follow up on items previously identified.
The inspection involved 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> of onsite inspection by two KRC inspectors.
'
Results:
Of the two areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
l
,
J l
78111304?
.
[
l
{
--
l
~.
. - _.
.
..
,
.
RII Report No. 50-302/78-20 I-1 o,s
.
/f /Z.[7 [
DETAILS I Prepared by:
//,
,
H. L. Whitener, Reacto'r Inspecto-
'Date Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Supportfranch
}$7 % 8= A seam
'
E. H. Brooks, Reactor Ins petor Date'
Nuclear Support Section N6. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch DatesofInspection:[ gust 10-11, 1978 Reviewed by:
b t I. A d[V!I R. D./Bartin, Chief Date Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Persons Contacted
- G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager
- J. Cooper, Compliance Engineer kG. M. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer
- J. E. Barrett, Plant Engineer kl. C. Kelley, Compliance Auditor
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not in the scope of this inspection 3.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Two unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraph 5 of this report.
4.
Exit Interview
.
The inspection findings were discussed with Mr. Beatty and members of his staff on August 11, 1978 and in a subsecluent telephone conversation l
with Mr. Barrett on September 5.
These findings are delineated in the
'
Detail of this report.
,
!
,
s.
. -
--
.,, - -
s
. ~. - -.
.
-
-, -. -
_ _ - _
_
-
, _ - -
.. _ _
. _.
)
l
..
,
RII Report No. 50-302/78-20 I-2 5.
Piping Supports And Restraints The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance activity for safety related piping supports and restraints.
This included a review of procedures for technical adequacy; examination of various installed
-
dynamic and fixed supports and restraints; and review of recent surveil-lance records.
Pertinent aspects of this review are discussed below, Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Surveillance Procedures a.
(1) Visual Inspection The inspector reviewed surveillance test procedure SP 201,
" Hydraulic Snubber Inspection," for technical adequacy and noted serveral items which were discussed with the licensee.
The items discussed were as follows:
(a)
Inspection of vent holes to ensure the vents'are open is not identified in the procedure nor included in the check off list on the data sheet.
(b) A check off column is not provided on the data sheet for verifying the inspection for seal leakage and for recording the hot or cold piston rod position.
(c) Use of baseline piston position data as a guideline to determine appropriate piston positions has not been specified.
(d) Acceptance criteria specifying limits of operable range for piston rod stroke is not defined in the procedure.
(e) The procedure does not specify that for any discrepancies identified during inspection, and for which corrective action is not planned immediately, the evaluation to determine that the snubber is operable as found must also include an evaluation to ensure that the snubber will remain operable during the next inspec-tion interval.
(2) Functional Test The inspector reviewed the functional test instructions in surveillance procedure SP 201 and maintenance procedure. MP 130, " Pipe Snubber Maintenance," for technical adequacy and discussed several items with the licensee as follows:
_
-.
_
-
..
-
.
-
.
,
.
RII Report No. 50-302/78-20 1-3 (a) The range for lock-up velocity and bleed rate is speci-fied only for the upper limit. The allowable ranges, as determined by an appropriate engineering evaluation
~
of information such as in correspondence from the vendor, Architect Engineer and Corporate Engineering, must be incorporated into the procedure acceptance criteria.
(b) The acceptance criteria for lock-up velocity and bleed rate determined by functional testing does not account for the effect due to temperature differences between test condition and operating condition (See paragraph 5.d).
Licensee management stated that the procedures would be evaluated with regard to the above comments and appropriate revisions made.
Revision of the procedures to incorporate more specific inspection and acceptance criteria was identi-fied as an item for future follow up review (302/78-20-01).
b.
Seal Material Ethylene propylene (EP) seal material was installed in most safety related hydraulic shock suppressors during a repair and rebuild program prior to initial criticality; however, a review of the construction department identification records for seal material indicated that EP seal material had not been installed in suppressors on the emergency feedwater line.
As these units have shown no signs of seal leakage, the licensee considered that they had been demonstrated to be compatible with their environment and has not inspected on a 31 day frequency.
The inspector discussed the NRC position that an expected lifetime for seal material other than EP must be established on the basis ( -
of an engineering evaluation which considers the ef fect of hydraulic fluid, operating temperature, moisture and radiation environment on the material, and the compression set characteristics of the material.
Other options available to the licensee were identified as; (1) install EP material in the suppressors and inspect in accordance with the Technical Specification frequencies, (2)
replace the seals with the same non EP material and establish the material lifetime as that period of time which the suppressors have operated in their environment without adverse effects on the seals and inspect in accordance with the Technical Specification frequencies, (3) inspect the suppressors with non-EP seal material on a 31 day frequency.
This matter was identified as unresolved.
Unresolved item:
Replace non-EP seal material with EP or pursue another option as discussed above (302/78-20-02).
_-
_
..--
.
<
.
-
.
..
,
.
RII Report No. 50-302/78-20 I-4 c.
Representative Sample The inspector discussed the selection of a representative sample of suppressors with the licensee as follows:
_
Representative sample as stated in the Technical Specification requires that the licensee evaluate the conditions of his plant to obtain as nearly as possible a selection of suppressors for functional testing that is representative of all plant conditions.
The licensee agreed to establish written guidelines for making the selection of suppressors for functional teating.
This item was identified for followup review at a future inspection (302/
78-20-03).
d.
Test Results And Scheduling The inspector reviewed recent visual inspection and functional
,
s test results for safety related hydraulic suppressors.
Inspection results indicate that the licensee is performing the visual inspection in accordance with the frequency identified in Technical Specification Table 4.7.e with inspections performed (5 months af ter initial critical) in May 1977 and Feburary 1978 (12 - 3 months).
The inspector reviewed functional test data for tests performed May 19, 1978.
Test data for lock-up velocity and bleed rate were within the defined ranges of 0.75 to 23 inches per minute lock-up velocity and less than 15 inches per minute bleed rate.
As discussed in paragraph 5.a.2, the licensee has not established an appropriate temperature correction.
This matter was identified as unresolved.
.
'
Unresolved Item:
The licensee will establish an acceptance criteria for functional testing which includes a lock-up and bleed rate correction for the temperature dif ference between test condition and operating condition.
This correction will be applied to the functional test data of May 19, 1978 to ensure that these snubbers are operable at operating temperatures (302/78-20-04).
e.
Plant Tour The inspector, accompanied by licensee personnel, toured the containment building to examine pipe and component supports and restraints.
Of 30 hydraulic restraints examined on the reactor coolant, pressurizer relief. feed water and mainstream lines. two (RC 30 and RC 50) were observed to have loose extension rod lock nuts.
The licensee immediately initiated a complete visual inspection of the lock nuts to ensure that all lock nuts were secure.
.
__-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
.
..
..
.
.
RII Report No. 50-302/78-20 I-5 6.
Follow Up Items a.
Hydraulic Suppressors Follow up items related to hydraulic suppressor inspection proce-dures which were identified in report number 77-13 as open items
-
(77-13-05) to be evaluated by the licensee were discussed as follows:
,
(1)
Items 77-13-05 (a)
Concerning verification of hydraulic fluid viscosity:
the licensee had viscosity tests performed by CS maintenance consultants on SF 96-50 fluid used in the power piping shock suppressors and Verilube F 50 used in the RCP shock suppressors.
Samples from storage supplies and from suppressors were analyzed in accordance with ASTM 0-445 for solids, water and SUS (Saybolt Universal Seconds).
Results indicate a slightly higher SUS, nominal 3% to 10%, for samples taken from suppres-
,
The licensee plans to conduct further testing to sors.
determine if a trend exists. The inspector had no further questions on this matter at this time.
(2)
Item 77-13-05 (b & c)
Concerning verification of piston rod position and obtaining baseline data for visual inspection:
the licensee has obtained baseline data relative to the hot and cold piston position but has not determined how this information will be used in the ir.spection process.
The licensee was informed
,
!
that this item is closed and the use of baseline data for visual inspection will be carried under the current
,
inspec-(
tion findings.
b.
Fire Protection System Follow up items related to fire protection which were identified
-
in report number 77-13 as open items to be evaluated by the licensee were discussed.
Following are the results of the licensee *s evaluations:
(1)
Item 77-13-02 Concerning disconnecting the halon system in the cable spreading room.
The licensee stated that a twenty-four hour iire watch will be in effect during any time that the halon system is disabled, and that portable fire suppression methods would be utilized.
The inspector had no f urther
,
questions on this matter.
.. _,.
_ _ _, _
_
_ - - - __ _ _
___
_
.
.
_ _ _
l
... _.. _ _ i.i
..i
.1
_.
[.l _
_
-
.
..
.,
,
RII Report No. 50-302/78-20 I-6 (2)
Item 77-13-03 Concerning the corrosive effect of water trapped in low spots of the fire suppression system subsequent to modifica-tion from a wet system to a dry system.
The licensee stated
-
that their evaluation indicates that the corrosion due to trapped water in an oxygen atmosphere would result in an estimated rate of two mils per year or.08 inch in forty years.
The licensee confirmed that the system would be tested periodically at system pressure.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
(3)
Item 77-13-04 Concerning the lack of emergency lighting in the cable spreading rcom:
the licensee stated that portable hand lights are availble on the hose carts located outside the cable spreading room, and that portable lighting and a battery charger will be installed at the entrance to the cable spreading room.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
t
.
___
_ _ _ _ _.. _ -. _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -