IR 05000302/1978015
| ML19317G220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1978 |
| From: | Burnett P, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317G174 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-78-15, NUDOCS 8002280854 | |
| Download: ML19317G220 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
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Report No.:
50-302/78-15 Docket No.:
50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name:
Crystal River, Unit 3 Inspection at:
Crystal Rin 03.6, C ystal River, Florida Inspection conducted: May 22-26, 1978 Inspector:
P. T. Bu tt Approved by:
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R. D. Martin, Chief Datd Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on May 22-26, 1978 (Report No. 50-302/78-15)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee preparation for refueling, refueling activities and review of initial and post-rod-re-patch power escalation tests.
One inspector was onsite for a total of 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified in the three areas inspected.
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JRII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-15 I-1
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DETAILS I Prepared by:
U2 5//f P. T.' Burnett, Reactor /[nspector dDate'
Nuclear Support Sectioh No. 1
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Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspecti May 22-26, 1978
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Reviewed by:
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w R. M irtin, Chief
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Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
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1.
Persons Contacted
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- G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager
- P. F. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent W. R. Nichols, Operations Soperintendent
- G. R. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent
- J. Cooper, Compliance Engineer e
- G. M. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer
- W. R. Klein, Reactor' Engineer
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J. R. Wright, Chem / Rad Protection Engineer W. Pittman, Maintenance K. Prince, Babcock and Wilcox Various other plant operations personnel.
- Indicates attendance at the exit interview on May 26, 1978.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings 2.
Not addressed.
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3.
New Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-15 I-2 l
4.
Exit Interview On May 26, 1978, the inspector r.et with Mr. G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear
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Plant Manager, and those others indicated by asterisk in paragraph 1.
j The scope and findings of this inspection were presented by the
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inspector. Plant management made commitments to add the Missile Shield Crane to the preventive maintenance program for cranes and to review ANSIB30.2-1976, a safety standard for cranes, for applicability to all cranes engaged in handling radioactive material or carrying loads over-
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reactor fuel (78-15-02).
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5.
Preparation for Refueling Prior to refueling, the licensee inspected the upper end fittings of all fuel assemblies for signs of wear caused by flow induced motion of orifice rod assemblies (ORA) and burnable poison rod assemblies
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(BPRA).
The inspection was performed using a TV camera.
The j
inspector reviewed a sample of the video tapes of the inspection. The
resolution and contrast of the tapes were good and it was clear that i
the ORAs had barely marked the end fittings. On the other hand, wear
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caused by motion by the BPRAs was ob'vious.
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The licensee stated that eight fuel assemblies including those from j
which the BPRAs came loose, and their symmetric counterparts, would be j
i reinstalled without orifice rod assemblies.
Other fuel assemblies previously containing BPRAs will have ORAs installed so that the retaining ball contact area is 90 from that of the previously installed BPRAs.
Procedure FP-203, "Defueling and Refueling Operations" was reviewed for content and for performance up to the time of the inspection. All appropriate procedure steps were completed.
The control room log
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maintained by the refueling consultant was also reviewed for the
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l activities in that area performed prior to the inspection.
No questions arose from that review.
The required surveillence J
procedures for fuel handling were found to be complete.
These i
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SP112, " Calibration of the Reactor Protection System,"
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SP220, " Instrumentation Functional Checks during Refueling Operations,"
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SP346, " Containment Penetrations Weekly Functional Checks During Refueling Operations,"
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-15 I-3
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d.
SP406, " Refueling Operations Daily Data Requirements,"
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SP532, " Reactor Building hain and Auxiliary Fuel Bridges
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Electrical Interlock Check" and f.
SP670, " Reactor Building Fuel Handling Bridges".
In reviewing the required surveillance procedures it was noted that
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none of the surveillance procedures addressed the reactor building
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polar crane, which had to be used to make the vessel accessible for both the defueling and refueling operations. The licensee does not-I l
have a surveillance procedure that addresses the polar crane. That piece of equipment is part of the preventive maintenance program implemented by Preventive Maintenance Procedure 109. However, that procedure has no stated frequency for performance. From discussions with plant personnel and review of documents immediately available to the inspector, it was not clear when the polar crane had last been inspected or whether a timely inspection had been performed prior to lifting the vessel head. This.has been identified to the licensee as an unresolved item pending further determination of the status and extent of inspections and preventive maintenance performed on the polar crane prior to its use for this outage.
l Unresolved Item: The inspection of the polar crane prior to its use for safety-related load lifting activities is unresolved pending licensee determination of the last date of polar crane inspection (78-15-01).
6.
Refueling Operations Problems with the upenders in the spent fuel pool and the two fuel transfer carts and drive units interrupted fuel handling shortly before the inspector arrived ons_ite, and no fuel handling from the spent fuel pool to the reactor building was accomplished during the
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period of this inspection. The inspector observed some of the remote j
maintenance activities attempted on these malfunctioning pieces of equipment, and also witnessed the use of a diver to work on the equipment underwater. In the course of the observations of activities
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in the spent fuel pool and adjacent areas, the inspector noted that two l
cranes appeared to be improperly reeved in that the wire ropes were not fully in the grooves of the upper drums. That was the case for the main hook of the spent fuel cask handling crane and for the missile shield
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crane directly over the spent fuel pool. In addition, the latter crane was reeved such that the various parts of wire rope between the upper and lower blocks were twisted and rubbing together. These concerns and observations were brought to the attention of plant management and (s
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maintenance personnel. During this time the cask handling crane was not in use and the missile fuel crane was used only for operations much
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less than its rated capacity.
7.
Power Escalation Test a.
Core Pcwer Distribution During the initial power escalation, core power distribution as a function of increasing power was measured using test Procedure 7/1/800/11 " Core Power Distribution." Following the control rod repatch in February 1978, core power distribution was measured using surveillance Procedure 116, " Core Power Distribution and
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Power Imbalance Correlation Test."
The data and cot:pleted procedures for these tests were reviewed by
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the inspector. The test results confirmed that adequate thermal margins, F, Fg, linear heat rate, and DNBR were maintained in all cases. q p
b.
Power Imbalance Test U
The relationship between the incore and excore measurements of the axial power imbalance were measured during the startup test using test Procedure 7/1/800/18 and following rod repatch using SP116.
Review of the plotted test data indicated that the relationship between incore and excore indications of axial power imbalance met the test acceptance criteria in all cases.
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Reactivity Coefficients at Power
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During the startup phase of operations, reactivity coefficients at power was measured at 40%, 70% and 100% power using test Procedure 7/1/800/5. Following review of the test procedure and results, the inspector had no further questions.
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