IR 05000302/1978024

IE Inspec Rept 50-302/78-24 on 781002-06 During Which No Items of Noncompliance Were Noted.Major Areas Inspected Incl:Plant Oper,Followup on Previous Noncompliance Items & Unresolved Items

ML20062F450
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/08/1978
From:	Quick D, Taylor P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20062F449	List: IR 05000302/1978024 ML20062F447
References
50-302-78-24, NUDOCS 7812180317
Download: ML20062F450 (12)

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UNITED $TATEs

. e E th, o NUCtE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION e

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REGION ll y ,( g 101 M ARIETT A STREET. " g

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I Report No.: 50-302/78-24 Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street South P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection at: Crystal River Site, Crystal River, Florida Inspection conducted: October 2-6, 1978 Inspectors: D. R. Quick W. H. Bradford P. A. Taylor p, //w /)J Approved by: t

'Date H. C. Dance, Chieff' .

Reactor Projects section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on October 2-6, 1978 (Report No. 50-302/78-24)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations;

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followup on previous noncompli. ace items and unresolved items; followup on licensee events, review of fire protection program; review of IE Bulletins and a plant tour. The inspection involved 81 inspector-hours on-site by three NRC personne Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in the seven areas inspecte _

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 I-l DETAILS I Prepared by: 7Mu /6N 2 ^ // J D. R. Quick, Reac06p'Inspegtor Date Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: October 2-6, 1978 Reviewed by: Td 5[hl H.'C.' Dance, Chief ///

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~[' Date Reactor Projects Sedion N Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

. Persons Contacted Florida Power Corporation (FPC) Corporate Of fices

• W. P. Stewert, Directog Power Production

• E. C. Simpson, Nuclear Support Services Specialist P. Y. Baynard, Acting Manager, Nuclear Support Services Q. B. Dubois, Director, Quality Programs D. A. Shook, Manager, Nuclear Engineering K. B. Baker, Production Engineer Crystal River Site

• P. F. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent W. R. Nichols, Operations Superintendent W. R. Klein, Reactor Engineer

• J. Cooper, Jr., Compliance Engineer

• T. Lutkehaus, Technical Support Engineer

• G. R. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent

• K. O. Vogel, Operations Engineer

• G. M. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer W. A. Cross, Technical Specifications Engineer

• Denotes those persons present at the exit interview . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector reviewed various open items, unresolved items, and license responses to items of ncncompliance. The status of these items is indicated below:

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 I-2

i (Closed) Infraction 78-06-01 (Paragraph 5 of RII Rpt. 78-6):

Failure to follow Administrative Procedures Covering Usage of Plant Procedures. Paragraph 5.a of RII Rpt. 78-6, pertaining to annual review of procedures, was the last item of this four part citation remaining open at the time of this inspection. The inspector reviewed Revision 22 of Administrative Instruction 400 which implements a new procedure review system controlled by the Administrative Section. This system has been implemented and the procedure reviews are now being accomplished in a timely manne (Closed) Unresolved Item 77-3/1 (Paragraph 3 of RII Rpt. 77-3):

Offsite Organizatio The inspector verified that Proposed Technical Specification Amendment No. 33 has been submitted and does revise Technical Specification Figure 6.2.-l to reflect the actual Offsite Organization at this tim . Unresolved Items None Exit Meeting A meeting was held by D. R. Quick with P. F. McKee (acting for the Nuclear Plant Manager) and members of his staff on October 5, 197 Items covered by this inspection at the plant site were discussed. The licensee made the following commitments during the exit intervie . Evaluate and modify the present methods employed to couple control rods to ensure that no control rod would be left uncoupled in the future. This is to be accomplished prior l

to the next fuel handling evolution, which is presently scheduled for April, 1979. (78-24-01) Submit a revision to LER 78-027 (Incore Instrument Uncertainties) reflecting the corrective action instituted by Technical Specification Amendment No. 1 This is to be submitted by November 1, 1978. (78-24-02) Establish a program to accomplish an evaluation of fire

, retardant material to be used on wooden scaffolding, l ladders, etc. necessary to be located in the plant, and to t

minimize the use of wooden materials, within the confines of industrial safety requirements. This is to be accomplished by Janua ry 1,197 (78-24-03) A meeting was held by D. R. Quick with W. P. Stewart (Director l Power Production) and members of his staff on October 6, 1978.

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 I-3 Items covered by this inspection at the Corporate Offices were discusse . Core Flux Tilt Caused by Uncoupled Control Rod The inspector discussed this event with licensee personnel to ascertain that the cause was correctly identified and that licensee actions pertaining to the event were in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements. The results of this review indicate that licensee action to control and recover from the core flux tilt event was prope Identification of uncoupled contral rod 5-1, (C-11), as the cause of the tilt, unit cooldown for corrective action, recoupling of control rod 5-1, (C-11), and subseque t unit restart were performed in a timely manner in accordance with regulatory requirement However, since the cause of this event was apparently the result of a new method of coupling control rods, employed for the first time, the inspector feels that either the procedure being used or the coupling tool design is not totally adequate to prevent recurrence of this problem. This concern was discussed with the licensee at the exit interview and the licensee committed to evaluate and modify the present coupling methods employed prior to the next fuel handling evolution, which is presently scheduled for April, 1979. The inspector will review licensee action on this item during future inspection (78-24-01) CFR Part 21 Reporting Program The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for reporting deficiencies in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 and has no further questions at this tim The review was conducted at both the plant site and the corporate office The licensee has developed and implemented a program designed to meet the regulatory requirement This program is described by corporate procedure NSSD-15 which appears to be adequate. The inspector traced a potential deficiency through the program with satisfactory result . Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed selec+ed LER's for consistency with the require-ments of the Technical Speci> ' cations and Regulatory Guide 1.16 (Reporting of Operating Information - Ap: ' dix A Technical Specifications). The inspector examined the licensee's analysis of the event, the corrective action taken and discussed the LER with licensee representatives. The following LER's were reviewed:

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 I-4

, LER 78-027 Incore Instrument Uncertainties This LER was generated as a result of concerns raised by B&W in a letter to the licensee dated May 8, 1978, describing measurement uncertainties associated with the Incore Instrument Syste Further evaluation resulted in Technical Specification Amendment No. 16, which revises certain core radial flux tilt limits. This amendment is now approved and in effect. The licensee committed to forwarding the supplement to this LER prior to November 1, 1978. This LER will remain open pending receipt and review of the revised report (78-24-02). LER 78-031 Dropped New Fuel Elevator Test Weight This LER was previously reviewed by the inspector (See Paragraph 7 to RII Rpt. 78-16 and Paragraph 2.W to RII Rpt. 78-21). The implementation of SP-601 covering Qualification and load testing of slings and hooks should prevent recurrence of this type proble The inspector has no further questions at this time. This LER is close LER 78-034 DHV-111 Inoperable The inspector reviewed this LER with the maintenance technician responsible for the corrective action taken. He stated that a complete inspection had been performed.on the control circuitry for the valve and that no discrepancies were found. He also stated that limit switch contact oxidation could be a possible explanation for the spurious electrical control failure experienced on this valve, but that no oxidation had been found. He offered an opinion that manual operation of the valve prior to his examina-tion had cleaned the contacts sufficiently to allow normal electrical operation. The inspector is satisfied that sufficient evaluation was performed in this case and has no further questions at this time. However, screening of similar spurious control problems will be conducted during future inspections (78-24-04). This LER is close LER 78-035 Inoperable Cable Tunnel Sump Pumps This LER was generated as a result of Unit 1 and 2 personnel inadvertently turning off power to these pumps at the switch panel which is located in the Unit 1 and 2 area. The license held discussions with Unit 1 and 2 supervisory personnel on the importance of these pumps remaining operational since they are required by Unit 3 Technical Specifications. These discussions resulted in the placement of information tags on the pumps power switches to prevent recurrence of this problem. This LER is close . - - -

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 I-5 LER 78-038 and 78-041 Unit 1 Battery Inoperable Due to Electrolyte Stratification The inspector discussed this recurring problem with the electrical supervisor and received assurance that although the batteries periodically fail to meet the acceptance criteria related to specific gravity, they had been proven capable of passing the required load test. An engineering evaluation of the electrolyte stratification problem is underway at the present time (REI-677).

The inspector has no futher questions at this time, but will follow the progress of the engineering evaluation during future inspections (78-24-05). These LER's are close LER 78-039 Nuclear Instrumentation Channel 2 Detector Replacement This LER is closed without commen LER 78-040 Chemical Addition Pumps CAP 1A and IB Inoperable The inspector discussed this LER with cognizant licensee personnel and ascertained that the licensee believes this problem to be related to air binding of the pumps. An engineering evaluation has been initiated to identify the system design problem responsible for this event ,~3EI 78-08-18). This LER remains open pending review of the results of the evaluation when availabl LER 78-042 Vital Instrument Bus Inverter VBIT-1A Inoperable The inspector discussed this LER with cognizant licensee personnel and has no further questions on this event at this time. However, I due to the recurring Inverter problems experienced at the site discussions were held with the electrical supervisor pertaining to the cause of these events. The electrical supervisor apprised the inspector of numerous failure modes experienced with the inverters consisting of failed electronic components as well as spurious protective type trips of the units. As a result of these problems a modification report (MAR 78-7-4 and 4A) was generated and one inverter is presently being modified extensivel The modification is intended to reduce the overall parts count and desensitize the protective cricuitry of the uni The modification is based on an engineering evaluation of recommenda-tions made by the manufacturer (Solid State Controls Inc.) in a letter to the licensee, dated April 17, 1978. The licensee plans to evaluate the operation of the inverter as a measure of the success of the modification upon completion of the work. The inspector will review results of this evaluation and details of the modification itself during future inspections (78-24-06).

This LER is close __

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 I-6 o

l l Fire Protection Survey During Plant Tour The inspectors conducted a preliminary fire protection survey of the plant in preparation for the NRC Fire Team Site Visit presently scheduled for late November, 197 Several areas of concern were identified during this plant tour and were discussed with the licensee (See Details II of this report). One of these items (Treatment of Wooden Materials Used in the Plant) resulted in a licensee commitment and is being carried as open item 78-24-0 Another ites relating to pentrations in the cable spreading room not being sealed properly resulted in the licensee performing an investiga-tion of all penetration seals in the roo During this investigation it was revealed that many electrical conduits were sealed with a " duct seal" material which was not designated as an approved sealing material for fire stops. The licensee evaluated this as an immediately reportable situation and informed the inspector by telephone on October 6, 197 The licensee stated that the conduits in question, although sealed with an unapproved material, did not constitute a fire stop since the length of the conduit itself provides the fire barrier, and that the

" duct seal" material, placed in the ends of the conduits, provided a ventilation stop only. This is for the purpose of containing Halon gas, from the fire suppression system, within the room when the

, suppression system is activated during a fire. The inspector reviewed the situation within NRC and provided the licensee with the following regional interpretation of current fire protection philosophy on October 11, 1978: Sufficient conduit length does constitute a satisfactory fire barrier when consideration is given to cable loading versus free air volume within the condui . Conduits should remain sealed as a ventilation stop to enhance the effectiveness of the Halon fire suppression system and must remain intact if credit for seals was assumed in qualifying the suppression syste . " Duct seal" material is not of particular concern as a ventilation stop unless sufficient quantities are present to increase the j fire loading of the room beyond that assumed in the fire hazard i analysi The licensee initiated an engineering evaluation of this situation on October 6, 1978 and will submit details in the written 14 day report

by October 20, 197 .

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 I-7 Review of IE Circulars and Bulletins The inspector reviewed applicable IE Circulars with licensee personnel to ascertain that they have been received on site and reviewed by cognizant supervisory personnel. Licensee's actions on the following IE Circulars were reviewed:

Circular N Subject 78-08 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment

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This circular involves the re-review of topical areas contained in five separate IE Bulletins as well as additional areas of concer The inspector discussed the recommendations of the Circular in all areas of concern with cognizant licensee personnel at the Corporate Offices and provided associated reference material necessary for proper re-evaluation. The licensee stated that he had contracted with Gilbert Associates Inc. to provide the review service in all areas of concer The contract was initiated on September 21, 1978 through Service Authorization No. 008-198 and requres GAI to review all listed items of concern associated with IE Circular 78-08. Environmental information about listed items is to be reported to the licensee by November 27, 1978. The licensee plans to evaluate any identified problem areas and initiate corrective action based on his evaluation if and when problem areas arise. The inspector stated that this evaluation program should identify any problem areas addressed in the circular. However this circular will remain open until the evaluation has been completed and reviewed by the inspector during future inspection The inspector reviewed applicable IE Bulletins with licensee personnel to ascertain; that they have been received by the licensee and reviewed for applicability by cognizant supervisory personnel; that information discussed in the licensee's reply was accurate; and that corrective action taken was effected as described in the reply. The following IE Bulletins were reviewed:

Bulletin N Subject 77-04 Containment Sump PH Following a LOCA 77-05 Electrical Connector Assemblies77-05A Electrical Connector Assemblies 77-06 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies i

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 I-8 78-01 Flammable Contact Arm Retainers in EG CR120A Relays 78-02 Terminal Block Qualification 78-04 Qualification of Stem Mounted Limit Switches 78-05 Malfunctioning of Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanism 78-06 Defective Cutler-Hammer Relays 78-10 Bergen-Paterson Shock Suppressors The inspector had no further questions on IE Bulletins 77-04, 78-05, 78-06 and 78-10 since documentation supporting the licensee's response

, was available for inspection and was considered satisfactory. The inspector has no further questions on IE Bulletins 77-05,77-05A, 77-06, 78-02 and 78-04 since the licensee submitted initial responses and his plans for re-review of these areas was available for inspection and appears adequate to satisfy the concerns of IE Circular 78-0 This circular reeains open and will be reviewed during future inspec-tion IE Bulletin 78-01 will remain open pending receipt of additional information in-connection with items two and three of the instruction .

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s RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 II-1 DETAILS II Prepared by: 7d h a he < II/7 i W. H. Bradford, Rege' tor Inspector Da Nuclear Support Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

!? i J  !! - 7 -It-P. A. Taflot, Reactor Inspector Date Nuclear Support Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection- y 0 tober -5 1978 Reviewed by:

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Nudear/up%, portQueu Section No. 2

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Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Persons Contacted Florida Power Corporation G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager

• P. F. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent W. R. Nichols, Operating Supervisor

• G. R. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent ,

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• T. C. Lutkehaus, Plant Fire Marshall '

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• G. M. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer

• R. O. Vogel, Operations Engineer

• J. Cooper, Compliance Engineer

, * Denotes those present at exit intervie . Licen<,ee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

! Not inspecte . M esolved Items None identified during this inspectio . Exit Interview A management interview was conducted at the conclusion of the inspection on October 5, 1978, with Mr. C. R. kestafer, Acting Plant Manager, and l

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 II-2 other licensee staff members (denoted in paragraph 1). All subjects presented in these details were discusse The licensee acknowledged the inspection finding . Fire Protection and Prevention The inspector reviewed the licensee's fire protection and prevention program to verify that controls had been established which include:

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Work control procedures which include welding and burning contro Plant operations approval and control of work done under the work control procedure A requirement for a fire watch for welding and burning operations with capability of communicating with the control roo A requirement for QA/QC surveillance during maintenance and plant modification Assurance that the cable penetration sealing material is controlled and that sealing material is not substituted which could be flammabl Plant emergency procedures had been established which provide instructions to plant personnel in fire emergencies and emergency procedures which provide for orderly plant shutdown in cases of loss of normal and pref erred alternate coolin The inspector reviewed the results of the latest fire insurance inspection which was conducted on April 17-21, 197 The inspector reviewed the fire protection / prevention technical specification surveillance test requirements, the fire protection /

prevention administrative controls and implementing procedure The inspector toured various areas of the facility to observe operation in progress, to inspect the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping and fire protection / prevention systems and condition The inspector noted in certain areas of the plant that there sere areas which required cleaning of accumulation of various materials which could be a fire hazard. The inspector also observed wood ladders and scme scaffold boards which had not been treated with fire retardan The licensee stated at the exit interview that the areas identified were being cleaned up. The licensee also stated that a survey would be msde of all wood scaffolding and

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-24 II-3 ladders in the plant and that the Florida Power Corporation Safety Department would review and detenmine a suitable fire retardant material to be use The inspector found penetration No. 48 in the cable spreading room which was not intac It appeared that a small piece of concrete had broken in the penetration and lef t an opening which measured about one inch long and 1/4 inch wide. Two other penetrations were found in which the bottom part of the penetration appeared to not have been completed. These penetrations are the two 8 inch closed cycle cooling lines. The inspector found a two inch conduit which extended down into the cable spreading room which was sealed with duct seal over the end of the conduit. This is a spare conduit with no wiring passing through it. The licensee stated at the exit interview that these penetrations had been repaired and that a Nonconforming Operations Report No.78-280 had been issued on these penetration (

The inspector used one or more of the following acceptance criteria for the above items:

Technical Specifications Appendices A and B of 10 CFR 50 Regulatory Guide 1.120, " Fire Fignting (Rules for Nuclear Power Plants)"

Regulatory Guide 1.39, " Housekeeping Requirements for Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" Section 3.2.3 of ANSI N4 Within the areas inspected no deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

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