IR 05000302/1978028

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IE Inspec Rept 50-302/78-28 on 781011-13 During Which No Items of Noncompliance Were Noted.Major Areas Inspected incl:zero-pwr-physics Tests & Pwr Escalation Tests
ML20062F442
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/09/1978
From: Burnett P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20062F441 List:
References
50-302-78-28, NUDOCS 7812180311
Download: ML20062F442 (4)


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UNITED STATES

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  1. o, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report No.:

50-302/78-28 Docket No.:

50-302

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License No.:

DPR-72 Licensee:

Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name:

Crystal River 3 Inspection at:

Crystal River Site, Crystal River, Florida Inspection conducted:

October 11-13, 1978 Inspector:

P. T. Burnett Approved by:

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R. D. Martin, Chief tatfe Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on October 11-13, 1978: (Report No. 50-302/78-28)

Areas Inspected: One inspector performed a routine unannounced inspection of zero-power-physics tests and power escalation tests.

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Fourteen hours were expended on site.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in the two areas inspected.

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-28-1-(M[

DETAILS I Prepared by-M r T. BHenEtt,~ Reactor' Inspector Dite Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection-October 11-13, 1978 Reviewed by:

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/f /9 /17 R. D.'~ Martin, Chief, d'at e'

Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.

Persons Contacted

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  • G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager
  • P. F. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent
  • G. R. Boldt, Engineering Performance Supervisor
  • W. R. Klein, Computer Engineer
  • W. A. Cross, Reactor Engineer
  • J. Cooper, Compliance Engineer
  • G. M. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer Various Plant Operations Personnel
  • Indicates attendance at Exit Interview on October 13, 1978.

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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not addressed.

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New Unresolved Items l

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Exit Interview

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A meeting was held with Mr. G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager,

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and those others indicated by asterisk in paragraph 1 on October 13, l

1978. The scope and findings of this inspection as described in

the following paragraphs were discussed with those present.

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-28-2-5.

Zero-Power Physics Tests In the course of the recent extended maintenance outage the licensee defueled the reactor and in refueling ultimately replaced four of the original fuel assemblies with four from another facility.

In view of these core changes the licensee prepared an extensive zero-power physics-testing program. This inspection confirmed that those zero power physics test were performed according to procedure, and satisfied the identified numerical acceptance criteria.

However, in the subsequent power escalation power distribution anomalies indicated that one control rod (5-1) was uncoupled.

This was later confirmed observationally and mechanically, and the control rod was recoupled.

Some but not all of the zero power physics tests were then repeated.

The inspector reviewed SP-102, " Control Rod Drop Time Test," as completed on September 13-14, 1978, prior to the discovery of disconnected rod. He also reviewed the data obtained on September 26, 1978, confirming proper drop time on Rod 5-1.

All drop times met the acceptance criterion of Technical Specification 4.1.3.4.

Zero-power physics tests for both the pre-and post-rod recoupling tests were controlled by PT-110, " Controlling Procedure for Zero Power Physics Test".

Both versions of the procedure were reviewed in their entirety by the inspector.

The procedure controls and schedules the performance of particular tests involving other pts such as:

Determination of sensible heat using PT-116, a.

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Checkout of the reactimeter using part of PT-110, c.

Determining critic.1 boron concentrations with all rods out using PT-111, d.

Measurement of temperature coefficients using PT-114, Calibrating the part length rod group using PT-113, e.

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Calibrating regulating rod groups using PT-112, and g.

Measuring ejected rod worth using PT-115.

Not all these specific tests were repeated for the second, post-rod recoupling version of the procedure.

There was however, a repetition of the reactimeter check out, recalibration of rod groups five and six and a new determination of the ejected rod worth.

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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-28-3-of some of the tests during the second series was discussed at some length with some members of the licensee staff, and the bases for their decision determined. For most of the tests it was anticipated that the change in measured values would be within the uncertainties of the measurements, and this is supported by the fact that the change in group 5 worth increased only by 100 pcm, or about 10 ppm boron, upon recoupling the uncoupled rod. Following these discussions the inspector had no further questions on the decisions. The inspector did comment at some length on possible improvements of technique in performing the isothermal temperature coefficient measurement.

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Power Escalation The licensee controlled power escalation using PT-120, " Controlling Procedure for Power Escalation Testing". At the time of the inspec-tion only one test remained to be performed: that was the determin-ation of incore versus excore axial imbalance at 75% power. A

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i prerequisite to this test was that the reactor be at or near 100%

power for seven days prior to performing it.

This is a consider-

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ation to allow preconditioning of the fuel and avoid pellet-clad interactions.

The inspector reviewed core performance and thermal limit data obtained during the power escalation as well as data immediately available on the system These data confirmed a small, positive power tilt in the WX quadrant, which the licensee expected based on their previous experience with lumped burnable poison assemblies.

The tilt is within Technical Specification limits.

Neither the data reviewed nor discussions with the licensee indicated any other questions or concerns related to core performance.

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