IR 05000302/1978016
| ML19319C966 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1978 |
| From: | Wessman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319C951 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-78-16, NUDOCS 8003040901 | |
| Download: ML19319C966 (6) | |
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O UNITED STATES o
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Report No.:
50-302/78-16
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Docket No.:
50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Licensee:- Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street South P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name:
Crystal R'ver 3 Inspection at:
Crystal River Site, Crystal River, Florida Inspection conducted:
June 12-15, 1978 Inspectors:
R. H. Wessman g
B. W. Riley B. T. Moon Approved by:
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Date f~ H. C. Dance, Chief d
Reactor Projects-Section No. 1 j
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on June 12-15, 1978: (Report No. 50-302/78-16)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of plant operations and outage activities; followup of licensee events; observation of fuel handling activities and review of documentation; implementation of 10 CFR 21 requirements; verification of conformance to limiting safety system settings and limiting conditions for operation; and facility The inspection involved 78 inspector-hours on-site by three NRC tour.
personnel.
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Results: Of the six areas inspected one item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Deficiency - Failure to meet post: ng requirements of 10 CFR 21 (78-16-01)); and three items of noncompliance were identified in one_ area:
(Infraction - Failure to follow procedural requirements of a Radiation Work Permit (78-16-02); Infraction - Failure to establish
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measures to prevent use of incorrect or defective material (78-16-03);
Infraction - Failure to take adequate corrective action (78-16-04)).
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-16 I-1 DETAILS I Prepared by:Dh 7 !u w%
R. H. Wessman, Reactor Inspector Date
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Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: June 12-15, 1978
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I Reviewed by:
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.[,,H.C. Dance, Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Persons Contacted
- G.
P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager
- W. R. Nichols, Operations Superintendent
- P. F. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent
- J. C. Wright, Chemistry / Radiation Protection Engineer f
- W. R. Klein, Reactor Engineer (
- J. Cooper, Compliance Engineer
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- G. M. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer
- G. R. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent
- W. A. Cross, Technical Specifications Engineer
C. G. Goring, Planning Coordinator P. L. Breaux, Nuclear Shift Supervisor S. W. Johnson, Inservice Inspection Engineer J. N. Kurtz, Maintenance Engineer J. J. Parrish, Plant Engineer H. M. Embach, Nuclear Shift Supervisor D. B. Eggleston, Chief Nuclear Operator F. R. Zitrananck, Assistant Nuclear Operator J. N. Hessinger, Compliance Auditor I. M. Brown, Power Plant Clerk W. M. Duncan, Power Plant Clerk
- Denotes those persons at Exit Interview.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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3.
Unresolved Items None identified during this inspection.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-16 I-2
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Exit Interview A meeting was held by R. H. Wessman with G. P. Beatty, Jr., and
'l members of his staff on June 15, 1978.
Items covered by the
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inspection were discussed, including the four noncompliance items specified in the following paragraphs.
5.
10 CFR Part 21 Inspection The inspector reviewed a portion of the licensee's program relating to meeting 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.
Procedures reviewed were:
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NSSD-15, Compliance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance CP-111, Procedure for Documenting the Reporting and Review of
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Nonconforming Operations Various portions of the Quality Manual
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Implementation of various aspects of these procedures was also verified by the inspector.
Within the areas inspected, one discrepancy was identified.
NSSD-15 requires the posting of 10 CFR 21, Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and a copy of NSSD-15 at various locations in the Florida Power Corporate system.
These documents
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were not posted, as required by NSSD-15, at the Crystal River site warehouse.
This was identified as a Deficiency in the Notice of Violation (78-16-01).
In that corrective action was taken prior to the inspector's departure from the alte this item is considered closed.
6.
Failure to Follow Procedural Requirements of A Radiation Work Permit As part of a general review of outage activities, the inspector
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reviewed selected portions of Chemrad Section Logs and radiation work permits. One discrepancy was identified by the inspector in that procedural requirements of a radiation work permit (RWP) were not followed.
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R11 Rpt. No. 50-302/78-16 I-3
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RP 106, Radiation Work Permit Procedure, establishes requirements for the use of the RWP for work in areas requiring special radiological controls. Section 5.1.3 of RP 106 requires the Chemrad Section to
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RWP No. 78-identify specific controls, as applicable, on the RWP.
1045 of June 5, 1978, was issued for the " Investigation of FHCR-4B Restriction and Repair." This RWP states that Chemrad will provide continuous coverage when the divers are in the pool.
At about 1800 on June 10, 1978 (according to licensee records) divers were in the reactor building pool, under the auspices of this RWP, without This has been identified as an Infraction in the Chemrad coverage.
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Notice of Violation (78-16-02).
7.
Dropped New Fuel Elevator Test Weight (LER 78-031)
The inspector investigated the circumstances of the dropped new fuel elevator test weight which occurred at 1450 on June 9, 1978.
This was reported to the NRC at 1600 on June 9, 1978.
This event was the accidental drop of a 2050-lb. test weight while moving it (submerged) from an upender to the fuel storage racks.
A plant fabricated crane hook failed, dropping the weight which may have damaged fuel assembly A-48 and possibly bumped fuel assemblies A20
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and A34. No release of radioactivity from the fuel assemblies had
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been identified by the licensee. The inspector's review included selected repair activities to fuel handling equipment conducted during May and June 1978, the licensee's activities at the time of the event's occurrence, and corrective actions taken subsequent to The inspector interviewed several members of the licensee's the event.
staff as part of his review.
The inspector confirmed that events occurred as described in LER
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78-31 and that the licensee's immediate response to the event was appropriate. Two discrepancies were identified which have been classified as Infractions in the Notice of Violation:
a.
(78-16-03) The hook used to lift the 2050-lb. test weight in the spent fuel pool (adjacent to nuclear fuel assemblies) was load locally manufactured from non-certified material, was not
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tested or qualified prior to use, and was not tagged or marked as to the limitations on its use. The failure of this hook while in use on June 9, 1978, contributed to the damage to fuel assembly A48.
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RII Rpt.' No. 50-302/78-16-I-4
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The use of this hook was contrary to Criteria VIII and XIV of Appendix 3 to 10 CFR Part 50..
Criterion VIII to 10 CFR 50
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Appendix B (Identification and Control of Material, Parts, and Components) requires the establish =ent of measures to prevent
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the use of incorrect or defective catorial in safety-related activities. Criterion XIV to 10 CER 50 Appendix B (Inspection,
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Test, and Operating Status) requires the establishment of
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measures, such as tagging or marking to indicate the status of inspection or tests on components, to preclude their inadvertent use.
These criteria' are implemaated, in part, by Section 1.7.6.7 (Operation QA Program) of the FSAR, and by the licensee's
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Quality Program Policies 8.1 (Identification and Traceability of Items Used During the Operational Phase) and 14.1 (Inspection, Test, and Operating Status).
b.
(78-16-04) On June 11, 1978,- two of the potentially damaFed
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fuel assemblies were inadvertently moved prior to the complete'
evaluation as to the extent of damt.ge that may have been incurred by the dropped new fuel elevator test weight.
Assembly A20 was moved to the reactor core and Assembly A48 was moved
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twice within the spent fuel pool.
These actions were contrary i
to Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50. Criterion XVI to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (Corrective Action) requires the establishment
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of measures to assure conditions. adverse to quality, such as
defective material, are promptly identified and corrected.
This criterion is implemented, in part by Section 1.7.6.7 (Operation QA Program) of the FSAR, and by the licensee's Quality Program Procedure 16.50- (Corrective Action for Operations :
Phase).
The inspector discussed the above noncompliances with the licensee
and reviewed the licensee's evaluation program for the affected fuel assemblies. The criteria for additional movement of fuel
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assemblies A20, A34, and A48 were established' by the licensee and reviewed by l
the inspector. Portions of the licensee's inspection effort-for
i fuel assemblies A34 and A48 were witnessed by the inspector.
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Review of Safety Limits, Limiting Safety Systen Settings, and LLniting Conditions for Operation
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The inspector reviewed selected plant records for the December 1977 - February 1978 period to determine compliance (on a sample
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Documents reviewed were:
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\\s RII Rpt. No. 50-302/78-16 I-5
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4-SP 110, Reactor Protective System Functional Testing SP 300, Operating Daily Surveillance Lug
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SP 320, Operability of Boron Injection Sources and Pumps SP 321, Power Distribution Breaker Alignment and Availability Verification Within the areas inspected no discrepancies were identified.
9.
Observation of Fuel Handling Activities The inspector observed portions or the refueling activities
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occurring in the Spent Fuel Building, the Reactor Building, and the Control Room.
Compliance with Technical Specification requirements and procedural controls of FP-203, Defueling and Refueling Operations, was verified. Minor procedural discrepancies were discussed with licensee personnel. Visual techniques in fuel handling were improved upon implementation of the inspec. tor's suggestion of using a light in the reactor vessel.
The inspector and the licensee discussed a procedural change to Section 5.22 of FP 203 which allows changes to the approved fueling sequence to be made by the
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Refueling Consultant. The intent of this change was to allow minor sequence changes (such as alternate carriage use, or " boxing-in" a
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given core location to facilitate seating a fuel assembly). However, the changed Section 5.22, as written, wculd allow a complete sequence change without management involvement.
The licensee agreed to review this portion of FP 203 to provide controlling guidance for the Refueling Consultant.
Within the areas inspected no discrepancies were identified.
10.
Inservice Inspection Activity The inspector reviewed with licensee personnel a portion of inservice inspection documentation generated during this outage.
The licensee has been conducting non-destructive examination of various welds in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5 and Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements.
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The licensee has identified two discrepancies requiring correccive action.
Radiographic examination of weld No. FW107A on the feed line to the "A" OTSG revealed a elongated linear indication about 3/8" - long. This has been identified as a possible crack or lack of fusion. The licensee plans a weld repair and a hydrostatic
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test.
A second indication (about 5/8" by 3/8") has been identified in the base metal adjacent to a weld in the emergency feedwater
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Thickness measurements have verified the
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metal is thinner than-the ASTM standard.
The licensee plans to weld a pad on this pipe and conduct non-destructive testing.
The inspector had no additional comment concerning the licensee's
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program-in this area.
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