IR 05000298/1993024
| ML20059F559 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1994 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059F554 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-93-24, NUDOCS 9401140065 | |
| Download: ML20059F559 (12) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:- - -- . - - - . . - - .. . . . I I APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV i l l Inspection Report: 50-298/93-24 Operating License: DPR-46 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 499 ! Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 l Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station Inspection At: Brownville, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: December 13-22, 1993 Inspectors: D. Blair Spitzberg, P Emergency Preparedness Analyst (Team Leader) Wesley Holley, Senior Radiation Specialist Wayne Walker, Resident Inspector l Accompanied by: George Cicotte, Battelle Laboratories-Floyd McManus, Comex Corporation Approved: [[[l/ / Aft [&? Blaine Murrai, Chief., Facilities Inspection k Date k
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Programs Section Inspection Summary Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensees performance and capabilities during an annual exercise of the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspection team observed activities in the Control Room (simulator), Technical Support Center, Operational Support l Center, and the Emergency Operations Facilit Results: l I
* The Control Room performed well during the exercise to detect and l classify emergency conditions and to make initial notifications to l offsite authoritie Emergency command and control were effective from the Control Room (Section 3.1).
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* The Technical Support Center demonstrated good command and control and !
, information flow. Technical assessments and prioritization of accident ; mitigation activities were timely and effective (Section 4.1). ! - I
* The Operational Support Center performed their emergency response l activities in an effective, professional, and timely manner. Command, ,
control, and communications in the facility were excellent. Response { personnel were trained and familiar with their assigned responsibilities. A weakness was identified for failure to ensure that a response team member was qualified for wearing respiratory protection j (Section 5.1).
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* The Emergency Operations Facility was activated promptly and performed {
well during the exercise. Notification messages were timely and offsite l radiological assessment and protective action recommendations were appropriate (Section 6.1).
- The exercise scenario was sufficient to demonstrate exercise objective ,
Exercise preparation and drillsmanship was identified as an area of j potential improvement (Section 7.1).
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* The licensee's critique process was sufficient to identify and characterize weak or deficient areas (Section 8.1).
Summarv of Inspection Findinas:
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. Exercise Weakness 298/9112-01 was closed (Section 9.1).
Exercise Weakness 298/9214-02 was closed (Section 9.2).
Exercise Weakness 298/9214-03 was' closed (Section 9.3).
Exercise Weakness 298/9214-04 was closed (Section 9.4).
- Exercise Weakness 298/9324-01 was opened (Section 5.1).
Attachment: Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting l '
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DETAILS 1 PLANT STATUS On December 14, 1993, the reactor scramme The licensee entered an unscheduled mini-outag PROGRAM AREAS INSPECTED (82301) The licensee's annual emergency preparedness exercise began at 8 a.m. on December 15, 1993. The exercise start time had been withheld from exercise participants. The exercise included full participation by state and county response organizations and was evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Administration. The exercise scenario was run using the Control Room i simulator in the dynamic mode. The exercise scenario began with the rupture of a process line transferring spent radwaste resin in the Reactor Water Cleanup sludge decant pump room. This event caused area radiation monitors to increase and led to classification of an Aicrt. About 50 minutes after the resin spill, a breaker in the 480 volt motor control center developed a ground , fault which rendered several A train safety related equipment inoperabl Later, a packing leak developed on an outboard Main Steam Isolation , Valve (MSIV) which led to Usreased steam tunnel temperatures and a reactor tri Both MSIVs on the effected steam line failed to fully close. These events resulted in conditions for a Site Area Emergency with the loss of two fission product barriers. A loss of coolant event followed when a break occurred below the reactor vessel on the Reactor Water Cleanup bottom head drain line. Plant conditions degraded further such that the only source of makeup to the reactor vessel was the Control Rod Drive system and one train of Standby Liquid' Control. Emergency Classification escalated to a General Emergency with the potential loss of the third fission product barrie Reactor Vessel level decreased to the top of active fuel with fuel cladding damage occurring. A filtered, monitored release path to the environment was established through the degraded MSIV, Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT), and the Elevated Release Point. Release filtration was subsequently lost with a fire occurring in SBGT due to heavy iodine absorptio The inspection team identified concerns during the course of the exercise, none of which were of the significance of a deficiency as defined in ; 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii). The identified concerns were characterized as an ; exercise weakness or as an area recommended for improvement. An exercise weakness is a finding that a licensee's demonstrated level of preparedness could have precluded effective implementation of the emergency plan in the event of an actual emergency. It is a finding that needs licensee corrective action. Other observations are documented which did not have a significant - negative impact on overall performance during the exercise but still should be evaluated and corrected as appropriate by the licensee.
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_4_ 3 CONTROL ROOM (82301-03.02.b.1) The inspection team observed and evaluated the Control Room staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise. These tasks included detection and classification of events, analysis of plant conditions, implementation of corrective measures, notifications of offsite authorities, and adherence to the emergency plan and implementing procedure .1 Discussion The inspection team observed that the Control Room personnel performed their duties in a professional manner. The Shift Supervisor detected and made a prompt classification of Alert following assessment of the resin spill initiating event. The Plant Manager relieved the Shift Supervisor as Emergency Director about 17 minutes after the Alert declaration. Accurate and ' complete notifications to offsite authorities of the Alert classification were made promptly from the Control Roo , The inspection team observed that Control Room personnel used appropriate Emergency Operating Procedures, flow charts, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures during the exercise. Operators were generally attentive and aware of plant conditions and statu It was noted, however, that the Shift Supervisor's Log Book and the Control Room Log Book, both contained few entries with minimal detail. The reactor operators maintained positions at the control panels during important transients and evolutions and notified the Control Room Supervisor when leaving the panels on other occasion The inspectors observed emergency direction, command, and control from the Control Room to determine whether clear chains of command were established and whether personnel were utilized effectively. Good command and direction was observed in the Control Room. Reactor operators and Control Room staff were used effectively. Communications both within the Control Room and between the Control Room and the Technical Support Center were good. The inspectors
observed that the practice of using repeat back commands was consistent and good. Plant public address announcements were timely and frequent reminders were provided of areas within the plant which should not be entere .2 Conclusions The Control Room performed well during the exercise to detect and classify emergency conditions and to make initial notifications to offsite authoritie Emergency command and control were effective from the Control Roo TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (82301-03.02.b.2) The inspection team observed and evaluated the Technical Support Center staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise scenario. These tasks included detection and classification of events, notification of Federal, State, and local response agencies, analysis of plant conditions, formulation __ _ _ __
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t-5-t of corrective action plans, briefing of repair teams, and protective action decision making and implementatio .1 Discussion : I The inspection team observed that the Technical Support Center staff worked well as an organization. Notification of events to State and local emergency : response agencies were promptly ordered by the Emergency Director and l implemented by the comunicator. The Emergency Director demonstrated the use of protective action recommendation (PAR) decision making procedures and PARS were promptly communicated to the off site response agencie The Emergency Director and Technical Support Center staff demonstrated a solid understanding of plant systems and properly used appropriate procedures to develop repair plans, set priorities, and implement corrective measure Plant status briefings were conducted frequently, detailing plant conditions, and establishing action priorities. In contrast to previous exercises, command and control, and technical assessment in the Technical Support Center was effective. Assessment teams provided trends of important reactor plant parameters and based projections of changes on those trends. The engineering team demonstrated good use of piping and instrument drawings in developing repair methods to restore reactor plant equipment. Close contact was maintained between the Emergency Director, technical assessment teams, and the Control Roo In reviewing the decisionmaking sequence that resulted in the General Emergency declaration from the Technical Support Center, the inspectors noted ambiguities in the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures in the vesting of authority for classification decisionmaking. Specifically, the Emergency ! Plan and Implementing procedures are worded to specify that the Shift Supervisor / Emergency Director are authorized to classify emergency condition It was not specified, however, that the classification authority should rest l with the Emergency Director at all times including when the Shift Supervisor is the Emergency Director. The wording of the Emergency Plan and Implementing procedures could be interpreted to specify that more than one individual could l simultaneously hold authority to classify emergencies. This observation was ; identified as an area for potential improvemen The Technical Support Center / Operational Support Center provided for continuous monitoring of airborne radioactive materials and the screening of incoming personnel for contamination. The inspector noted, however, that , following the resin spill and the Alert announcement, positive steps were not ! initiated to prevent eating and drinking in the Technical Support Center until such time that habitability was verified. This was identified as an area for potential improvemen Information flow in the Technical Support Center was good. Technical Communicators did an excellent job of screening operational information and i immediately notifying decisionmakers of important changes in plant conditions.
l The inspectors noted that the I&C/ Electrical status board was not maintained __ _ _ _ -_ _ __
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~6- l in a manner that provided meaningful information. For example, no times were listed on this status board and only one priority was listed. The status j board was not updated as conditions and priorities changed. All other status boards used in the Technical Support Center were maintained current and accurat l During the exercise, no Post Accident Sample (PASS) was obtained until a l contingency message was issued by an exercise controller at noon. A PASS I sample team had been organized and dispatched at 10:50 a.m., however, reactor i plant conditions did not support the collet. tion of a PASS sample of reactor coolant. The team was recalled with no attempt being made to sample drywell or torus atmosphere. The licensee did not demonstrate aggressive actions to obtain information from post accident samples that could have been obtaine This was identified as an area for potential improvemen The inspectors observed that some of the trend analyses performed by Technical Support Center staff of reactor plant data was accomplished using graphs that had been developed and brought to the Technical Support Center by the engineering assessment team prior to the exercise. These graphs were not part of the normally controlled Technical Support Center documents. . Bringing such l documents into the body of controlled Technical Support Center documents was i identified as an area of potential improvemen .2 Conclusions The Technical Support Center demonstrated good command and control and information flow. Technical assessments and prioritization of accident mitigation activities were timely and effectiv OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (82301-03.02.b.4)
The inspectors evaluated the performance of the Operational Support Center staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise. These tasks included activation of the Operational Support Center and its effectiveness in providing support to operations, including the coordination of emergency in-plant respon;e team l 5.1 Discussion The inspection team observed that activation of the Operational Support Center was prompt and personnel accountability and security of the facility was good, Command and control in the facility was strong. The location of the Operational Support Center within the Technical Support Center envelope improved its functional efficiency and its coordination with Technical Support Center staff. The inspectors observed good interaction between the respective staffs. Communications in the Operational Support Center, which included internal communications, those with Technical Support Center personnel, and with in plant teams, were considered an exercise strengt l l
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l-7-The inspectors observed health physics personnel performing habitability checks during the exercise. A continuous air monitor was located near the entrance / exit of the Technical Support Center / Operational Support Center and its measurements were observed at various times throughout the exercis The Operational Support Center dispatched 15 in-plant teams during the course of the exercise. The teams were well briefed on plant conditions in the areas they were directed to ente Instructions were given on methods of performing their assigned tasks, and on the tools and equipment needed. Craft team members carried a dedicated emergency tool kit that reduced the response time of teams. The leaders of the teams, who were health physics personnel, were equipped with alarming dosimeters as well as their normal dosimetry. The inspector accompanied several teams during the exercise. The teams practiced .' good health physics survey techniques and demonstrated good communications with the Operational Support Center. Upon returning to the Operational Support Center, the teams were debriefed and their individual doses recorde l The inspectors noted that facility sign-in rosters designed to record entering ! and departing response personnel were maintained in an inconsistent manne I For example, some team members made roster entry errors such that their return time entry would appear earlier than their departing time from the facilit It appeared that members signed in or out wherever they observed their name first in the logs. This observation was considered an area for potential improvemen During the exercise, an in plant repair team member was dispatched from the Operational Support Center who was not respirator qualified as required because the individual's respirator fit test certification had expired. The individual was a maintenance worker assigned to Team This' team was dispatched at 10:04 a.m. and was tasked with controlling the radwaste resin spill. During this time, radiological conditions in the area were elevated and unstable and the potential existed for airborne radioactivity to exis Training Program Description (TPD) 0415, " Respiratory Protection," describes the licensee's requirements for the qualifications of personnel who could be required to wear respiratory protection. This TPD references Training Program Description 0602, " Operational Support Center Personnel" which requires that Operational Support Center team maintenance and operator personnel and othe crafts be respirator qualified. The failure to ensure that a response team member was qualified for respiratory protection as specified in the licensee's program requirements was identified as an exercise weakness (298/9324-01).
In addition to the weakness noted above, an operator was dispatched into the reactor building with Team 10 at 11:12 a.m. to restore core spray. Records available in the.0perational Support Center showed that this individual's respirator qualifications had expired because the individual's physical examination had lapsed. This individual informed Operational Support Center staff that he had undergone the required physical on November 30, 1993, and-that his qualification records had not been updated to reflect this. Based on this information, the individual was deemed respirator qualified although no
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record of this determination was logged by Operational Support Center staf l After the exercise, the inspectors confirmed that this individual had j completed the requirements for respirator qualifications prior to the ' exercise. During the exercise, engineering personnel were also allowed to be members of in-plant teams dispatched from the Operational Support Center without being respirator certified. This was not considered part of the 1 weakness only because thesa teams were dispatched prior to significant degradation of plant conditions, and into areas that did not have a potential for airborne radioactivit l Conclusions ,
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The Operational Support Center performed their emergency response activities l in an effective, professional, and timely manner. Command, control, and ; communications in the facility was excellent. Response personnel were traine l and familiar with their assigned responsibilities. A weakness was identified j for failure to ensure that a response team member was qualified for wearing respiratory protectio ; i 6 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (82301-03.02.b.3) l
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The inspection team observed the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff as I they performed tasks in response to the exercise. These tasks included l activation of the Emergency Operations Facility, accident assessment and classification, offsite dose assessment, protective action decisionmaking, notifications, and interactions with offsite field monitoring team .1 Discussion The Emergency Operations Facility was staffed and activated promptl Facility staff appeared to be well trained and understood their responsibilities. Technical information communications were excellent and general information flow was good. The Emergency Director provided frequent and accurate updates to Emergency Operations Facility personnel and offsite authorities. Briefings and interim communications were comprehensive and timely between Emergency Operations Facility management, licensee offsite radiological assessment personnel, and state representatives co-located in the Emergency Operations Facility, f Offsite notification messages and updates were timely, complete, and accurately reflected the known plant conditions. The review of notification messages, however, appeared cursory and could be improved. For example, l offsite notification message Number 8, issued at 12:09 p.m., incorrectly i stated the licensee's Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) to include sheltering of certain sectors from 0-2 miles, when the actaal PARS were to evacuate all sectors from 0-2 miles. The inspectors noted that corresponding verbal notifications were correct. The written notification was corrected with the next notification at 12:30 p.m., which was sent expressly for the purpose of correcting the former incorrect notification. The inspector noted that the incorrect notification Message 8 had been approved by the Emergency J l
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-9-Director without correction, even though he had corrected an error on the PARS on a previous notificatio The inspectors noted that Protective Action Recommendations made by the licensee during the exercise were reasonable and conservative. Dose assessments were performed for anticipatory radiological releases and were consistent with projected and simulated measurements. Differences between dose assessments generated by the licensee with those by the states were quickly identified and resolve .2 Conclusions The Emergency Operations Facility was activated promptly and performed well during the exercise. Notification messages were timely and offsite radiological assessment and protective action recommendations were appropriat SCENARIO AND EXERCISE CONDUCT (82301)
The inspection team made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and realism of the scenario and to evaluate the conduct of the exercis .1 Discussion The exercise scenario was sufficient to demonstrate major exercise objectives.
i The inspectors noted a number of errors and omissions in the scenario prior to the exercise which resulted in several'last minute revisions having to be made during the week of the exercise. While these problems did not significantly diminish the progression of the scenario, the inspectors concluded that such last minute changes could be avoided with improved exercise preparatio Several instances were noted of conditions anomalous to the scenario which were posed by the simulator. For example, there was an erroneous monitor failure alarm at 8:09 a.m. for the radioactive waste liquid effluent monito Also noted were premature actuations of the Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) and Reactor Water Clean-Up alarms. The inspection team also noted that realism
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j was reduced by limitations in the simulator in the area of fire alarms and ! detection. The lack of a mockup of the fire panel required the licensee to l use paper messages which were not realistic and appeared to be a distraction for the operating crew, diverting attention away from the control panels. In addition, the scenario did not anticipate the need for certain contingency messages related to the alignment of the standby gas treatment system. This lack of preparation forced controllers to intervene in a manner that detracted from realis _ _ - __
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The inspectors noted examples of minor prompting, prestaging,. and unnecessary controller actions during the exercise as follows:
. At 8:10 a.m., an exercise player was noted to be in the Technical Support Center before exercise activities had begun in this area. This indicated a possible compromise of the exercise start tim e At 9:40 a.m., an I&C/ Electrical controller in the Technical Support ,
Center showed a drawing from the scenario package to the engineering 4 team to clarify the location of the recirculation Pump A ground. The inspectors noted that the probable location of the ground had already been determined by the exercise player e On several occasions, exercise players were observed attempting to engage controllers or evaluators in conversations which if answered-would have provided excessive insight into the scenario or conditions about which players should have known in accordance with their assigned duties. For example, a dose assessor in the Emergency Operations : Facility was observed attempting to obtain verification of the quality I of field team radiological data from a controller, rather than through cross-checking of information source Exercise preparation and drilismanship was identified as an area of potential improvemen .2 Conclusions The exercise scenario was sufficient to demonstrate exercise objective Exercise preparation and drilismanship was identified as an area of potential improvemen LICENSEE SELF-CRITIQUE (82301-03.02.b.12) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's formal self-critique which was held by telephone on December 22, 1993, to determine whether the process would identify and characterize weak or deficient areas in need of corrective action.
. Discussion , The licensee critique process included input by exercise players, controllers, and evaluators. Licensee findings were categorized in terms consistent with NRC practice and were reviewed by senior management before the critique. The licensee identified no deficiencies or weaknesses. Three improvement items-
- were discussed as were several observations. Many of the improvement items
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and observations referenced were similar to those made by the NRC inspection
; tea The licensee failed to identify the exercise weakness identified by the I j NRC team. This was considered an area for potential improvement.
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The licensee's critique process was sufficient to identify and characterize I
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weak or deficient area i 9 FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS , l (Closed) Exercise Weakness 298/9112-01: Failure to provide adeauate ) technical assessment and analysis from the Technical Support Cente I l The inspectors verified that the corrective measures had been implemented as specified in licensee's response dated November 10, 1992. During the 1993 exercise, the inspectors noted that assessment and analysis activities were conducted in a timely manner. The engineering team provided trends of important reactor plant parameters and based projections of changes on those trends. The engineering team demonstrated good use'of piping and instrument drawings in developing repair methods to restore reactor plant equipment. The engineering team maintained close contact with the Emergency Director and provided technical support to the Control Room. The engineering team provided confirmatory analysis of core damage assessment. The licensee demonstrated that the corrective measures implemented to resolve this weakness were satisfactory and that engineering analysis and technical assessment was effective during this exercis .2 (Closed) Exercise Weakness 298/9214-02: Failure to promptly detect and classify General Emeraency condition During the 1993 exercise, each emergency classification was made in a prompt and timely manner consistent with initiating condition .3 (Closed) Exercise Weakness 298/9214-03: Failure to approve offsite notifications properly and to complete the notification process in a timelv manne During the 1993 exercise all offsite notifications were approved by the 1 appropriate individuals. A new offsite notification hotline system significantly improved the notification process and all notifications were made in a timely manne .4 (Closed) Exercise Weakness ?.98/9214-04: The use of two dose assessment proarams for decisionmakina purposes without clear cuidance on reconcilina conflictina result _) i During the 1993 exercise, dose projection model output that was not to be used l for protective action decisionmaking was clearly marked to show it was for j qualitative rather than quantitative purpose j . J
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i l ATTACIMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 Licensee Personnel ; L. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist M. Estes, Emergency Preparedness Evaluator ; R. Gardner, Plant Manager , R. Gibson, Supervisor, (vality Assurance Programs ' R. Hayden, Coordinator, E "rgency Preparedness ,
*G. Horn, Vice President, h lear J. Kelsay, Emergency Prepaladness Specialist ' *M. Krumland, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness *E. Hace, Senior Manager, Site Support *J. Meacham, Senior Nuclear Division Manager D. Reeves, Jr., Senior Staff Engineer D. Robinson, Acting Division Manager, Quality Assurance *J. Sayer, Acting Plant Manager , *G. Smith, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Safety *D. Whitman, Division Manager, Nuclear Support i NRC Personnel , *R. Kopriva, Senior Resident Inspector *B. Murray, Chief, facilities Inspection Programs Section The inspectors also held discussions with and observed the actions of other station and corporate personne * Denotes those present at the exit interview 2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on December 22, 1993, by telephone conferenc l During this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the !
inspection as presented in this report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to, or reviewed by, the inspection team during the inspection.
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