IR 05000295/1981020
| ML20011A846 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1981 |
| From: | Hayes D, Kohler J, Waters J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011A837 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-81-20, 50-304-81-16, NUDOCS 8111030278 | |
| Download: ML20011A846 (14) | |
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.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No.:
50-295/81-20; 50-304/81-16-Docket No.:
50-295/304 License No.:
Connonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Inspection At:
Zion, IL Inspection Conducted:
August 1, 1981 through October 1, 1981 GL W
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Inspectors:
J. E. Kohler k.
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V J. R. Waters
/l> ~ 37-2I/
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Approved By:
D.
. Hayes, ieV
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/ '/ h / 2P/ '
Reactor Projects Section IB
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i Inspection Summary Inspection on August 1, 1981-October 1, 1981 (Report No. 50-295/81-20; 50-304/81-16)
Areas Inspected: Routine 'inannounced resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspection items, reactor trips, work performed to unauthorized drawings, mispositioned purge valves, radioactive releases, TMI Action Items, ban on Zion radwasta shipments, inoperable auxiliary feed pumps, emergercy technical specifi-cation variance, Unit i unidentified leakage, primary to recondary leakage, Unit 1-RCS I-131 increase, Unit 2 containment sump increases, replacement of Unit 2 charging pump, replacement of Unit 2 boron injection tank, eddy current testing of 2A and 2C steam gerierators, temporary technical specification change for TR 242, managerial changes, receipt of new fuel, operat2inal safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance o'sservation and licensee event reports.
The inspection involved a total of 476 inspector hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br /> onsite during off shifts.
Results: Of the areas inspected one item of~ noncompliance (work on containment isolation valves performed to unauthorized drawings, paragraph 4)~and one deviation from a commitment (mispositioned purge valves during Unit 2 purge at hot shutdown,
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paragraph 5) were identified.
8111030278 01gog9
{DRADOCK 05000295 PDR
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1.
Persons Contacted
- K. Graesser, Station Superintendent E. Fuerst, Assistant Station Superintendent-Operations
- G.
Plim1, Assistant Station Superintendent-Administrative and Support Services
- R.
Budowle, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
- J. Gilmore, Unit 2 Operating Engiceer L. Pruett, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- P. LeBlond, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- A. Miosi, Technical Staff Supervisor B. Schramer, Station Chemist D. Walden, Fuel Handling Foreman A. Ockert, Technical Staff Engineer-Primary Group F. Ost, Health Physics Engineer C. filich, Technical Staff Engineer-ISI
- R Cascorano, Technical Staff Engineer-Radwaste
- B. Harl, Quality Assurance Engineer
- D.
Flynn, Quality Control Engineer
- L. Liden, Westinghouse Representative
- J. Johnson, Westinghouse Representative
- Denotes those present at management exit of October 1, 1981 2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (closed) Unresolved Item (50-295/77-23, 50-304/77-11): Paint deterioration in Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containments. The inspectors reviewed completed time
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and materials sheets (11/77, 3/78) for both containments which provided documentation of repainting at elevation 560.
(closed) Unresolved Item (295/78-27-01, 304/78-27-01): Asco Solenoid Valve Problem. Asco modification kits have been installed in all Unit 1 valves and most Unit 2 valves that do not require environmental qualification.
For valves that require environmental qualification, new valves are being procurred (Type NP) and the deadline for installation has been extended to June, 1983. No recent licensee event reports have been received that deal with valve failure to isolate due to oil in the instrument air lines.
(closed) Unresolved Item (PN0--l-79-28): Omission of a Safety Circuit to Test Operability of Slave Relays to the Reactor Trip Permissive P4.
The licensee reviewed Westinghouse letter CWE 79-38 dated November 8, 1979 and incorporated portions of the vendor comments into their start up pro-cedures (cycle reactor trip breakers and verify the operation of RT relays prior to each start up).
(closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-20-02): Ping Calibration cnd Frequency.
All health physicists have received Eberline training course and instrument mechanics have included the monitors in their periodic calibration program.
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(closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-20-03, 304/80-21-03): Jumper and Litted Lead Log. Drawing changes requests have been issued to the architect-(S&L),
however final drawings have not been received. The station electrical group has performed the required review of the log.
(closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-25-04, 304/80-27-04): Completion of Magnetic-Particle Checks coramitted to in LER 304/80-25. All magnetic particle checks have been performed and one failed weld was identifi2d (AIR 93-80).
(closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-25-01, 304/60-27-01): Evaluate Boric Acid Evaporation Release for Procedure Changes. The review was performed and no changes were made.
(closed) Unresolved Item (295/81-09, 304/81-05) Inverter Investigation. The licensee has determined that the cause of the inverter failures is high cir-culating currents. A technical staff surveillance has been written to monitor inverters for high circulating currents.
3.
Summary of Operations Unit 1 Unit operated at power levels up to 100% with no reactor trips or unscheduled shutdowns.
Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at power levels up to 81%. Power level was limited as required to maintain T average within 4 degrees fahrenheit of the program band while the unit was coasting down for the refueling outage.
The following reactor trips and shutdowns occurred:
a.
On August 7, 1981 at 9:14 AM the unit tripped from 79% due to low level in "D" S/G coincident with steam flow / feed flow mismatch. The bistable for "D" SG low level had been tripped for trouble shooting a faulty comparator when spurious opening of a governor valve resulted in a steam flow / feed flow mismatch. The unit was made critical again at 12:40 AM August 8, 1981 but tripped at 3:45 AM.
The trip was due to inadvertant use of the " fast" button in conjunction with opening governor valve while initially loading the turbine. The trip signal eminated from exceeding the intermediate range high flu:: setpoint. The reactor was made critical again at 4:15 AM and restored to the grid at 5:10 AM August 8, 1981.
b.
Power level was reduced August 30, 1981 in order to maintain secondary side power less than 50%. The reduction was necessitated by isolation of a second feedwater heater string due to leakage. The first string had been out of service for some time. This left only on string.
c.
Unit 2 was taken off the grid at 1:08 AM September 11, 1981 for a planned refueling outage. At 1:11 AM the reactor tripped on "C" low low level-3-
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due to improper steam dump valve operation. The unit is currently still shutdown for refueling.
!!o items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Unauthorized Modification to Containment Isolation Valve Circuitry LER 50-295/81-38 documents an occurrance in which mechanics working to an unreviewed drawing provided by a technical staff engineer performed a wiring modification which could have defeated the isolation signal to eight (four per unit) containment isolation valves.
On September 16, 1980 a work c est was processed to replace the existing gas analyser panel with a new o,.a.
The technical staff engineer who wrote the work request did not realize that the new panel would require wiring -
modifications to containment isolation valve circuitry. From the description of work, the shift engineer and operating engineer who reviewed the work request could not tell that it would result in a modification. The mechanics performing the work obtained from a technical staff engineer marked up
"information only" drawings which shoued wiring changes to the control circuitry of valves 1&2RC8025 & 8026, and 1&2 DT9159A & B.
These are series containmenc isolation valves on the vent lines from the pressurizer relief tank and the reactor coolant drain tank respectively.
On August 17, 1981 during pre-operational testing of a different modification, IRC 8025 failed to close when given a safety injection signal.
Investigation led to the discovery that contrary to Zion Administrative Procedure 6-52-2, wiring changes had been made to unauthorized drawings. Also, system modifi-cations had been performed without invoking Q.P. 3-51 which controls the modification process and implements the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
As stated in the LER the probable cause of 1RC8025 failing to close was the improper wiring modification.
Since the same process was used to rewire 2RC8025, 1 & 2 RC8026, and 1 & 2 DT 9159 A & B, the licensee has tagged the power supplies for all eight valves out of service pending review of the wiring details. Further investigation by the licensee showed that power supplies for 2RC 8025 & 8026 and 1 & 2 DT9159 A&B were tageed out of service December 1, 1980, and the power supplies for 1RC8025 & 8026 were tagged out of service March 27, 1981. These tags were posted for reasons unrelated to the original problem but indicate that after chose dates the valves.could not have been open to compromise containment integrity. A review of logs and records by the licensee showed no evidence that the valves (all normally closed) were open prior to the out of service tags being posted. Thus it appears that containment integrity was not violated for either unit.
The code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 50.59 Section (b) states in part that the licensee shall maintain records which include a written safety evaluation which provides the basis for the determination that a change to the facility does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
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Contrary to the aboye, between September 16, 1980 and January 23, 1981 the licensee performed a modification to the control circuitry of eight containment isolation valves without a written safety evaluation.
The violation occurred because:
(1) the engineer who originated the work request was not aware that wiring modificatons would be required, (2) the shift engineer and operating engineer could not tell from the work request that a wiring modification would be performed, and (3) the mechanics performed the wiring modification to an unauthorized drawing provided by a technical staff engineer.
This violation was licensee identified.
5.
Mispositioned Purge Valves During Unit 2 Purge at Hot Shutdown On September 11, 1981, at 3:00 PM, with Unit 2 in hot shutdown, a purge of the Unit 2 containment was initiated in preparation for refueling activi-ties. The purge was terminated manually from the control room after about five minutes when it was determined that the inboard valve of both the supply and exhaust lines was positioned full open in violation of licensee commit-ment to the NRC (letter from S. Varga to J. Abel, dated January 15, 1981).
The licensee had previously committed to the NRC to limit purge valve position to no more than 50 degrees full open during purging operations in modes above cold shutdown.
Although the inboard valves were mispositioned, the outboard valve on the supply and exhaust lines was correctly positioned and would have been able ;o effect full automatic closure against maximum containment differential pressures.
The licensee is also in possession of an engineering analysis which proves that full open purge valves will close against maximum containment differential pressure, however, the analysis has not as yet been reviewed by the NRC.
The inspectors investigated the occurrance and met with management. It was determined that the cause of the event was personnel error on the part of the engineer responsible for setting the valve position. The event was pron ptly terminated when the nonlicensed equipment operator accompanying the engineer informed operating management of his uncertainty of the correctness of the valve position.
It was further determined that no procedure was in effect since the job was assumed to be within craf t capability and merely involved adjusting the regulated flow of air to the valve closing mechanism.
The licensee will write a procedure to control future purge valve manipulations during purging. As previously committed to the NRC, written notification of the valve mispositioning is being made through a special notification to the NRC project manager.
This item is classified as a deviation from a regulatory commitment.
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Radioactive Releases a.
During Unit 2 power operation on August 18, 1981 attempts at reseating the number two reactor coolant pump seal on the ID reactor coolant pump by varying volume control tank pressure resulted in small increases in the continuous stack release rate. These release increases, although well below any limits, occurred even though the volume control tank was vented to the waste gas header. This condition is similiar to the small gas releases that have occurred periodically at the Zion Station in the past and is again symptomatic of a leak in the waste gas collection system.
The NRC Region III met with Zion Station management on August 28, 1981 to discuss the continuing effort being made to identify and correct leakage !n the waste collection system. New equipment utilizing helium leak detection methods is planned for the September 1981 Unit 2 outage.
This item is unresolved and is designated open item 295/81-20-01, 304/81-16-01.
b.
At about 12:00 midnight on September 22, 1981 a series of small gaseous releases began as indicated by the auxiliary building vent stack monitor 0-R-14.
The monitor reading increased from normal background of 1000 to 1300 cpm to a peak of 1800 to 3000 cpm in a period of 15 to 20 minutes. The 0-R-14 readings then gradually returned to normal over a 4 to 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> period. This pattern was repeated about every eight hours.
On September 24, 1981 a correlation was established between the releases and the evolution of adding make up water to the volume control tank (VCT). The addition of make up water raises VCT pressure, thus indicating a leak in any of several valves and/or piping from the top of the VCT.
This hyp) thesis was supported by concomitant incteases in other radiation monitors near the VCT whenever 0-R-14 readings increased.
The licensee tightened a leaking flange joint at IVC 8120 and replaced leaking relief valve IVC 8119.
This action appears to have stopped the releases.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
,TMI Action Items The inspector determined that the following Three Mile Island Action requirements had been completed:
Item II.E.A.1 Install Dedicated Hydrogen Penetration for Purging III.A.1.2 Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities-6-
8.
Ban on Zion Radwaste Shipments A dry active waste (DAW) shipment from Zion was found to be leaking water upon its arrival at the Richland Washington disposal site August 21, 1981.
Approximately 2 pints of water containing 20 to 80 pico-curies o: activity was found on the truck bed. The chipment consisted of piecea of a waste evaporator that was thought to be dry. The center crosspiece under the DAW container was found to be damaged and had been repaired using a length of 4" x 4" lumber. The repair apparently did not hold and the floor of the container sagged, splitting a weld and releasing the water. As a result, the disposal site banned further shipments from Zion until certain loading procedure changes were made. The procedure changes were made and reviewed by the disposal site and the ban on Zion shipments was lifted on September 14, 1981.
A special inspection report by the NRC will be issued describing the dispostjon of this event.
9.
Inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps At approximately 9:30 AM, on September 14, 1981, Unit 2 was in a normal plant cooldown to begin a refueling outage when the plant operators discovered that the auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFW) were inoperable. This condition lasted for approximately 15 minutes and was of minimal safety significance because of plant conditions. At the time of the event the reactor coolant system was at 350 psig and 250 degrees fahenheit, and both RHR trains were in service to control temperature. All steam generators were below the 10% low low level for flushing of the steam generators, and the autostart signal for the AFW pumps was bypassed by having the switches in pull-to-lock.
When steam generator levels reached the point at which feed was required again, the operator exercised the control room switch for one of the AFW motor driven pumps and the pump failed to start. The operator was also un-successful in starting the second motor driven AFW pump. While the steam generator AFW pump had insufficient steam to turn the turbine, its associated steam supply valve did not open as designed when actuated by the operator.
Thus, all three AFW pumps were inoperable. One motor driven AFW pump was successfully started at 15 minutes and no further prcblems were encountered during the cooldown. At all times the urit was in e. controlled condition on RHR, and the unit is presently in cold shutdown.
Prior to the problem, all three pumps had successfully started twice during the past week from automatic initiation signal and one of the motor driven AFW pumps functioned normally during the cooldown.
The licensee suspects a sneak circuit in a design that was installed during modifications involved in implementing requirements of IEB ES-20 (W-2 switches). This event will be the subject of a special NRC inspection (295/81-22; 304/81-18).
10.
Emergency Technical Specification Varfaqce On September 4, 1981 the licensee was granted an emergency variance on the technical specification required surve111ance on reactor coolant pump ut-7-
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frequency and under voltage reactor trip lastruments.
The variance was re-quested when the licensee could not locate records showing that the under voltage and under frequency devices were calibrated last' refueling outage.
Technical specification table 4.1-1 requires calibration every outage not to exceed 20 months.
This item is classified as a licensee identified item of noncompliance in which no citation will be issued.
11.
Unit 1 Unidentified Leakage On September 22, 1981 the Unit i reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate began a series of sporadic increases that persisted for several days. The leak rate as indicatel by computer program and volume control tank (VCT)
level fluctuated from less than 1 gpm to 3 gpm.
By September 25, 1981 the leak rate had stabilized at about 3.4 gpm.
Since only 2 gpm could be attributed to known sources the remaining 1.4 gpm was classified as un-identified. At 12:00 noon September 25, 1981 the plant entered an L.C.O.
in which the unidentified leakage had to be reduced below 1 gpm in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the unit would have to be placed in hot shutdown. Later in the same dcy a relief valve on the letdown line down stream of the letdown heat exchr.nger was found to be leaking water to the floor. Letdown was isolated at 7:30 PM September 25, 1981 and a temporary repair performed. Final valve replacement was completed September 27, 1,981.
This reduced the unidentified KOS leakage to approximately zero.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
12.
Primary to Secondary Leakage on the IB Steam Generator Primary to secondar-leakege on the IB steam generator had _ been approximately 12 to 30 gal / day from April through June,1981 and decreased to undetectable in July and August (See Inspection reports 50-295/81-09; 50-304/81-05 and 50-295/81-14; 50-304/81-10). Routino leakage measurements were stopped after August. On September 23, 1981 in resporre to increased I-131 activity in the IB S/G a leak rate measurement was resumed with the following results:
Date Leak Rate, Gal / Day September 23, 1981 115 Septenber 25, 1981 123 September 28, 1981 117 The licensee is continuing to periodically measure leakage. The technical specification limit is 500 gal / day.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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13.
Unit 1 RCS I-131 Increase On September 21, 1981 the licensee noted an increase in Unit I reactor coolant system (RCS) 1-131 leg ls.
The levels for the previous 20 days had been approximately 4.5x10 uc/mi. Subsequently the levels have been as follows:
Date Activity, uc/ml-3 September 21 9.9 x 10-3 September 22 7.44 x 10-2 September 23 2.85 x 10 September 24 4.84 x 10-September 25 4.7 x 10-
-1 September 26 1.21 x 10-1 September 27 1.64 x 10-1 September 28 1.04 x 10-2 September 29 7.0 x 10 September 30 7.97 x 10-The September 30, 1981 RCS gross beta / gamma activity was 0.299 uc/ml which is lesa than the technical specification limit of 51.06 uc/ml (based on the current vsli,e of E).
The licensee has increased the sampling frequency and is continuing to monitor the I-131 levels.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
14.
Unit 2. Centainment Sump Increases During the coastdown of Unit 2 prior to refueling, the resident inspectors observed that the daily reactor coolant leakage surveillance detected an increasing volume of water being pumped from the Unit 2 sump to radioactive waste proces9ing. The volume eventually reached 12-13,000 gallons per day.
While the Unit 2 reactor was shutdown after a reactor trip, the licensee entered the containment inside the missile beetler, and visually observed conditions in sump.
The pumping capacity of the two redundant sump pumps was calculated.
It was determined that one of two pumps had stopped pumping, but the other pump was performing normally.
The licensee determined that the sump accumulation rate was well within the capacity of the one remaining puurp and failure of that pump could be promptly detected by installed sump level monitoring. The sump accumulation was observed to result from a leaking steam generator hand access cover.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
15.
Replacement of Unit 2 Charging Pump In a June 17, 1981 letter from T. R. Tramm, Nuclear Licensing Administrator CECO. to J. G. Keppler, Director of I.E., Region III, the licensee committed to replacement of one Unit 2 charging pump during the current outage. The stainless steel clad pump was to be replaced with an all stainless pump in response to a clad cracking problem previously identified in Unit 1.
To Lnplement the pump replacement three all stainless pumps were obtained via Westinhouse Corp. Two were destined for the Byron Nuclear Power Station and the third was to be installed in Zion Unit 2.
Upon receipt at the site the new pumps were found to have significant differences in external dimensions, and in the oil system ac compared tc the installed pumps.
Since installation of the new pump would require modification of the lube oil system and..rimary piping modifications and would result in one pump being different.*sa the other three installed at Zion, the licensee has c'ected not tr rm the replacement. The licensee intends to notify Region III of its m.ision and provide justification via separate correspondence.
No itemn of noncompliance were identified.
16.
Replacement of Unit 2 Boron Injection Tank As a result of Unit 1 boron injection tank liner (BIT) leakage (documented in I.E. Report 50-295/81-06, 304/81-04) the licensee drained the Unit 2 BIT, removed the manfway and inspected the interior of the tank. The in-spection revealed some pitting of the stainless steel cladding. The pits were fewer in number than was seen in the Unit 1 BIT but were of larger diameter.
No positive indications of a breach of cladding were found. The licensee had previously obtained an all stainless steel BIT from Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, and is proceeding with the replacement of the clad BIT with an all stainless steel BIT.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
17.
Eddy Current Tes?ing of 2A and 2C Steam Generators Eddy current testingofthe2Aand2CsteamgeneratortudsbeganSeptem-ber 19, 1981. In the 2A steam generator over 1832 tubes were probed in-cluding all the row I and row 2 tubes.
Indications of less than 40% of wall thickness were found on 10 tubes and these were plugged. Three other tubes had indications of defects or imperfections that did not exceed the plugging limit.
In the 2C steam generator over 1016 tubes were probed including all row 1 and 2 tubes. Three tubes had indications of defects exceeding the 40%
plugging limit and were plugged. None of the tubes plugged in either steam generator were in row 1 or row 2.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
18.
Temporary Technical Specification Changes for TR 242 The licensee informed the resident inspectors that an excessive amount of hydrogen had been found in the Unit 2 system transformer (TR 242) oil. The hydrogen is theorized to be the result of breakdown of water-which is leaking into the oil through some missing bushings in-the transformer. The corrective action will involve a transformer outage in excess of the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> allowable time limit specified in technical specifications for continued power operation of Unit 1 (Unit 2 supplies the reserve es;ential engineered safety festures electrical feed to Unit 1 engineered cafety features buses 147, 148 and 149).
In order to maintain Unit I at power while TR 242 is out of service, the licensee obtained a temporary technical specification change allowing TR 242 to be out of ser" ice for seven days. Offsite power will be supplied to Unit 2 by back feeding from the switch yard through the Unit 2 main transformer, through the unit auxiliary transformer.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
19.
Managerial Changes The inspectors were notified of the following managerial changes at the Zion Station:
From To Mr. E. Fuerst Unit 1 Operating Engineer Assistant Station Superintendent-Operations Mr. R. Budowle Assistant Technical Staff Unit 1 Operating Engineer Mr. P. LeBlond Technical Staff Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor 20.~ Receipt of New Fuel The inspector verified prior to rece pt of new fuel that technically adequate i
approved procedures were available wn_ch covered the receipt, ins.o: tion, and storage of new fuel. The inspector observed receipt inspections and storage of new fuel elements and also verified that fuel handling activities were performed in accordance with the licensee's procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
21.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable legs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of August-11-
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and September. The inspector verified.the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that main-tenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation sad direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security t
plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of August, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the auxiliary feedwater system to verify operability. The inspector also reviewed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwarte shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical speci-fications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
22.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
The limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtataed prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and mate-ials used were properly certified; radiological controls were Lnplemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is as 'gned to safety related equipment maintenance which may effect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
a.
Modification of Contaielect Isola _ ion Va1.c Circuitry b.
Replacement of Unit 2 Charging Pump c.
Replacement of Unit 2 Boror. Injection Tank-12-T T
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Repair of B'ck-up Service-Water. Supply Valve to Auxiliary Feedpump 1A a
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2B Diesel Generator Cardox Fvstem Maint<enance Following completion of maintenance on the Unit i normal offsite power supply,.
the inspector verified _that these systems had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
23. Fonthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the 0,.1A, IB, 2A and 2B diesel generators, emergency batteries and charging system power _ operated vales. ihe inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was' calibrated'
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that limiting conditioas for operation were met', that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications ~and procedure requirements and wera reviewad by personnel-other than the individual directing the test,' and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly revicwed and resolved. by appropriate management '
personnel.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
24.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel,.and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reporta-bility requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was_ accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordanca with technical specifications:
Unit 1 LER NO.
DESCRIPTION 81-33 Missed Grab' Sample 81-34 ORT-PRO?B Out of Calibration 81-35 Failure of 1RE-0011 and 12 81-37 Failure of Air Ejector Monitor
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81-38 Improper Modification to containment Isolation Valves 81-39 Inability.to Verify Caliaration of RCP
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Bus.UF and UV Devices i-13-i
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Unit 2 LER NO.
DESCRIPTION 81-15 Failure of Unic 2 Inverter 81-16 Failure of SS9356B to Close in Sixty Seconds 81-18 Blower Tripped on Radiation Monitor Regarding LER 50-295/81-38, this event is discussed in detail in paragraph 4.
Regarding LER 50-295/81-39, this event is discussed in detail in paragraph 10.
Regarding LER 50-304/81-16, this event will be the subjecc of an updated LER when the valve is disassembled and is designated as open item 50-304/81-16-02 Regarding 50-295/81-33 and 50-304/81-18, this event will be classified as a licensee identified item for which no citation will be issued.
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25. Meetings, Offsite Functions The inspectors attended the following meetings and offsite functiona during the inspection period:
J. E. Kohler and J. R. Waters Westin2 ouse Training Center h
August 18, 1981 ATWS Seminar Zion, IL September 17-18, 1981 Region III Resident Inspector's Seminar Mishicot, Wisconsin August 10, 1981 Meeting with Presidential Resident Inspector's Office Oversite Committee Members Zion, IL J. E. Kohler September 3-5, 1981 NRC Headquarters NRC Objectivity Seminar Bethesda, Marland 26.
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable itens, items of nencompliance or deviations. Three unresolved items (paragra phs 6, 9 and 24) were dis-closed during this inspection.
27.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on October 1. 1981 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's commento.
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