IR 05000295/1981032
| ML20027D713 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1982 |
| From: | Creed J, Davis A, Hind J, James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027D712 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-81-32, 50-304-81-30, NUDOCS 8211080277 | |
| Download: ML20027D713 (60) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COT!ISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-295/81-32(DETP); 50-304/81-30(DETP)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2-Investigation At:
Zion Nuclear Power Station Zion Illinois Police Department Fox Lake Illinois Police Department Wheeling Illinois Police Department W. E. Davern and Associates, Bellwood, Illinois Chicago Offices:
Isham, Lincoln and Beale, Inc.
City of Zion, Illinois Chicago Police Department Period of Investigation: December 23, 1981 to June 15, 1982 Reviewed By:
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. R. Creed, Chief Safeguards Section 2L6
'J A. Hind, Director ivision of Emergency Preparedness and Operation Support Approved By:
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O A. B. Davis Deputy Regional Administrator G%YonAn-
[/. G. Kc%hfer Regional Administrator Investigation Summary:
Investigation from December 23, 1981 through June 15, 1982 (Report Nos. 50-295/81-32; 50-304/81-30).
Areas Investigated: The investigation addressed allegations received through televised newsbroadcasts and through interviews with two individuals who provided information only if confidentiality was granted to them. These 8211080277 821102 Enclosure Contains PDR ADOCK 05000295
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two individuals had worked at the facility and stated that they based their
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allegations on personal observations. Additional information was obtained from local police agencies, from plant employees, and security guard inter-views. General allegations investigated included:
(1) widespread onsite f
and offsite drug use by Station and security force employees; (2) personnel working under the influence of alcohol; (3) control room operators sleeping on duty; (4) operational errors due to fatigue, drug, or alcohol use; (3) falsification of documentation for equipment checks; (6) inadequate security force training; (7) sexual activities onsite which may have effected duty performance; and (8) a coverup by licensee management of alleged widespread drug use.
Additionally, the following aspects of the licensee's physical protection program were inspected, in part:
(1) Access Control - Personnel; (2) Records and Reports; (3) Security Contingency Plan and Implementing Procedures; and (4) Guard Training and Qualification. Approximately 350 mandays were expended onsite and offsite during this investigation, including off-shift periods.
Results: No information was developed to substantiate widespread drug use or that the alleged acts, omissions, or improper practices resulted in unsafe plant operations at the Zion Nuclear Power Stacion. Other significant results of the investigation included:
A.
For allegations pertaining to Station employees, the investigation concluded that:
(1) Marijuana had been smoked onsite. This conclusion was based upon statements obtained from five persons who stated they smelled the odor of marijuana onsite and the termination of employment for one contractor employee for smoking marijuana. However, no information was developed which could identify the persons (except the contractor employeo) involved. Additionally, no information was developed to substantiate that marijuana was bought or sold onsite.
(2) Some Station employees had used marijuana offsite during non-working hours since employed by Commonwealth Edison. However, only two persons admitted in sworn statements to using marijuana offsite since January 1980 within the time frames and frequency determined as likely to have a potentially detrimental effect on
job performance. These individuals were identified to the licensee i
for fitness for duty determinations to be made. No information was obtained to substantiate the allegation that any current Zion Station employee dealt in the sale of marijuana and/or other drugs offsite.
(3) Alcohol had been consumed onsite. This conclusion was based upon empty alcohol containers (beer cans, etc.) being found onsite. The exact time frame and the identity of individuals involved in onsite consumption of alcohol was not determined. Since January 1980 at least five individuals were found to be under the influence of alcohol upon reporting for work.
Plant management took actions to discipline the personnel and prevent them from working while under
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a the influence of alcohol. The investigation did not discover information to conclude that abuse of alcohol affected the safe operation of the plant.
'(4)_ Control room operators did not sleep while on duty. However, the attentiveness of some control room operators on occasion-was an area of concern.
(5) Allegations of falsified equipment checks, mannitol being used to dilute cocaine, serious errors due to fatigue, alcohol use or drug use, sexual activities, and a contract Quality Control inspector's use of marijuana were not substantiated.
B.
For allegations pertaining to the contract security force at the Zion Station, the following findings were made:
(1) Six members of the guard force admitted offsite use of marijuana.
During a meeting on February 4 and 5, 1982, the licensee stated that the identified individuals would be kept under management surveillance.
(2) It could not be substantiated that thermos bottles were used to smuggle alcoholic beverages onsite. However, since some searches of handcarried items were inadequate, alcohol could have been brought onsite in thermos bottles. The Iicensee has taken correc-tive actions to satisfy the NRC's concern pertaining to searches of handcarried items.
(3) Allegations pertaining to sexual activities, inadequate firearms training, inadequate response training to site threats, improper functioning of access control equipment, and intoxicated guards being issued weapons were not substantiated.
C.
For allegations pertaining to Commonwealth Edison management, the investigation concluded that:
(1) An undercover operation pertaining to drug use by Station employees lacked adequate management control and supervision. The investigator did not conclude whether or not Law Enforcement officials were misled, but did conclude that a miscommunication occurred.
(2) The investigation did not substantiate the allegations that Commonwealth Edison management personnel failed to take action on individuals allegedly involved in widespread drug use or that the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor intentionally interfered with an undercover operative's drug investigation.
D.
One violation of NRC requirements was identified during the investiga-tion. The licensee was cited for failure to follow search procedures for some handcarried items. The licensee initiated corrective action which should prevent recurrence.
(Details of this item of noncompliance are Unclassified Safeguards Information and exempt from disclosure.)
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E.
During the-investigation, Commonwealth Edison initiated an increased onsite drug awareness surveillance program and hired a nationally recognized consultant on drug abuse to evaluate the scope and effective-ness of their drug program and policies. A strengthened and indepth~
" Company Policy Regarding Drug Abuse" was formalized on April 29, 1982.
Commonwealth Edison advised the NRC on May'6, 1982, of measures taken to' implement the strengthened program.
Related Details: NRC published two documents since January 1, 1982, which, although noc directly related to-the Zion investigation, address the NRC's concern for possible drug abuse at nuclear. plants.
1.
IE Information Notice No. 82-05, " Increasing Frequency of Drug Related
. Incidents," dated March 10, 1982, addressed the increased frequency of drug related incidents within the past five years.
It also announced-the formation of a Drug Abuse Task Force in the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforceme:4t to address the problem on a generic basis.
2.
An NRC report " Survey of Industry and Government Programs to Combat' Drug and Alcohol Abuse"_(NUREG-00D3) was issued in June 1982.
It represents information-and views from sample utilities, agencies, and corporations on the extent of the drug and alcohol problem, practices and perceptions of program elements used to counter drug abuse and utility views on two proposed rules (10 CFR 50. " Fitness of Duty Rule" and 10 CFR 73.56
" Access Authorization Rule").
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TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR REPORT DETIILS Subject Page Persons Contacted...............................................
Background......................................................
Scope and Conduct of Investigation..............................
Allegations:
a.
Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) Management
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(1) Alleged Misleading of Law Enforcement Authorities Regarding s
Source of Marijuana Released to Police Chief........
(2) Alleged Failure to Advise Metropolitan Enforcement Group (MEG) of Marijuana Purchase.........................
(3) Alleged Inaction Against Identified Drug User.........
(4) Alleged Intentional Interference With Undercover Operative's Investigation...........................
b.
Zion Station Personnel (Excluding Security Force)
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(1) Alleged Use of Marijuana and Other Drugs Onsite.......
(2) Alleged Use of Marijuane and Other Drugs Offsite......
(3) Alleged Employees Working While Intoxicated...........
(4) Alleged Failure to Complete Equipment Checks and Falsified Documentation for Equipment Checks
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(5) Alleged Use of Mannitol to Cut (Dilute) Cocaine Offsite
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(6) Alleged Use of Marijuana by a Contract Quality Control Inspector...........................................
(7) Alleged Serious Errors in Work Performance Due to Fatigue, Alcebol Use, or Drug Use...................
(8) Alleged Sleeping on Duty by Control Room Operators
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(9) Alleged Sexual Activities Onsite......................
c.
Security Force....................
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(1) Alleged Illegal Use of Drugs Onsite and Offsite.......
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(2) Alleged Issue of Weapons to Guards Who were Intoxicated.........................................
(3) Alleged Smuggling of Alcoholic Beverages Onsite.......
(4) Alleged Sexual Activities in the Steam Tunnel.........
(5) A11eded Inadequate Training with Shotguns.............
(6) Alleged Inadequate Training and Weapons to Repel an Assault at the Plant
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(7) Alleged Abandonment of Post by Guards if Site was Attacked...........................................
(8) Alleged Improper Functioning of Access Control Equipment
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Management Actions a.
Region III and Licensec Management Meeting on
. February 4, 1982.........................................
b.
NRC. initiated Augmented Inspection Program.................
Licensee's Increased Drug Awareness Surveillance Program...
c.
d.
NRC Positions and Actions to Continue Investigation........
Licensee's Policy and Actions Regarding Drug Abuse.........
e.
f.
Fitness for Duty Determinations............................
Attachments:
1.
Effects Criteria, X-Y Question 2.
Nuclear Stations Division Vice-President's Directive, dtd 11/1/80; Subject:
Conduct of Operations 3.
Details of Cited Violation of NRC Requirements (UNCLASSIFIED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (Corporate)-
J. J. O'Connor, Chairman of the Board and President C. Reed,.Vice President F. Palmer, Division Vice President - Nuclear Stations l
D. Petkus, Division Vice President
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Sanders, Manager, Industrial Relations D. Smith, Former Security Manager W. Duke, Security Manager Commonwealth Edison Company (Plan _t Management)
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K. Graesser, Station Superintendent
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G. Plim1, Assistant Superintendent R. Smith, Station Security Administrator A. Torez, Assistant Station Security Administrator C. Ginn, Quality Control Inspector W. Fuller, Personnel Supervisor E. Fuerst, Assistant Superintendent of Operations Attorneys H. Delscy, Commonwealth Edison Company M. Miller, Isham, Lincoln and Beale J. B. Burns, Isham, Lincoln and Beale M. Gill, Isham, Lincoln and Beale M. T. Hannafan, Hannsfan and Handler, Ltd.
S. Handler, Hannafan and Handler, Ltd.
R. R. Nosek, William J. Martin, Ltd.
F. E. Stachyra, William J. Martin, Ltd.
M F. Miquelon, Miquelon, Cotter and Daniel, Ltd.
C. T. Hexter, Schuchat, Cook and Werner J. Stone, Stone and Grimes C.. Wilson, Wilson and Associates Law Enforcement Agencies
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G. C. Jones, First Assistant U.S. Attorney (Chicago)
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F. Foreman, States Attorney, Lake County Illinois L. Mulcrone, Former Director, Northshore Metropolitan Enforcement-Group (Northshore MEG Unit)
R. Kozak, Metropolitan Enforcement Group (MEG)
N. Lee, Chief, Zion Police Department E. Dillow, Detective, Zion Police Department
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M. Douglas, Detective, Zion Police Department J. Donaldson, Chief Deputy, Lake County Sheriff's Office C. Corsi, Detective, Lake County Sheriff's Office W. Hoos, Investigator, Wheeling Police Department R. Trinnt.d, Chief, Fox Lake Police Department
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Others
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-W. E. Davern,'0wner, W. E. Davern and Associates (Detective Agency)
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P. Bensinger, Drug Consultant, Commonwealth Edison Company-N.~Snyder, M.D., National Institute'on Drug Abuse J. Chambers, M.D., Drug Consultant, USNRC Burns' International Security Services,~Inc.
S. L. Fervida, Regional Manager R. Clark, District Manager C. Potempa, Regional Personnel Manager J. Hanahan, Security Force Supervisor Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Direct Onsite Investigation)
P. Baci, Investigator, Headquarters G. Christoffer, Physical Security Specialist, Region III D. Fredland, Attorney, Headquarters i
R. Fortuna, Investigator, Headquarters E. Gilbert, Investigator, Headquarters J. Kniceley, Physical Security Specialist, Region III T. Madeda, Physical Security Specialist, Region III J. McCarten, Investigator, Region III G. Pirtle, Physical Security Specialist, Region III B. Stapleton, Physical Security Intern, Region III 2.
Background On February 24,.1981, two individuals employed by Commonwealth Edison at the Zion' Nuclear Power Station (valve operators) were
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arrested near the plant for alleged possession and/or selling and delivering cocaine and marijuana. The arrests came as a result of a year long undercover investigation which had been conducted by the Zion Police Department in conjunction with the North Shore Metropolitan Enforcement Group (MEG).
The circumstances surrounding those arrests were reviewed by the Region III staff and management in order to determine if there was any evidence that the arrested individuals presence onsite and duty performance had been inimical to the safe operation of the facility.
The Zion Police Department indicated that they had information that i
more than one employee at Zion used drugs during working hours.
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Although police authorities were in possession of an informant provided list of more than 20 names of people allegedly involved in drugs at the plant, the fact that their investigation was continuing prohibited release of any further information. They did categorize the informa-tion as " unsubstantiated intelligence information."
An augmented inspection program was established at Zion to monitor plant operations and personnel between February 24 and March 23, 1981 to deter-ine if the facility was being operated according to NRC requirements.
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The results of this increased inspector coverage and additional unannounced backshift spot inspections provided added confidence that the plant was being cperated safely and in accordance with reouirements.
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Subsequent to discontinuing the program, contacts with the Mayor, City Attorney, and other municipal officials of the City of Zion indicated that they had information that between one-fouth and one-third of plant employees were using or selling drugs. The information'was again characterized as being hearsay and unsubstantiated intelligence informa-tion which was insufficient for prosecution. The information had been obtained from informant (s) working at the plant. During a June 1, 1981, meeting with members of the Region III staff, Zion City officials re-quested the placement of an NRC undercover agent inside Commonwealth Edison's organization at the plant to gather information on alleged drug related activities at Zion. The officials indicated that because of the city's strained relations with Commonwealth Edison and questions in their minds as to how hard the licensee would pursue the drug issue, an NRC employee would be appropriate as the undercover agent, rather than a licensee employee. The Zicn officials were later informed that such an operation was beyond the scope of NRC's civil jurisdiction and would not be conducted; however, the officials were advised that their request for an undercover agent was discussed with the Drug Enforcement Administration.
During the period following the initial arrests, the licensee informed Region III that they were taking actions as a result of both our concerns and their concerns. Among those actions were:
(1) a general corporate policy regarding drug and alcohol use was established; (2) plant modifi-cations were made to make certain areas more accessible to supervisory surveillance; (3) advice was solicited from the Drug Enforcement Adminis-tration and Illinois Department of Law Enforcement on approaches to resolve the matter, and (4) a company drug monitoring program was instituted. The licensee indicated they would keep Region III informed of the progress of the monitoring program. Since the NRC's augmented inspection program did not identify problems affecting the operation of the plant, and since the licensee appeared to be taking prudent measures to monitor for a problem, Region III's active involvement in this situation ended. The licensee provided no additional substantive information pertaining to the results of their undercover operations.
Unrelated to the question of drug use at Zion in early December, the licensee informed Region III of certain labor and morale problems involv-ing the contracted guard force at Commonwealth Edison's Dresden facility and the fact that a Chicago television channel had been contacted by former guards and was interested in doing a story on the subject. During the period December 16-18, 1981, the television station broadcast an initial series of feature newstories involving alleged drug use and/other inproprieties alleged at both Dresden and Zion.
Subsequent stories were broadcast, which culminated in a half-hour prime tire special on March 27, 1982.
Although the broadcasts initially dealt with guard related allegations at Dresden, subsequent broadcasts brought forth the allegations specifi-cally dealing with the Zion Station that a: e covered in this report. An investigation was also conducted at Dresden and is covered in a separate report.
(Reports No. 50-10/81-22; 50-237/81-40; 50-249/81-33.) The investigative effort was initiated at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
A separate investigation was subsequently started at the Zion Nuclear Power Station due to the number and significance of allegations received.
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3.
Scopo and Cor, duct of Investigation The investigation was conducted as a result of allegations from a number of different sources. One source was a series of televised newsbroadcasts that showed guards (silhouetted with their voices distorted) and others expressing concerns and making allegations regarding security and drug use at the Zion Nuclear Power Station.
A second source was a former undercover inveetigator hired by Commonwealth Edison who had conducted an investigation at Zion at the request of the licensee. The undercover investigation was conducted to look into possible drug use by employees.
A third source of allegations was a former Zion Station employee.
In-formation was also received from a local police agency regarding alleged drug use by Zion station employees. Additional allegations were developed during interviews with current plant employees and security guards. Except for the information provided during the interviews of plant employees and guards, the allegations were received during the period of December 16, 1981 to January 11, 1982.
The allegations covered a wide variety of subjects including alleged mis-conduct or omissions on the part of several licensee corporate managers, site employees, and contractors employed by the licensee. The allegations are described in detail in section 4 of this report. Gonerally, these allegations included:
(1) widespread use of drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, nitrous oxide, and LSD onsite; (2) widespread use, sale, or possession of varicus drugs offsite; (3) licensee's management cover tp of known drug problems; (4) guaids not properly trained or capable of properly protecting the facility; (5) errors in operations caused by drug use; (6) control room operators asleep while on duty; (7) employees engaged in sexual activities onsite which were detrimental to their duty performance; and (8) alcohol consumed onsite and esployees reported to work inebriated.
In most cases, the allegers directed al-
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legations and provided information against others, but one a: leger, indicated that many of the alleged acts of drug use and misconduct committed by others were also committed by the alleger.
In order to assure that the NRC actions would not adversely affect the contemplated ongoing actions of any other agency, a meeting was held with appropriate local law enforcement authorities on January 6, 1982 at the request of Region III. Attending that meeting were: the First Assistant U. S. Attorney (Chicago); the State's Attorney for Lake County, IL; representatives of the North Shore Metropolitan Enforcement Group (MEG); the Chief of Polics, Zion, IL; and representatives of the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration. All parties concluded that the icsue of primary concern was the possible impact of drug use on the safe operation of the facility. The law cnforcement agencies felt that their direct involvement in this investigation was not warranted due to the overriding safety implications and the small quantities of drugs allegedly involved. All agreed that NRC should take the lead in the investigation.
The initial Region III investigative activities involved interviews with guards, gathering of general information and clarification of allegations from the various sources noted above. On January 20, 1982, onsite specific interviews of plant personnel began with three investigative
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The initial interviews were conducted in order to determine the scope of drug problems and were intended to be general screening inter-views.
Interviews were conducted with corporate officials, security force members, plant licensed operators, equipment attendants, equipment operators, rad-chem technicians, fuel handlers, and other plant employees. Employees were interviewed to cover a wider scope of the plant population and to protect the identity of the individuals who were alleged to be involved in drug use.
The investigative approach at this time was to obtain all information about drug use by employees and document that information in signed sworn statements. After that information was obtained, it was our intention to consult with specialists and experts in the field of drug effects on performance so a determination could be made if employee job performance may have been adversely affected by such drug use.
For this reason, the line of questioning during the interviews was general in nature and drug use related questf ras were not limited relative to time occurrence of use. They were aimed at getting information relative to any effect that drug use might have on the safe operation of the facility. Corroborated evidence of instances of onsite use would have resulted in immediate action to eliminate the possibility of any involvad individual having an effect on facility operation.
At the onset of the onsite investigative activities, difficulties in obtaining information were encountered. Due to the nature of the investigation and the possible criminal implications for drug possession, use or sale, the licensee determined that those scheduled to be inter-viewed should be represented by legal counsel if they desired. Event-ually, 11 attorneys from seven differen? law firms were involved in the investigation. The attorneys were employed or retained by the licensee, the union, and/or individual employees.
During the initial interviews, several individuals (based on advice of counsel) refused to answer some questions, particularly'those dealing with offsite drug use.
Generally, the refusals were based on the prohibition against criminal self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Others felt that informa-tion relating to their offsite activities during non-duty hours was not relevant to the investigation and the safe operation of the plant.
The employees, throagh their attorneys, also expressed concerns about possible NRC licensing actions or licensee administrative actions that might be taken based on information they provided which, in their opinion, would have no effect on duty performance.
In addition to those matters described above, other legal and admin-istrative problems, questions and legal objections were raised by
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the ecployees and their lawyers during the course of the investigative activities. These included:
(1) questioning the reliability of information provided by the allegers; (2) the investigation falling outside the charter and purvicw of the NRC; (3) questioning relating to past or offsite activities violating personal privacy; (4) providing specific allegations and their sources prior to interviews; (5) having union representatives present at each interview; (6) attorneys being
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concerned over the personal implications of the public release of certain information their clients provided and the " confidentiality"
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for their clients the NRC could provide; (7) draft stateconts pre-
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pared by the investigators not being verbatim transcripts of the interviews and allegedly containing inaccuracies in addition to
- lacking the overall perspective of the interview'; (8) attorneys and-their clients objecting to the term " voluntary" being included in the introduction to statements; and (9) some individuals continuing
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their reluctance to answering questions or providing statements.
Other complicating factors included: delays in completing interviews caused by attorneys' schedules and availability; delays caused by the
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non-availability of personnel due to plant manning requirements, and
the time needed for employee consultations with attorneys prior to l
NRC interviews.
l The concerns, disagreements, questions, and delays brought the investi-
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gation to a deadlock. Questions relating to offsite. drug use were not
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being answered and investigation statements were not being sworn to and signed.
In early March 1982, the NRC established significant posi-
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It was intended
and expected that these positions would overcome employee / attorney
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objections regarding the offsite drug use questions. sad would enable
the investigation to be completed. These positions were:
(1) letters
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were obtained from.the local U. S. Attorney and the Lake County Illinois State's Attorney explaining conditions.in which.they would j-decline criminal prosecution for certain drug related offenses; (2)
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no NRC or licensee enforcement action would be taken against any
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individual for past, offsite drug use; (3) investigation would continue.
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l with questioning concerning offsite drug use limited to that which may affect onsite performance; and (4) the' identity of individuals
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who provide information to the NRC would be kept confidential by the NRC on a "best efforts" basis.
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In regards to (2) above, if there was any current offsite drug use or
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drug habit by an individual which might affect onsite job performance, i
the licensee would prohibit that individual from performing safety related activities until he/she completed an appropriate licensee drug i
rehabilitation program and his/her fitness for duty was determined.
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In regards to (3) above, the impact, if any, of offsite drug use on
onsite performance would be established by the NRC based on criteria t
developed through consultation with competent medical authorities and would be made available to all individuals for reference in future interviews. The criteria were established by the Region III staff and
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management based on information provided by several sources. The purpose
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l of the criteria was to develop drug use questions, answers to which would
provide information specific to the effects of on duty performance; that is, "Since x-(specified date) have you used drug (named) within y (a
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specific number of hours or days) of performing duties?" Consulted in establishing the criteria were:
Dr. M. Snyder, Research Division, i
National Institute of Drug Abuse; Dr. J. P. Chambers, M.D., a private
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physician retained as a consultant to the NRC, and through him his
associates, Dr. R. W. McDermott, M.D.
.and Dr. C. Witfield, M.D.,
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e publication of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) entitled
" Drugs of Abuse." Additionally, Mr. Peter Bensinger, former head of DEA, who hcd been retained by the licensee as a consultant, participated in discussions of the criteria after they were established.
The establishment of the criteria (defined in Attachment 1) enhanced the ability to centinue the interview process with the resultant production of relevant information from the subsequent interviews.
By April 7,1982, the onsite interviews and the obtaining of sworn statements relative to plant employees was essentially completed, although some limited followup work continued later. The results of these interviews and statements are described in section 4 of this report. The specific allegations and findings are covered by general categories of personnel: corporate management, plant personnel, and guards.
A total of 216 individuals were interviewed, many of them more than once. A total of 137 signed sworn statements were taken from those individuals providing relevant information.
In summary, the investigation initially began with a limited scope and objectives and quickly expanded. The seriousness and possible implications of the allegations resulted in the conduct of an extensive investigation into these matters.
The remainder of this report describes the conduct of the investigation and a summary review of each major allegation with the description of findings and conclusions for each.
4.
Allegations Allegations of misconduct which could impact on the safe operation of the plant pertained to plant ope:ations, plant security, and Corporate coverup and inaction to alleged known drug involvement by Station and security force personnel. Specific allegations, investi-gative actions, and results and findings are addressed below. Abbre-viated background information prefaces each of the three major cate-gories of investigative effort (Corporate personnel, Station employees, and Security Force Personnel).
a.
Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) Management Allegations that CECO officials had covered up krowledge of drug and alcohol abuse at the Zion Station were made by a tormer under-cover agent at Zion and were included in the December 1981 news-casts.
Persons identified as having information pertaining to the " caver-up" were interviewed by an NRC Region III investigator and inspectors.
The investigative effort pertaining to the CECO corporate cover-up included interviews of four CECO corporate officials, three Zion Station employees, the attorney who assisted with the Zion Station undercover investigation, the undercover agent, the
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owner of the detective agency that employed the undercover agent and various law enforcement officials.
Signed statements were submitted by four corporate officials, one Zion Station employee, the attorney who arranged for the licensee's undercover operation, the undercover agent, and the cuner of the detective agency who hired and employed the agent.
Individuals were advised of the allegations that were being investigated. The CECO employees who were questioned regarding their knowledge of and involvement in the undercover operation were all represented by an attorney from the law firm of Hannafan and Handler. The attorney was present during interviews and during the signing of the statements. The owner of the detective agency was represented by an attorney frem the firm of Isham, Lircoln and Beale, who also represented the licensee. The undercover agent did not request and did not have an attorney present during interviews. Representatives of police agencies were not requested to provide written statements.
A summary of allegations, investigative actions, findings, and conclusions pertaining to CECO management are discussed below.
Commonwealth Edison's involvement with local law enforcement dgencies was investigated due to the general allegation of corporate " Cover Up" of known wide spread drug use.
(1) Allegation: CECO Officials Misled Law Enforcement Authorities Regarding the Source of The Undercover Agent's Drug Purchase:
(a) Allegation Details: The undercover agent determined from television newscasts that the Zion Police Chief had apparently been misled regarding the source of the marijuana she had purchased.
In a written statement, the undercover agent stated that she had purchased marijuana and turned it over to the CECO Personnel Supervisor. The Personnel Supervisor then turned it over to the Zion Police Chief and told him that the marijuana was found at the plant. The undercover agent stated that this was a " complete lie" and an attempt to cover up her identification of criminal activities at the plimt.
(b)
Investigative Actions: NRC investigators interviewed several persons involved in the undercover operation and the relense of marijuana to the Zion Police Chief.
Persons interviewed included: Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) corporate officials, an involved Zion Station employee, a CECO-retainec attorney who initially arranged for the undercover operatJon, the undercover agent, the owner of the detective agency retained by Ceco to conduct the investigation, and the Zion Police Chief.
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e The questioning pertained to the individuals' knowledge of where the drugs were purchased, steps taken to inform law enforcement officials of the source of the marijuana, and what law enforcement officials were told regarding the source of the received marijuana.
(c) Findings:
In a signed statement, the undercover agent stated that: on June 23, 1981, at an offsite location, she was given a small bag of marijuana (less than one-half ounce) by a contractor that worked at the Zion Nuclear Station. Shu further stated that although she did not pay for the marijuana, in her official report to her employer and to the client, she said she paid for it and was reimbursed twenty-five dollars. On July 2, 1981, the undercover agent met with a contractor in the con-tractor parking lot at the Zion Station and purchased a bag of marijuana (approximately one ounce) for $40.00.
Additionally, she stated that she purchased a half pound of marijuana for $150.00 prior to July 14, 1981 from a contractor employee near the security building outside of the protected area of the Zion plant. She told no one of the purchase and never submitted a voucher for the $150.00. The Investigators could not verify the existance cr disposition of the alleged half-pound of marijuana.
In her signed statement she stated that after the marijuana purchase on July 2, 1981, she called the owner of the detective agency who instructed her to inform the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor about the purchase so he could pick up the marijuana from her and turn it over to the police.
According to her, after some difficulty, she turned the marijuana over to the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor in the parking lot.of the Zion Holiday Inn on July 14, 1981. She stated she gave him the sample, one ounce, and allegedly the one-half pound quantity of marijuana she received.
On July 15, 1981, the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor turned the marijuana over to the Zion Police Chief.
In the personnel supervisor's statement, he states that he told the Police Chief, "This marijuana was not bought at the plant " and the CECO Vice President, Nuclear Stations,
"would be in later to see him on this."
Chief Lee of the Zion Police Department informed investi-gators that the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor indicated that the marijuana was found in a corner of the plant and was not connected with any individual and that the Division Vice President, Nuclear Stations, would be in later to see him on the matter. The Police Chief never received a phone
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e call or visit on the subject. He was surprised to learn from the newscasts that the marijuana had been from the undercover operation. Additionally, the Police Chief stated that the amount of marijuana he received was tut estimated 23 grams, which could not have included the described half-pound of marijuana allegedly purchased by the undercover agent.
The Ceco Division Vice President, Nuclear Stations, stated in his signed statement that he told the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor to take the marijuana to the Zion Police. He did not remember what he specific-ally told the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor to tell the Zion Police. He assumed the Zion Station Personnel
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Supervisor would advise the police where he get the marijuana. He could not recall whether he called Chief Lee after the purchase, but he remembered he did not meet with the Police Chief after the purchase. He also stated that he had met with the Zion Police Chief on one occasion and briefed him that an undercover operative was onsite and her reports to dcte indicated that nothing was going on.
Initially, the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor's sole involvement in the undercover operation was to get the undercover agent on the payroll and did not include any " operational" involvement.
The undercover agent submitted weekly hand written reports to the owner of the detective agency, who edited, typed and submitted them to the CECO, Vice President, Nuclear i
Stations. He (Vice President) was the sole CECO recipient of the reports. He stated in his signed statement that no one else was shown the reports and he kept them in a locked desk drawer.
The owner of the detective agency was interviewed by the NRC and submitted a signed statement on February 9, 1982.
By letter dated March 15, 1982, a supplementary signed (March 9, 1982) statement was submitted to the NRC by his counsel. The reason for the supplementary submittal was to clarify misleading or incorrect assertions contained in the previously signed statement of February 15, 1982.
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The original document, stated, in part:
"In my opinion,
it would appear the improper reporting to tne police of the purchases of marijuana and Commonwealth's failure 3-to not inform any police agency properly about the pur-chases irtil there were charges in the media constituted a cover-up of [the undercover agents) findings during her drug operation at the site".
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The supplementary statement reads, in part:
"... in my view, as long as some police authority was informed, we had fulfilled our obligations... other than the
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tolsvision rzports, I hsva no r2:cen to doubt that Chief Lee was properly informed of the circumstances
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surrounding the acquisition of the marijuana."
(d) Conclusion: * It appears that the site Personnel Director did not fully describe to the Zion Police Chief the circum-stances pertaining to his receipt of marijuana. His stated reason for this was he believed the Division Vice President-Nuc1 car Station would coordinate with the Zion Police Chief at a later time. However, his coordination did not occur.
The Division Vice President could not recall if he was ex-pected to coordinate with the Police Chief on the marijuana issue. 'The investigation did not conclude whether or not Law Enforcement officials were misled, but did conclude that a miscommunication occurred.
(2) Allegation: Although Informed of The Undercover Investigator's Findings and Activities, CECO Officials Prevented Information From Being Forwarded to the Metropolitan Enforcement Group (MEG) as had been initially planned:
(a) Allegation Details: The alleger stated that at the be-ginning of the operation, she was told that MEG would be the primary law enforcement agency contact. However, during the course of the operation she was instructed not to contact MEG and that the Zion Police Department would be given the marijuana she received during the operation. MEG was never provided.information about the operation.
(b) Investigative Actions: This allegation was addressed during interviews conducted with CECO corporate officials, a Zion Station employee, the attorney retained to set up the undercover operation, the owner of the detective agency, and the undercover agent. The questioning per-tained to what information they had concerning the agents'
findings, what agreements existed for informing law
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enforcement authorities, and who made the decision to contact Zion Police instead of MEG and why.
(c) Findings: After the drug arrests in February 1981, the licensee met with several law enforcement authori-ties. During those meetings, it was recommended and decided that CECO would place their own private under-cover investigator in the Zion Station because the law enforcement agencies did not have the manpower or money to participate directly in the operation.
An agreement was reached that MEG would act as primary law enforce-ment liaison for the undercover investigation. MEG was supposed to keep the Zion Police Chief informed of developments.
In an attempt to locate a private investigator for the Zion assignment, an attorney retained by CECO contacted a private investigation firm that had previously done work for CECO. They, in turn, referred him to W. E. Davern and Associates. The Davern agency was retained and on April 9, 1981, a meeting was held between the attorney, the owner of
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the detective' agency, and the undercover agent. During this meeting, the agent was told that MEG was the primary law enforcement liaison-for the operation. - She was given
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. the names and 24-hour phone numbers to contact MEG agents.
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. She was' instructed that prior to making any drug purchase
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- or if her safety was-jeoparized.she should. call MEG.
Accordir.g to the undercover agent, ca July 14, 1981,
she turned the marijuana she had received during the-
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j operation over to the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor.
She was told by Mr. Davern that the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor would take the marijuana to the Zion Police Chief. Davern stated that he complied with-the-decision
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to give the drugs to Zion Police, based on his instruc-tions from Ceco, but preferred to give them to MEG.
He told the agent the drugs would be turned over to the
Zion Police.
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On July 15, 1981, the Zion Station Personnel Supervisor turned over the marijuana to the Zion Police Chief per instructions from the Division Vice President, Nuclear Stations.
In his signed statement, the Division Vice
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President, Nuclear Stations, says:
I told (the
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Personnel Supervisor) to take the marijuana to the Zion Police.
I do not recall CECO entering into any agree-
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ment to work with MEG officials or to have MEG contact our undercover agent at the plant.
I do recall a meeting with other CECO officials, and possibly Jim Burns (the.
attorney who arranged the operation) where I expressed concern that Chief Lee was being cut out of the undercover operation. The reason for my concern may have been that I_was advised that MEG, as opposed to Chief Lee, was to be the law enforcement liaison for the operation.
I also recall being informed that MEG would keep Chief Lee advised of the operation and this information alleviated
3 my concern."
(d) Conclusion: The direct contact and liaison between MEG
j and the individuals involved '.n the undercover operation
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did not occur as originally p.anned.
MEG provided 24-
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hour phone numbers and MEG agents' names were made available to CECO, but there was no action on the part of CECO to use those resources. Drugs were turned over to the Zion Police Chief rather than to MEG by a CECO representative.
Apparently, confusion and mismanagement by CECO concern-ing the undercover operation led to a deviation from the i
original plan. This resulted in no law enforcement agency l
being advised of alleged drug purchases made by the undercover operative until approximately five months after t
the purchases were completed.
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(3) Allegation: Although Informed of Widespread Use of Drugs, Management Took no Action Against Indiv! duals:
(a) Allegation Details:
In a statement, the undercover agent said that employees at Zion Station had. smoked marijuana or used drugs both on and offsite, or that she personally observed individuals use marijuana or other drugs on and offsite. Although she had reported this information to CECO, no action was taken against the individuals.
(b)
Investigative Actions:
Interviews were conducted with CECO corporate officials who were involved in the undercover operation, the attorney retained.by CECO who initially arranged for the undercover operation, and the undercover agent. The undercover agent's reports were also reviewed.
The questioning pertained to the information that the undercover agent provided CECO officials about drug use at the plant and what actions they took as a result of the information they were provided.
(c) Findings: The undercover agent submitted weekly activity reports to her employer, who then edited and forwarded them to the CECO Division Vice President, Nuclear Stations.
The CECO Division Vice President, Nuclear Stations, re-viewed the reports which contained accounts of what she had observed offsite, conversations concerning drug use, and eyewitness instances of onsite drug use.
He deter-mined that the reports contained mostly gossip and innuendo about the personal lives of plant personnel and were not oriented to the undercover cperation.
Through review of the undercover agents reports and signed statement, it was determined that there was one eyewitness account by the undercover agent of an on-duty guard allegedly ingesting a pill onsite and two eyewitness accounts of individuals employed at Zion Station using marijuana at offsite locations. Other accounts of drug use were either mentioned during con-versations with or conversations overheard by the under-cover agent.
Through a review of the Burn's undercover agents' reports, that were supplied to our office, it was determined that there was no mention of any observation of drug use onsite or offsite.
After the termination of the operation, a meeting between CECO corporate officials was held. The attorney, re-tained from Isham, Lincoln and Beale, was provided copies of the typewritten reports.
It was his task to analyze the reports.
In his signed statement, he stated:
"On
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I n-the basis of my analysis of the reports, I. told Edison that there was only one mention in the reports of any use.of drugs. The Burns' investigator who was in there at the same time.found no evidence of drug or alcohol use onsite. My recommendation'was that we did not have any indication of a serious drug or alcohc1 problem."'
It should be noted that in the past there had been instances of drugs being found and used onsite, and management had taken action against the individuals.
(Refer to paragraph 4.b)
(d) Conclusions:.There were no actions taken against individuals mentioned in the undercover agent's reports because there was no hard evidence of onsite drug use.
(4) Allegation: The. Zion Station Personnel Supervisor Intention-ally Interfered With the Undercover Agent's Investigetica When She Began to Report Alleged Drug Activities:
(a) Allegation Details:
It was alleged that the agent was placed on the night shift against her will and her operations at-the Zion Station were terminated because she had compromised her effectiveness by identifying herself and her activities at the plant while applying for credit at a dress shop in Zion. The Personnel Supervisor told other plant employees that she was an undercover agent.
(b) Investigative Actions: This allegation was discussed during interviews with CECO corporate officials, several Zion Station employees, the attorney retained for the operation, the owner of the detective agency, and the agent. The questioning pertained to information they had about the undercover agent being placed on another shift, her identity as an agent being disclosed, and the Personnel Supervisor's role in the operation.
(c) Findings: During initial meetings regarding the opera-tion, it was determined that the Personnel Supervisor's involvement in the' operation was only to get the under-cover agent onsite and to serve as her contact if she had an emergency.
In regards to the disclosure of her identity, it was determined through interviews of seven CECO personnel, one attorney, the owner of the detective agency and the agent that at least eight of these persons had heard of the following two identity disclosure incidents.
She had told her fiance, who worked at the Zion Station, that she was an undercover agent. After CECO officials heard of this incident, the attorney met with the undercover agent and her employer.
She assured them that her fiance recognized the need for confidentiality and would keep her identity a secret.
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In mid-August, the undercover agent went to a dress shop in Zion to be fitted for a wedding. dress. During the fitting, she allegedly told the clerk she was working at the Zion Station as a stationman but she was actually working undercover. The clerk's husband worked at the Zion Station and gave this information to the Assistant.
Plant Superintendent, who then told the Parsonnel Manager.
When the attorney monitoring the operation was told by CECO officials that she had revealed her identity in the dress shop, he contacted the detective agency owner and it was agreed that the undercover agent should be removed from the operation because her identity had been re-vealed and her saftey was compromised.
The Personnel Supervisor told the Assistant Superintendent of Operations (ASO) the identity of the undercover agent.
He felt he had to disclose her identity to him because she had requested a change to the night shift to aid her in the investigation. Since she was a probationary employee and in view of the complaints about her work performance, the Personnel Supervisor felt the only way the ASO would allow her to change her shift was if he knew she was an undercover agent.
The attorney retained by CECO stated that "Because of her poor attendance record (aggravated by the fact that she was in the employee probationary period), station officials had no interest in hiring [ undercover egent]
for permanent employment.
It was also felt that an offer of permanent employment might compromies her independence in the investigation. The concern of Edison officials was that after 90 days of employment, she would complete the normal employee probationary period. Thereafter, she might try to claim that she was entitled to the job security given bargaining unit employees, and thereby make it very difficult to terminate her at the end of the operation...
I met with
[ undercover agent] and [ owner of detective agency) on July 15, 1981. She agreed to sign a document waiving any rights to job security which she might have as a member of the union, and to resign when so requested."
The undercover agent began work at Zion Station on May 18, 1981, and ninety-six days later on August 21, 1981, her operation was terminated.
(d) Conclusions:
It appears that the Personnel Supervisor did not intentionally interfere with the agent's investigation once she began to report alleged drug activities.
It also appears that the agent hindered her own operation by disclosing her identity as an agent to persons not involved in the undercover operation and was terminated because she had compromised her effective-ness and personal safety as an undercover agent.
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b.
Zion Station Personnel (Licensed, Nonlicensed, Management and
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Contractors - Excluding Security Force):
Numerous allegations pertaining to on and offsite drug use, persons working under the influence of ~ alcohol, control room operators sleeping on duty, serious errors due to drug or alcohol use, falsi-fication of equipment check documentation by Station employees and other less significant allegations were received by NRC Region III.
Two allegers provided information, under oath, pertaining to Station employees. They requested, and were granted, confid4ntiality.
}
Another source of information cooperated with a local law enforce-ment agency but declined te be interviewed by NRC investigators.
s t
The investigative effort pertaining to Zion Station employees included onsite interviews of 128 Zion Station employees (excluding y
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security force members - details of which are addressed in paragraph 4c below), interviews of persons providing allegaticns, interviews e
of local law enforcement agency officials, and coordination with a
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local television reporter who provided periodic information.
p The initial interviews included persons identified in the allega-tions, onsite management representatives, section supervisors, and members of the work force who, although not identified in the allegations, may have had knowledge that would be beneficial to determine the validity of the allegations received. Zion Station employees interviewed worked within the Operations,
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Radiation Chemistry, Fuel Handling, Electrical Maintenance, and Mechanical Maintenance Departments.
During the interviews of Station employees, persons identified in allegations were advised of the allegations against them in -
so far as the grants of confidentiality to the allegers would allow. All but tl:.ee of the persons interviewed were repre-sented by legal counsel retainediby Commonwealth Edison, the International Brotherhood of, Ele' trical Worbrs (union local),
c or counsel of the individual's choice. Persons interviewed and who cooperated with the investigation were granted confidentiality.
Therefore, an identifier rather than the individual's name is used in this report.
- Through initial interviews of the 128 persons, written statements,\\
submitted under oath, t.ere required from 52 Zion Station employees /
Persons requested to provide, written statements were generally those individuals identified in an allegation (s) or who provided information with a direct beading on,the allegations being in-
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vestigated. The remainder of the persons interviewed indicated they had no knowledge pertaining to allegations being investigated and therefore no statements were requested.
Forty-nine Station employees provided written statements which were signed under oath. Three persons declined to sign written statements of their interview resnits. They also declined to
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p answer any further questions after their initial-interview.
Additionally, one individual declined to be interviewed unless
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the' interview was tape: recorded.
Inquiries'were also directed toward management's' policies, procedures, awareness,'and corrective measures in regard to the use and abuse of alcohol and controlled substances. : Nuclear Stations Division Vice President's Directive No. ~ 013, " Conduct
"i of Operations," dated November 1,-1980, provided guidance per-t taining to prohibitive conduct for Operations Division personnel.
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(See Attachment:2, Division Vice President's Directive No. 013,_
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November 1, 1980.)
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A summary of the allegations, investigative actions conducted,
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i; and findings pertaining to Zion Station employees-are addressed
^d-below, b
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'i (1) Allegation: Marijuana and/or Other Drugs Were Used Onsite m/
Ds I
by Station Employees (Excluding Security Force):
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U (a) Allegation Details: Thirty Station employees wer*
alleged to have used marijuana and/or.other drugs onsite.
They included licensed operators, equipment attendants, r
fuel handler personnel, and radiation chemistry personnel.
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Three of the 31 Station employees allegedly bought / sold 3 5 marijuana onsite. The alleged onsite drug abuse involved
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. marijuana, cocaine, and nitrous oxide. One individual
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(ZPE 26) allegedly admitted use of LSD while on duty to
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an alleger.
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The allegers stated that they had observed onsite use
i of marijuana and/or other drugs or that ~ individuals
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F, admitted or implied drug use to the_allegers. Another
source of information who cooperated with a local law
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enforcement agency, but declined to be interviewed by
the NRC, also identified Station employees who allegedly used marijuar,a and/or other drugs onsite.
Ten Station employees (ZPE's 30, 35, 33, 18, 8, 29, 7, 11, 38 and 50) were identified by two sources of information i
L as onsite users of marijuana and/or other drugs. The re-f l'
mainder of the alleged onsite marijuana and/or other drug
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users were identified by a single source.
(b) Investigative Actions: The following reports were reviewed:
(1) two documented police interview results j
pertaining to alleged drug abuse at the Zion Nuclear s
.O Station, (2) reports from two undercover operatives i'
empicyed by Commonwealth Edison from May through August 1981, (3) a report of a.pclygraph examination for one i
N undercover operative.
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i For purposes of this report, onsite means within the protected area
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boundary of the plant.
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NRC investigators / inspectors also interviewed 128 Zion Station employees (in addition to security force personnel).
Additionally, the Zion Police Chief and two Zion Police Detectives were interviewed.
The questioning during the interviews pertained to individual use,,and knowledge of other Zion Station employees use, of. marijuana end/or other drugs onsite-since employed by Commonwealth Edison; and observation of marijuana or other drugs onsite.
(c) Findings: Four Station employees (ZPE -53, 9, 54, and 31)
i and one undercover operative hired by Commonwealth Edison-stated that they had smelled what they believed to be the odor of marijuana onsite within.the past two years.
One Station employee (ZPE 60) advised the investigators
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that a contractor employee was terminated by a Station supervisor for smoking marijuana onsite. This incidant occurred approximately January 2, 1980.
Two incidents of marijuana being found onsite were identified. On May 15, 1980, during a routine security inspection, NRC security inspectors observed security force personnel discover a substance in a Station employee's handbag which.was later determined to be marijuana. The employee was reassigned to a non-nuclear site. On February 9, 1982, a cigarette believed to contain marijuana was found onsite, tested, and deter-mined to contain trace amounts of marijuana.
Employee ZPE 50 stated that he was approached by an
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employee in the latter part of 1980 and asked if he
]
(ZPE 50) wanted to smoke marijuana onsite. The individual (ZPE 50) declined the offer. The employee who allegedly made the offer to smoke marijuana onsite is no longer employed at Zion.
Nitrous oxide is maintained onsite within the hot lab and used to conduct various analyses of water samples.
One individual (ZPE 35) stated that a former employee asked him if he wanted to inhale nitrous oxide. ZPE 35 declined the offer but observed the former employee inhale nitrons oxide. No other person interviewed had observed or heard of nitrous oxide being inhaled by any current-Zion Station employees. The former employee does not work at Zion and has not worked at Zion for over a year.
One of the two undercover operatives hired by Commonwealth Edison to investigate casite use of drugs consented ta a polygraph examination requested by the security con-tractor on January 6, 1982. The examination covered
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l observations during the summer of 1961 pertaining to
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e illegal drug activity by Commonwealth Edison employees, Burt.s Internationcl Security Services employees, and i
contractor employees. Drug activity was explained as being usage and/or sale and/or distribution of drugs.
The rt 'rt cf the polygraph results indicated that the undercover operative was telling the truth when he denied any observations of illegal drug activity during the summer of 1981 at the Zion Nuclear Station.
A review of a televisfca news transcript for December 21, 1981, indicated that Lne other undercover operative did observe the taking of amphetamines inside the plant by a security force member on one occasion but did not observe smoking of marijuana onsite (within the pro-tected area boundary). The operative stated that three months was not cuough time to catch anyone.
(Refer to paragraph 4.c for additional information pertaining to the security force.) No other observations of onsite marijuana and/or other drug use were noted in the daily reports prepared by the undercover operative.
All Station employees interviewed denied personal use of marijuana and/or other drugs onsite and knowledge of ether current Station employees using marijuana and/or other drugs onsite.
(d) Conclusions: Widespread oncite drug abuse was not sub-stantiated. Based upon the number of persons who smelled the odor of marijuana and the termination of the contractor for smoking marijuana onsite, the investigation indicated that marijuana has been smoked onsite. No information was developed which could identify the persons (except the contractor) who have smoked marijuana onsite.
Three persans (ZPE 53, 61, 31) and a report of one of the undercover cperatives indicated that Station manage-rannt (supervisors) had beer. advised of the incidents when the odor of marijuana had been smelled onsite.
No information was developed to substantiate the allega-tion that Station employees identified by allegers had
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used marijuana and/or other drugs onsite. Additionally, no information was developed to substantiate the allega-tion that marijuana was bought or sold onsite.
The ten Station employees alleged to use drugs onsite by more than one source of information will be identi-fled to the licensee so their fitness for duty can be verified.
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(2) Allegation: Marijuana and/or Other Drugs Were Used Offsite
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by Station Employees (Excluding Security Force):
(a) Allegation Details: Forty-three Station employees were accused of using marijuana and/or other drugs offsite. They included licensed operators, equipment attendants, fuel handler personnel, and radiation chemistry personnel. The alleged drug abuse involved marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, and barbiturates.
One individual (ZPE 27) allegedly admitted use of LSD to an alleger. The alleger (s) also identified seven of the above persons (ZPE 17, 18, 35, 33, 24, 30, and 50) as small-time dealers of marijuana and/or cocaine for their friends.
The allegers stated that they had observed marijuana and/or other drugs being used offsite by the individuals or the individuals admitted or implied marijuana and/or other drug use to the allegers. Another source of information who cooperated with a local law enforcement agency but declined to be interviewed by the NRC, also identified some of the 43 Station employees who allegedly used marijuana and/or other drugs offsite.
From information received from various sources, seven
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Station employees (ZPE 30, 3L, 8, 29, 7, 50 and 16) were
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identified by two sources as offsite marijuana and/or other drug users.'
The remainder of the alleged offsite marijuana and/or other drug users were identified by single sources.
(b)
Investigative Actions: The following reports were re-viewed:
(1) two documented police interview results pertaining to alleged drug abuse at the Zion Nuclear Station, (2) reports from two undercover operatives employed by Commonwealth Edison from May through August 1981. The Zion Police Chief and two Zion Police Detectives were also intersiewed on January 11, 1982.
I This allegation was addressed during NRC investigators /
inspectors interviews of 128 Zion Station employees. The questioning during the interviews pertained to individual use and knowledge of other Zion Station employees' use of marijuana and/or other drugs offsite since employed by Commonwealth Edison. The questioning was later refined to address individual offsite use of marijuana and/or other drugs within the criteria determined to be potent-ially detrimental to job performance (x-y criteria).
Offsite in this report means outside of the Zion Station protected area boundary.
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Note:
Section 4.b(1).
In summary, a total of eleven Plant employees were identified by more than one source of information as marijuana and/or drug users:
six both on and ofsite; four onsite only; and one offsite only.
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P Individuals' knowledge of offsite trafficking of drugs was also addressed.
Licensed operators were initially questioned in the context of if they had ever used marijuana or drugs (controled substances).
(c) Findings: TVo individuals (ZPE 24 and 50) admitted use of marijuana since January 1980 within eight hours before going to work.
ZPE 24 (nonlicensed employee) admitted use of marijuana since January 1980 within eight hours before going to work on approximately 30 occasions. He stated he had
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never used mari juana within six hours before reporting for work and on all occasions had at least six hours sleep before coming to work. He further stated that he had not smoked marijuana offsite since December 1981.
ZPE 24 also stated that he had occasionally had an alcoholic beverage to drink while smoking marijuana.
ZPE 50 (nonlicensed employee) admitted use of marijuana since January 1980 within eight hours before going to work on "less than 10 occasions." He further stated that he had not used marijuana offsite since January 1982 but had used marijuana between October 1981 and January 1982.
On the occasions he had used marijuana, it had been six to seven hours before going to work and he had slept before going to work. He stated his use of marijuana consisted of a few puffs on a marijuana cigarette passed among the people present. ZPE 50 had also consumed alcohol at times during the occasions when he used marijuana.
ZPE 50 denied using marijuana three or more times a week.
Both individuals were identified to the licensee to determine their fitness for duty and entry into the licensee's drug rehabilitation program.
The two persens were removed from safety related duties until a fitness for duty determination had been made.
Another employee (ZPE 12) admitted smoking marijuana off-i site since employed by Commonwealth Edison (latter part
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of 1979) but denied smoking marijuana offsite since i
February 1982. ZPE 12 also denied smoking marijuana within eight hours before coming to work or three or more times a week since January 1980.
Five Station employees (ZPE 42, 13, 18, 24, and 50)
indicated they had knowledge pertaining to possible offsite use of marijuana by Zion Station employees (n'ot within time limits or frequency determined to be detrimental to job performance) but declined to identify the individuals. Reasons for declinations to identify possible offsite users of marijuana were varied. Some of the five individuals felt that offsite use of
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marijuana was not relevant for the NRC to investigate since it did not, in their opinion, affect safe plant operations. Others felt that the information they had was not sufficient to determine if the use of marijuana affected their duty performance.
Information received from the five individuals is summarized below:
ZPE 42 stated that he had heard of individuals
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going to parties where marijuana may have been used and where individuals may have got " stoned."
He did not know whether they meant from alcohol or marijuana. He also stated that he had never heard of any Zion Station employee using marijuana within eight hours before coming to work or three or more times a week.
ZPE 13 stated that he had seen individuals employed
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by Commonwealth Edison smoke marijuana offsite, but not since approximately March 1981. He was aware of no instance when marijuana was smoked within eight hours of an employee assuming duties at the Zion Station. ZPE 13 declined to identify the individuals.
ZPE 18 stated that he had conversations with Zion
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Station employees about his possession of marijuana offsite but denied ever smoking marijuana within eights hours of performing any duties at the Zion Nuclear Facility. - ZPE 18 declined to answer any questions involving the possession of marijuana or any controlled substance by any other Station employee.
ZPE 24 stated that he had seen Zion employees in
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possession of marijuana since January 1980. Ho declined to identify the employees.
l ZPE 50 stated that on a couple of occasions since
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January 1980, two Zion Station employees have used marijuana offsite in his presence. He declined to identify the Station employees. He also stated that he did not know if the Station employees had to work within eight hours after using marijuana.
He
l further stated that he had no knowledge of a Zion Station employee using marijuana three or more times
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a week since January 1980.
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During initial interviews, 20 Station employees declined to answer questions pertaining primarily to personal offsite use of marijuana and/or other drugs or knowledge of other Station employees' offsite use of such drugs.
Four of the 20 Station employees were NRC licensed
operators. Grounds for declinations were generally based l
upon their 5th Amendment rights, as defined in the United i
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l
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States Constitution, challenges of relevancy of the questions to safe operation of the plant, or both.
u l
During subsequent interviews, all but two Station f
l employees (ZPE 9 and 47) ar.swered questions about per-l sonal of fsite use of marijuana and/cr other drugs since l
January 1980 when asked within the context and criteria determined as detrimental to job performance (x-y criteria).
Neither of the two individuals who declined to answer questions about personal offsite use of marijuana were NRC licensed operators.
ZPE 9 declined to answer qacstions about his personal
=
offsite use of marijuana since employed by Commonwealth
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Edison during the initial interview. He further declined
to participate in any other icterviews during the investi-gation when the line of questioning was modified to address offsite use of marijuana within the time frame and frequency determined as potentially detrimental to work performance. ZFE 9 also declined to provide a written statement pertaining to his initial interview results.
ZPE 47 refused, in his written statement, to answer
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questions pertaining to his use or purchase of marijuana offsite "because it doesn't relate to the health and safety of the public."
Based upon the positions taken by ZPEs 9 and 47, the extent of their offsite use of marijuana since January 1980 could not be determined. They will be identified to the licensee for on-the-job surveillance and possible inclusion in the licensee's drug and alcohol identification and rehabilitation program.
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Chicago police records indicated that ZPE 27 had agreed to participate in a drug rehabilitation program in 1971 due to an arrest for possession of LSD and other offenses.
<
ZPE 27 denied use of marijuana and/or other drugs since
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January 1980 within the time frame and frequency determined as detrimental to work performance.
E Commonwealth Edison had been advised of alleged offsite
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sales of marijucna by a contracto-employed at the site as early as July 10, 1981. The information was provided
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by an undercover operative hired by Commonwealth Edison.
[
(Refer to section 4.a for further information.)
h (d) Conclusions: The investigation indicated that some
[
Station employees have used marijuana offsite during f
nonworking hours since employed by Commonwealth Edison.
{
There was information to substantiate that only two p
persons used marijuana offsite since January 1980 within
}
the time frames and frequency determined as likely to
have a detrieental effect on job performance.
No e
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b information was obtained to substantiate the allegation that any current Zion Station employee dealt in the sale of marijuana and/or other drugs offsite.
Information available to the NRC pertaining to the alleged offsite sale of marijuana by the contractor employee will be provided to the Zion Police Department.
The identified contractor does not currently work at Zion.
The seven Station employees alleged to use drugs by more than one source of information will be identified to the licensee so their fitness for duty can be verified.
(3) Allegation: Alcoholic Beverages Were Used by Station Employees During Working Hours or to the Extent Tbat it Affected Work Performance - (Excluding Security Force)
(a) Allegation Details: Two Station employees (ZPE 5 and 49) were accused of either drinking alcoholic beverages or being under the influence of alcohol during working hours. Persons identified as allegedly abusing alcoholic beverages included an equipment attendant and a fuel handler. One individual (ZPE 5) was identified by two sources as allegedly working while under the influence of alcohol. Additionally, an unspecified number of unidentified contractor personnel were observed drinking alcoholic beverages onsite by one alleger.
(b) Investigative Actions: Reports from two undercover operatives employed by Commonwealth Edison from May 1981 through August 1981 were reviewed.
This allegation was addressed during the interviews conducted by NRC investigators / inspectors of approxi-mately 128 Zion Station employees.
The questioning pertained to the individual's personal use of alcoholic beverages during working hours; the individual's knowledge pertainirig to cther Station employees' use of alcoholic beverages during working hours; the individual's knowledge of Station employees working while under the influence of alcohol; and the individual's personal observations of containers onsite that may contain alcoholic beverages (beer cans, whiskey bottles, et.).
(c) Findings:
Two individuals (ZPE 5 and 28) confirmed being disciplined for being under the influence of alcohol during working hours since January 1980. Two additional Station employees were identified by ZPE 5 as being disciplined in the same incident involving himself. One current Station employee (ZPE 28) who was interviewed had completed an alcohol rehabilitation
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program. All of the above personnel were observed intoxicated upon reporting to work and were detained by their supervisors. They did not perform any work assign-ments in an intoxicated state. The individuals involved and the circumstances were common knowledge to most persons interviewed, including management personnel.
ZPE 36 stated that he had observed ZPE 10 report to
- rk in the plant under the apparent influence of alcohol. ZPE 36 was not aware of any corrective action taken against ZPE 10.
ZPE 19 stated that he had received hearsay information that, on two different occasions, two off-duty operating engineers came into the plant while under the influence of alcohol. ZPE 19 stated that he reported the incidents to the appropriate supervisor.
ZPE 19 also stated that the incidents of being onsite under the influence of alcohol that he was aware of were isolated, corrective action had been taken, and the individuals were either sent hom.3 or otherwise not permitted to work.
Seven Station employees (ZPEs 44, 42, 9, 54, 22, 52, and 50) had observed beer cans or whiskey bottles at various locations within the plant during the past two years.
Three of these Station employees stated that the con-tainers were in obscure locations where they could have gone unnoticed for years and the containers had an accumulation of dust on them.
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Two Station employees had smelled what they believed to be the odor of alcohol onsite. ZPE 39 indicated during his interview that on one occasion he smelled what he believed te be the odor of alcohol in the plant elevator.
ZPE 42 stated that he had smelled the odor of alcohol on the breath of some individuals after the lunch hour but never felt that their ability to perform their duties was impaired.
No one interviewed had personally observed a Station employee consume alcoholic beverages onsite during working hours. No one interviewed had observed an individual working while intoxicated.
One undercover operative hired by Commonwealth Edison advised a corporate manager (Mr. Frank Palmer), by means of a written report, that contractors were ob-served drinking beer onsite (along the protected area boundary) during the ILnch hour on at least one occasien.
The operative also advised the corporate manager of methods allegedly used by contractor personnel to get alcoholic beverages onsite without going through search equipment. The operative stated that security measures were strengthened shortly thereafter.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ - -
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.The Plant Superintendent indicated during his interview that he was aware of the incidents and individuals cited.
above. He stated that ZPE 5 and two fuel handlers were disciplined for their incident.
ZPE 28 was assigned to day shift after completion of the rehabilitation program and his activities were closely monitored. ZPE 10 was reprimanded for his incident since it was a one time occurrence. ZPE 10 was observed apparently intoxicated-upon reporting to work.
(d) Conclusions: The presence of alcohol containers (beer I
cans, whiskey bottles, etc.) indicated that alcohol had been consumed onsite. The' exact time frame and identity of individuals involved in onsite consumption of alcohol was not determined.
The investigation indicated that some individuals (at least 5) had been involved in incidents pertaining to being under the influence of alcohol during working hours. One of the individuals alcohol related problems required entry into a rehabilitation program.
The investigation also indicated that plant management was advised of individuals observed under the influence of alcohol during working hours and actions were taken to discipline the personnel and prevent them from working.
The investigation did not discover information to conclude that abuse of alchol was prevalent to the extent that it impacted on the safe operation of the plant.
(4) Allegation: Required Equipment Checks Were Not Performed and Equipment Check Documentation was Falsified:
(a) Allegation Details: Equipment operators deliberately failed to conduct required equipment checks at times and falsified equipment check documentation.
The alleger contributed the failure to perform the equipment checks on equipment operators getting "high" before coming to work or during working hours, or sleeping during working hours. The Heatir;g, Ventila-tion, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) room and spent fuel pit room were two areas identified by the alleger as areas where required equipment checks were not com-pleted. Although specific individuals were not identi-fled, the alleger stated that failure to perform required equipment checks happened "a lot of times."
(b) Investigative Actions: This allegation was addressed during the interviews conducted by NRC inspectors of 89 nonlicensed Zion Station employees. The questicning pertained to the individual's failure to complete re-quired equipment checks and falsify documentation, and
o-knowledge of other individual's failure to' complete required equipment checks and falsify documentation'.
(c) Findings: No one interviewed was aware'of any incident where a current Station employee failed to perform required equipment checks or falsified any documentation pertaining to' equipment checks.
Zion Station employee (ZPE 12) stated that'he was aware of one past employee who failed to perform his work and did not make all required equipment checks.
It was in excess of a year since the employee had worked _at the plant.
'Some Station employees stated there had been occasions when their work assignments prevented them from completing required equipment checks. On these occasions, their-supervisors were advised and arrangements were made for the oncoming shift to complete the equipment' checks.
An equipment attendant (ZPE 14) admitted being disciplined for sleeping on the job about a year ago.
However, he stated under oath that he has always performed required equipment checks and never falsified any documentation pertaining to equipment checks.
(d) Conclusions: The investigation did not reveal informa-tion to substantiate the allegation that currently-employed equipment attendants deliberately failed to perform required equipment checks. No information-was developed to substantiate the allegation that documentation by current Station employees pertaining to equipment checks was falsified. Additionally, no information was developed to substantiate the identity of any current Station employee using marijuana and/or-other drugs onsite to "get high."
(Refer to paragraph.
4.a.(1) for further details.) The two Station employees (ZPE 24 and 50) who admitted offsite use of marijuana within eight hours before coming to work stated, under esth, that they had always performed required equipment checks. No supervisory personnel who were interviewed were aware of any occasion when documentation pertain-ing to equipment checks was falsified.
(3) Allegation: Mannitol in the Radiation Chemistry Department Was Used By Some Station Personnel to Cut Cocaine Offsite:
(a) Allegation Details: Three Station employees (ZPE 1, 16, and 16) were identified as using mannitol, available in the hot lab of the Zion Nuclear Power Station, to cut /
diluta cocaine offsite. Persons who allegedly used the mannitol included other unnamed radiation chemistry personnel. The alleger did net observe Station employees actually use mannitol or remove it from the site. The
O O
alleger felt that persons allegedly using and selling cocaine probably obtained the mannitol from the hot lab within the plant to cut cocaine offsite.
(b)
Investigative Actions: This allegation was addressed during the interviews conducted by NRC inspectors of 89 nonlicensed Zion Station employees.
The questioning pertained to individual's knowledge of mannitol being onvite, its use, and the person's knowledge of it being used to cut cocaine.
(c) Findings: Mannitol is maintained in the Radiction Chemistry Department and routinely used for boron analysis. The substance is not controlled onsite.
Mannitol, and other substances, can be used to cut cocaine. No personnel interviewed had any knowledge of mannitol being used for other than its intended purpose.
Two undercover operatives hired by Commonwealth Edison from May 1981 through August 1981 to investigate drug abuse did not develop any information to indicate that Zion Station employees were obtaining mannitol from the site to cut cocaine.
(d) Conclusions: The investigation indicated there was no information to substantiate the allegation that Zion Station employees used mannitol from the plant to cut cocaine offsite.
(6) Allegation: A Contractor Quality Control Inspector Used Marijuana Offsite:
(a) Allegation Details: A contractor Quality Control (QC)
inspector smoked marijuana during working hours. The allegar stated that the contract QC inspector had worked onsite during a Unit 2 outage in 1980. During this period, the contractor allegedly bought marijuana offsite and smoked marijuana during working hours. The alleger subsequently changed the allegation to only offsite use of mar:Juana by the QC inspector.
(b)
Investigative Actions: Dccumentation pertaining to Unit 2 outage projects was reviewed by an NRC inspector.
After confirming tnat the contractor had performed
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visual inspections of welds, the alleger was contacted again to determine if he had any knowledge of the QC inspector using marijuana within eight hours before coming to work or use three or more times a week.
(c) Findings: An NRC inspector confirmed that the contract
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QC inspector had access to the site between October 1979 and July 1980. The QC inspector worked on projects
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e,
~P 79-02 and 79-14,-which pertained to modification of.
piping = supports (hangers).,The contract QC inspector
- had performed visual inspections of welds and signed off on some Component Support Control Sheets and QC-Review Sheets.
.The visual' inspections of completed welds were signed off as-being accomplished in accordance with the'
i-contractor's Quality Assurance Procedure
.2, Revision S, " Visual and Mechanical Examination Procedure," dated August 20, 1979.
' Interviews with site representatives indicated that.the contractor firm performed its own Quality Control
' checks and the licensee's Quality Assurance Department-monitored the contractor's QC program. Approximately.
10 licensee QA audits pertaining to. project 79-14~were reviewed by the Region III inspector. Audit. findings
'were addressed and resolved. Approximately 30 Noncon-formance Reports-(NCRs) were also~ reviewed. Reviewed NCRs' pertained primarily to weld flashings and spatter.
The contractor foreman stated that the QC inspector no longer worked at the Zion Station or for the Contractor Firm. The QC inspector's present' address was not known.
Subsequent to the onsite: investigation, the alleger was-contacted again to confirm the contract-QC inspector's alleged use of marijuana. The alleger, at this time, stated that the contract QC inspector had allegedly smoked marijuana offsite only, and then within a few hours after getting off of work. The alleger had no knowledge of the contract QC inspector using marijuana within eight hours _before reporting to work or three or more times a week.
(d) Conclusions: The investigation revealed no information to conclude that the QC inspector had used marijuana within the time ~ frame that may have a detrimental effect on job performance. However, due to the nature of the work, the fact that the individual could not be inter-viewed, and the massive amount of QC documentation pertaining to the projects, the licensee will be advised of the QC inspector's identity and requested to review a sample of the inspections performed by the QC inspector to verify the adequacy of his inspections.
(7) Allegation: Serious Errors _in Duty Performance Were Caused Due to Fatigue, Alcohol Use, or Drug Use:
(a). Allegation Details: Two Station employees (ZPE 22 and 49) were identified as responsible'for serious errors in duty performance pertaining to lake' discharge tank releases to the lake. The incidents allegedly involved
s
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equipment attendants. The errors were of sufficient magnitude to warrant submission of a report to the NRC.
The alleger stated that the errors pertaining to the discharge tank releases could very well be attributed to alcohol or drug use.
The alleger also cited less significant incidents such as many instances when deminerlizer pumps were left on with no water flowing through them and the demineralizer system being on much longer than it had to be when secondary storage tanks are filled. These incidents were also attributed to personnel error.
(b) Investigative Actions: This allegation was addressed during the interviews conducted by NRC inspectors of 89 nonlicensed Station employees. The questioning pertained to the individual's knowledge of serious errors where fatigue, drug use, or alcohol use could have been a contributing factor. Serious errors were defined as errors resulting in the event being reported to the NRC or errors that, in the individual's opinion, constituted a safety hazard to plant operations.
A review of " personnel error" related Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for the period of January 1980 to December 1981 was conducted to determine if the names of the individu?,1s responsible for the error were also the individuals alleged to have used drugs en duty.
There were 31 personnel error LERs. TVenty-five LERs identified work sections involved as follows: Maintenance and Repair Personnel (3); Nonlicensed Operations Personnel (9); Licensed and Senior Operators (4); Radiation Pro-tection Personnel (8) and Construction Personnel (1).
(c) Findings: No one interviewed was aware of any serious personnel errors that affected safe operations of the plant where fatigue, alcohol use, or drug use may have
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been a contributing factor.
f One Station employee (ZPE 50) was aware of a couple of occasions when a boric acid tank had overflowed. He was not aware if alcohol, fatigue, or drug use were contributing factors to the incident. The incident did not warrant submission of a LER. Another Station employee was involved in an incident in 1979 whereby a bearing in a turbine was ruir.ed. This incident did not involve fatigue, alcohol use, or drug use as contribut-ing factors. No other incidents were cited during the interview process.
Interviews with licensee management, reviews of the LERs and the associated deviation reports (DVRs) dis-closed that there is no documentation available which specifically identifies the individual (s) responsible for the errors. The DVRs do indicate the timo the DVR
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was written. A review was made of the Zion Station Shift Log for each shif t identified in the DVR. This log listed by name, the Shift Engineer, Shift Foreman, Radwaste Foreman, and nonlicensed operations personnel.
The names of individuals alleged to be involved in onsite drug use were listed on many of the shift log entries. However, no positive correlation between the individual responsible for the personnel error and the individuals listed as assigned'to a particular shift could be developed. A review of the LERs also indicated that, although an event was reported during a particular shift, it could have been the result of an error made by someone assigned to another shift.
The investigation did reveal that three LERs pertaining to lake discharges were submitted.
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LER 80-023, dated June 27, 1980 documented a release of 4000 gallons of OA lake discharge tank without verification of dilution flow to the Unit 2 discharge canal when only one service water pump was in service. The radioactivity released was within technical specification limits. The 11-censee's corrective action consisted of a review by appropriate licensed and nonlicensed operating personnel of technical specification requirements associated with liquid discharges.
LER 80-003, dated August 3, 1980, documented that
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after the OA lake discharge tank release was started, it was noted that the liquid release form did not include ana1 sis results of a sample taken after
2000 gallons of waste water were added to the tank.
No technical specification release limits were ex-cceded. The cause was contributed to poor communica-tions between personnel and a failure to properly review the liquid release form.
Corrective actions consisted of reinstructing appropriate personnel and clarification added to the liquid release procedures.
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LER 80-004, dated August 2, 1980, documented that approximately 6000 gallons of the lake discharge tank was inadvertently discharged to the lake because a valve was erroneously left open.
Cor-rective action consisted of caution cards on the valves and several procedures were changed.
(c) Conclusion: The investigation did not reveal informa-tion to conclude that any serious personnel errora were caused due to fatigue, alcohol use, or drug use.
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m (8) Allegation: Control Room Operators Were Sleeping on Duty:
(a) Allegation Details: Nine NRC licensed Nuclear Station Operators (NS0s) were allegedly observed sleeping in the control room. The alleger also stated that equip-ment attendants had also slept in the control room with the knowledge of on-duty NS0s.
(b) Investigative Actions: This allegation was addressed during the interviews of 128 Station employees conducted by NRC investigators and inspectors. Eight (ZPE 55, 56, 57, 37, 26, 27, 58, and 50) of the nine NS0s alleged to be observed asleep in the control room were included in the interviews.
The questioning pertained to the individuals' observa-tions of NS0s sleeping on duty or performing any actions that could constitute a safety hazard to plant operations.
(c) Findings: No nonlicensed persons interviewed had observed NS0s asleep in the control room or perform their duties in other than a professional manner.
ZPE 44 had heard rumors of control room operators who may have been sleeping on duty but the rumors were at least two years old.
ZPE 44 had no knowledge of the specific details pertaining to the alleged incident (s).
ZPE 42 had heard of an employee (name not recalled) being
" chewed out" by management personnel for having bis feet on the desk and his eyes closed. Ei E 42 thought manage-ment was aware of the incident and took action. The incident occurred over a year ago.
ZPE 43, a licensed operator, stated that on a few i
occasions individuals have allegedly appeared to have fallen asleep in the control room. He stated he was asked to come to the control room when ZPE 6 (a non-licensed employee) was alleg'edly asleep.
ZPE 6 was awake by the time ZPE 43 arrived. On another occasion, approximately March-September 1981, another nonlicensed employee was observed apparently asleep in the control room by a foreman.
ZPE 43 could not recall the individual's or the foreman's names. The three NS0s were reportedly
" criticized" and warned by the foreman for allowing the incident to occur.
ZPE 43 also stated that from time to
'
time he had seen NS0s in the control room who have appeared tired and fatigued when the person (s) worked extended hours. When this occured, he stated immediate action was taken. The N.0 was temporarily relieved and told to walk around.
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ZPE 34, a licensed. operator, stated that he could recall a few occasions when he had observed a control room operator inattentive and apparently sleepy with his head on the desk. He (ZPE 34) immediately moved these individuals and watched them until they appeared more attentive and wide awake. ZPE 34 attributed their tiredness to the late hour (i.e., 3:00 a.m.) rather than any drug or alcohol implications. ZPE 34 stated that he never had to relieve an individual or switch him to the center desk to answer telephone calls as a result of sleeping at the controls.
ZPE 26, a licensed operator, stated that on rare occasions he had nodded off in the control room while on duty and had been immedietely aroused by co-workers or supervisors and had been relieved to walk around or get a cup of coffee.
ZPE 26 stated that this has happened on rare occasions to other control room oprcators. ZPE 26 stated that such incidents occurred or.1y when he had worked a back shift or had worked extended hours. He further stated that such incidents were not intentional and on no occasion had any safety related problems resulted.
ZPE 27, a licensed operator, stated that he had never fallen asleep on duty in the control room but has placed his head down on the desk for a period of five to ten minutes in order to rest. ZPE 27 stated that
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he had not rested in this manner very frequently. He further stated that he had never seen any incident in which three operators had their heads down at the same time, nor did he recall anybody ever being disciplined for resting in this manner.
(d) Conclusions: The investigation did not reveal any infor-mation to conclude that an NSO had been asleep while on duty in the control rocm.
There have been occasions when NS0s have " nodded off."
The attentiveness of NS0s is an area of concern developed during the investigation.
Condoned practices as described by ZPE 27 and ZPE 34 pertaining to NSos resting by placing their heads on the desk for a period of five to ten minutes may con-stitute inattentiveness to duty and could encourage an NSO to fall asleep.
Commonwealth Edison's Nuclear Stations Division Vice President's Directive No. 13, " Conduct of Operations" dated November 1,1980, cites " habitual or t.:nonic lack of attentiveness" as an example of actions and performance which cannot be tolerated (See Attachment 2 of this section). The qualifiers of " habitual and
,
chronic" conflict with the necessity for on-duty
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-control room operators to be attentive at all times.
The policy guidance described in Directive No. 13 pertaining to attentiveness requires revision to be consistent with the constant attentiveness expected from control room operators. The licensee will be required to address this matter.
(9) Allegation:
Station Employees Engaged in Sexual Activities On Site:
(a) Allegation Details: Unidentified Station employees were allegedly engaged in sexual activities at the plant.
A review of the transcript of a December 16, 1981 tele-cast indicated that sexual activities, including sexual intercourse and oral sex, had and continued to occur onsite. Although not explicitly stated, the implication was that sexual activities at the plant impacted on plant operations.
(b)
Investigative Actions: This allegation was addressed during the interviews conducted by NRC inspectors of 89 nonlicensed Zion Station employees. The questioning pertained to the fndividuals' knowledge of the extent of sexual activities onsite that would violate acceptable standards.
heports from two undercover operatives hired by
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Commonwealth Edison from May 1981 through August 1981 were also reviewed.
(c) Findings-One Station employee (ZPE 21) stated that a sexual harassment complaint had been made against him but was subsequently resolved.
A report from one undercover operative and an interview prior to administering a polygraph examination to the other undercover operative " implied" that a romantic relationship "may" exist between a female member of the security force and a Station employee.
Commonwealth Edison was advised of the alleged romantic relationship between the Station employee and the security force member in an undercover operative's report dated June 4, 1981.
One undercover operative also stated during an interview with an NRC Region III investigator and an inspector that the male Station employee mentioned above allegedly had made comments on one occasion which the undercover operative interpreted as demeaning and soliciting of sexual activity.
No one interviewed had any knowledge of onsite sexual activities as described by an alleger in the telecast transcript.
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(d) Conclusions: The investigation did not obtain any in-formation to conclude that any onsite sexual activities resulted in unsafe operation of the plant.
c.
Security Guard Force Investigation During televised newscasts, allegations were made by current and former guards concerning improper security practices at the Zion Nuclear Power Station including:.(1) use of illegal drugs and alcoholic beverages onsite by members of the security force; (2)
inadequate security training; (3) sexual activities by a member of the guard force while on duty; and (4) inadequate searches of handcarried packages. During the course of the investigation into the above security practices, additional information was provided regarding illegal drug use on and offsite by specific members of the security force and inadequate access control equipment opcrability.
A review of the above allegations by the NRC showed five specific instances of the use of illegal drugs on and offsite by members of the contract security force. Four of the instances were developed during NRC interviews and one was presented during a television presentation. All alleged instances of illegal drug use relative to members of the security force were investigated and documented within the boundaries of one allegation.
During the course of the NRC investigation into alleged improper security practices at the Zion site, the following representatives were interviewed:
five members of licensee onsite management, three members of the offsite contract security management, and 88 percent of the onsite contract security force, which included guard supervisors and guards. Each of the guards and guard supervisors provided signed sworn statements or oral statements under oath. A summary of allegations, investigative actions, and findings pertaining to the security force are addressed below.
(1) A11egationi 3everal Members of the Contract Security Guard Force Used Illegal Drugs On and Offsite:
(a) Allegations Details: During a televised newscast, an alleger stated that guards who were issued weapons had come to work "high" on marijuana or were " pill popping."
Another alleger stated that he/she had observed a guard security supervisor (ZGI 2) smoking marijuana offsite and observed the individual, while armed and on duty, take white pills which he/she stated to the alleger were
" speed" (amphetamines). The alleger also stated that another security guard (ZGI 3) had told him/her that he/she (ZGI 3) has smoked marijuana and had taken " speed" to stay awake while on duty at the Zion Nuclear Power Station.
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A third alleger stated that he/she sold illegal drugs to and bought illegal drugs from ZGI 2.
The individual further alleged that on several occasions ZGI 2 got "high" on company property with ZGI 4.
The alleger identified another member of the security guard force (ZGI 5) who had knowledge of onsite drug use, but deliberately over-looked the problem. The alleger' stated that he/she had never observed ZGI 5 use illegal drugs, only that ZGI 5 told him/her that he/she used illegal drugs.
(b)
Investigative Actions: Between December 23, 1981 and January 13, 1982, two Region III inspectors questioned each interviewed contractor security guard force member about parsonal knowledge of any Zion employee (contractor, guard, or licensee employee) who either in the past or present, used, sold, or possessed illegal drugs onsite.
The questioning was later expanded to include knowledge of offsite drug use.
All of the above interviews were documented in written and signed sworn statements. The results of two of the above interviews were recorded under oath. All guards interviewed were asked if they wanted legal representation or legal assistance. Sub-sequent to the interviews, two individuals did retain private legal cousel.
A review of the statements showed that 15 security force members were_ implicated in illegal drug use on or offiste, or both, and one licensee employee was implicated in offsite illegal drug use.
In addition, one of the drug implicated individuals was alleged to have brought an alcoholic beverage onsite on one occasion.
To further evaluate allegations against the 15 guards and one licensee employee, two Region III inspectors conducted 26 followup interviews of security guards.
The investigation into illegal drug use by members of the contractor security force was concluded on February 4, 1982.
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(c) Findings: The NRC investigation into the use of illegal
,
drugs on and offsite by members of the security force revealed the following findings based on interviews and, where indicated, written records:
No additional information, other than from the alleger (ZGI 4), was developed concerning the allegation that ZGI 5 (no longer employed at Zion) had knowledge of on and offsite illegal drug use by Zion employees.
One alleger (ZGI 9) stated that he/she had heard runors that four guards used illegal drugs (ZGIs 3, 8, 10, and 11)
on and offsite.
During followup interviews of ZGI-10 and 11, they denied any use of any illegal drugs.
ZFE 8 was not available for followup interviews.
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One individual (ZGI 12) admitted use of marijuana approximately three years ago but had not used any illegal drugs since then. ZGI 12 also stated that five other guards (ZGI 13, 14, 15, 22 and 23) used illegal drugs offsite.
ZGI 12 admitted that his/her statements were based only on rumors. A followup interview of the five individuals revealed that ZGI 14 and 15 denied any use of-any-illegal drugs.
ZGI 13 admitted to use of marijuana more than 3 years ago and before employment with the Security Force Contractor.
ZGI 22 and 23 admitted that they use marijuana offsite.
Three allegers (ZGI 16, 17 and 20) stated that ZGI 18 used marijuana offsite.
ZGI 20's allegation was based on rumors that he/she had heard. ZGI 16 stated that he/she'had observed ZGI 18 use marijuana offsite and that
.ZGI 18 appeared to be under the influence of drugs while on duty. ZGI 18 told ZGI-16 that he/she used drugs. ZGI
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18 was interviewed twice and both times denied any use or knowledge of illegal drugs either on or offsite.
TWo allegers (ZGI 17 and 20) stated that ZGI 19 told them that he/she used marijuana and/or cocaine offsite.
ZGI 19 was interviewed and admitted illegal drug use before being employed by the Security Force Contractor, but denied any drug use since employment at Zion.
Individual ZGI 16 admitted offsite use of marijuana.
This individual further stated that it was his/her intention to continue to use marijuana offsite.
It should be noted that there were no allegations made against this individual.
ZGI 16 denied any onsite use of any illegal drug.
Two Individuals (ZGI 1 and 9) alleged that ZGI 3 used illegal drugs both on/offsite. Another individual (ZGI 3) admitted offsite use of marijuana but denied any onsite use of any illegal drugs. The individual further stated that he/che would probably continue to use marijuana offsite. This individual refused to name other guards that allegedly use illegal drugs.
ZGI 22 alleged that ZGI 21 used marijuana offsite.
During an interview, ZGI 21 admitted offsite use of
marijuana, but stated that he/she is only an occasional (individual could not be specific) user of marijuana.
ZGI 21 indicated (verbally) that he/she would continue to use marijuana'offsite.
ZGI 21 denied any onsite use of any illegal drug.
Three allegers (ZGI 12, 21 and 13) stated that ZGI 22 used
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marijuana offsite. Two additional individuals (ZGI 9 and 26) alleged that ZGI 22 used illegal drugs while onsite.
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ZGI 22 admitted offsite use of marijuana.
ZGI 22 further
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stated that he/she had used all types of illegal drugs 1before being employed by the~ Security Force Contractor and would continue to use marijuana offsite.
ZGI 22 denied any onsite use of any illegal drug.
Two individuals (ZGI 17 and 26) alleged that ZGI 23 used marijuana onsite. Four other individuals-(ZGI 12, 16,-21 and.22) alleged that ZGI'23 used marijuana offsite. One of the above individual (ZGI'17) also alleged that on one occasion.ZGI 23 had brought and consumed an alcoholic beverage onsite. ZGI 23 admitted to offsite use of marijuana but denied any onsite use of any illegal drug.
ZGI 23 further stated that he/she used marijuana once or twice a week and that he/she may occasionally con-tinue to use marijuana but not as often as before.
ZGI 23 refused to give names of additional onsite security employees who allegedly used'111egal drugs.
One individual provided Region III inspectors a local newspaper article that stated that a Security Force Member's home was burglarized and that half a bag of cannabis (marijuana) was taken. The person involved stated to the Region III inspectors that the cannabis was not his/hers.
Five individuals (ZGI 6, 13, 16, 20 and~22) alleged that ZGI 2 used marijuana offsite. Three other individuals (ZGI~1, 12 and 17) alleged that ZGI 2 used marijuana and
" speed" onsite. One additional individual (ZGI 4)
alleged that ZGI 2'had bought and sold marijuana and'
hashish and got "high" with the alleger on half.a dozen occasions on licensee property.
ZGI_2 was interviewed by.two Region III inspectors on two separate occasions.
During the first interview, ZGI 2 denied use of any illegal drugs either on or offsite. During the second interview, when confronted with the allegations against him/her, ZGI 2 admitted to offsite use of marijuana but still denied any onsite use of any illegal drugs.
During the initial phase (December 29, 1981) of the investigation into the above noted drug allegations, Region III provided some preliminary investigative information relating to allegations made against two individuals to the onsite security contract supervisor.
As a result of providing this information.to the con-tract security agency (Burns International Security Services Inc. (BISSI)), the individuals were directed by BISSI to take a polygraph test which addressed any knowledge they may have concerning illegal drug use.
Region III had not requested that either individual be given a polygraph test, but did request the results of the tests.
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On January :14,1982, both individuals (ZGI 2 and 23) were-
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administered a polygraph examination.
-A review of the _ test results and a re-interview of the'two' individuals by BISSI indicated that'one. individual was attempting to deceive
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the polygraph operator;'the other individual passed the-polygraph test.
-On February _1, 1982, a meeting was' held between Mr.~K..Graesser, Plant Superintendent, Zion Nuclear.
Power Station, and members of his staff and several.
Region III representatives at the Zion Station. The-licensee was advised that six members (ZGI 2, 3,.16,-.
,
- 21, 22, and 23) of_the contract security force _ admitted-to offsite use of marijuana. The licensee was also advised that two of the individuals (ZGI 2 and 23) had also been alleged to have used illegal drugs while on
. duty; however, the investigation could not substantiate this allegation. Region III provided the licensee with the individuals' names and corresponding details. Site-management stated that they would have to consult with their corporation management before they could take any action on the findings.
On February 4 and 5,-1982, meet'ings were held with senior licensee and contract security management to discuss the_ investigative findings concerning illegal drug use by some members of.the Zion _ security force.
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The licensee stated that the six identified individuals would be kept under management. surveillance.
-Subsequent to the above meetings, BISSI terminated employment for two individuals for noncooperation in their investigation into the Region III findings.
A review of the above findingssshowed the following:
Six members (ZGI 2, 3, 16, 21, 22, and 23) of_the
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contract security force admitted in written state-ments to offsite use of marijuana.
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Five of the six (ZGI 3, 16, 21, 22, end 23) stated they would continue to use marijuana offsite.
Two of the six (ZGI 3 and 23) refused to give names
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of other guards that allegedly use illegal drugs.
Tko other~ individuals (ZGI 18 and 19) were alleged
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to use drugs offsite by more than ene source.
(d) Conclusions: A review of the findings pertaining to the allegation concerning illegal drug / alcohol use both ca and offsite by members of the security force showed the following:
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Onsite illegal drug / alcohol use could not be substantiated.
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Offsite illegal drug-use was substantiated in that six
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individuals of the guard force admitted to offsite use of marijuana. Three of the six were alleged to use drugs onsite by more than one source.
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TWo individuals (ZGI 18 and 19) were alleged to use drugs
offsite by more than one source. An accurate determination of their use/non-use 'could' not be determined.
~
(2) Allegation:
Intoxicated. Guards Have Been' Issued Weapons.
(a) Allegation Details: On December 16, 1981, during a televised newscast, an individual alleged that guards at a Commonwealth Edison Company Nuclear Power Station who were in an inebriated state, had been issued weapons
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when they came to work.
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(b)
Investinative Actions: Two NRC inspectors interviewed members of the licensee's contract security guard force
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between December 23,.1981 and January 13, 1982.' Each individual was asked if they had ever observed or known of a guard, while in an inebriated condition, being issued
a weapon. The Station Security Administrator war asked about any relevant information he may have had concerning
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the allegation. The inspectors also reviewed all security
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incident reports written at Zion Station within the past three years.
(c) Findings: None of the guards interviewed could recall r
any occasion when a guard was issued a weapon and allowed
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to work when the individual appeared to be in an inebriated condition.
Several guards did recall incidents where individuals came to work in what appeared to be an inebriated condition.. Security supervisors took prompt action against these individuals and they were not allowed to work. An interview with the Station Security Administrator further substantiated that, to his knowledge,
no one ever observed any guard in an inebriated condition being issued a weapon. A review of security incident reports failed to locate any report which substantiated that inebriated guards were issued weapons
.
(d) Conclusions: The ellegation that weapons were issued to guards while in an inebriated state could not be sub-stantiated.
(3) Allegation: Particular Iype of Containers Were Used to Bring Alcoholic Beverages Onsite and These Containers Were Not Searched Prior to Entering the Protected Area:
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h-(a)_ Allegation Details:
On' December 16, 1981, during a televised newscast, an individual alleged that alcoholic beverages were brought ensite in certain containers and that the containers ware not searched prior to entering the protected area.
(b) _I_nvestigative Actions: Two Region III inspectors inter-viewed members of the licensee's contract security force between December. 23, 1981 and January 13, 1982. Each'
individual was asked how they searched containers and how other individaals that they have observed searched con-tainers. Each individual was also asked if alcoholic beverages were brought onsite in containers. The inspec-
. tors also reviewed the licensee's approved security plan and corresponding procedures. On January 13, 1982, the inspectors observed search activities of handcarried items.
(c) Findings: None of the guards interviewed ever observed or knew of alcoholic beverages being brought onsite in the named containers. Most guards interviewed expressed the position that the search of the containers was not-adequate in that the containers could not adequately be searched by equipment and are not given a physical search.
The guards also stated that other types of containers are neither mechanically nor physically searched prior to entering the protected area. An observation by the inspectors substantiated the guards position that some containers received an inadequate search. One item of noncompliance was identified.
(Refer to Appendix A and Attachment 3 for further details - Safeguards Information.)
(d) Conclusions:
It could not be substantiated that the named containers were used to bring alcoholic beverages onsite.
liowever, some searches were inadequate, so a finding can not be made that alcohol was not brought onsite in the con-tainers. As a result of the investigation into this allegation, one item of noncompliance, not related to the specific allegation, was identified. When this item was identified, the licensee took action to correct the non-compliance.
(Details of the item of noncompliance are safeguards information as defined in 10 CFR 73.21)
(4) Allegation: Sexual Activities Have Occurred In The Steam Tunnel at The Zion Station:
(a) Allegation Details: On December 16, 1981, during a televised newscast, one individual alleged that sexual activities, including sexual intercourse, and oral sex, had occurred onsite. Although not explicitly stated, the implication was that sexual activities at the plant impacted on plant operations.
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k (b) Investigative Actions: To determine the validity of this allegation, two Region III inspectors interviewed members of'the licensee's contract security force. Each.
of the interviewed guards were asked if they had observed, participated in, or heard of rumors of sexual activities while on duty that have taken place in the steam tunnel or other areas of.the plant.
(c) Findings: All members of the security force interviewed stated that they were unaware of any alleged onsite.
(on duty or off duty) sexual activities. No documenta-tion was found to substantiate the allegation of onsite sexual activities.
(d) Conclusions: Based on the above findings, the-investiga-tion did not substantiate the allegation.
(S) Allegation: Shotgun Training Given to The Site Security Force Was Inadequate.
(a) Allegation Details: On December 17, 1981, during a televised newscast, an individual stated that he/she could not properly use the shotguns which were available at the site. The alleger further stated that he/she had a hard time holding and loading the weapon.
(NOTE:
The alleger did not specify if this allegation applied to Zion or Dresden, or both. Therefore, Region III pursued this allegation during investigations at both sites).
(b) Investigative Actions: Two Region III inspectors asked each guard several questions pertaining to the use of weapons, particularly the use of the sFotgun. The individuals were asked:
(1) if they censidered the weapons training they had received to be adequate; (2)
if t'ney were aware of any cheating with respect to weapon qualifications; and (3) if they could properly use the weapons that are provided, and specifically, the shotgun.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's approved security plan to identify training requirements and reviewed 15 weapon qualification certifications.
The licensee's Station Security Administrator (SSA)
and a management representative of the offsite security contractor were also interviewed concerning shotgun availability and training.
During the interviews, several guards voiced additional concerns dealing with weapons training which were not related to the specific allegation. These concerns included:
(1) that more time should be available for shotgun training, (2) the training that is given is not
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realistic, and (3) that shotguns available onsite are different than the shotguns used for qualification.
One guard stated that half the guard force, including himself, was not qualified with required weapons. The guard would not provide any cdditional information concerning this matter.
(c) Findings: All of the guards interviewed felt that if they had to use their weapons, they had the knowledge and ability to use them properly. A selective review of weapons training records showed that the selected in-dividuals were properly qualified and that security plan commitments in the area or weapons training were being met.
Interviews with the site security administrator and an offsite security contractor management representative showed that neither were aware of any cheating during weapon qualifications, and that all security officers were qualified with required weapons. Both individuals stated that there is a difference between shotguns used for qualification and those available at the site in that, the safety is in a different location on the onsite weapons.
(d) Conclusions: The specific allegation relating to shotgun training inadequacies and the capability of security force members to properly use the shotguns could not be substantiated.
Based on our concern of the type of shotguns used for qualifications and those available at the site, the licensee directed their security contractor to provide the same type of shotguns for weapon qualifi-cation as are used onsite.
(6) Allegation: The Security Force at The Zion Nuclear Power Station Was Not Adequately Trained or Properly Armed to Repel a Terrorist Assault at the Plant:
(a) Allegation Details: On December 17, 1981, during a televised newscast, several individuals alleged that training they had received was not adequate to repel a terrorist assault at the plant.
It was also alleged that guards were not properly armed to defend the plant from terrorists who may use automatic weapons.
(b) Investigative Actions: The Region III inspectors asked each individual a series of questions which related to:
(1) training that the individual had received; (2)
participation in security drills; and (3) their opinions relating to their ability to repel a terrorist assault at the plant. The inspectors also interviewed the site security training coordinator for the contract security force and selectively reviewed appropriate site training records for members of the security force. The approved security plan was reviewed to identify training and drill commitments.
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.(c) Findings: Alliguards interviewed felt that they were adequately trained and co.ild delay an attack at the site until assistance, arrived. Training requirements
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specified by the licensee's security plan were being met.
r The licensee provided weapons which were specifiedlin
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the security plan. The plan had been reviewed by'the
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Office of Nuclee.r Material Safety and Safeguards, NRC and determined to be adequate to meet regulatory I
requirements. All interviewed guards acknowledged that the licensee has procedures to deal with site security contingencies and that they were aware of their individual duties. The! guards further stated that contingency drills were conducted, but very infrequently.' Thg drills ful-filled security plan commitments.
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(d) Conclusion: There was no evidence provided:to substant-itate the allegation that the security force?,was inade-quately trained a..d equipped. However, the frequency of contingency drills was an area of concern since minimum compliance was being fulfilled. The licens,ee agreed to l
y evaluate the need for increa:ed frequency of contingency
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drills.
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(7) Allegation: Guards Would Desert Their Posts and Run If The-Site Was Attack,ed:
(a) Allegation Details: During a televised newscast on December 17, 1981, one individual alleged that guards assigned to protect the facility would desert their posts and run if the site was attacked. The individual
interviewed did not specifically identify the site to be the Zion Station. The Region III pursued this master
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as if the allegation related to Zion.
(b)
Investigative Actions: Two Region III inspectors.ested '
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each individual:
(1) what their respon'sibilities were
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regar' ding response to an 6ttack on the site, and (2)
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when they wot Id use their weapon? The Station Security
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Administrator was also interviewed concerning his under-
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standing of actions to be taken by the security force
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if the site was attacked. The license's approved
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security plan was reviewed to verify cc,mmitments in the
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plan r :lating te response requirements.
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(c) Findings: All interviewed members ;of the security force, stated that they would interpose themselves between theg,
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i vital equipment and any adversary attempting an intrusion.P,
l In addition, all guards stated that they would use their
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I weapons for self-defense, = if required, and would not desert their post.
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A~ review of the licensee's approved security plan con-
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firmed that the commitments.in the plan are comparable toresponserequirementsin10CFR73.55(h)[4).
The
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interview of the Site Security Administrator showed that
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L he fully understood his and the guard force's response requirements.
(d) Conclusions:
Based on the information provided, the allegation that guards would dasert.their posts and
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run if the site was attacked could not be substantiated.
- The licensee was meeting all approved security plcn requirements concerning response to such a contingency.
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(8) Allegation: Access Control Equipment Was Not Working Properly:
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(a) Allegation Details: One individual alleged that search equipment at the access facility (gatehouse) was not
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working properly in that the alleger was able to bring three pints of whiskey and a.38 caliber revolver into the Zion plant.
(b)
Investigative Actions: TWo Region III inspectors inter-viewed members of the contract guard force regarding the
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bringing of alcoholic beverages onsite and if they had s
,h ever observed or known of anyone attempting to bring
k alcoholic beverages onsite. The guards were interviewed between December 23, 1981 and January 13, 1982.
.i L The inspectors reviewed equipment tests (daily, weekly, and quarterly function test logs) and maintenance log records for search equipment from January 1981 to December 1981.
Independent tests of each walk-through metal detector at the site was also conducted. The inspectors interviewed the Station Security Administrator pertaining to the licensee's policy concerning individuals detected. bringing 4,
alcoholic beverages onsite.
(c) Findings: Most of the guards interviewed responded that it would be possible for an individual to bring alcoholic beverages on site, even though no one provided any direct information that individuals had smuggled alcoholic bever-age on site. Access control requirements, as reflected
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by the licensee's security plan and procedures, are not designed to stop an individual from attempting to bring alcoholic beverages onsite. The NRC requires that the licensee implement a search program for the detection of any firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.
Nr to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1).)
The interview with the Ststion Security Administrator
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showed that the licensee has a policy that does not condone the use of alcoholic beverages onsite by eny irdividual, Any person attempting to bring alcoholic
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beverages into the protected area will be denied access.
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The policy further states that any alcoholic beverage found will be confiscated and appropriate licensee man-
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El agement personnel will be immediately notified and access
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for the individual will only be allowed efter management approval.
A review of appropriate maintenance and test logs showed that all search equipment was operating properly during
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the time period when the alleger stated that a revolver was brought onsite. Testing by Region III inspectors during the course of the investigation also showed that the equipment was operating properly. The inspectors conducted several tests of each piece of equipmunt using a revolver similar to the one allegedly brought into the facility.
(d) Conclusions:
Based on the information provided, the allegation that liquor was being brought into the plant and that an undetected.38 caliber revolver was taken chrough the access control search equipment could not be substantiated. A review of the licensee's access centrol program at entry points into the protected area showed that the licensee was adhering to all security plan access requirements except ss noted in section 4c(3)
above. As stated in that sectic, based on the search procedures used, it was possible that liquor could have been brought onsitu.
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5.
Management Actions During the course of this investigation, actions were taken in order to address or obviate potential drug use related problems, investigation findirgs, and difficulties encountered during the conduct of the in-vestigation. These actions were initiated and taken by both NRC manage-ment and the licensee's management.
Because these actions were taken as the investigation progressed, their description is generally chronological.
a.
As noted previously, Region III management initiated a meeting with all interested law enforcement authorities. This meeting provided guidance and the precedence for Region III to take investigation responsibilities.
It provided the context in which the law enforce-ment authorities viewed the criminal aspects of any possible in-t vestigation findings. This meeting also established the fact that the safety ir. sues involvad in plant operation were the overriding concerns.
b.
A meeting between senior Region III and licensee management was held on February 4, 1982. The meeting was requested by Region III to:
(1) generally review the investigation to date; (2)
discuss the interim conclusions reached and (3) describe the f.ecessary actions to be taken.
Th6 licensee was informed that there appeared to be indications of some drug use by plant personnel and that we were unable to assess the scope of the problem at that time. There was, however, no indication yet developed that drug use by plant employee-had affected the operation of the facility.
In spite of this, the
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a licensee was requested to impicment a program of special drug awareness surveillances in order to obviate the possibility of drug effects on the duty performance of employees. The licensee's commitments and actions are described in Section 6.d below.
Findings regarding the guard force were presented to the licensee's management. They, in turn, forwarded the information to the Regional Manager, Burns International Security Services Inc.
(BISSI) who met with Region III Management and inspectors on February 5, 1982.
Thv. BISSI management suspended two security officers pending their own investi;;ation.
Later, we were in-formed that the two suspended guards were terminated for failure to cooperate with the BISSI investigation. The other four guards identified as occasional offsite users of marijuana were placed under a management surveillance program. This program involved increased, but informal surveillance of those individuals by.
on duty supervisors.
The NRC indcpendently initiated an augmented inspection program c.
for backshitt and weekends on February 10, 1982. This program involved NRC inspectors observing employees' activities on an unannounced random basis to assure that required safety related duties were being properly performed. The augmented program continued uninterrupted until March 1, 1982. On March 25, 1982, a continued but less intense augmented program was begun. This program included the assignment of either a resident inspector from another facility or a regional based inspector to the site from approximately March 22 to June 14, 1982. The augmented program, included an increased monitoring of plant activities while the investigation was being conducted and required a minimum of two hours inspector ccverage during each backshift.
d.
By 1 citer dated February 18, 1982, the licensee informed Region III of the interim steps taken at Zion to increase drug awareness surveillance. This program consisted of the following measures:
(1) At least two back shift and one weekend plant visit would be
made by either a senior member of onsite or offsite manage-ment. The mangers involved included the Divisica Vice Pres-ident, Station Superintendent, Division Managers, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Station Operating Engineers, ctation Technical Staff Supervisors, Security Administrator, and the Staff Assistant to the Operations Manager. During these
visits, performance would be observed and conversations would be conducted with both control room personnel and other per-sonnel working in the plant. Additionally, a management representative would be assigned to the control room, at all times, to observe operations and be alert to any signs of aberrant behavior. Further, the performance of the guards would be monitored during offshift and weekend visits by General Office security personnel.
(2) All plant operators, radiation control technicians, stationmen, and instrument technicians would have contact with their
_. - -. _
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E supervisor drring the first hour of a shift. The superviser would assess the individual's ability to perform their duties.
(3) If aberrant behavior was noted, senior management would conduct a timely review and determine if a fitness for duty examination by competent medical authority should be requested.
(4) The searching of plant personnel and lunch boxes upon entering the plant would be increased.
The licensee also informed Region III management that they were in the process of evaluating the scope and effectivenes of their present drug programs and policies. The former Director of Drug Enforcement Administration, Mr. Peter Bensinger, had been retained to work as a consultant to a broad based committee of company management on the project, e.
As the earlier noted problems in completing the investigation and obtaining needed information were encountered, Region III management, with assistance from NRC Headquarters management, took actions for their resolution. These positions and actions, intended to overcome encountered employee (and attorney) objections regarding the in-vestigation of offsite drug use, were described 2nd discussed with licensee management during a meeting on March 1, 1982. The posi-tions and actiona were then described to the attorneys representing plant employees on March 3, 1982, and were documented in a letter to Commonwealth Edison on the same day. The areas addressed in-cluded:
(1) Written statements would be obtained from the U.S. Attorney and Lake County State's Attorney concerning their position on declining criminal prosecution for past drug possession and use.
(2) No enforcement action would be taken for past offsite drug use.
Current offsite use, which may affect onsite job performance, will require that the Company prohibit the individual from performing safety related activities until the individual had completed a drug rehabilitation program and their fitness for duty had been determined.
(3) Region III would develop criteria concerning the impact of offsite drug use on onsite duty performance. This criteria would be developed through consultation with competent medical authorities and would be provided to the individual employees at the time of the interviews.
(4) The identity of individuals wculd be kept " confidential" by the NRC on a "best efforts" basis.
(5) Allegations taken by the licensee based on their prohibition of any drug or alcohol use onsite would be reviewed by the NRC.
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(6) Any possible " false" statements made to the NRC would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
As noted in other sections of this report, these positions and actions were taken and resulted in the successful completion of the investigation.
f.
In their letter dated February 18, 1982, the licensee indicated that the process of evaluating completely the scope and effective-ness of their drug awareness programs and policies had begun.
The purpose of the evaluation was to ensure that comprehensive and well documented corporate drug awareness policies existed and were properly implemented.
On May 6, 1982, Mr. Bensinger met with Region III management and presented the completion of that evaluation. The review was conducted by a 13 member senior level company panel representing all phases of the operation. The results of the panel included both a policy statement and an implementation program. The new
" Company Policy Regarding Drug Abuse," dated April 29, 1982, includes the following:
(1) The illegal use, sale, or possession of narcotic drugs, or controlled substances while on the job or on Company property is a dischargeable offense.
Any illegal substances will be turned over to the appropriate law enforcement agency and may result in criminal prosecution.
(2) Off-the-job illegal drug use which aould adversely affect an employee's job performance or which could jeopardize the safety of other employees, the public, or Company equipment is proper cause for administrative or disciplinary action up to and in-cluding termination of employment.
(3) Employees who are arrested for off-the-job drug activity may be considered to be in violation of this policy.
(4) Drugs which are illegal include, among others, marijuana, cocaine, hallucinogens, and depressants and stimulants not prescribed by an accredited physician.
(5) Employees undergoing prescribed medical treatment with a controlled substance should report the treatment to their supervisor or Company Medical Department.
In a letter to the Regional Administrator, dated May 6,1982, the licensee informed the NRC of the steps that were being taken to implement the provisions of this policy, which was approved by the Chairman of the Board and President of Commonwealth Edison.
The firm policy statement was approved and, during the first
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three weeks in May, would be reviewed with Company officers, managers, and general office department heads, division vice presidents, and station superintendents.
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Approximately 120 headquarters and division industrial rela-
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tions people would receive a comprehensive orientation and training program covering the health effects of drugs, company policy, legal implications, and supervisory guidelines for action.
All 17,000 Company employees would attend regularly scheduled
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or special meetings beginning in June to review the policy.
These meetings would be conducted by the industrial relations staff with assistance from medical professionals.
Special training would be conducted for all supervisory per-
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sonnel to assist them in identifying aberrant behavior symptoms, identify drugs, and drug influenced behavior.
The policy was reviewed with union leadership on April 26,
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1982. Their response and general support was positive.
Onsite managers have been designated for law enforcement
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liaison.
Meetings would be held with contractors and union leaders in
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the building trades to review and implement policies at all construction sites.
The Employee Assistance Program, including drug treatment
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and counseling, would be made available to ell employees.
Supervisors have the responsibility to ensure employees
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are in a condition to work and for referring questionable cases for fitness-for-duty examinations, including urine testing Background investigation procedures would be continued with
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psychological testing for all nuc1cer operators and licensed personnel.
Pre-employment physicals would continue to include urine
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testing to identify drug users.
Searches would be made of employees and lockers on an
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intermittent and as-needed basis.
In-service and new employee orientation programs, along
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with various Company manuals and booklets, would stress communication of the drug policy.
Medical experts and treatment resources have been identified i
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and would be available to assist the Medical Departments and Employee Assistance Program. Nursing staff and doctors would J
be fully briefed ou the policy and latest health information.
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g.
On April 23, 1982,- the licensee was provided the names and pertinent information of the two individuals who admitted the offsite use of marijuana within the criteria established for determining the possible effect of onsite performance. By letter dated April 27, 1982, NRC requested that the licensee inform us in writing of the program to be instituted to assure those Individuals are, and will continue to be, fit for duty.
The licensee responded by letter dated May 18, 1982. The in-dividuals were to be interviewed by the Compar,y's Medical Director and would be asked to submit to a urine test to assess the extent of offsite drug use and evaluate the impact on fitness for duty.
One individual complied cad was certified as fit for duty. The second individual refused to submit to a urine test and as of May 14, 1982, was rer:oved from duty until such time as he would be determined fit for duty.
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ATTACHMENT 1 Effects Criteria
"X-Y Question" Purpose:
To quantify the estimated effects of offsite drug use that might effect onsite performance.
Source:
X portion was based on period covering the allegations.
Y portion was based on input from several sources and the application of that input by Region III.
Individual Usage:
Marijuan,a - Since January 1980 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of performing duties.
Cocaine - Since Janaury 1980 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of performing duties.
LSD - Anytime within the last 3 years.
Amphetamings - Since January 1980 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of performing duties.
Other Controlled Substances - Since January 1980 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of performing duties.
Chronic Usage:
Merijuana, Cocaine, Amphetamines - 3 or more times per week.
Other Controlled Substances - 2 or more times per week.
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ATTACHMENT 2 n.ej
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, pCLEAR STATIONS DIVISION VICE-PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE
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F14
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013 P
Effective Date:
Noveinber 1,1980
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Replaces:
October 1, 1980
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Massrs:
J. S. Bitel R. H. Holyoak
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J. O. Danson N. J. Kalivianakis I
D.'P. Galle R. E. Querio K. L. Graesser /
L. J. Scott e,
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J.,F.
Gudac Q:
u Subject:
Conduct of Operations
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Commonwealth Edicen Company's nuclear plant operations f
must be conducted in the most professional manner possible.
yt-4 Included in the scope of operations are all shift supervisors,
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nuclear station employes who are required to perform in-plant
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duties which may affect nuclear safety, radiological health and PC safety, and the public health and safety.
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)jy In this regard, the following elements are Division pDs.LCy :
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1.
All personnel shall be alert and capable of performing
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their assigned duties in a professional manner at all
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Of.particular note are operators who are tied JQ to a duty station (including control room operators);
hr; such personnel must be attentive to their panels in order to professionally execute their duties.
Examples
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of actions and performance which cannot be tolerated g
are:
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Sleeping.
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(b)
Habitual or Chronic Lack of Attentiveness.
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Card playing, games, or other distractions
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from prescribed duties.
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(d)
Alcohol.or Drug Use.
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So-called practical jokes which could reduce
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the ability of persons or equipment to perform F
as. required.
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Any other acts which could adversely affect the ability of individuals or equipment to
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perform their intended safety functions.
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ANYONE FAILING TO ADHERE TO THESE REQUIREMENTS
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WILL BE SUBJECT TO SEVERE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCHARGE FROM 6 THE COMPANY.
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2.
The only reading material allowed will be professional, job related literature approved by the Station Superintendent.
Examples of reading material not allowed are newspapers, novels, non-professional
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magazines and other non-job related material.
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No radios or television capable.of receiving commercial
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broadcasts will be permitted in the plant except.M
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authorized by the Station Superintendent.
ANYONE FAILING TO COMPLY WITH ELEMENTS 2 OR 3 WILL BE SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY MEASURES COMMENSURATE WITH THE SEVERITY OF THE VIOLATION, TAKING INTO
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ACCOUNT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INFRACTION.
DIS-CIPLINARY ACTION COULD INVOLVE WARNINGS, DISCIPLINARY SUSPENSIONj OR DISCHARGE, ANY OF WHICH STEPS COULD BE REPEATED OR BYPASSED.
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The above elements are not all inclusive.
They do,
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for certain
..however, outline specific performance requ remen s l
clements of nuclear plant operations which indicate the seriousness I
with which the Company views such actions.
Our objective is a professional atmosphere - one in which operators and their super-
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l visors continue to gain in knowledge of the plant and its operations
l while performing normal evolutions and routines.
The confidence of the general public in our ability to operate our nuclear stations can be severly damaged by any failure to adhere to a professional code of conduct.
The attached newspaper crticle concerning the Trojan Nuclear Station represents a case in point and is included to illustrate the potential consequences of
'ations of this policy.
Such publicity detracts from the profes-
.a1 level of performance of all personnel in the nuclear industry.
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