IR 05000295/1981016
| ML20010D089 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1981 |
| From: | Axelson W, Paperiello C, Phillips M, Wohld P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010D087 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-81-16, 50-304-81-12, NUDOCS 8108210455 | |
| Download: ML20010D089 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Reports No. 50-295/81-16; 50-304/81-12 Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Zion Site, Zion, IL Inspection Conducted: July 28-30, 1981
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Inspectors:
M. P.
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P. R. Wohld 8/
o E/7/[/
Approved By:
W. L. Axe so Acting Chief Emergegcy Preparedness Section
.J PIhrib Cli ef, I
Emergency Preparedness and Program Support Branch l
I Inspection Summary Inspection on July 28-30, 1981 (Reports No. 50-295/81-16;50-304/81-1M
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l Areas inspected: Routine, announced inspection of Zion emergency exercise I
involving observations by six NRC representatives of key functions and l
locations during the exercise. The inspection involved 90 inspector-hours l
onsite by two NRC inspectors and four consultants.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
l 8108210455 810010 PDR ADOCK 05000295'
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed V.L. Crow,NRCConsultant,TechnicalSupportCenter(TbC)
T. C. Earle, NRC Consultant, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
J. G. Myers, NRC Consultant, Radiatioa Environmental Monitoring Team M. P. Phillips, Region III, Inplant Health Physics Team B. C. Thompson, NRC Consultant, Inplant Health Physics Team P. R. Wohld, Region III, TSC Commonwealth Edison and Areas Observed L. O. De1 George, Director of Nuclear Licensir.g, Media Center F. Palmer, Vice President Nuclear Stations, Recovery Manager, E0F K. Graesser, Plant Superintendent, Station Director, TSC D. Galle, Chief Controller, EOF J. Baker, Controller, Control Room J. Barr, Controller, TSC R. Budowle, Controller, TSC W. Brenner, Controller, Media Center G. Nelson, Controller, EOF F. Krowzack, Controller, Inplant Health Physics Team and Laboratory I. Bryant, Controller, Radiation Environmental Monitoring Team K. Weaver, Controller, Inplant Health Physics Team P. Corwin, Controller, Inplant Health Physics Team l
V. Chaney, Controller, Radiation Environmental Monitoring Team L. Caldwell, Controller, Operations Support Center (OSC)
The above personnel attended the exit interview on July 29, 19b1.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items Related to Emergency Preparedness
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(Closed) Open Item 295/81-13-23; 304/81-09-23:
Installation of equipment at the interim EOF. The inspectors observed that procedures, P&ID drawings, FSAR, telecopying equipment, and radiological monitoring equipment were available at the interim EOF.
3.
General An exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) and the Zion Annex was conducted at the Zion Station on July 29, 1981, testing the integrated responses of the licensee, Federal, State, and local organizations to a simulated emergency.
The exercise tested the licensee's response to a major release of noble eas with some iodine. Attachment I describes the scenario.
The exercise was integrated with a test of the States of Illinois and and Wisconsin, Lake County (Illinois), and Kenosha County (Wisconsin) emergency plans.
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4.
General Observations a.
, Procedures
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This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using the GSEP, Zion Annex, and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) used by the Corporate Command Center (CCC), EOF, and Station.
b.
Coordination Ti4e response was coordinated, orderiy, and timely.
If the event had been real, the actions of the licensee would have beer sufficient to permit the States and local authorities to take appropriate protective actions.
c.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with six NRC observers and approximately 40 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observers. FEMA observed and will report on the responses of the States and local governments.
d.
Critique The licensee held a critique immediately following the exercise the afternoon of July 29, 1981. The NRC and the licensee identified the deficiencies as discuased in the exit interview.
5.
Specific Deficiencies Noted Problems identified by the NRC observers during the exit interview included:
(1) workspace was too small in the TSC for NRC and licensee interaction; (2) the actual staging area for Rad / Chem Technicians (RCTs) does not fit the description in the Emergency Plan; (3) the workspace was too small for all personnel required to be at the interim EOF; and (4) incorporation of more technical realism into the scenario in future drills and exercices is necessary to adequately test operations and technical personnel.
6.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room The operators responded well to cues, and made proper notifica-tions.
Informatian on plant conditions was routinely passed to the TSC in a tieely manner. The exercise did not test the operator's ability to correct plant malfunctions. This area is tested during the NRC licensing examination of ibe operators, however, future exercises should incorporate more technical tealism into the scenario to adequately test operations and technical personnel. This was discussed in a telephone con-
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versation between Messrs. B. Lee and C. Reed of C;Co, and Victor Stello, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, of the NRC on July 27, 1981.
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b.
Corporate Command Center (CCC)
The initial decisions regarding the exercise came from the CCC.
l Communications between the TSC, EOF, and CCC were adequate.
l Initial control of the emergency exercise by the CCC prior to j
activation of the E0F was adequate.
c.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
l Activation of the permanent TSC was orderly and timely.
Command and Control functions performed at the TSC were very good. Monitoring of the TSC for radiological habitability was simulated using an Eberline PING-3, which measures airborne radiation and contamination levels. The PING-3 was located in the same room as the Station Group Directors.
The noise level due to operation of the PING-3 would probably be excessive, resulting in ineffective communications within the TSC. The licensee identified this problem during their critique, and stated the PING-3 would be relocated to an area monitoring the same ventil.1ation.
l During the course of the exercise, which NRC regional personnel also participated in, some personnel requiring access to plant data as it is normally displayed in the TSC were refused access due to space limigptions. As was discussed in a previous (
inspection report, the licensee has not submitted a layout diagram to NRC describing how the criteria in NUREG-0696 will be met with regard to the positioning of the 26 personnel in the TCC as specified in GSEP.
During the exercise, all licensee personnel were located in the monitoring / planning area, rather than positioned throughout the entire TSC.
Access to this portion of the TSC was then controlled.
Section 2.4 of NUREG-0696 states that the size of the TSC shall be large enough te provide space for personnel access to functional displays of TSC data, and provide a separate root adequate for at least three persons to be used for private NRC consultations.
It further states that the TSC working space shall be sized for j
a minimum of 26 persons, including 19 designated by the licensee, five NRC personnel, and one each from the States of Illinois and
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Based on tbc current location of personnel within the TSC and security procedures used, these criteria in NUREG-0696 were not met during the exercise.
Review of the final TSC for approval will be made by the NRC Division of Emergency Prepared-ness, and this TSC must be fully operational, including the Safety Parameter Display System, by October, 1982.
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d.
Operation Support Center (OSC)
The OSC as described in the GSEP was the assembly area for the l
emergency maintenance teams only, even though Section 7.1.3 of 1/
IL Inspection Reports No. 50-295/81-13; 50-304/81-09.
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d the generic GSEP states that the OSC is the location to which operat$cns support personnel will report during an emergency and from which they will be dispatched for duties or assign-ments in support of emergency operations. None of the Radiation /
Chemistry Technicians (RCTs) reported to the OSC, rather, they reported to the Radiation Protection Office. This office was used instead of the OSC described in the GSEP for three reasons:
(1) the only entrance or exit to the Auxiliary Building or Containments is past this office; (2) a large suppl of monitor-ing equipment is maintained near this office; an? (3) communications between inplant health physics teams, this office, and the TSC is in place to facilitate rapid transmission of health physics data to the TSC. All maintenance teams dispatched from the OSC were required to initially report to the Radiation Protection Office to pick up a health physics team and authorization for exposure. The licensee identified this difference in personnel locations during their critique, and agreed to aither revise GSEP to agree with c rrent practice or dispatch RCTs from the OSC.
The OSC and Rad Protection Office were manned in a timely manner.
Although air sampling and radiation monitoring were performed to ensure habitability of the OSC, TSC, Control Room, and the Auxil-iary Building in general, no such monitoring was performed in the Radiation Protection Office.
If this area is to be used as the assembly point for radiation protection personnel, it must also be routinely checked for habitability. Periodic plant status updates from the Control Room were passed on to personnel at the Rad. Protection Office via the Rad / Chem Director. Management of the radiation protection personnel during the exercise was very good, as all health physics personnel were aware of their duties and were kept informed of changing conditions at all times.
e.
Emergency Operations Faci?.its (E0F)
The temporary EOF, which is located in the Westinghouse Training Center lunchroom, was activated in accordance with the Emergency Plan in a timely manner.
Command and control functions at the EOF were adequate, and it was clear who was in charge. Adequate briefings of personnel regarding updated plant conditions were held. The interface between the senior managers at the EOF and the TSC was adequate. The Environmental Emergency Coordinator maintained good records.
Communications bet 9een the field monitoring teams and the Environs Director were excelleut. The NRC dedicated Health Physics Network (HPN) and Emergency Notification System (ENS) phones were not a-vailable, and the phones provided for NRC use were not located near the recovery center managers. The HPN and ENS phours are under the direction of the NRC, and will be installed in the interim EOF in the near future. Due to the number of personnel assigned to the recovery center in the EOF, noise levels were high and difficult to control. This had a tendency to interfere with communications.
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Although Ceco owns the entire Westinghouse Training Center, and leases it to them for their use, for the purposes of the EOF, only the lunch room was utilized. This space by itself is in-adequate to contain the number of personnel that would be expected to respond to an emergency. Although the licensee has stated that in an emergency the entire facility could be used, there is no plan or procedure for utilizing the e This is discussed in a previous inspection reportgyire facility.
Work stations
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as placed for the exercise did not face the center of the room, and were poorly organized, e.g.,
State representatives were far removed from the emergency control center (Environmental / Emergency Coordinator and Staff), and some personnel could not see data status borads.
f.
Public Information Center The Public Information Center was established at the Zion-Benton Township Moose Lodge in Winthrop Harbor. This facility is approximately one mile from the interim EOF.
CECO's technical spokesperson gave periodic news briefings throughout the enarcise.
g.
Environmental Monitoring Teams The environmental monitoring teams were assembled in a timely manner, briefed by the Environs Director, and assigned to the nearsite environs (within about two miles of the plant).
Com-munications equipment and instrumr.;tation were thoroughly checked, and all monitoring equipment was within calibration. Team members were well versed in their duties.
Sampling locations assigned by the Environs Director were quickly located and required samples were properly taken.
Communications were handled very well. Teams were kept well informed of plant status and radiation icvels.
It was suggested that pocket dosimeters be shielded from the weather by bagging prior to being placed in the field.
h.
Inplant Health Physics Teams The inplant health physics teams were dispatched from the Radiation Protection Office ra'her than the OSC. The teams were aware of the location of protective clothing, self contained breathing apparatus, radiological monitoring equipment, and sampling equipment. The teams demonstrated adequate exposure control and maintained exposure control for maintenance teams involved in the simulated repair of a valve. A higher initial exposure authorization for maintenance team workers should have been issued by the Rad / Chem Director, as the initial authorization was exceeded by ona member of the team.
RCTs demonstrated the ability to determine it elevated radiation levels found were due to airborne activity or direct radiation.
All surveys performed by tne teams were documented, and the records kept in the Radiation Protection Office.
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IE Inspection Reports No. 50-295/81-12; 50-504/81-09.
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7.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit inte view at the conclusion of the licensee's critique with representatives denoted in Paragraph 1.
The licensee agreed to address the inspectors' concerns. stated in Paragraph 5, however, the licensee responded by stating that they felt the size of their current TSC is adequate.
Attachment: Exercise S_enario
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21 m L(rX ISL' OF JIJ 29, 1931 h. vised Jou i, 1951 hibE M
TDE T(PC I S.M.D UMLItC Ol' Cutin 2CS to.
ISSLTD Mr.SSACE
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0550 Control All Ground Rales (pre-published).
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(Oh,o00J
0555 Control C.R.
- Nortral Operating Information s
Ala rt
0600 Control C.R.
- Reactor Troubles Reactor Coo'lant 14ak of 55 GPM.
EAL for ALERT 50 CPM. Wind Data: From SSE at 10 MPH.
C.I.
0600-1045 C.I.
H.P. tns
- Dose & Dose Rate Info in plant.
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0600-0915 C.I.
ICT in Lab
- Nsults of Containment hir 6-Reactor Coolant
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sanples drawn prior to 0915.
C.I.
0600-1045 C.I.
Environs
- Dose Rate at various locations in plant Teams environs. (Site Map)
C.I.
0600-1000 C.I.
Response to
- Weather Forecast for next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. To be provided gaeries of M4T if questioned.
C.I.
0 @ -1045 C.I.
C.R. or TSC - Containment integrity is not impaired.
06d Control C.R.
- Reactor Status.
0630 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status.
3A 0630 Contingency C.R.
- Contingency Message Declaration of ALERT - NARS form provided. Notify SPSO.
0645 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status.
0700 Control C.R.
Reactor Status.
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0700 Contirgercy IIF
- Contingency Message - Assure notificat'.on.to states,of ALERT.
Sit ergency
0715 Control C.R.
- Reactor Trouble: 6 x 102 R/hr in containment, (Oh. A15)
(EALs for Site Emergency,>_ 4 x 102 R/hr in containment) Wind Datas (From SSE at 10 MPH)
0730 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status. Wind Data.
0745 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status. Wind Data,
0800 Control C.R.
- Heactor Status. Wind Data.
0800 Contingercy hTT,CCE - Contingency message Declaration of Site Emergency.
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c.R.
(inRS Form provided) - Notify States.
0515 Control C.R.
Reactor Status. Wind Data.
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0830 control C.R.
- Reactor Status. Wird Data.
0845 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status. Wind Data.
0900 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status. Wind Data.
Genertl
0915 Control C.h.
- Reactor Status: 3 x 103 R/hr in primary containmen (EALs for General Emergency:
FrergIncy 12 x 10pR/hr in primary containment)
(Transttion)
(to Reisase)
Wind Data.
(0915-1045)
C.I.
0915-1315 C.I.
ICT in 1.ab
- Results of Contairmnt Air & Reactor Coolant sarples drawn between 0915 and 1315.
0930 Cratrol C.R.
- Reacter Status. Wind Data.
- 0945 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status. Wind Data.
l Not C.I. - Control Information - verbally presented Data.
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8wvit ed any 7
, 1981
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ISS S MPSSNT
h eneral 1000 Contingency C k..Trc, Contingency Message, Declaration of General
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ner gergy tim,C%E Daergency (tnN form provided). Notify Transitu.nl States.
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16B 1000 To 8 sse)
Cont hgency Tc.
Seno HP Team to collect Heactor 091
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Ooolant & Cnntainment air sanples.
h tanoed)
1000 Control C.k.
- Reactor Status. Wind Data.
C.I.
1000-1600 C.I.
Response to Update forecast to be provided if requested.
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gaeries of Mil i
1015 Control C.R.
Reactor Status. Wind Data.
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Reactor Status. Wind Data.
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1030 Control C.R.
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Contingency Message - Iodine and Noble Gas 1030 Contingency TSC,00F
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Hesults of Containment Air and Heactor Coolant Samples. Transmit to utJS & Wisc.
Leneral
1045 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status: Containment Pressure spike to h ig:ncy 60 PSIG. Purge valves R'/-0003 & R/-0004 have IHelscse)
lost closed indications (White) status lights.
[1045-1245)
Stack monitors are pegged high off-scale. High range effluent monitor is reading 5.55 x 108 uC1/sec.
C.I.
1045-1245 C.I.
H.P.
- Dose Rates in-plant and near purge valve.
Maint. Team hate repak can M Weted by 1245.
C.I.
1045-1245 C.I.
C.I.
1045-1245 C.I.
Environs Team - Dose Rates at various locations in plant environs.
Simulated readings.
1100 control C.R.
Reactor Status. Wind Data.
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1115 Contingency CR,TSC,hCIC - Contirgency message. Release is occurring through h
containment purge line. Notify States, (NARS Form Provided).
- 1115 Control C.R.
Reactor Status. Wind Data.
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22B 1115 Contingency Maintenance Dispatch maintenance teams to investigate
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Director rmalfunction causing release.
1130 Control C.R.
Reactor Status. Wind Data.
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1145 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status. Wind Data.
1200 Control C.R.
Reactor Status. Wind Data.
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1215 Control C.R.
Reactor Status. Wind Da*.
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1215 Control Maintenance - Progress Report on Repairs.
Teams
1230 Control C.R Reactor Status. Wind Data.
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h.covery
1245 Control Maintenance Depairs completed.
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P ase Team ($245-1600)
1245 Control C.R.
Peactor status: Stack Monitor readings normal
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range.
1300 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status. Wind data.
1315 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status. Contairunent radiation below 400 R/Hr. Primary systera is stabilized in recirculation phase. Winc; speed increase to 20 t.ph.
1320 Contingency C.R,TSC
- Contirgency Message. Release has stopped.
CCC Notify States, (fMRS Form Provided).
1330 Control C.R.
- Reactor Status.
Norest C.I. - Control Inforrution - verbally presented Data.
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Revised JutY 1. 1981 PhA.SL POG.
TIMC T&E ISbLTD OlfILINE OF CutinNTS l
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155 2 WEfX
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- Reduce emergency classification to A!IRT.
Recovery l
Phase Notify States, (NM5 Form Provides).
l (1245-1600)
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(Continued)
1415 state DOC Control Imal 11r's
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Re-entry can begin.
1600 control C.R..TSC
- End Exercise, conduct critiques.
(Variable)
gor,cy-All Teams l
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Notes C.I. - Control Information - verbally presented Data.
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