IR 05000295/1981001
| ML19347E132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1981 |
| From: | Hayes D, Kohler J, Waters J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347E125 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-81-01, 50-295-81-1, 50-304-81-01, 50-304-81-1, NUDOCS 8104240073 | |
| Download: ML19347E132 (15) | |
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O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No.
50-295/81-01 50-304/81-01 Docket No.
50-295; 50-304 License No. : DPR-39, DPR-48 Licensee :
Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, II. 60690
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Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Inspection At:
Zion Site, Zion, Illinois Inspection Conducted: Ja uary 1-February 27, 1981 Inspectors:
J. E.
hier
. R LGL J. R. Waters 3 - 8.7 - 8/
Approved By:
D W Hayes, ief Proj ts ection IB D
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Inspection Summarv Inspection on January 1-Feb rua ry 27, 1981 (Report No. 50-295/81-01:
50-304/81-01)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced resident inspection of licensee action on previous items, reactor operations, operator logs, steam generator inspection, ECCS throttle valves, Type B6C testing, Sealed Sources, "0" Diesel Generator Status, TMI action verification, purge valve operations, radioactive releases, preparation for refueling, refueling surveillance, refueling maintenance, refueling activities, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, LER follow-up and IE Circular follow-up. The inspection involved 489 inspector hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br /> onsite during off-shif ts.
Results: Of the areas inspected one item of noncompliance (severity Level V-Improper log keeping, paragraoh 4) was identified.
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DETAIIS l
1.
Persons Contacted j
- K. Graesser, Superintendent
- L. Soth, Operating Assistant Superintendent J. Marianyi, Operating Engineer J. Gilmore, Unit 2 Operating Engineer E. Fuerst, Unit 1 Operating Engineer K. Kofron, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent T. Miosi, Technical Staff Supervisor H. Studtmann, Quality Assurance Manager T. Rieck, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor B. T'Niemi, Technical Staff Engineer R. Budowle, Technical Staff Engineer
- G. Plim1, Assistant Superintendent Administrative and Support Services D. Waldon, Fuel Handling Supervisor D. Howard, Rad-Chem Supervisor
- P. Kuhner, Quality Assurance R. Shannon, Inservice Inspection Engineer
- T.
Lukens, Quality Control Supervisor
- Denotes those present at management exit of February 27, 1981 2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (closed) Unresolved item (295/80-25-2, 304/80-27-2) : Modify procedutes to minimize the time accumulators are cross connected via vent lines.
The licensee has ccmpleted modifications to station procedure SOI-4.
(closed) Unresolved item (295/80-17-10): Determine cause of failure of 1A0V-SS9355A reported in LER 50-295/80-39. The licensee cycled the valve five times during Unit 1 outage and it operated satisfactorily each time.
Valve was visually inspected by maintenance department with no defects observed.
(closed) Unresolved item (295/80-12/01):
Inspect the 1B charging pump for cracks.
Destructive examination of the 1A charging pump revealed clad cracking on the inside surfaces and boric acid attack. The 1A pump was replaced with a new completely stainless pump. In a special report, the licensee committed to examine the IB charging pump ultrasonically during the 1981 refueling outage.
During the 1981 Unit I refueling, the licensee decided to replace the IB
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charging pump with a new all stainless pump like the 1A replacement. The licensee intends to replace Unit 2 charging pumps (2A, 2B) during the 1982 refueling with all stainless pumps.
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The NRC issued Information Notice 80-38 on this item.
(closed) Unresolved item (295/80-11-01): Zion Station has demonstrated operability of Unit 1 purge valves to the satisfaction of NRR and success-fully purged Unit 1 containment above cold shutdown (see paragraph 10).
3.
Summary of Operations Unit 1 The unit operated at power levels up to 99% and began a power coast down for end of core life operation.
Unit 1 1981 refueling outage began at 0515 on January 15, 1981. The outage is expected to last approximately 66 days.
Unit 2 The unit operated at power levels up to 93%. Reactor power was limited due to isolation of one of the low pressure feedwater heater strings because of tube leakage.
No unscheduled shutdowns were experienced.
4.
Unit Reactor Coolant System Leakage While making control room rounds on February 13, 1981, the inspector noted in the Unit 2 NSO turnover sheet from Shif t 1 to Shif t 2 that an excessive reactor coolant system leak had been discovered and was corrected.
Revs.ew of the NSO log book for Shift 1 on February 13, 1981 shows one entry made at 0000 describing that the results of the daily reactor coolant system (RCS) flow balance. This entry indicated a 1.3 gpm unidentified RCS leak.
No entries regarding the leak were contained in the shif t engineer's log nor were there any entries in the NSO or shif t engineer's log to indicate that the leak was corrected.
The inspector reviewed the volume control tank (VCT) automatic makeup strip chart for twenty-four hours prior 0900 on February 13, 1981 and determined that the excessive leakage condition began at approximately 0800 the pre-
_vious day, on. February 12, 1981.
Iog books were again checked to determine whether the abnormal VCT makeup rate was logged. Neither the NSO or SE i
logs indicated the excessive leakage.
The inspector checked the plant stack monitor for the twenty-four hour
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period beginning at 0900 on February 12, 1981 and determined that over the
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twenty-four hour period there was a gradual approximate 2000 cpm background
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release rate increase but well below the alarm point. This gradual increase in the R14 release rate had gone undetected until the inspector's discovery.
Upon licensee inspection of the R14 chart, an EFS phone call was made.
Samples subsequently pulled showed levels of activity in the lower limit-3-
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of detection. Further inspection by the licensee and a Region III specialist could not identify any specific plant process that resulted in the increase in R14.
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l The inspector ultimately determined that on February 12, 1981, a pressurizer sample valve opened to take the morning RCS sample, was never closed.
The VCT automatic makeup began replenishing the RCS. On February 13, 1981, at 0000, the results of a computer RCS flow balance indicated an excessive leak and at 0530 on February 13, 1981 the sample naive was closed, i
The inspector concluded that the event pointed out management weaknesses which require attention:
a.
A gradual radioactive release rate increase occurred over a twenty-four hour period without operator detection.
b.
No log book entties of the leakage condition were made regarding the abnormal VCT makeup and management took no immediate action.
Technical specification 6.2.A states in part that detailed written procedures shall be prepared, approved and adhered to.
Contrary to the above, Zion Administrative Procedure 10-52-2, Operating i
Log Books, was violated on February 12, 1981 when nuclear station operator and shif t engineer log books did not include an entry regarding significant reactor coolant system leakage that was occurring on Zion U it 2.
This n
is a Severity Level V Violation.
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In responding to this noncompliance, the inspector requests that the licensee address the actions it plans to take to facilitate operator detection of increases in the plant radioactive release rate.
5.
Unit 1 Steam Generator Inspection Approximately one week prior to Unit i refueling outage, the licensee determined that IB and 1C steam generators had primary to secondary tube leakage. This determination was based on increasing gross beta / gamma-activities of routine steam generator samples. By securing blowdown and monitoring the buildup rate of iodine -131 in the steam generator, the licensee estimated the leak rates to be 2.25 GFD and 45 GFD for IC and d
IB steam generators respectively. After shutdown and cooldown, an attempt was made to locate the leaking tubes by performing a 600 psi secondary side pressure test with the primary side of the SG drained. Pressure was held for approximately 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> but no leakage was visible from the
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primary side. Multi-frequency eddy current testing was then performed on approximately 2580 (out of 3388) tubes each in the IB and IC steam generators. These tubes were probed from the hot leg side of the tube sheet to at least the far end of the U' bend. This inspection included
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i the first three rows adjacent to the divider plate, all tubes around the circumference and selected central areas. Additionally all other tubes on the IB steam generator were probed from the hot leg side of the tube
sheet to the first support plate.
In the IB steam generator, indications of degradation were found in the U-bends of 16 row 2 (second row from the divider plate) tubes. Since the indications occurred in the U-bend, their depth could not be determined with any degree of certainty and the 16 tubes were plugged. One tube in Row I was impassible to a 0.550 inch eddy current probe and was plugged.
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One Row 9 tube was found to be degraded but not to a depth exceeding the plugging limit. Test results for another Row 9 tube showed corrosion external to the tube on the support plate. This tube was not plugged.
A total of 10 cubes scattered in Rows 29 through 39 produced indication signals in the vicinity of the anti-vibration bars that were indecipherable.
The signals were not consistent from tube to tube. Three tubes which pro-duced signals that were larger in magnitude and closer to the normal in-
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dication pattern were plugged. This made a total of twenty tubes plugged
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in the IB steam generator.
In the IC steam generator, indications of degradation were found in the U-bead of two Row 1 tubes. These were plugged. A Row 8 and a Row 9 tube showed degradation indications that were less than the plugging limit and were not plugged. Another Row 9 tube and a Row 15 tube showed indications that exceeded the plugging limit and were, therefore, plugged. A Row 17 tube produced indication signals in the vicinity of the antivibration bar that was indecipherable. This tube was plugged making a total of 5 tubes plugged in 1C steam generator.
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Since the majority of indications were found in Rows 1 and 2, these rows I
were eddy current tested on the 1A and ID steam generators even though they had not demonstrated any leakage. No indications were found.
The licensee consulted with representatives of Westinghouse and Con-Am
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Inspections on the decisions regarding which areas to inspect and which tubes to plug.
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I No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
ECCS Injection Path Throttle Valves
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In response to an occurrence at another facility, the inspector examined the licensee's provisions for establishing and. maintaining proper throttle
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positions on 12 valves used to control the flow rate; from the boron injection
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tank to the cold legs, from the safety injection pumps to the cold legs, and f
from the safety injection pumps to the hot legs. The proper flow rates are
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verified by station procedure TSS 15.6.84, charging and S.I. check valve verification test. Proper throttle position is ensured by the use of welded stem locking devices, iA the welds must be cut or the locking l
device destroyed in order to change the valve position.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Sealed Source contamination
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The inspector received a verbal request from the NRR to compare the requirements for sealed cource contamination contained in the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) with the existing station policy. The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed RP1480 and determined that all STS requirements are contained within the RP1480 procedure with the ex-ception of annual NRC reporting of sealed source contamination.
No items of noncompliancs were identified.
8.
Redundancy of the O Diesel Generator During control room inspection on January 5,1981 the Senior Resident Inspector noted that with both units operating, each unit had a unit specific diesel generator out of service. The common diesel ("0")
was being included as the redundant diesel to both units. Unit operation in this condition was deemed permissable by station management for seven days under technical specifications. The inspector questioned this interpretation since the "0" diesel cannot be physically tied to both Unit I and Unit 2 simultaneously. Moreover, the "10" diesel cannot be dedicated to one unit or the other unit until the diesel senses bus undervoltage.
The licensee stated that the mode of operation was permissable since the FSAR consideration for a blackout is not site but unit specific.
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The licensee further stated that should a blackout occur on one unit requiring the common diesel, the other operating unit would be lef t l
with only one diesel generator and would immediately comply with the limitingcondition of operation for a unit with one diesel generator.
The licensee's interpretation was discussed with the Operating Project Manager, NRR, and cognizant personnel in the regional office. The Senior Resident Inspector requested the responsible licensee offsite review organization to review the required action to be taken with one unit specific diesel generator on each unit out of service. No changes in the licensee's actions are anticipated.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
IE Headquarters Request for Senior Resident Inspector Review a.
Three Mile Island Lessons Learned category January 1,1981 Items The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed the status of the TNI
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requirements to be implemented January 1,1981. All require-ments were met with the exception of the following two items:
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(1) As noted in licensee correspondence to NRR, the STA training program is now being carried out.
Implementation of fully qualified STA's meeting Ceco requirements will begin on June 1, 1981.
In the interim STA and augmented SRO personnel are carrying out the STA function.
(2) The licensee has not made any containment pressure setpoint changes.
(3) Licensee has received NRC permission to purge in hot shutdown with the valves blocked 30-50 degrees, b.
The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed the results of a compil-ation made to determine the cumulative number of days Zion Unit 1 and 2 were shutdown due to TNI modification IE Bulletins, Circulars, Orders from October 1,1979 to the present. The results are as follows:
Unit 1 Unit 2 77 days 101 days c.
ITWS Procedure Review the Senior Resident Inspector was directed by IE headquarters to review the licensee's procedure for coping with an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). The control room operator action is contained in Emergency Operating Procedure-12. The inspector determined that the licensee's procedure met the inspection guidance provided:
If an automatic scram should have occurred and has not, the licensee should:
(f) Depress manual scram button immediately.
(2) If rods still do not move, begin immediate emergency boration and attempt to drive rods in.
(3) If rods fail to move, have power disconnect switch or breaker to rod holding coils opened.
(4) Continue efforts to effect shutdown.
The operator should have complete authority to commence
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emergency boration, and he should be responsbile for doing this when the situation requires it.
Criteria for the use of emergency boration relative to inabil.ity to insert nega-tive reactivity by other means should be included in emer-gency procedures.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Unit 1 Containment Puraina The licensee was able to demonstrate purge valve operability, in accord i
with the NRC's October 23, 1979 interim purging position by limiting
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the purge valves to between thirty and fifty degrees open. The valves were prohibited from opening a full ninety degrees by limiting air supply pressure on the valve operator with the installation of pressure regulators upstream of the air supply pilot valves. The modification permitted Unit 1 containment to be purged prior to reaching cold shutdown for the 1981 refueling outage.
The licensee has committed to purge only to improve working conditions, i
to perform safety related surveillance or maintenance. In the case of Unit 1, the purging was required to perform technical staff surveillance-21 which is the hot visual reactor coolant system leakage surveillance.
The Senior Residsnt Inspector verified that the daily air pressure sur-veillance and every five day mechanical valve position surveillance was performed.
Unit 2 will be modified prior to the next scheduled refueling outage.
Until such time as the Unit 2 modification is complete, no purging
except in cold shutdown is permitted.
I No items of noncompliance were identified.
11. Radioactive Releases
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During the inspection interval, the inspector reviewed several radio-active releases from the plant to determine whether technical specifications and approved plant procedures were being followed. These releases are described below:
a.
On January 27, 1981 in conjunction with the Unit i refueling outage, the Unit I condenser hotwell was released to the forbay without the requirement of 44,000 gpm dilution as specified by technical specifications 3.11.3.
Upon investi-gation the licensee stated that the release of the condenser hotwell does not qualify as a release of radioactive vaste similar to a lake discharge tank release unless sampling showed significant activity levels. The samples taken of the hotwell prior to release showed a gross beta gamma activity of 7.45x10-7 microcuries per cubic centimeter and a tritium activity of 2.48x10-5 microcuries per cubic centi-meter which is well below limits set for lake discharge tank
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release. Region III specialists agreed with the licensee's characterization of the hotwell release as not covered under technical specification 3.11.3.
b. The inspector reviewed radioactive release permit 81-33 rela-ting to the Unit I containment purge in hot shutdown and de-termined that all requirements were met prior to the purge.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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12. Duration of the Containment Leak Rate Test
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The inspector informed the licensee of the existing policy regarding the duration of the integrated leak rate test required by 10CFR50 Appendix J:
Tests of a duration shorter than twenty-four hours must be performed in accordance with BNr0P-1 and must ha ce been performed in the past. First time reduced duration i
tests must receive prior NRC approval.
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The licensee responded to this position as follows:
a.
The NRC had approved the Point Beach Nuclear Power Station's previous reduced duration tests even though these tests were clearly in violation of 10CFR50 Appendix J in that the reactor coolant system was not vented.
b.
The Zion Station instrumentation is state of the art equip-ment, superior in every way to the instruments used at Point Beach.
c.
Zion Station performs the test with plant personnel while Point Beach uses an outside contractor.
d.
BNTOP-1 specifies an inferior computing method (total time)
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which Zion Station used in the past. The total time method was abandoned by industry and government in the Draf t Integrated 1.
Leak Rate Standard ANS-N274 l
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Zion Station has performed a reduced duration ILRT in 1980.
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Zion Stat!on will run the best test possible consistent with accept d industry practice and NRC acceptance criteria
as applied to other plants in NRC Region III.
13.
Preparation for Refuelina The inspector verified that technically adequate procedures were approved for fuel handling, transfers, core verification, and inspection of fuel to be reused.
The inspector verified that the licensee had submittel a proposed core
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reload technical specification change to NRR (or that the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation of the reload core showed that prior
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NRR review is not required). The inspector also reviewed the licensee's
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program for overall outage control.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Surveillance - Refueling The inspector observed portions of TSS 15.6.35. (Manual Actuation of Safety Injection and Safe Shutdown System), Diesel Generator Loading Test, and PT-23 (MSIV Refueling Surveillance) on Unit 1 to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with regulatory requirements, licensee commitments and administrative controls; that minimum crew requirements were met, test prerequisites were completed, special test equipment was calibrated and in service, and required data was recorded for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel conducting the test were adequate; and that the test results were adequate.
During the performance of Pr-23 in hot shutdown (main steam-isolation valve testing) it was determined that the loop B MSIV would not close automatically. This put the licensee into Technical specification 3.9.4.C.
The licensee closed the MSIV and caution carded all other MSIV's to ensure that the valves would not be open in a reactor mode other than cold shutdown.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
15. The inspector verified maintenance procedures include administrative approvals for removing and return of systems to service; hold points for inspection / audit and signoff by Quality Assurance Department or other licensee personnel; provisions for operational testing following main-tenance; reviews of material certifications; provisions for assuring Limiting Condition of Operation requirements were met during repair; provisions for housekeeping during and following maintenance; and responsibilities for reporting defect to management.
The inspector observed the maintenance activities listed below and verified work was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and by qualified personnel:
a.
Installation of reactor vessel vent valve.
b.
Installation of reactor vessel level indicating system.
c.
Installation of containment narrow range level indicating system.
No items of noncompliance we.re identified.
16. Refueling Activities
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The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by the technical specifications-10-
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and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required by technical specifications; observed 2 shif ts of the fuel handling operations. (removal, inspection and insertion)
and verified the activities were performed in accordance with the technical specifications and approved procedures; verified that con-tainment integrity was maintained as required by technical specifica-tions; verified that good housekeeping was maintained on the refueling area; and, verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
17. Operational Safety verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of January and February. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Unit 1 containment, th' auxiliary building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interviev verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of February, the inspector examined the accessible portions of the accumulators, SI piping inside containment, and RHR recirculation sump, to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive vaste system controls associated with radwaste shipments.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
18. Monthly Maintenance observation
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Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards rnd in conformance with technical specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review: The limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were-11-
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removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performr.d prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
a.
Bergan Patterson snubber removal for overhaul b.
Drop coupling of IB RCP to backseat pump c.
Steam generator sludge lancing d.
Repair inlet valve to IB seal water filter Following completion of maintenance, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
19. Monthlv Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on diesel generator load sequencing per technical specifications 15.6.35, containment purge auto isolation valve surveillance per PI-17 and manual actuation of containment spray per technical specifications 15.6.40 and verified that testing was performed in accordance with ade-quate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected compo'nents were accomplished, that test results conforced with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed aud resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Eddy current testing IB and IC steam generators 79. Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective-12-
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action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications:
LER NO.
Unit 1
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79-96 Low-Lew Tave Comparator out of Specifications
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79-97 Rod Urgent Failure Alarm 80-53 Failure of IRE 0007 80-54 Failure of IA RHR Mini-flow Valve 80-55 Nissed Grab Samples-ORT PR02B 80-56 Failure of ORT PR02B 80-57 Ndssed Surveillance on F. P. Discharge 81-01 Loss of OPR036 81-02 Failure of IB MSIV to Close 81-03 1A Charging Pump Trip LER NO.
Unit 2 80-30 Failure of Service Water Valve to RCFC to Operate 80-31 Trip of 23 Diesel Generator 80-32 Rod Control System Urgent Failure 81-1 Loop D OTdT Indicating Low Regarding LER 50-295/79-96,.LER 50-295/79-97 and LER 50-295/80-53, the thirty day reporting requirements of the technical specifications was exceeded. The licensee has taken action to preclude recurrence This will be classified as a licensee identified item of noncompliance in which no citation will be issued.
Regarding LER 50-295/80-55, the technical specification required sur-veillance due to an out-of-service radiation monitor was not performed for two shif ts due to personnel error. The licensee has taken action to preclude recurrence.
This will be classifed as a licensee identi-
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fled item of noncompliance in which no citation will be issued.
Regarding LER 50-295/80-57, two technical specifications required activity samples on a fire sump discharge were missed due to personnel error.
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The licensee has taken action to preclude recurrence.
This will be classified as a licensee identified item of noncompliance in which no citation will be issued.
Regarding LER 50-295/81-02, the licensee has committed to an investiga-tion to determine the cause of failure of the Keane solenoid valve.
The failed valve has been returned to Keane Controls Company and the licensee is to issue a follow-up LER upon r3ceiving the results of Keane's investigation.
This item is open pending the licensee's issuance of.an LER up-to-date.
and is designated Open Item 50-295/81-01-1.
21. IE Circular Follow-up For the I2 Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
IEC ND.
Title 80-01 Service Advice for G.E. Induction Dise Relays 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours 80-03 Protection from Toxic Gas Hazards 80-Oi Emergency Diesel-Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and Onsite Supply 80-09 Problems with Plant Internal Communications Systems 80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures 80-12 Valve Shaf t to Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies 80-14 Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized
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Water System and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel 80-15 Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Circulation Cooldown-14-
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IEC ND.
Title 80-16 Operational Deficiencies in Rosemont Model 510DU Trip Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters 80-17 Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water Jet From Baffle Plate Corner 80-21 Regulation of Refueling Crews 80-23 Potential Defects in Beloit Power Systems Emergency Generators No items of noncompliance were identified.
22.
Meetings, Training, Offsite Functions The inspectors attended the following offwice functions during the inspection period:
J. R. Waters February 9-13, 1981 IE Regional Office for Fundamentals of Inspection Training Glen Ellyn, II.
Joel E. Kohler February 3-4, 198i Zion-Indian Point Risk Assessment Bethesda, Md.
February 9, 1981 Westinghouse Training Center Zion, II.
23.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. One unresolved item was disclosed during this inspection.
24.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on February 27, 1981 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspec-tion activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
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