IR 05000280/2009002

IR 05000280-09-002, 05000281-09-002, on 01/01/2009 - 03/31/2009, Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Routine Integrated Inspection Report

ML091190695
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	04/29/2009
From:	Gerald Mccoy NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Christian D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR-09-002
Download: ML091190695 (25)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ril 29, 2009

SUBJECT:

SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED RESIDENT INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 05000280/2009002 AND 05000281/2009002

Dear Mr. Christian:

On March 31, 2009, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 14, 2009, with Mr. Bischof and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green)

which was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance of the issue and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Surry Power Station.

Additionally, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Surry Power Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.

VEPCO 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000280/2009002 and 05000281/2009002 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos: DPR-32, DPR-37 Report No: 05000280/2009002 and 05000281/2009002 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility: Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 5850 Hog Island Road Surry, VA 23883 Dates: January 1, 2009 through March 31, 2009 Inspectors: C. Welch, Senior Resident Inspector J. Nadel, Resident Inspector E. Stamm, Project Engineer R. Hamilton, Senior Health Physicist (4OA5)

M. Bates, Senior Operations Engineer (1R11)

C. Kontz, Operations Engineer (1R11)

Approved by: Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000280/2009-002, 05000281/2009-002; 01/01/2009 - 03/31/2009; Surry Power Station,

Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Inspection Report The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident and region based inspectors.

The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4, dated December 2006.

NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None

Licensee Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. The violation and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Units 1 and 2 operated at full Rated Thermal Power for the entire report period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations for extreme cold weather predicted for January 16 - 18, 2009. The inspection focused on verification of design features and implementation of the licensees cold weather procedures to protect mitigating systems from the adverse weather effects. The inspection was accomplished by walkdown of vulnerable areas and review of procedures 0-OSP-ZZ-001, Cold Weather Preparations; OC - 21, Severe Weather Checklist; and 0-ECM-1205-01, EDG Room Temperature Monitoring and Compensatory Measures for Extreme Low Room Temperatures. A sample of action items from the cold weather procedures were verified complete; which included verifying the proper position of roll-up doors, ventilation louvers, thermostat settings and that piping insulation and heat tracing was installed and operable in areas susceptible to a cold environment. Areas walked down included the auxiliary and safeguards buildings, the turbine building, the main steam valve houses, and refueling water storage tank level instrumentation. The inspectors verified weather related problems were being identified, entered into the corrective action program, and properly addressed. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignments

.1 Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial equipment alignment walkdowns on the four risk-significant systems listed below to verify the systems were correctly aligned to perform their safety function. The walkdowns occurred during periods when the redundant train or backup system was out-of-service for maintenance or testing or following realignment after an extended system outage. The positions of critical valves, breakers, and control switches were verified in the correct configuration by in-field observation and/or review of the main control board. The inspectors reviewed station drawings, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and the Technical Specifications (TS) to determine the correct system lineup for the existing plant conditions. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify equipment alignment issues were being identified and properly resolved.

• Common: A and B emergency service water pump trains during maintenance on the C pump on January 23

• Unit 1: No. 1 emergency diesel generator during maintenance on the alternate AC (AAC) diesel generator on January 20

• Unit 2: A charging pump train during maintenance on the B pump (2-CH-P-1B)on March 12

• Common: emergency service water A pump train during maintenance on the C pump on March 16

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the AAC diesel generator and related support systems by walkdown and review of licensee documents to:

(1) assess the systems material condition,

(2) verify the system was properly aligned to perform its safety function, and

(3) to identify discrepancies that could impact its availability and functional capacity. The inspectors, during the walkdown, verified valve and breaker positions, component labeling, hangers and supports, and that valves were locked in position if required. Condition of the system was discussed with the system engineer and a licensing representative. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify system configuration issues/deficiencies were being identified and properly resolved. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Fire Protection - Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a defense-in-depth review of the seven fire areas listed below by walkdown and review of licensee documents to evaluate the fire protection program operational status and material condition and the adequacy of:

(1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources;

(2) fire detection and suppression capability; (3)passive fire protection features;

(4) compensatory measures established for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features; and (5)procedures, equipment, fire barriers, and systems so that post-fire capability for safe plant shutdown is ensured.

The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify fire protection deficiencies were being identified and properly resolved. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

• Fire Zone 18A, fuel oil pump room 1

• Fire Zone 18B, fuel oil pump room 2

• Fire Zone 19, Unit 1 safeguards building

• Fire Zone 20, Unit 2 safeguards building

• Fire Zone 17, auxiliary building 2 foot elevation

• Fire Zone 28, emergency service water pump house

• Fire Zone 31-G1, Unit 1 turbine building basement hot work

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Fire Protection - Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a fire brigade drill held on March 12, 2009, to evaluate the readiness of the licensees personnel to fight fires. Aspects considered in the evaluation include: the control room operators response, including identification of the fire location, dispatch of the fire brigade, and sounding of alarms; the number of individuals assigned to the fire brigade; response timeliness; use of protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus; the brigade team leaders command and control, use of pre-fire plan strategies, briefs, and delegation of assignments; fire hose deployment and reach; approach into the fire area; effectiveness of communications among brigade members and between the brigade and the control room; search for victims, smoke evacuation, and the drills objective and acceptance criteria. The inspectors observed the post drill critique and verified noted deficiencies or areas for improvement were captured.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

On January 13, 2009, the inspectors observed the licensed operator simulator exam administered using scenario RQ-09.1-SE-5, Rev. 5. The scenario involved both operational transients and design basis events. The inspectors observed the crews performance to determine whether the crew met the scenario objectives; accomplished the critical tasks; demonstrated the ability to take timely action in a safe direction and to prioritize, interpret, and verify alarms; demonstrated proper use of alarm response, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures; demonstrated proper command and control; communicated effectively; and appropriately classified events per the emergency plan. The inspectors verified that simulator conditions were consistent with the scenario and reflected the actual plant configuration (i.e. simulator fidelity). The inspectors observed the evaluators post scenario critique and confirmed items for improvement were identified and discussed with the operators to further improve performance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history and associated documents in preparation for this inspection. During the week of January 19 - 23, 2009, the inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of operating tests associated with the licensees operator requalification program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the effectiveness of the licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines established in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, and inspection procedure 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. The inspectors also evaluated the licensees simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5-1998, American National Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for use in Operator Training and Examination. The inspectors observed two crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation reviewed included written examinations, Job Performance Measures (JPMs), simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, simulator modification request records, simulator performance test records, operator feedback records, licensed operator qualification records, remediation plans, watchstanding records, and medical records. The records were inspected using the criteria listed in inspection procedure 71111.11. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance program for the backflow preventers located in the charging pump cubicles, emergency switchgear rooms, and mechanical equipment room #3 floor drains.

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and associated circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews, as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Inspectors also attended Maintenance Rule Working Group meetings where proposed changes to the treatment of backflow preventers under the maintenance rule were discussed.

Inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the system, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with system engineers. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), VPAP 0815, Maintenance Rule Program, and the Surry Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Matrix. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, for the six work activities listed below:

(1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;

(2) the management of risk;

(3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and,

(4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify deficiencies in risk assessments were being identified and properly resolved. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

• January 16-17: Unit 1 and 2 on-line elevated risk condition (Yellow) during installation of the turbine building flood control panel design change

• January 20: Unit 1 and 2 on-line risk condition (Green) during the 18 month preventive maintenance package on the AAC diesel generator

• February 17: Unit 1 and 2 on-line risk condition (Green) during emergent work on the AAC diesel generator

• February 26: the post maintenance risk assessment for Unit 1 and 2 risks (Yellow) during replacement on February 19 of the charging pump cubicle floor drain backflow devices

• March 4: Unit 1 and 2 on-line elevated risk condition (Yellow) during maintenance on the A service water header valve 1-SW-310

• March 11: Unit 1 and 2 on-line risk condition (Green) during maintenance on the AAC diesel generator

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six of the licensees operability evaluations, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate:

(1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations;

(2) whether continued system operability was warranted;

(3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered;

(4) if compensatory measures were involved, whether the compensatory measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and

(5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify deficiencies in operability determinations were being identified and corrected. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

• CR 320798: qualified electrical isolation devices not installed between safety-related and non-safety related circuits in the turbine building flood control panel

• CR 322193: emergency diesel generator no.1 start failure delay relay 2 (SFD2)actuates early

• CR 328804: 2 of 4 fasteners on the seismic support for the Unit 1 service water pump (1-SW-P-10B) discharge check valve broke off during maintenance

• CR 321633: Spent fueling pool cooling pump 1A (1-FC-P-1A) high vibrations

• CR 322029: the Unit 1 1C charging pump (1-CH-P-1C) bearing oil cooler service water temperature control valve (1-SW-TCV-108C) did not appear to fully stroke during the quarterly surveillance test

• CR 323266: the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (01-FW-P-2)bearing oil sample contains water

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the two modification(s) identified below to verify:

(1) that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk-significant systems, structures, and components (SSCs) were not degraded through modification;

(2) that modifications performed during increased risk-significant configurations do not place the plant in an unsafe condition; and,

(3) that the modification did not affect system operability or availability as described by the TS and UFSAR. Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modification design and implementation packages, WOs, site drawings, corrective action documents, applicable sections of the UFSAR, supporting analyses, TS, and design basis information. The inspectors witnessed aspects of each modification implementation and observed aspects of post-modification testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to the report.

• Design Change Package (DCP) 0-06-046, Emergency Diesel Generator Timing Relay Replacement/Surry/Units 1 & 2

• Design Change SU-08-0025, Turbine Building Flood Control Panel UPS Installation/Surry/Units 1& 2

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the six risk-significant maintenance activities listed below, the inspectors reviewed the associated post maintenance testing (PMT) procedures and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed completed records to assess whether:

(1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;

(2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed;

(3) test acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;

(4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;

(5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;

(6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;

(7) test equipment was removed following testing; and

(8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify PMT deficiencies were being identified and corrected. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report.

• No. 1 emergency diesel generator 18 month preventive maintenance packages

• No. 1 emergency diesel generator start failure relay (SFD2) calibration

• No. 1 emergency diesel generator start failure relay (SFD2) replacement

• AAC diesel generator 18 month preventive maintenance packages

• Unit 2 charging pump (2-CH-P-1B) bearing oil cooler service water temperature control valve (1-SW-TCV-208B) corrective maintenance

• Common: emergency service water pump 1A (1-SW-P-1A) diesel Agastat timing relay testing

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of the receipt inspection of new fuel to verify fuel handling operations were performed in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures.

The inspection also included verification that the security seal on the shipping containers were intact, shipping container accelerometers were not tripped, the fuel assemblies were being properly tracked, and personnel who performed the work were appropriately qualified. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed the surveillance test and/or reviewed test records for the seven risk-significant activities listed below, to assess, as appropriate whether the SSCs selected met the TS, UFSAR, and licensee procedure requirements and effectively demonstrated that the SSCs were ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify surveillance testing deficiencies were being identified and properly resolved. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

In-Service Tests:

• 2-OPT-FW-003, (Rev. 42); Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2-FW-P-2 and 2-OPT-FW-007, (Rev. 6); Turbine Driven AFW Pump Steam Supply Line Check Valve Test performed on January 13

• 0-OPT-SW-003, (Rev. 35); Emergency Service Water Pump, 1-SW-P-1C, testing performed on January 23

• 1-OPT-CS-002, (Rev. 14); Containment Spray System Test performed on March 10 (CS-P-1A only)

Surveillance Tests

• 1-OSP-TM-004, (Rev. 9), Turbine trip test performed on January 6

• 1-PT-2.36, (Rev. 9); 4KV Under-frequency testing performed on January 28

• 2-OPT-EG-001, (Rev. 50); Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise Test and 2-OPT-EG-005, (Rev. 19); Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System Tests performed on February 23 RCS Leakage:

• 1-OPT-RC-10.0, (Rev 25), Reactor Coolant Leakage - Computer Calculated and 2-OPT-RC-10.0, (Rev 23), Reactor Coolant Leakage - Computer Calculated performed on February 19

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator exam conducted on January 13, 2009 to assess the licensees performance in emergency plan classification, protective action recommendation, and off-site notification. This simulator exercise is included in the Emergency Response Performance Indicator Statistics.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

The inspectors performed a periodic review of the three following Unit 1 and 2 PIs to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the PI data from the fourth quarter 2007 through the fourth quarter 2008. Documents reviewed included applicable NRC inspection reports, licensee event reports, operator logs, and station performance indicators.

• Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours

• Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours

• Unplanned Scrams With Complications

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program:

As required by NRC Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR report summaries and periodically attending daily CR Review Team meetings.

4OA3 Event Followup

a. Inspection Scope

On January 12, 2009, while performing control room observations, the inspectors observed control room operators respond to a lowering intake canal level: The inspectors assessed the operating crews team work, communications, procedure usage, and diagnostic abilities.

The operating crews effectively diagnosed and responded to the transient and prevented a larger challenge to the plant. Monitoring of the intake canal level had been increased in response to dredging activities in progress at the low level intake. On identification of the lowering level, the operators initiated 0-AP-12.01, "Loss of Intake Canal Level, and identified amperage on circulating water pump CW-P-1A had increased. The operators promptly communicated to personnel at the low level intake to stop all dredging activities while also securing 1-CW-P-1A. Operators then throttled circulating water outlet valves to the condenser waterboxes to maintain intake canal level well within the technical specification requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with the licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.

.b Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/173 Ground Water Protection Initiative (GPI)

a. Inspection Scope

On February 23 through 25, 2009, the inspectors reviewed Surry Power Stations groundwater protection actions for compliance with the industry initiative described in the NEI Document Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative- Final Guidance Document, August 2007 (NRC document reference ML072600292 and ML072610036).

The inspectors review covered the licensees site characterization with regard to site hydrology and geology, site risk assessment with respect to systems structures and components that posed a credible risk for licensed material to reach ground water, on-site ground water monitoring programs, established programs for remediation in the event of inadvertent releases, and record keeping which allows for proper planning and resource allocation for the eventual decommissioning of the site.

The inspectors reviewed the communication aspects of the sites program. These aspects included the requirements for initial and periodic briefing of sites GPI program with designated State and Local officials, voluntary notifications of State/Local officials and follow-up notifications of the NRC regarding any significant on-site spills or environmental water samples exceeding the criteria in the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program. The programmatic inclusion of follow-on NRC documentation requirements including 30 day reporting and annual reporting was also reviewed. The inspectors reviewed the program to determine if it included the oversight commitments of having a self assessment of the program not later than 12/31/2008 and periodically at an interval not to exceed 5 years there after and a separate review under the auspices of NEI within one year of the initial self assessment and periodically thereafter at an interval not to exceed 5 years.

The inspectors reviewed various program documents including procedures, condition reports, self assessment and corrective actions and determined that the licensees program was implemented consistent with the NEI document with one action scheduled but not yet completed. The independent NEI review is scheduled. The requirements specified in TI 2515/173 have been met. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/176, EDG TS Surveillance Requirements

Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing Inspection activities for TI 2515/176 were previously completed and documented in inspection report 05000280 & 281/2008004, and this TI is considered closed at Surry Power Station; however, TI 2515/176 will not expire until August 31, 2009. The information gathered while completing this temporary instruction was forwarded to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for review and evaluation.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

An exit meeting was conducted for the Licensed Operator Requalification inspection on January 23, 2009, to discuss the findings of this inspection. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was reviewed during this inspection.

On February 25, 2009, the inspectors discussed the results of the Ground Water Protection Inspection (TI 2515/173) with Mr. Luther Jones, members of his staff, and management representatives from Station Engineering, Licensing, and Nuclear Oversight.

An exit meeting was conducted on April, 14, 2009. The resident inspection results were presented to Mr. Bischof and other members of the staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.

• 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control; requires, in part, that design changes be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Contrary to the above, design control measures commensurate with the original design were not implemented for a design change implemented in the 1980s to the safety-related motor operated valve (MOV) control circuits for the condenser inlet isolation valves. The condenser inlet isolation valve closing circuits were modified to actuate on a turbine building flooding signal The circuit modification did not include electrical isolation via qualified isolation devices, per IEEE-279, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, between the safety-related closing circuit for the MOVs and the non-safety related circuit in the flood control panel. This was identified in the licensees CAP as CR 320789.

A regional Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation under the Significance Determination Process and concluded that the performance deficiency was of very low safety significance. The most credible accident sequence involved a seismic event which caused the loss of automatic isolation of the condenser inlet motor operated valves via the panel in question and caused a condenser pipe break. Manual closure of the valves which would terminate the turbine building flood, though possible, failed. Consequently, all electric power to critical mitigation equipment was lost and core damage ensued. Critical assumptions included the low initiating event frequency of such an event and that operator actions could terminate the flooding.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

M. Adams, Director, Station Engineering

L. Baker, Supervisor Shift Operations

A. Barbee, Training Manager

G. Bischof, Site Vice President

B. Garber, Supervisor, Licensing

K. Grover, Manager, Operations

A. Harrow, Supervisor Electrical Systems

L. Hilbert, Manager Nuclear Oversight Department

R. Johnson, Manager, Outage and Planning

L. Jones, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry

T. Kulterman, Training Supervisor

R. Manrique, Supervisor, Primary Systems

C. Olsen, Manager, Site Engineering

L. Ragland, Supervisor, Health Physics Operations

R. Simmons, Manager, Maintenance

K. Sloane, Plant Manager (Nuclear)

M. Smith, Manager Engineering Programs

B. Stanley, Director, Station Safety and Licensing

M. Wilda, Supervisor, Auxiliary Systems

D. Wilson, Training Supervisor

LIST OF ITEMS

Closed

05000280, 281/2515/173 TI Ground Water Protection Initiative (GPI)

(Section 4OA5)

05000280, 281/2515/176 TI EDG TS Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing (Section 4OA5)