IR 05000280/1981017
| ML18139B470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/19/1981 |
| From: | Burke D, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139B463 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-81-17, 50-281-81-17, NUDOCS 8108040604 | |
| Download: ML18139B470 (7) | |
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~o: :-.,,JA:=n::7TA ST., :'-L':'i., SUITE 3~CO Report Nos. 50-280/81-17 and 50-281/81-17 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Uni ts 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Approved by:
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+----'='--'---=+--.,..;;--~------------ Dance, ection Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY t L9fe1 Dat!e ~iefned
~ Inspection on May 1-29, 1981 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 90 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance, calibration and testing, fire protection, plant security, and followup on LER 1 Results Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in five areas; one violation was identified during inspection of fire protection barriers (Nonfunctional fire doors without fire watch - paragraph 5.d):
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G ADOCK 05000280 PDR
e DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager
- G. E. Kane, Operations Superintendent
- 0. A. Christian, Superintendent of Technical Services L.A. Johnson, Maintenance Superintendent S. P. Sarver, Health Physics Supervisor F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, HP, p 1 ant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, records and contractor personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov Licensee Action on Previous Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Unit 1 Unit 1 remains shutdown for the Steam Generator Replacement Project (SGRP). The SGRP is essentially complete, and preoperational testing of the Unit 1 system is in progres Prior to refueling, the inspectors reviewed Periodic Tests ( PT I s) and witnessed certain speci a 1 and periodic tests to verify that the required systems were operable for refueling operations. Portions of the following PT 1s were reviewed:
PT 1.1, Nuclear Instrumentation PT 8.2, CLS Logic PT 18.2, SI PT 18.1, LHSI PT 22. 3, EOG I s PT 26.3, Radiation Monitors PT 1s 30.1 and 30.2, RHR
Special Test 109, Integrated Engineered Safeguards Functional Test, was witnessed, as well as the closure of the containment purge valves (MOV-lOOA-0)
on high radiation signal One of the purge valves (MOV-lOOA) did not cycle properly and was isolated. Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie Refue 1 i ng of Unit 1 commenced on May 28, 1981, and was comp 1 eted on May 31, 198 During this ti me, the inspector observed refue 1 i ng activities to verify that they were being conducted in accordance with the plant Technical Specifications (TS) and procedure Appropriate licensed personnel were utilized during fuel movement and direct communication was maintained between the control room and the refueling area; the cavity boron samples were within TS 3.10 limits, the source range detectors were in service, and the containment access hatches were properly installed. The.licensee had previously revised OP-4.1, Containment Integrity Checklist, to address the use of the blank flange on the equipment hatc Although the personnel access hatches were operable, personnel entrance and egress was impeded by intermittant problems with the door limit switch lights and the inner door locking pin. Corrective maintenance on the doors is in progress. The fueling cavity was at the proper water level (27 feet+ 6 in.); however, the skimmer was below the surface of the water; - refueling personnel adjusted the skimmer to remove the dust and traces of oi 1 from the water surface. The refueling area was appropriately petitioned off and isolated from the other work areas and personnel in containment. Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie Prior to refueling, the inspector also observed portions of the 10 year reactor pressure vessel inspection. The complete results of the inspection are being reviewed by Region II metallurgical inspector At approximately 7:00 a.m. on May 28, 1981, during thunderstorms, the licensee noted rainwater leaking into the Unit 1 control room, behind the vertical boar Holes had apparently been inadvertently punched in the Service Building (SB) roof by erected scaffolding legs during a'
plant modification in that are The rainwater fell four stories through the SB electrical room, the cable vault area, and the control room, to the emergency switchgear room in the basement. Water was also observed in the reactor trip breaker cubicle above the control roo On May 28 and 29, 1981, several inches of standing water was observed in certain Unit 1 turbine building basement areas such as the valve pits and clean and used oil roo Significant amounts of rainwater apparently flooded into the turbine building basement from the louvered air intake structure in the turbine building basement due to plugged drain In addition, wet floors were observed in an Emergency Diesel Generator rooms and in the Auxiliary Buildin The inspector has observed additional rainwater leakage and certain flooding in areas and buildings at Surry during periods of heavy rainfal His initial
. concern regarding leakage was identified in IE Inspection Report No /80-43 and 50-281/80-47, when rainwater leaks in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building roof and roof plugs led to electrical shorting and
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inoperability of the low head safety injection pump 2-SI-P-I Sub-sequently, several leaks in the Service and Auxiliary Buildings have been observe A recent Unit 2 LER (81-17) illustrated moisture accumulation in an electrical junction box which led to shorting of a Train B coil for the main steam trip valve (TV-MS-201C) control circuits. Some of the rainwater also flows into contaminated areas and sumps which increases the amount of 1 i quid to be inventoried, processed, and disposed through the liquid waste syste In addition, on May 28 and 29, 1981, the plant security vital door access system was inoperable due to flooding of electrical cable trenches and conduit for the key card access systems, although proper compensatory actions were taken by the security forces for access to the vita 1 area The rainwater leaks (and flooding) are designated open item 280/81-17-02 pending review of the corrective actions, inspections, or measures the licensees implements to assure that leaks are promptly* identified and correcte This i tern was brought to the attention of corporate management by regional managemen Certain fire barrier doors at Surry are on the security key card access system to control or 1 imit access to these areas, although the areas are not VITAL area When the key card access system was inoperable, as described above in paragraph 5.c, security personnel were posted at vital area doors to control access into the vital area However, access of station personnel rooms was also necessary, so the non-vital doors were put in access by defeating the latching devices. Although the swinging type doors had closers, the following fire doors (barriers) were not functional on May 28, 1981, due to inoperable latching devices:
Doors 37, 39 and 41 leading from the mezzanine into the three emergency diesel generator room; door 21 between the turbine building and the emergency switchgear room; door 10 into the cable spreading room above the control room The nonfunctional fire barriers without a continuous fire watch is a violation of Technical Specification 3.21.G (280/ and 281/81-17-01),
and applies to both Unit The licensee subsequently made the doors operable or established a fire watc On May 28, 1981,the inspector also observed the emergency exit (rear)
door from EDG#l room open to the outside yard are The fire watch posted at the door stated that the EOG room contained fuel oil fumes and was being aired out so we 1 ders could work on the EOG exhaust support The inspector noticed that the welders were preparing to work in an area above the EOG auxiliary fuel oil day or wall tank catch basin, which consisted of an 18,inch concrete dike rising from the floor under the tank. Some 100 to 200 gallons of fuel oil were emptied into the catch basin when water was detected in the EOG fuel oil supply tanks (See paragraph 6.C.).
Due to the possibility of sparks or weld slag falling into the fuel oil in the catch basin, the Shift Supervisor prohibited welding on the supports until the basin was pumped out. The inspector had no further questions at this tim *
e 4 Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operated at power during May, 1981, except for the reactor trip discussed belo During this time, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 2 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility technical specifications and procedure Within the areas inspected, no additional violations were identifie Specific areas of inspection and review included the following: Review of annunicated alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plan Followup on the Unit 2 reactor trip which occurred at 11:40 a.m. on May 5, 198 With Unit 1 defueled and Unit 2 operating at full power an electrical breaker (15H8) was closed to return the Unit 1 emergency buss lH to service following preventative maintenance and testin Electrical fault protection interlocks sensed the coincidence of 15H8 being closed and undervoltage on the lH buss, and opened the reserve station service (RSS) breaker to the F transfer buss which feeds the Unit lH and the Unit 2J busse When the 2J buss was de-energized, the C main feedwater (FW) regulating valve controller shifted from auto to manual, and the momentary loss of 2J and vital buss 2-IV initiated a RPI turbine runbac This combination soon resulted in a low steam generator C level, which initiated the reactor tri The EOG auto started and re-energized the 2J buss as required, but the FW regulating valve controller was not returned to auto before the low low SG level trip occurre The reactor and turbine trip results in the loss of station power, and therefore the C reactor coolant pump power was lost because the F transfer buss could not transfer to RS The ensuring plant shutdown was normal, and restart was made within a few hours after the electrical systems were restored to norma Personnel have been reinstructed on the proper use of procedures for placing these e 1 ectri ca 1 busses and breakers into service; the procedures describe the use of jumpers to momentarily bypass the UV interlock when the breaker is closed onto the buss to supply powe The inspector followed up on the May 28, 1981, discovery of water in one of the two underground fuel oil tanks for the emergency diesel generators (EOG).
Several hundred gallons of water were found in the 20,000 gallon fuel oil tank EE-TK-2 Traces of water (less than 1%)
were also found in the 550 gallon auxiliary (day) tanks in each EOG room; no water was found in the 550 ga 11 on base tan ks on each EO Previously on May 10, 1981, some 4,000 gallon of fire protection system (FPS) water was inadvertently pumped into the above ground 210,000 gallon fuel oil storage tank (HS-TK-1) through a FPS foam eductor to the tank due to mispositioned valve The storage tank was isolated from the underground tanks until the water was removed, however, the underground (UG) tanks were not sampled at this tim In addition, the inspector observed that the LI-EE-lOOA and B manometers, which
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indicates the 1 eve 1 s of fue 1 oi 1 in the underground tan ks, were i noperab 1 The 1 i cen see opens the va 1 ve between the above ground storage or head tank and the UG tanks daily and monitors flow to each tank (or lack of flow) to verify that the underground tanks are ful This method of verifying that the UG tanks are full apparently led to the flow of water to the UG tan the licensee is repairing the UG tank level manometer (Open item 280/81-17-03).
The inspector verified that an on-site supply of at least 35,000 gallons of fuel oil were available in accordance with TS 3.16.A.l. The day tanks in each*
EOG room were flushed into the FPS diked catch basin beneath each tank to assure that the lines and day tanks contained no water; samples of various fuel oil tanks also indicated no further presence of water. In addition, since the UG tank A suction line. is 6 inches above the tank bottom, the licensee will insert a pipe into the A tank and pump out the tank bottom to assure that the water has been eliminated. ALER will be submitted on the occurrenc Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The inspector reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planned. Certain LERs were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine comp 1 i ance with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirement The review included examination of 1 og books, i nterna 1 correspondence and records, review of SNSOC meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff member Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie LER 280/81-01 concerned linear indications in loops A, Band C main steam piping found during RT examinatio Pitting corrosion from stagnant oxygenated water present during period of shutdown *was the apparent caus Boat Samples 11 from A and C Main Steam piping were sent to Stone and Webster for detailed analysi Results showed no cracks were present, only pitting corrosion in portions of the pipe where steam condensate was presen The indications found were allowable per ASME Section XI, and were substantially less that the critical flaw size described in FSAR, Appendix Visual examination of one Unit 2 steam line during the snubber inspection outage revealed only a slight amount of pitting which was reJlloved with light surface buffin The Unit 1 areas have been repaired. This LER is considered closed. The following LER 1 s were reviewed and closed:
280/80-10 280/80-74 281/80-06 281/81-07 281/81-17 280/80-13 280/81-02 281/80-11 281/81-08 281/81-18 280/80-20 280/81-03 281/80-12 281/81-09 281/81-19 280/80-22 280/81-04 281/80-47 281/81-10 281/81-20 280/80-42 280/81-05 281/80-49 281/81-11 281/81-21 280/80-62 280/81-06 281/80-50 281/81-12 281/81-23 280/80-63 280/81-07 281/81-01 281/81-13 281/81-24 280/80-68 280/81-08 281/81-02 281/81-14 281/81-25 280/80-73 281/81-03 281/81-15 281/81-26 281/81-05 281/81-16
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Security The inspector verified the following by observations: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control.