IR 05000280/1981024
| ML18139B568 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1981 |
| From: | Burke D, Dance H, Marlone Davis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139B567 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-81-24, 50-281-81-24, NUDOCS 8110160493 | |
| Download: ML18139B568 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/81-24 and 50-281/81-24 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Su:z site~ear Surry, Virginia Inspectors: rl--(' ~t;d,- ~/
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SUMMARY H. C. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection Inspection on August 3-31, 1981 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 140 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance, calibration and testing and plant securit Results Of the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees.
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager G. E. Kane, Operations Superintendent
- D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Technical Services M. Kansler, Engineering Services Supervisor D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, HP, plant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, records and contractor personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov Licensee Action on Previous Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified.during this inspectio.
Unit 1 Operations Unit 1 operated at power during the inspection period except for the reactor trip discussed belo During this time, the inspectors routinely toured the Unit 1 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications and procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Specific areas of inspection and review included the following: Review of annunciated alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plan Followup on the loss of four circulating water (CW) pumps due to loss of 4160v screenwell bus lG on August 11, 198 A fault in the
1 phase cable between the switchyard and the low level intake structure occurred at 1907 hours0.0221 days <br />0.53 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.256135e-4 months <br /> and caused the loss of the lG bus and four circulating water pumps lA, lB, lC and l Both units began ramping
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power down and water box discharge valves were throttled back to maintain intake canal leve The #1 screenwell transformer was taken out of service, all unit 1 CW pumps were verified free of faults, the 15G8 tie breaker was closed and lA, 18 and 10 CW pumps were restarted *.
Rampdowns were secured at 1928 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.33604e-4 months <br /> with Unit 1 at 96% and Unit 2 at 98%. The Defective cable was replaced and returned to servic Followup on the Unit 1 reactor trip from high pressurizer pressure which occurred at 0258 on August 22, 1981.. Instrument technicians were troubleshooting a noise problem on power range nuclear instrument channel N4 While performing procedure CAL-NI-049, which measured voltages across N-41 control power fuses, one test point was shorted to ground, causing a control power fuse failure and a turbine runbac The operator saw the runback alarm and noted the steam dumps opening, but did not observe the turbine load recorder indicating that a turbin runback was occurrin He momentarily took the steam dumps to reset which caused a high pressurizer pressure trip and opening of the steam generator safety relief valve During the recovery, the 1C 1 loop code* safety failed to fully reseat due to a linkage proble Safety Injection was manually initiated on low pressurizer level from the cooldow The RCS cooldown limits of 100° F/hr were not exceede The linkage was reset on the 1C 1 loop steam generator code safety valve and tested satisfactorily prior to Unit 1 restar Followup on the Unit 1 runback from 100% to 72% power that occurred on August 26, 1981,.at 0959 hour0.0111 days <br />0.266 hours <br />0.00159 weeks <br />3.648995e-4 months <br /> Instrument technicians performing troubleshooting in power range nuclear instrument channel N-41 caused the control power fuse to blow while attempting to measure voltage across two test point The Unit had been operating with N-41 rod drop circuity in bypass with the bistable trippe Loss of control power caused loss of the bypass signal, indicating a dropped rod to protection circuitry which caused a 30 second runbac Steam dumps activated and rods drove in while power ran back to 72%.
Flux mapping was performed prior to increasing power in accordance with Technical Specification 3.12. Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operated at power during the inspection perio During this time, the inspectors routinely toured the Unit 2 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing, and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility technical specifications and procedures. Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Specific areas of inspection and review included the following: Review of annunicated alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the pl an.J 411*
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Followup on the August 11, 1981, loss of four Unit 1 Circulating water pumps which resulted in ramping Unit 2 down to 98%. (Discussed in Paragraph 58).
On August 28, 1981, the inspector observed performance of Unit 2 periodic test PT 2.1, 110verpower-Overtemperature Del ta Temperature Protection.
During performance of the PT for monitor T432, an out of specification voltage was found and calibration procedure PT 2.18 was performed satisfactoril On August 14, 1981, the inspector observed troubeshooting to determine the cause of a step increase on one channel of containment total and partial pressure. Troubleshooting was performed in accordance with PT 2.12 for PCV-201 The problem with Channel 1 containment pressure indication was found to be an open drain valve at the pressure transmitter, which had been bumped by construction worker The instrument returned to normal reading when the drain valve was shu.
General Items * The inspector followed up on open item 280/81-04-02, which concerned 50 HP office requests for temporary shielding engineering studie The original 50 requests were cancelled and those requests which were still considered valid were resubmitted for engineering evaluatio Eleven requests for temporary shielding were resubmitted during the period May 29, 1981 to June 9, 198 The licensee has made progress in the evaluation of these request Request number 81-7 concerns the Unit 1 Seal Water Injection Filters Shieldin The engineering study has been completed except for a seismic analysis of the auxiliary building floor which is being performed by Stone and Webste Request number 81-4 concerns the Unit 2 Seal Water Injection filters, with the engineering study about 60% complete. Item 280/81-04-02 remains open pending further review of the program by the inspecto The inspector verified the following by observations: Gates and door*s in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control.