IR 05000280/1981004
| ML18139B325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1981 |
| From: | Burke D, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139B320 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-81-04, 50-280-81-4, 50-281-81-04, 50-281-81-4, NUDOCS 8105260707 | |
| Download: ML18139B325 (13) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGlON II 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/81-04 and 50-281/81-04 Licensee: Virginta Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2*
Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Surry s'i te near Su ~
..
SUMMARY Inspection on January 2-30, 1981 Areas Inspected RONS Branch
-.3#/?;
b-6.te Signed This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 90 inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant modifications, maintenance and testing, Licensee Event Reports and plant securit Results Of the six areas inspected, no violations were identified in four areas; one violation was found during review of testing (Failure to perform PT 18.Gc during shutdown-paragraph 5.c) and one violation was identified in the area of plant operations (TS flow path isolated during operations-paragraph 6.a).
810526070-,
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees*
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- G. Kane, Superintendent, Operations
- R. F. Saunders, Acting Superintendent of Technical Services L.A. Johnson, Superintendent, Maintenance S. P. Sarver, Health Physics Supervisor
- F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer Other Licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, HP, Pl ant maintenance, Security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, records, and Contractor personne *Attended Exit Intervie.
Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons i~dicated in Paragraph 1 above; violations were specifically discussed with the licensee when identifie.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Unit 1 Steam Generator Replacement Project The Unit 1 Steam Generator Replacement Project is proceeding as planne During this reporting period of the SGRP outage, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 1 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant testing, maintenance, and repairs were being conducted in accordance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and facility procedures. Specific areas of inspection and findings included: Observation of the welding of an upper steam generator moisture sepa-rator assembly to the lower sectio Observation of maintenance and cleaning being performed on the Unit 1 A recirculation spray heat exchanger. (See open item 280/80-39-02). All tubes in the RS heat exchangers are being cleaned; some scale, mud, and sea growth (seaweed, shells, etc.) were found in the tubes.
Eddy-current testing of the tubes has revealed no tube degradation to date. Item 280/80-39-02 remains open pending completion of the
- * licensee's cleaning and inspection program, and his evaluation of the finding Review of the defueled Unit 1 BIT isolation valves, MOV-1867 A and C which were found improperly wired during preventative maintenance inspections on December 17, 198 The BIT inlet and outlet valves A and C stroked closed when the control room switch was hel~ in the open position, and vice-versa; the redundant MOV 1 s (1867 Band D) operated properly. The electrical power leads were apparently switched subse-quent to cold shutdown, since the operators injected the BIT into the RCS at shutdown to borate the RCS and prepare the BIT for long term layup; no problems were observed when the BIT was injected by opening MOV 1s 1867 A thru Since documentation of the power lead or wiring change on these safety related valve motors could not be found, the Licensee submitted an LER (80-74) on the apparent lack of adminis-trative control, in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(3).
On January 29, 1981, the inspector asked the licensee to open certain breaker panels on motor control center (MCC) lHl-1 and lJl-When opened, the inspector observed that the identification tags or markings on the electrical power leads did not match their terminal board tags in several MCC breaker cubicles, including those for MOV~1867 A and C, indicating that.the 480VAC power leads to the valve or component motors had been changed without changing the identification tags on the leads.
When wiring or leads are disconnected, reconnected, or changed, proce-dures require a functional test of the components to assure operability and proper rotatio The licensee stated that the Unit 1 safety related MCC breaker cubicles would be inspected and maintained to assure that the tags or markings on the electrical leads matched the markings on the terminal strips at their point of attachment (~ermi-nation). Unit 2 MCC cubicles will be inspected during the next sche-duled shutdown. Since MOV-1867 A and Care not adjacent (1867 A and B are), but are both from the H emergency buss, the inspector reviewed certain periodic testing on MOV-1867 A and C to verify operability from the time the MCC lHl-1 and lJl-1 power cables were moved to the addi-tional 4160/480V transformer, installed in April, 1979 (DC 79-SlS).
Peri.odi c tests ( PT) verified proper va 1 ve operability through February, 1980, when PT 18.6c, CSD Testing of SI MOV 1 s, was last performe However, the inspector noted that PT 18.6c was not performed during the Unit 1 August 1 to 10, 1980 shutdown for SG tube plugging operation This is contrary to 10 CFR 50.SSa and the ASME,Section XI Code testing requirements which require valve testing exercise each shutdown if not performed quarterly, and is.a Severity Level V Violation (280/81-04-01).
Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operated at power during January, 198 During this time, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 2 control room and other plant areas to*
verify that the plant operations, testing, and maintenance were being
conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications (TS) and procedures. Specific areas of inspection and review included the followin The inadvertent isolation, on January 2, 1981, of the eves boric acid flow path to the charging pumps, during Unit 2 operation. The Unit 2 valves 2-eH-223 and -226 were closed instead of the (defueled) Unit 1 valves l-CH-223 and ~226, which were identified on the tags and tagging record. Although the Unit 2 emergency borate line was also inoperable ( p 1 ugged) during the occurrence, the RWST fl ow path was operab 1 Following this occurrence, the inspector observed that several eves valves, including 1-CH-226 and 2-CH-226, were not properly identified due to missing valve identification tags or boron encrustation and deposits on the valves and tags, complicating the valve identification and tagging proces The isolation of the flow-path from the boric acid tanks to the charging pumps during Unit 2 operation, is contrary to Technical Specification J.2.B.4, and is a Severity Level !.VViolation (281/81-04-01). While in the boric acid flat~ eves area, the inspector observed that the Unit 2 boric acid filter and housing was reading some 4 R/hr on contac Although the filter was properly posted, the inspector routinely observed pipe insulators working on the eves piping. Review of the workers dose records indicated that the insulators are fre-quently extended above 1,000 mr per quarter to complete work in the.
boric acid flat area. The HP office routinely stamps 11ALARA Evaluation Indicates that shielding would not be practicable for this job", on the Radiation Work Permits, although Hp requests for shielding studies have been submitted to engineering, such as request 79-02 on the boric acid filter In fact, as part of the implementation of the Surry ALARA radiation-protection program for shielding in plant areas outside containment, the HP office submitted some 50 requests for engineering studies in December, 1979, and January, 1980, to determine if shielding could be used on systems in the decon and auxiliary buildings to reduce radiation exposures in those areas. As of January 6, 1981, none of the requests fa~ shielding had been completed. The licensee is, therefore, requested to respond to this matter in the letter attached to this report. (Item 280/81-04-02). While reviewing control room logs, the inspector followed up on the Unit 2 SI accumulator level increases which required some one percent draining of the A and e accumulators once or twice per day to assure the TS 3.3.A.2 borated water volume was not exceede Since the accumulator in-leakage was assumed to be lower in boron concentration than the desired 2100 ppm concentration in the RWST and accumulators, the licensee increased the accumulator sampling frequency from monthly to weekl On January 6, 1981, tne accumulator samples were approxi-mately 2070 ppm boron;_ ho~ever, when the accumulators were sampled on January 14, 1981, C was.analyzed as being below the TS 3.3.A.2 limits of 1950 ppm by some 7 ppm boro Recirculating the accumulator volume with the RWST (2114 ppm boron) for some two hours returned the accumu-lator concentration to 2053 boron (verified by chemical samples and
- analysis).
TS 3.3.8.1 permits one accumulator to be isolated (inoper-able) for up to four hours during unit operation. Accumulators A and B were within specifications when sampled; however, the licensee recir-culated the A accumulator with the RWST for some 70 minutes prior to samplin Operating procedure 7.1, section 5.4, 11Circulating the SI Accumulator(s) with the RWST 11, details the accumulator sampling tech-niques, 11after completing the desired circulating time 11 * Although this circulating time is normally 30 minutes, specific times are not defined and extended.*recirculation may mask previous boron dilutions in the accumulator Periodic Test 38.10, 11Chemistry Sampling-Accumulators", references OP-12 for drawing local accumulator samples, and not OP7.1 which is normally used. The licensee stated that PT 38.10 and OP 7.1 will be reviewed and revised to address the above discrepancie While reviewing OP-12, 11Sampling System", the in.spector noted that OP-12 for Unit 1 had recently been revised and listed some 54 sample system procedures, while OP-12 for Unit 2 had not been revised since 1975, and contained only 20 sample procedures; the sampling procedure for the accumulators was, for instance, not in the Unit 2 OP-1 The licensee performs annual reviews of Emergency, Operating and Annunciator Proce-dures as part of the operating staff training program; however, each OP may not be periodically reviewed by appropriate personnel in accordance with the interest of Section 5.4 of ANSI N18.7-J972. Adequacy of the above procedures and the l icensee 1 s program for periodic Operating Procedure revi*ew wil 1 be designated Open Item (281/81-04-03).
The inspector reviewed the Unit 2A reactor trip breaker failure to open during periodic testing on January 7, 198 The redundant (series) B trip breaker was verified operab 1 The breaker was replaced and inspected by the licensee to determine the cause of failur The failure to open was determined to be mechanical binding of the under-voltage relay due to the loss of a small C-type spring clip which retains the UV relay bushing; the loose bushing apparently led to the binding of the mechanis The remaining reactor trip and bypass breakers were inspected and tested to verify that the clips were in place and the breakers operabl Procedures are being revised to verify that the small clips are in place to retain the relay bushing The inspector reviewed the status of the auxiliary building ventilation modifications to assure that the old and new plant ventilation dis-charge stacks were properly monitore The new fan (F-59), filter and charcoal banks deliver area ventilation exhaust to the previously installed monitored stack while the previously installed fan, filters and charcoal banks currently exhaust the safeguards and fuel building to the new stack, which is monitored by the ventilation-vent sample The safeguards wi 11 soon exhaust to the new fan and filter The licensee stated that training and updated documents would be provided to the shift teams to assure that the status and kn owl edge of the modified systems are maintained. In addition, abnormal procedures
addressing the new operating systems will be provided to operations personnel. (281/81-04-04). Review of Reportable Occurrences The inspector reviewed the Reportable Occurrence (RO) reports listed below to ascertain.that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken* and plann.e Certain Licensee Event Reports ( LER) were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements. The review included examination of log books, internal correspondence and records, review of SNSOC meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff member~.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie LER 280/80-51 concerned the discharge tunnel radiation monitor being out of service during a release of 11A 11 Liquid Waste Test Tank due to a defective cfrcuit card. The monitor was repaired. The liquid waste radiation monitor was operational during the release, and the tank had been sampled prior to the release with a.11 isotopes falling within specifications for releas This LER is close LER 280/80-53 concerned a recirculation valve. on Outside Recirculation Spray Pump 118 11 being found open. The valve was closed; subsequent investigation was unable to determine when the valve was opene Independent valve and equipment verifications have been implemented. This LER is close LER 280/80-54 concerned a motor operated valve, MOV-SW-1028, Servic~ Water to CCW Heat Exchangers, which failed to cycle during performance of a periodic test. The motor was replaced and the valve cycled normally. This LER is close LER 280/80-56 concerned heat tracing tape which was damaged duririg mechan-ical work nearby. The redundant circuit was verified operable. The damaged tape was replaced and verified operable. This LER is close *
LER 1s 280/80-57 and 280/80-69 concern heat tracing failures due to excessive hea In both cases, the redundant circuit remained operabl The failed tape was replaced and verified operable. A design change has been prepared to replace existing heat tracing circuitry. Implementation of this design change should eliminate the heat tracing failures currently being exper-ienced. These LER 1s are close LER 280/80-58 concerned the volume in the RWST specified in the Architect-
-Engineer1s accident reanalysis being greater than that assumed in the Order for Modi fi cati o.n of License of June, 197 The RWST was fi 11 ed to the correct volume and the level transmitters were respanned to reflect proper level. This LER is closed.
LER 280/80-60 concerned a low flow alarm for process vent radiation monitor*
RM-GW-101/102 caused.by a broken vacuum pump drive bel The belt was replace No discharges were in progress at the time of the failure and the system was isolated upon indication of the alarm. This LER is close LER 280/80-61 concerned an unplanned liquid waste release in which 3% of the contents of 11A11 LWTI were re 1 eased prematurely while the operators were waiting for health physics to complete the isotope analysis of the tan The operators had* performed a preliminary valve lineup in preparation for releas HCV-LW-104A had been left open from a previous releas The discharge tunnel and liquid waste radiation monitors were operating during the release and the actual release rate was less than the maximum specified on the release form subsequently received from health physics. The oper.a-tors involved were reinstructed~ This LER is closed; LER 280/80-62 concerned a radiation* monitor, RM-CC-105/106 with alarm setpoints greater than twice backgroun Reduced background radiation had resulted from Unit 1 defuelin The alarm setpoints were reduce The licensee was requested to change the system code on the LER for LER 280/80-64 concerned charcoal filters 3A and 38 in the Auxiliary Building failing DOP and Freon testing due to the settling of the charcoal in the filters causing voids, and due to a bent support rod in the HEPA filter housing. The bent rod was repaired and the charcoal repl~ced. This LER is close LER 280/80-65 concerned the failure of MOV-SW-1038 to operate electrically during a flush of the Recirc Spray heat exchanger The three redundant valves operated properly. Marine growth is the probable caus The ~alv was cycled manually and then operated successfully electrically. The valve was disassembled and cleaned. This LER is close LER 280/80-66 concerned the failure of fuel transfer on No. 1 Diesel Gene-rator during the monthly operational tes The Base Tank level c9ntrol switch was found to be sticking. The switch was repaired and level control restored. This LER is close LER 280/80-75 concerned radiation monitor setpoints being less than twice background on RM-CC-105/106 due to reduced background radiation from Unit 1 defueling. A Tech Specs change has been submitted to the NRC to eliminate references to setpoints for RM-CC-105/10 The setpoints were reduced to less than twice background. This LER is close LER 281/80-12 concerned a missing pipe support on charging pump 2-CH-P-1 The installation of this support was neglected due to a typographical error which was made in determining which supports were required to be installed prior to unit operation. The missing support was installe The licensee was requested to provide additional corrective action.. This LER remains ope *
LER 281/80-13 concerned excessive boric acid concentration in the Boron Injection Tank caused by operator error in *pumping the Boron Evaporator Bottoms Tank into the Boric Acid Storage tank without samplin The reactor was taken subcritical and the tanks were diluted. Operators were rein-structed to use approved procedures and administrative controls were estab-lished to minimize recurrence. This LER is close LER 281/80-14 concerned low levels in the RWST and CA Makeup to 118
Accumulator caused*the level in the RWST to drift below the recently revised Tech. Spec. minimum level of 96%.
Surveillance test (PT-36) had not been changed to reflect* new RWST and CAT level requirements, al though the new limits were contained in the shift order boo Reactor shutdown was commenced while RWST and CAT levels were returned to within Tech Spec limits. Control room data has been updated and operators cautioned about the new tank limit (See IE Inspection Report 281/80-37).
This LER is close LER 281/80-15 concerned high level on accumulator tank 2-SI-TK-B during st*artup testing at low powe The indica~ed level of the accumulator increased when the tank was pressurized. After pressurization level indi-cators read 61%, exceeding the Tech Spec wax of 58.3%.
The cause of the higher reading was condensation in the dry reference 1 eg Water was drained to lower the accumulator level. Subsequently, the reference legs were drained of condensation. This LER is closed.
LER 281/80-16 concerned a malfunction of trip valve TV-SS-2018 (pressurizer vapor space sample line isolation valve).
The trip valve would not stay closed when closed from the control roo The inside trip valve TV-55-201A was operabl Inspection of TV-SS-2018, limit switches and associated components did not reveal any problems. The valve was successfully cycled and the malfunction could not be repeated. The valve has been returned to service. This LER is close LER 281/80-17 concerned the failure of main steam flow transmitter (FT-2495)
to function during Unit 2 startup. The equalizing valve for the transmitter was not fully closed. The redundant steam line flow transmitter was oper-ating. Immediate action was to place channel 4 high steam flow and channel 4* steam flow greater than feed flow Bi-stable switches to the trip mod Subsequent action was to close the equalizing valve for the transmitte This LER is close LER 281/80-18 concerned the failure of charging pump service water pump 2-SW-P-lOA to develop proper discharge pressure. The cause was sediment and suspended-material accumulation in the suction side of the pum The 118
pump was operable. The pump suction strainer was cleaned and the pump was disassembled, cleaned and inspected and verified operabl This LER is close LER 281/80-19 concerned the failure of trip valve TV-SS-2068 to remain closed when actuated from the control room due to a misadjusted limit
- switc The trip valve was isolated by a downstream manual valve and the position limit switch was readjusted. This LER is close LER 281/80-20 concerned excessive boric acid concentration in BAST 11C 11 and BIT 2-SI-TK-The cause was transferring the batch tank to an inservice BAS Redundant systems were operable. Reactor shutdown was initiated and -
the tanks were diluted to within specifications. Procedures were changed to require all transfers of boric acid to an inservice tank to be made from tanks of known concentration. This LER is close '
LER 281/80-21 concerned pressure on 11811 accumulator being reduced be 1 ow allowable limits while attempting to pressurize with the normal nitrogen supply. The other two accumulators remained operable. The low accumulator pressure was caused by a 1 eak and 1 ow pressure in the nitrogen fi 11 heade The accumulator was declared inoperabl Additional nitrogen supply pressure was added and the accumulator repressurized. The leaking fitting on the fill header were repaired. This LER is close LER 281/80-22 concerned the Channel III flow computer for 11A11 * steam gene-rator steam flow, FC-2474, failing causing a low flow indicatio The protection bistable was placed in the tripped mod The redundant steam flow channel for 11A 11 loop was operationa The affected circuitry was repaired, the unit calibrated, and returned to service. This LER is close LER 281/80-23 concerned BIT discharge piping and valve MOV-28670 being declared. inoperable due to mechanical damage to heat tracing tape from scaffolding being erected in the are The redundant discharge line was operable. The damaged heat tracing tapes were replaced and MOV-28670 was tested to verify operability. Construction personnel were instructed to exercise more care with scaffolding construction. This LER is close,
LER 281/80-24 concerned trip valve TV-SS-2008 failing to remain closed when the control switch was released. The redundant valve TV-SS-200A was oper-abl The close limit switch had failed and was replace This LER is close LER 281/80-25 concerned failed heat tracing tape on the BIT inlet line. The redundant circuit was operable. The tape was damaged by scaffolding work nearby. The damaged tape was replaced. This LER is close *
LER 281/80-26 concerned failure to confirm operability of a low head safety injection pum Prior to tagging out 11811 low head SI pump, the redundant pump was demonstrated operabl The oncoming shift failed to demonstrate operabi 1 i ty eight hours 1 ater. The error was discovered and the periodic test initiated approximately eight hours and forty minutes after the 118
pump was tagged ou All licensed personnel were reinstructed on the necessi.ty of a more complete review of tech spec limitations when a safety system is operating in a degraded mode. This LER is close..
LER 281/80-27 concerned heat tracing failure of circuit 6a (boric acid to blender) due to excessive hea The redundant circuit was operable. The failed circuit was replaced. This LER is close LER 281/80-28 *concerned an inoperable check valve, 2-SW-113, noted when a reduction in service water pressure to the charging pumps was experience The discharge check valve on the non-operating redundant pump was found to have the internals remove Documentation of this modification was not performe The discharge valve was closed which allowed the operating service water pump to function as designe Check valve 2-SW-113 was replaced and tested. Operation and maintenance personnel were reinstructed in the proper method of performance of work on safety-related systems. The licerisee was r~quested to correct the system code~ cause code, and cause subcode on the LER form. This LER remains ope LER 281/80-29 concerns low discharge pressure on charging pump service water pump 2-SW-P-lOA caused by an eel lodged in the pump's impeller. The redun-dant pump started and returned system pressure to norma The pump was disassembled and the eel removed from the impelle The pump was subse-quently proven operable. A design change is in progress to improve seismic stress, system pressures, and improve the filtration capabilities of the system. This LER is close LER 281/80-30 concerned a heat tracing circuit failure on circuit 6A (boric acid to the blender) due to mechanical damage from scaffolding installatio The redundant circuit was functioning. The affected heat tape was replace Construction personnel were formally advised on the importance of safety related heat tracing and the consequences associated with damaging it. An individual was assigned to provide interface between the station staff and construction personnel to aid in avoiding similar problem This LER is close LER 281/80-31 concerned an improperly installed pipe support in the alter-nate charging system (4-CH-387, FC-1298A).
The final as-built review of supports installed as a result of IE Bulletin 79-14 showed the pipe support to be overs4ressed. The alternate charging header was isolated and the pipe supports were modified. The header was then returned to service. This LER is close LER 281/80-32 concerned heat tracing on #2 BIT inlet damaged by personnel working pipe support mod1fications nearby. Redundant heat tracing circuit was operabl Damaged tape was replaced*and verified operable. Adminis-trative and organizational changes referenced in LER 281/80-30 should prevent recurrence. This LER is close LER 281/80-33 concerned excessive control room air leakage during check of the control room emergency ventilation syste The doors from the emergency switchgear room to the turbine building would not close properly and the door seals on the instrument shop, turbine building #3 machinery room and cable tunnel doors had deteriorated with us The emergency ventilation system was verified functional and the defective doors were repaire **
-*
Routine periodic inspections of the doors has been implemented. This LER is close LER 281/80-34 concerned the failure to operate of the outlet butterfly valve for 11A11 water box, MOV-CW-200 The inlet butterfly valve was operabl The torque switch on MOV-CW-200A was found to be corroded and stuck in the open positio An operator in radio contact with the control room was stationed to close the valve if required. The torque switch was replaced and the valve tested operable. This LER is close LER 281/80-35 concerned the momentary loss of the Unit 1 11H 11 emergency bus and the Un.it 2 11J 11 emergency bus when a jackhammer breached the reserve station service duct bank and came in contact with an energized conducto For further discussion of this event, see Inspection Report 281/80-47. This LER is close LER 281/80-36 concerned auxiliary feed valve, MOV-FW-2518, failure to respond to control switch position. The limitorque cover was found not to be placed and three control wires broke The reason for this condition could not be determine The broken wires were repaired and the cover replaced. The MDV was then tested. satisfactorily. This LER is closed.**
LER 281/80-37 concerned a high temperature on 11A 11 charging pump due to low service water flow to the pum Service water pump 2-SW-P-108 indicated a low discharge pressure. The low discharg_e pressure switch sensing line was clogge The redundant pump, 2-SW-P-lOA, was operable and when started, returned charging pump temperatures to norma The cause of the low dis-charge pressure was a clogged pump suction strainer. The suction strainer and sen~ing line for the discharge pressure switch were cleaned. A design change is in progress to improve seismic stress, system pressures, and improve the filtration capabilities of the service water system. This LER is close LER 281/80-38 concerned an improper valve lineup resulting from clearing tags which caused the dilution of 11811 and 11C 11 Boric Acid Storage Tanks with primary grade wate A power reduction was commenced and batching to the storage tanks to increase boron concentration was initiated. The importance of correct tagging reports was re-emphasized to the individuals involve Some valve identifications have been changed from a 11CH 11 to a 11 PG 11 desig-nation to ident.ify the,type of fluid being controlled. This LER is close LER 281/80-39 concerned the inability to establish a satisfactory control room pressure di fferenti a 1 during the control room and relay room oper-ational pressure tes Damper MOV-VS-1048 was not fully closed due to slippage of the clamp holding the damper's operating ar The control room emergency venti 1 at ion system was functiona The damper *was adjusted to insure full closure and the test repeated satisfactoril This LER is close LER 281/80-40 concerned 1 ow discharge pressure on charging pump service water pump 2-SW-P-lOA due to material entrained in the water and being deposited on the pump's im~eller. The redundant pump functioned as
\\
designe The suction strainer was cleaned* and the affected pump was disassembled and cleaned. The pump was tested and returned to servic A*
design change in progress, as a result of the pipe stress analysis program, will improve*the filtration capabilities of the system. This LER is close LER 281/80-41 concerned snubber 2-WFPD-HSS-18 being declared inoperable due to a bent rod-eye. The rod-eye was deformed due to the improper alignment of the pipe clamp to snubbe The snubber _was declared inoperable and replaced. This LER is close LER 281/80-42 concerned the failure of #3 emergency diesel generator to start on a manual start signal from the control roo The ~anual start circuit was in the "Preferred Start #1 11 mod The 11Preferred Start #2
circuit was selected and the diesel started. The starting air motor vanes were found to be worn beyond acceptable limits thereby preventing the motor from rotating. The air motor was repaired and its operability proven. This LER is close *
LER 281/80-43 concerned a failed Control Room leakage test due to excessive leakage from the door to 28 battery roo The emergency ventilation system was proven operabl The door was repaired and the test repeated satis-factorily. This LER is close LER 281/80-44 concerned low head safety injection pump 2-SI-P-lA being declared inoperable due to a ground caused by rainwater leaking from a roof hatch dripping into the electrical motor connection bo The redundant pump was verified operable. Water was removed from the connection box and heat was applie When the motor connection box dried, the pump and motor were verified operable and returned* to servic The leaking roof hatch was repaired. (See IE Inspection Report 281/80-47). This LER is close LER 281/80-45 concerned inoperable containment vacuum pumps due to a broken lug on relay CV-010 A-8. A jumper was installed to allow a vacuum pump to operat The broken lug was replaced and the jumper remove A design change was initiated to allow manual operation of the vacuum pump with a failure of the control circuit. This LER is close LER 281/80-46 concerned the inadvertent opening of the circuit breaker to MOV-CW-200C (condenser circ. water outlet valve). The respective waterbox inlet MOV was operable and would have closed if necessary to preserve water in the intake canal. A construction worker had hung his coat on the oper-ating* arm of the circuit breaker which opened the breaker and de-energized the valve. The breaker was closed and the MOV cycled to verify operabilit Construction workers were instructed *not to hang anything on circuit breakers. This LER is close *
12 Plant Physical Protection The inspector verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attended~ Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for p 1 ant access contra 1.