IR 05000280/1981033
| ML18139B747 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1982 |
| From: | Burke D, Dance H, Marlone Davis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139B743 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-81-33, 50-281-81-33, NUDOCS 8202220445 | |
| Download: ML18139B747 (7) | |
Text
e UNITED STATES e
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/81-33 and 50-281/81-33 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Gas Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Virginia Approved by: _ __,~::::.._-=--~;...._------------. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on November 2 - December 11, 1981 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 260 resident inspector-hours onsite in the areas of Plant Operations and Operating Records, I&E Bulletin followup, plant maintenance, refueling operations, plant security, and Licensee Event Results Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in five areas; one violation was identified in the remaining area, plant operations (failure to follow abnormal procedure for inoperable radiation monitors -
paragraph 6.c.).
e DETAILS Persons Contacted.
Licensee Employees
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager
- G. E. Kane, Operations Superintendent
- D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Technical Services D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Health Physics Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift supervisor, QC, HP, plant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, records and contractor personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and Jindings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Unit 1 Operations Unit 1 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection perio During this time, the inspectors routinely toured the Unit 1 control rooms and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications and procedures. Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Specific areas of inspection and review
- included the following: Review of annunciated alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plan Review of the Unit 1 reactor trip and safety injection (SI) which occurred on November 25, 198 The trip from full power was caused by a coincidence of testing on the Unit 1 channel III temperature protection instrumentation and the shutdown Unit 2 electrical system Channel III of the overtemperature delta T (OTdT), overpower delta T
(OPdT) and low T average (543°F) were placed in the tripped mode for periodic testin While the instrument channel was tripped, electrical personnel were performing testing on one of the Unit 2 emergency busses following an undervoltage relay modification (Design Change 89-970).
Shorting bars were inadvertently left in a test plug which created a false undervoltage signal on the lJ emergency bus, causing the F transfer bus to separate from the C reserve station service (RSS)
(startup) power supply transforme CRSS al so 'supplies normal power to the Unit 1 H emergency bus through the F transfer bu When the lH bus lost power, unit 1 instrument channel I was lost until the emergency diesel generator started and supplied power to the lH bu Since charinel III was tripped for testing, the loss of channel I initiated the 2 out of 3 OTdT and OTdT logic for the Unit 1 reactor trip. Safet injection occurred some 0.4 sec after the trip when a momentary ( sec) high steam line *flow indication occurred; the low Tave coincidence for SI was present due to the tripping of channels I and III discussed abov The low Tave (543°F) coincidence also blocked operation of the main steam bypass or dump valves, resulting in operation of the main steam (code) safety relief valve The steam generator power operated relief valves were inoperable (isolated) due to leakag The flow control valves (MS-104A thru D) to the moisture separators and reheaters were blocked open prior to the trip, forcing steam relief through the crossunder safety valve The reactor coolant system (RCS)
was cooled down some 90°F during the event, which was within the TS 3.1.B limits of 100°F per hour.* Pressurizer pressure decreased from 2235 psig to 1765 psi The engineered safeguards equipment functioned as required; however, the high steam line flow signal apparently did not exist for a time sufficient to de-energize and close the main steam isolation valve The valves remained open despite actuation of the steam break protection logic for 0.6 second Licensee review of the event continue Review of the Unit 1 reactor trip from full power which occurred on November 29, 1981, which was due to failure of the A reactor coolant pump (RCP) moto The opening (tripping) of any RCP motor breaker initiates a reactor tri The A RCP motor stator developed a phase to ground fault during operation; RCP flow coastdown was norma The Unit 1A RCP motor was the only RCP motor in Units 1 and 2 which had not recently been replaced, and replacement was scheduled for the next refueling outage; the replacement motor was onsit Review of Unit 1 RCP motor records indicated that the A RCP motor was operating at some 20° to 30°F higher than the Band C RCP motors and was drawing about 20 amps more than Band C~
The A RCP motor temperature was not logged on 11/27 and 11/28 before the failure on 11/29; the computer readout was not believed to be accurate by the data taker No action was taken by the licensee to monitor a backup thermocouple, since a containment and RCP cubicle entry would be required to accomplish the transfer. A light brown powdery deposit was observed on the A motor cooling air discharge during removal a sample was taken and is being analyze The A RCP motor is being replace * *
e
Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection period.'
The inspector routinely toured the Unit 2 control rooms and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, maintenance, and testing were being conducted in accordanc.e with the facility Technical Specifications (TS) and procedures. Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified concerning failure to follow Abnormal Procedures during refuelin Specific areas of inspection and review included the following: Review of alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plant, during operation Followup of the Unit 2 turbine and reactor trip on November 7, 1981, during power reduction for shutdown and refuelin The turbine trip at 32% power was initiated from a high level in 68 feedwater heate Feedwater heater tube leaks have been identified and are being repaire * While inspecting alarms and equipment in the control room on November 13, the inspector observed that the Unit 2 containment particulate and gaseous radiation monitors (RM-259 and 260) were turned of Unit 2 was in the cold shutdown condition and the containment was venting through its purge isolation valves (MOV-VS-200 A thru D), which auto close when high radiation is detected on RM-259 and 26 Abnormal Procedure (AP) 5.18 requires isolation of the containment purge by closure of MOV 200 A thru D when RM-259 and 260 are not operable. This failure to follow procedure AP 5.18 is a violation of Technical Specification 6.4.D (281/81-33-01).
The licensee took corrective action to close the purge valves and increase the containment air sampling frequenc The containment air activities were well below MPG limit In addition, on November 30, the inspector observed the manipulator crane area radiation monitor (RM-262) in the alarm condition, however, no response from the operating staff or documentation of the alarm was observe The alarm occurred due to the decreasing refueling cavity water level during pumpout following refuelin The licensee stated that the radiation alarms and monitors will be more closely and carefully observed, and will take corrective actions or recurring equipment problems (eg - water in RM-259 and 260)
and false alarms which may be affecting the operator's response to the radiation monitor ( Item 281/81-33-02). During startup of Unit 1 on November 26, 1981, following recovery from the trip and SI on November 25, the unit experienced two anti-motoring turbine trip reactor trips. A tube leak was subsequently identified in 11C 11 moisture separator reheator and is the probable cause of the anti-motoring signa One additional trip was experienced by Unit 1 on November 26, 1981, due to source range high flu The reactor operator did not block the
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source range trip prior to increasing power level beyond the source range leve Procurement of Safety-Related Materials The inspectors toured the 1 icensee I s warehouse and storage areas to assure that selected safety-related materials and spare parts are inspected, stored, identified and used in accordance with QA procedures and requirement Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie Areas and materials in the main warehouse appear to be well, controlle However, the inspectors noted that certain components, such as the NBFD relay coils which were recently removed from the racks during the NBFD relay changeout program, were stored in a mini-warehouse or spare parts room in the electrical shop which did not have a QC hold are The licensee established a locked QC hold area to assure that the coils would not be used in safety-related relay The instrument shop will also establish a QC hold area for similarly identified item LER Review The inspector reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planne Certain LERs were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine complinace with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirement The review included examination of log books, internal correspondence and records, review of SNSOC meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff member Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie LER 280/81-49 concerned operation with two charging pumps inoperabl While preparing to place 118 11 charging pump in service with 11C 11 pump in pull-to-lock and the 11A 11 pump operating, the motor coupling for the auxiliary oil pump for 118 11 charging pump was found sheare With 11A
pump operating and 11C II pump on the norma 1 feeder, both pumps we*re being supplied from the same emergency bu To provide a diverse power supply for 11C 11 *pump, it was placed on the alternate feede During the short time required for this action 11C 11 pump was inoperabl The 118
pump was repaired and returned to service. This LER is close LER 280/81-53 concerned a containment isolation valve, l-SI-73, inadvertently left open during test personnel turnove The redundant inside isolation valves was close One of the testing personnel realized his mistake and called on-shift personnel to inform them of the valve statu The valve was closed and personnel involved were reinstructed. This LER is close LER 280/81-56 concerned the removal of one RHR loop from service for evaluation of seal leakage while the unit was at cold shutdown with the RCS partially drained for maintenanc The leak was determined to be minor and not requiring immediate seal maintenance; the pump was
returned to servic This LER is close e
After defueling the pump seals were repaire LER 280/81-59 concerned trip valve TV-CC-109A that would not clos The valve was manually isolated and following disconnection and reconnection of its line the valve cycled normall This LER is close LER 280/81-60 concerned MOV-CS-102A, the chemical addition tank outlet valve, which would not open electricall The valve motor operator thermal overload protection opened when attempting to cycle the valv This was probably the result of the valve being overly hand tightened the previous da The valve was manually opened, the motor operator overload protection res~t, and cycle tested satisfactorily. Personnel were reinstructed on MOV operability requirement This LER is close LER 280/81-62 concerned failure of radiation monitor RM-CC-105 due to a broken electrical wir The wire was repaired and the monitor tested and returned to service. This LER is close LER 280/81-64, 280/81-65 and 281/81-67 concerned heat tracing failure due to excessive hea In each case the heat tracing tape was replaced and tested within the time limit specified by the Technical Specification These LER's are close LER 280/81-68 and 281/81-68 concern fire barriers that were left open and unattende In both cases fire watches were established and the Fire Marshall notifie The barriers were subsequently seale A meeting was conducted between the station Fire Marshall and the construction Electrical Supervisor and Superintendent to re-emphasize the importance of sealing fire barrier These LER's are close LER 281/81-52 concerned MOV-SW-202A failure to close due to motor operator grounding due to flooding in the sum The sump was drained the motor operator replaced, and the valve cycled to verify oper-ability. This LER is close LER 281/81-53 concerned check valve 2-SW-108 failure due to excessive play in the valve disc as a result of wea The valve was isolated and repaire This LER is close LER 281/81-57 concerned the circuit breaker for MOV-2867B being inadvertently opene The breaker is located in an area where extensive design change activity was underwa The breaker was probably bumped accidentally, causing it to ope The breaker was closed and the valve responded properl The number of construction personnel authorized access to the switchgear room has been reduced, and the remaining reinstructed. This LER is closed * LER 281/81-63 concerned 118 11 Safety Injection accumulator exceeding the maximum allowable level during fillin The operator performing the
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operation had his attention drawn to another section of the control board momentarily and slightly exceeded the T.S. maximum volum The makeup operation was terminated, the shift supervisor notified, and the volume decreased to within allowable limits. the operator was reinstructed. This LER is close LER 281/81-65 concerned a smoke detector battery charger failure due to an electronic component faul The charger has been replace This LER is close IE Bulletin IE Bulletin 80-18 concerned maintenance of adequate m1n1mum flow through centrifugal charging pumps (CCPs) following a secondary side high energy line ruptur Calculations showed that the maximum RCS pressure for the weakest CCP to deliver 60 gpm was less than the primary safety valve lift poin The licensee has subsequently performed interim modification 1 of Westinghouse letter NS-TMA-2245, dated May 8, 1980, (enclosure to IE Bulletin 80-18).
The CCP miniflow return is aligned to the CCP suction with the alternate return path to the Volume Control Tank (VCT) locked close The SI initiation automatic closure signal has been removed from the CCP miniflow isolation valves by design change 80-583 for Surry Units 1 and 2.
Emergency operating procedures were modified to require closure of the CCP miniflow isolation valves when the actual RCS pressure drops below 1600 psig and to reopen the valves on increasing pressure at 2000 psi The SI systems were tested after performance of the design change modifi-cations and retested via the periodic test progra This bulletin is closed for Surry Units 1 and.
Plant Physical Protection
The inspector verified the following by observations: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromise or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for pl ant access contro No violations were identified.