IR 05000280/1981012
| ML18139B357 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1981 |
| From: | Burke D, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139B356 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-81-12, 50-281-81-12, NUDOCS 8106020177 | |
| Download: ML18139B357 (6) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/81-12 and 50-281/81-12 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License No DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Surry site near Surry, Virginia Inspector /J ( ~,~ /;v D!J: Burke '
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Approved by J.Jc ~6~~
H. C. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Irtspection on March 2-31, 1981 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 90 resident inspector-houri on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance, calibrations and testing, followup on previous findings, and plant securit Results Within the five areas inspected, no viol~tions were identified.
I DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- G. Kane, Superintendent, Operations
- R. F. Saunders, Acting Superintendent of Technical Services
- J. Patrick, Acting Superintendent, Maintenance S. P. Sarver, Health Physics Supervisor
- F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, HP, p 1 ant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, records and contractor personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov Licensee Action on Previous Findings (Closed) Violation (281/80-47-01): Identification and corrective actions not taken on conditions adverse to quality. Proper corrective actions were taken on the Unit 2 Safeguards Building roof leaks, the RHR piping support, and the deficient supports on the Charging Pump SW and CCW systems pipin The importance of prompt identification and corrective action on safety-related deficiencies has been emphasized to station personne (Closed) Violation (281/80-47-02) Failure to follow maintenance procedures for reinsulating borated water lines. The'piping has been properly insulated; increased frequency of inspect i oas should assure that the heat-traced 1 i nes are properly insulated.*
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Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Unit 1 Unit 1 remains shutdown for the Steam Generator Replacement Projec The licensee is preparing to hydrotest the secondary side of the steam generators; about half of the primary loop welds are complete. During the reporting period, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 1 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant testing, maintenance and repairs
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were being conducted in accordance with the technical specifications and facility procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Specific areas of inspection included: Followup on the silt deposits in the six inch service water lines to the charging pump and control room chiller cooling system The pipelines with silt deposits were horizontal runs of piping near the strainers and have been replaced with analyzed and qualified_ new piping, eliminating the silt. Open item 280/81-08-01 is closed. - Inspection of the flooded Service Water (SW) valve pit in the Unit 1 turbine building basemen The pit contains parellel SW valves MOV-SW-102A and -1028 which supp 1 y coo 1 i ng water to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchangers for Unit 1 and 2.. The motor operated valves automatically isolate under certain accident and canal level conditions* to conserve the high level intake canal water inventor The motor and limitorque controls on MOV-SW-1028 was found wet and inoperable, and was manually closed and electrically isolated
. until repairs were completed under Maintenance Report 110309102 The inspector observed the stroke testing of MOV-SW-102A from the control room, which verified operability. The licensee is inspecting and testing pit flood (high water level) detectors to assure proper operabilit Observation of testing of the Unit 1 RWST high/low annunciated alarms instrumentation in the upper manway atop the RWS The floating ball level instrumentation switches did not appear operable, but will be repaired prio.r to Unit 1 startu The licensee is evaluating the narrow range RWST level instrumenation to determine if more suitable level setpo.ints or instrumentation are require Recent technical specification revisions increased the required minimum RWST level to
Thus, the licensee controls the RWST level.. at_(approx.) 96.5% +/-
1%.
However, the wide range RWST level instrumentation* used to control and assure proper RWST levels (LI-CS-lOOA thru D and LI;CS-200A thru D)
is only accurate to+/- 2%.
This item remains open p_ending':C:ompletion of the licensee's review of the RWST wide and narrow:range_ instrumentation (280/81-12-01).
The inspector also noted that Periodi~~T~st 2.19A to~,
calibrate RWST level instruments. CS-100 and 200 A thru D refers tc:i the -
100% level as being equivalent to 551 inches of pure water, thus the 1.25% 'solution of borated water would actually be slightly below 55 inches when the level instrumentation indicated 100%.
The actual level would be some 0.5 inches less or 550.5 inches based on chemistry lab density determinations; the difference is negligibl However, the RWST curve of level vs. tank volume indicates 551 inches of 1.25%
solution of borated water is equivalent to 554.8 inches of pure water
at the 100% RWST 1 eve The 1 i censee is reviewing this apprent --
discrepanc.
Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operated at power during March 1981, except for the reactor trip discussed belo During this time, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 2 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility technical specifications and procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified. Specific areas of inspectfon and review included the following: Review of annunciated a 1 arms in the contra 1 room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plan *
Followup on the Unit 2 reactor trip which occurred at 1821 hours0.0211 days <br />0.506 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.928905e-4 months <br /> on March 21, 198 The B main feedwater pump developed a slight shaft seal leak which led to steam wetting of the pump suction pressure instrumentation adjacent to the FW pum A momentary short apparently (not repeatable) led to the momentary loss of the FW pump suction pressure i ndi cation which tripped the pump on 1 ow suet ion pressure protection*.
A 1 though the turbine was runback, the steam generator levels decreased until A S/G reached the low-low lsvel setpoint which tripped the reactor. A normal reactor trip and recovery ensued while the FW pump seals were replaced. The reactor was critical again within some 2. 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, and the FW pump repaired and restarted a few hours later. The inspector examined the post trip review data to determine why the reactor tripped on low-low SG level (17%) versus steam-flow/feedflow mismatch in coincidence with low SG level (23%).
The reactor was at 95% power and operating with reduced SG levels for the moisture carryover tests when the FW pump trippe The turbine was apparently runback to reduce the FF/SF mismatch before the SG low level coincidence occurred; however, after the FF/SF mismatch cleared, the shrinking SG levels resulted in the low-low SG *level -tri The inspector had no further questions at this tim The inspector reviewed the circumstances with reg*rd*to~~he isolation of the Unit 2 containment air gaseous and partjculate:-~riidiation monitors ('RM-259 and -260).
At 2100 on* March 25; 1981, technicians sampled the Unit 2 containment atmosphere; the results were typical.-
At 0210 on 3/26/81, the operating staff found no flow through RM-259:
and -260 and implemented the Abnormal Procedure (AP-5.18); valves 2RM-7 and -13 were found closed, which isolate the flow path to radiation monitors RM-259 and -260. The licensee could not determine who closed 2RM-7 and -13, or why they were closed, although proper flow through the va 1 ves had been verified on 3/25/81 by the daily RM P The inspector noted that the HP containment atmosphere sampling procedure
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2-PT-38.23 did not have the proper RM valve* nomenclature in Appendix.--A (e.g. - RM-2-2 is actually 2-RM-12, RM-2-1 is 2-RM-13, etc.), although HP personnel stated that the proper valve was manipulated for samplin The licensee stated that* 2-PT-38.23 would be revised to correct the RM va 1 ve numbers and to verify that 2-RM-7 and 13 are ope (Item 281/81"-12-01). The licensee recently requested and received a one time* 30. day extension on the snubber inspection outage from the NR The 6 month shock suppressor or snubber inspection was due on March 17, 1981, in accordance with Technical Specification 4.17; however, another ~Unit 2 shutdown would be required in April to install NRC required equipment which is being delivered to the sit The 30 day extension combines the outages. * A reactor shutdown is normally required to conduct inspections on the inaccessible snubbers. The licensee conducted the inspection of the accessible snubbers in accordance with 2~PT-398.1 on March 5, 1981, with satisfactory result Following review of the completed PT and inspection of certain snubbers, the inspector identified specific sections of 2-PT-39. which need clarification (e.g. - specify floor levels in SG Valve pit for snubber locations) and several snubbers which need ID tags. The licensee is reviewing the PT and implementing appropriate action (Item 281/81-12-02)
The inspector observed certain periodic testing on Unit 2 during March, including 2-PT-2.9, Main Steam Flow Instrumentation, and 2-PT-2.26, RCS Pressur During conduct of 2-PT-2.26, the pressurizer PORV 1 s opened and closed as required, however, the PORV isolation valves MOV-2535 and-2536 would not open (torqued out). The MOV 1s were declared inoperable and left closed; the valves will be inspected and repaired during the April 1981 outag The inspector also observed maintenance activities on radiation monitor RM-220 in the Unit 2 discharge tunnel; the RM has been alarming occa-sionally (erratically) in recent weeks. * Samples -indicate no detect-able activity in the Unit 2 discharge water effluen The inspector verified that the licensee has a str:ike contingency plan in the event of an !BEW personnel walk-ou The~)'EPCO-I:BEW contract expires on March 31, 198. - -*
-:...,,: ~- The inspector verified the following observation: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructed.
5 Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control.
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