IR 05000280/1981027
| ML18139B642 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1981 |
| From: | Burke D, Dance H, Marlone Davis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139B641 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-81-27, 50-281-81-27, NUDOCS 8112070472 | |
| Download: ML18139B642 (6) | |
Text
e UNITED STATES e
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/81-27 and 50-281/81-27 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company P. 0. Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 SUMMARY Inspection on September 1-30, 1981 Areas Inspected Virginia This inspection involved 160 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance, calibration and testing, plant staffing, LER's, followup on previous findings, and plant securit Results Of the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified *
( 8112070472 811030" i PDR ADOCK 05000280 /
G PDR *
J
e Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager DETAILS
- R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager G. E. Kane, Operations Superintendent
- D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Technical Services M. Kansler, Engineering Service Supervisor D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Health Physics Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators,*shift supervisor, QC, HP, plant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, records and contractor personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation 280/81-22-07:
Inadequate redundancy maintained for the OP and OT delta T protection system (TS 3.7.B). Licensee personnel have been reinstructed on adherence to the Technical Specifications (TS) and on communication between the operations and technical staff (Closed) Violation 281/81-22-01, Inadequate documentation of RCS Leakag Improved Logkeeping and documentation have been implemented following following conferences involving corporate and station management and operations personne (Closed) Violation 280/81-22-01, Inadequate controls, documentation, and approval when the control room annunciator alarm card for the spent fuel pit high level alarm (CF6) was pulle Operations personnel were instructed on the use of proper controls, forms, and approvals when systems such as the control room annunciators are modifie (Closed) Violation 280/81-22-06, Inadequate boric acid flow path to the core during cold shutdown (after refueling).
Procedures have been developed and implemented to assure adequate flow paths to the core for various plant conditions. (Closed) Violation 280/81-2204:
Inadequate calibration procedures for the chemical addition tank (CAT) level instrumentatio The Unit 1
'
I(
- e
calibration procedure CAL-CS-005 was revised to correct for the density differences between water and sodium hydroxid Unit 2 calibration procedure CAL-CS-010 revision is in.progres (Closed) Violation 280/81-22-08, CLS Periodic Tests (PT) 8.4 and not performed in accordance with TS 4. The PT's were subsequently performed and were satisfactor The PT's have bee.n revised for performance during unit shutdown conditions, and Technical Specifi-cations have been reviewed to assure accuracy and completeness of the surveillance test (PT) progra.
Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified during this inspectio.
Unit 1 and 2 Operations Unit 1 and 2 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection perio During this time, the inspectors routinely toured the Unit 1 and 2 control rooms and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications and procedures. Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Specific areas of inspection and review included the following: Review of annunciated alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plan At th~ beginning of the month, the licensee experienced condensate leaks in the Unit 1 and 2 containment On 9/1/81, the Unit 1 containment sump and recirculation sump were full, and several inches of water covered the containment basement floor due to an auxilary feedwater (AFW) flow instrument pipe flange leak to (C steam generator).
The flange was furmanited on 9/2/81, which corrected the leakage; the water in the sumps and on the containment floor was subsequently pumped to the liquid waste system and processe Unit 2 had secondary leaks on a diaphragm valve in the 3/4 inch chemical addition line to the B steam generator (SG) feedwater piping, on an auxiliary feedwater (AFW) check valve (gaset), and on a SG blowdown flow monitor instrumen The Unit 2 containment sumps were full, and approximately one foot of water covered the containment basement floo The Unit 1 and 2 safeguards building valve pits contained some 3 to 4 feet of standing water, and the liquid waste system was essentially full. Since progress was not attained on reduction of the levels of standing water or the feedwater leaks in Unit 2 containment, the Licensee commenced shutdown of Unit 2 on September 2, 1981, to correct the leaks and process the accumulated wate The licensee performed an analysis and safety review of the
water on the containment floor and in the sump The effects of the water (some 90,000 gallons in Unit 2) on ultimate sump PH for iodine retention ability, peak containment pressure, dilution during recirculation mode of SI, and equipment submergence were r~yt_~wed_~_ and a determination was made that the water did not present an *J!J.!.t~\\(i~ewed safety questio Certain Unit 2 components near-the containment floor, such as the primary drains transfer tank (POTT) pump motors were*
electrically checked and found wet; the motors were electrically isolated and repaired during the shutdow During the Unit 2 shutdown, the inspector toured the Unit 2 containment to inspect snubbers and various equipment, installation progress of fire equipment in containment (eg -
RC pump oil collection tank, standpipes, etc.), and water accumulatio A maximum of 16 inches of water accumulation was measured at the containment outside wall, near the stairs in the outside annulu An additional three inches of water would be expected near the center of containment since the floor slopes toward the center. The inspector also inspected the instrument room to assure that the water on the containment floor was not penetrating into the in core room, which extends under the reactor vessel. Although the Unit 2 incore room sump high level annuciator alarm (E-3 on panel B) was not annunciated, the sump was full and some one to two inches of water had accumulated on the floor of the roo The level switch (LS/DA-205) was repaired and the room and sump pumped ou The reactor pressure vessel is well above the floor of the incore room and was not wet by the wate The licensee plans to install redundant sump level indication instrumentation in the near futur Unit 1 runback and shutdown due to control rod problems on 9/10/8 During performance of Periodic Test (PT) 6, Rod Drive Surveillance, three groups of rods were determined to be inoperable due to a defective power cabinet car The licensee commenced a Unit 2 rampdown in accordance with TS 3.12.C.13; during the power decrease, a turbine runback from 80 to 46% occurred when rod M-4 dropped some 79 steps, initiating the nuclear instrumentation system 11dropped rod 11 runbac Unit 2 was subsequently shutdow Prior to the shutdown, the licensee had identified higher than normal Iodine activity levels in the Unit 1 reactor coolant system (RCS).
Licensee and vendor analysis indicate that certain once used fuel rods may have pinhole leak The Unit 1 Dose Equivalent (DE) Iodine was approximately 0.5 uCi/mL prior to the shutdown, and reached a maximum activity of 3.7 uCi/mL several hours after the shutdow Technical Specification 3.1.D limits the specific activity of the reactor coolant to 1.0 uCi/mL when the reactor is critical or the RCS is greater than 500° F; the DE (I-31) activity may exceed 1.0 uCi/mL
{but must be less than 10.0 uCi/mL) for up to 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Unit 1 was restarted fo1lowing decay and cleanup of the activity to less than uCi/m Power increases were slowed to 1/2% per hour to 11condition:
the fuel; RCS activities stabilized at 0.1 uCi/mL (DE Iodine) for the remainder of the wee,:
- .
4 Unit 1 was shutdown on 9/20/81 to perform maintenanc The DE Iodine activity peaked at some 1.8 uCi/mL following shutdow The inspector observed certain maintenance and repair activities such as the C reactor coolant pump (RCP) stud inspections and repairs. A slight RCP flange leak led to boron deposits on the studs or bolts which resulted in some corrosion on the exposed threads of a few of the C RCP stud The studs with visible corrosion or wastage were replace The A and B RCP studs were inspected and found acceptabl While in the Unit 1 containment, the inspector verified that previous sources of leaks, such as the auxiliary feedwater check valves and the flow limiting orifices, were being replaced with new components to reduce potential leakag Hydrotests and inspections were being performed as require The inspector observed some rust of crud in the fluid of the reservior on AFW piping snubber WAPD-HSS-141-The licensee replaced the snubber and plans to perform the PT 1s for snubber inspection and surveillance prior to startu The inspector had no further question The inspector verified that the licensee 1 s onsite organization structure is as described in the Technical Specification The inspector also verified that the qualifications of the new Superintendent of Technical Services meets the requirements of ANSI N18.1 as required by Technical Specifi-cation Licensee Event (LERs)
The inspector reviewed the LER's listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planne Certain LER's were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirement The review included examination of log books, internal correspondence and records, review of SNSOC meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff member Within the areas inspected, no violation were identifie The following LER's were reviewed and closed:
UNIT 1 280/81-11 280/81-12 280/81-13 280/81-16 280/81-17 280/81-21 280/81-23 280/81-24 280/81-26 280/81-27 280/81-28 UNIT 2 281-81-22 281/81-27
- 281/81-29 281/81-30 281/81-31 281-81-32 281/81-33 281/81-35 281/81-37 281/81-38 281/81-40
280/81-30 280/81-32 280/81-35 280/81-36
e 281-81-41 281/81-43 281/81-44 281/81-45 281/81-46 281/81-47 281/81-48 281/81-54 The inspector verified the following by observations: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zo'nes described in the physical security plans were not compromise or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access contro No violations were identified.