IR 05000280/1981031
| ML18139B648 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1981 |
| From: | Burke D, Dance H, Marlone Davis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139B647 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.1.3, TASK-1.C.5, TASK-1.C.6, TASK-TM 50-280-81-31, 50-281-81-31, IEB-80-19, NUDOCS 8112160356 | |
| Download: ML18139B648 (9) | |
Text
e UNITED STATES e
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/81-31 and 50-281/81-31 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Surry site near Surry, Virginia Inspectors: i/._ (,{)~ ¢,-:
0. J. Burke
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Approved by: ;(/( J~
H? C. Dance, Section Chief, Division of 11/"J(I /f Date 1Signed
//h()/rl Da7te Signed
,, I z.o /r1 Date Signed
Resident and Reactor Project Inspection
SUMMARY Inspection on October 1-31, 1981 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 220 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Plant Operations and Operating Records, Plant Maintenance, Calibration and Testing, Followup on NUREG 0737 Items, Licensee Events, and Plant Securit Results In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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e DETAILS Persons Contacted 2. Licensee Employees
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager
- G. E. Kane, Operations Superintendent
- D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Technical Services M. Kansler, Engineering Service Supervisor D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Health Physics Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift supervisor, QC, HP, plant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, records and contractor personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Unit 1 and 2 Operations Unit 1 and 2 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection perio During this time, the inspectors routinely toured the Unit 1 and 2 control rooms and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing, and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications and procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Specific areas of inspection and review included the following: Review of annunciated alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plant. A Unit 2 turbine runback to 35% from 85% power was experienced on October 1 Prior to the runback the Unit had been experiencing transients on the feed water heater system causing fluctuations in
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turbine output. Three wires were found broken in a junction box for number one governor valve and were repaire The cause of the broken wires is suspected to be cable pull or vibration mechanical damag During the transient the unit was out of the delta flux band for approximately 32 minute Rod motion and boration were used to restore delta flux to the allowable ban Following repairs the unit was returned to full power operatio The licensee i;Jill inspect similar wiring on other governer valves and review the preventative maintenance program on the component The annual VEPCO Emergency Exercise was conducted at Surry on October 30 and 3 The drill was determined to be acceptable; no violations were noted by the NRC inspection team monitoring the exercis Details of this inspection will be included in the Emergency Exercise IE inspection reports (50-280/81-28 and 50-281/81-28) Following review of control room logbooks on 10/5/81, the inspector reviewed the circumstances associated with the decoupling of the Unit 1 containment spray pumps under maintenance request (MR) Sl108271213 and Sl10827124 The MR's were written to open the coupling between the containment spray (CS) pump and the clutch assembly to the turbine designed to drive the pump (the turbine is not required and has been isolated).
Electric motors drive the CS pumps A and B through couplings on the other side of the pump The MR's were written to prevent pump failure due to potential clutch problems on the turbine side of the uni In late September, the CS A and B pump couplings were opened; however, the pumps were uncoupled from the electric motors instead of the turbine drive Unit 1 was the cold shutdown (CSD)
condition when the uncoupling was performed; no LCO's were violate On 10/4/81, Periodic Test (PT) 17.1, Containment Spray System, was performed following seal repairs on the ACS pump, and prior to Unit 1 startu PT 17.1 revealed that the CS pump was uncoupled and inoperable; the redundant CS pump 1-CS-P-lB was also found uncouple The MR's to perform the CS pump uncoupling was not properly stamped 11Safety-Related
, which led to the even The licensee is taking corrective action to stamp every MR 11Safety-Related 11 or Non-Safety-Related" to assure that the MR's are properly stamped and controlle The licensee will also consider the addition of a "Testing required to verify operability" entry on the MR, for additional administrative control of safety-related equipmen The inspectors had no further questions at this tim During Motor Control Center (MCC) breaker inspections and verifi-cations, the inspectors found the electrical breakers to the containment recirculation spray pumps lA and lB motor heaters tagged out and ope The Unit 1 tags were removed and the heaters re-energized.
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TMI Task Action Plan (TAP) Item I.A.1.3, Shift Manning:
In response to NUREG 0737 dated December 10, 1980, the licensee revised administrative procedures for Surry Units 1 and 2 to limit overtime in accordance with the requirements of section I.A.1.3. Administrative Procedure ADM-3, Hours of Work, dated March 13, 1980 limits scheduled work hours as follows:
(1)
An individual shall not be permitted to work more than 12 consecutive hour (2)
At least a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> break will be scheduled between all work period (3)
An individual shall not be permitted to work more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7 day perio (4)
An individual shall not work more than 14 consecutive days without having 2 consecutive days off.
Exceptions to the above can be made only with written approval of the station manage Inspector audit of work hours for several plant staff members who perform safety-related functions disclosed no violations of ADM-The licensee has implemented the revised shift staffing requirements of item I.A. Amendment 69 to Surry Technical Specifications was approved on May 22, 1981, covering minimum shift crew compositio The licensee is reviewing the interpretation of the requirements for the Auxiliary Operator (AO), since the A.O. is not defined in Technical Specifications or NUREG 073 The A. 0. is currently a control room opertor trainee (or unlicensed control room operator, CRO) with a few weeks to a few years of training and experienc However, since there are several AO's on each shift, the inspectors have determined that the licensee is currently in compliance with item I.A.1.3 shift manning requirement Continued compliance will be monitored by the inspector Tap Item. I.A.1.3. is closed for Surry Units 1 and TAP Item I.C.5., Procedures for Feedback of Operating Experience to Plant Staff:
The licensee's response to NUREG 0737, dated December 10, 1980, stated that the operating experience assessment function was being implemented through both a system level Safety Engineering and control group and a station level Safety Engineering Staff (SES).
Surry Administrative Procedure ADM-21, Safety Engineering Staff, tasks the SES with responsibilities for (1) review of operating experience
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information, (2) the feedback of pertinent information to operators and other personnel, and the dissemination of such information for incorporation into training and retraining program Based on discussions with licensee management and operations personnel*
and an interview with the SES manager, the inspectors have determined that the licensee is in compliance with item I.C.5 of NUREG 073 This item is close TAP Item I.C.6, Guidance on procedures for verifying correct per-formance of operating activities:
The licensee's response to NUREG 0737, dated December 10, 1980 committed to implementation of a program for verifying the correct performance of operating activitie Based on discussions with license management and operations personnel and review of licensee procedures, the inspectors have determined that this program has been implemented at Surr This program includes the following:
(1)
Shift Supervisor permission is required for performance of surveillance testing (periodic tests) and maintenance procedure (2)
The Shift Supervisor signs off on a system released for work or returned to service on maintenance order (3)
The Shift Supervisor is informed of any changes in plant status and relays this information to the operator Balance of plant operators report equipment status to the respective licensed control room operators on duty who relays this information to the shift superviso (4)
Equipment important to safety is returned to service by maintenance operating procedure (MOP).
A periodic test or the MOP is used to verify operability when equipment is returned to servic Both procedures utilize a second person to ensure critical items are verified to be in proper alignmen (5)
Licensee procedures require a second qualified person to verify the status of critical component Two signatures are required for periodic tests. Critical valve positions are controlled by the administrative key lock progra Shift turnover checklists verify the status of important plant parameters and equipmen The checklist requires the signatures of the oncoming and offgoing operator in each area, as well as the oncoming shift superviso All requests for tagging are independently reviewed by the Shift Supervisor/Assistant Shift Supervisor (Licensed SRO) prior to authorizing the operator/auxiliary operator to place the tags, and subsequent to tag placement and clearin However, the licensee does not plan to require two man verification of all tag
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placements. A second qualified person verifies correct imple-mentation of the equipment control measures as described above, although two man verification of tags or equipment in the field may increase radiation exposure Based on this review the inspectors find.the method for verifying correct performance of operating activities to be acceptabl This item is close.
IE Bulletin IE Bulletin 80-19 concerning failures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays in reactor protective systems of operating combustion engineering designed plants. Surry Units 1 and 2 do not use mercury-wetted Relays in the Reactor protection syste The Bulletin is close Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The inspector reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain that NRG reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planned. Certain LERs were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirement The review included examination of log books, internal correspondence and records, review of SNSOC meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff members *
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie LER 280/81-10 concerned radiation monitor alarm setpoints on two component cooling detectors being greater than the Technical Specification (TS) limi A change to PT 26.1 was made and reviewed by the inspector. This LER is clo*se LER 280/81-12 concerned the failure to calibrate seismic instrumentation due to defective procedure The periodic test was labeled as a calibration procedure, when in reality it was a functional test. The calibration procedure has been added to the periodic test progra This LER is close LER's 280/81-33 and 280/81-47 concerned high I-131 dose equivalent activity following reactor trips caused by known fuel element defect The TS 3. transient limits (10 mci/cc) were not exceede Levels were monitored every four hours until activity returned to less than 1.0 microcurie/c The licensee is continuing to monitor the slightly elevated level of activit These LERs are close LER 280/81-34 concerned unsealed fire barrier penetration The penetrations were sealed and contractor management were briefed on strict compliance with requirements. This LER is close LER 280/81-38 concerned an open breaker for MOV-1860A, which had apparently been accidently bumped by construction personne The breaker was closed and the licensee has reduced the number of construction personnel authorized
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access to the switchgear roo Similar and adjacent breakers were inspected and found in the correct position. This LER is close LER 280/81-39 concerned low level in 1A1 Accumulator due_ to improper valve manipulation during fillin The operator involved was reinstructed. This LER is close LERs 280/81-40 and 280/81-41 concerned heat tracing failures due to mechanical damag The type was replaced and tested, and workers reinstructed. These LERs are close LER 280/81-42 concerned a failed log rate meter card in a radiation monitor in the component cooling syste The card was replaced, the instrument calibrated and the monitor was returned to service. This LER is close LER 280/81-46 concerned a failed regulation card in power cabinet lAC which prevented outward movement of control rod The unit was shut down, the faulty card was replaced, rods were tested, and the unit was returned to operatio The inspector followed the troubleshooting and testing activities. This LER is close LER 1s 280/81-48 and 280/81-52 concerned C steam flow transmitter failures caused by moisture in the electronic portion of the transmitter The failed transmitters were replaced with moisture resistant transmitter*s, however the accumulation of water in the electrical conduit attached to the transmitter has not been fully addressed. Similar conduit installations should be verified dry, the source of water inleakage isolated, and the electrical cables inspected for possible degradation during the next outag Similar accummulation of water appears to have been detected in certain SI accummulator level instrumentation. These LER 1s remain ope LER 280/81-55 concerned the inadvertent omission of a snubber from an updated Periodic Test data shee The snubber was inspected, the PT data sheet changed, and a visual walkdown of lines performed to ensure all snubbers were accounted for an inspection lists. This LER is close LER 280/81-57 concerned a failed steam flow transmitter due to a defective amplifier board which was subsequently replaced. This LER is close LER 281/81-28 concerned the inadvertent closing of number 3 diesel generator output breaker during performance of P.T. 8.5 (Monthly Consequence Limiting Safeguards on Unit 1). The diesel was tested to verify operability and the PT has been changed to ensure positive control of EDG output breakers. This LER is close LER 281/81-49 concerned an incorrect flush time due to an error in a change to PT 1 The Periodic Test was corre~ted and other Periodic Tests were reviewed to ensure proper flush times. This LER is closed.
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LER 281/81-50 concerned the failure of A charging pump while C charging pump,:-was out of service for minor maintenanc The A pump had a failed bearing seal resulting from water in the lube oil which originated from a tube failure in the charging pump lube oil coole The C pump was returned to service within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> The A pump bearing seal and lube oil cooler were subsequently repaired and returned to service. This LER is close LER 281/81-56 concerned a sample valve TV-SS-2028 which fail open due to faulty limit switch in the valve operato The switch was repaired and the valve cycled to verify proper operation. This LER is close LER 281/81-59 concerned a loss of power to a smoke detector panel caused by a faulty power supply card in the battery charge The card was replaced and the system returned to service. This LER is close LER 281/81-61 concerned an open fire barrier penetratio The fire barrier plate was replaced and new requirements for penetrating fire boundaries were instituted. This LER is close LER 281/81-66 concerned two inoperable snubbers found during the accessible snubber visual inspection periodic tes The snubbers were replace This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-55 concerned inoperable charging pump service water (SW) pumps 2-SW-P-lOA and 2-SW-108 due to an electric motor failure and impeller caps screw failure respectivel The licensee was requested to submit a supplement LER to explain: Corrective action to prevent recurrence of motor wetting from 2-SW-P-108 leakage (Not addressed in LER). Section 2 of the LER narrative stated that there were no observable increases in charging pump temperature However, review of computer printed data by the inspector indicated that charging pump bearing temperatures exceeded the alarm setpoints (but not the design limits). What operator actions are necessary when temperture alarm points are exceede This LER remains ope In addition, the inspectors have observed packing leaks in the SW lOA&B pumps for Units 1 and These leaks, when combined with the low suction pressure problems of this SW subsystem, have on occassion led to inoperable (Air bound) SW pumps (See LER's 280/81-37 and 281/81~57).
The licensee is reviewing the SW system to determine what modifications are required to assure proper operabilit The pump leaks are expeditiously repaired.
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- Plant Physical Protection
The inspector verified the following by observations: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access contro No violations were identified.