IR 05000272/1986031
| ML18092B395 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1986 |
| From: | Norrholm L, Roxanne Summers NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092B394 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-86-31, 50-311-86-34, NUDOCS 8701070409 | |
| Download: ML18092B395 (28) | |
Text
u. s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
050272-861018 50-272/86-31 Report No /86-34 50-272 Docket No DPR-70 License No DPR-75 Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
October 28, 1986 - November 24, 1986 Inspectors:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector K. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector R. J. Summers, Project Engineer Reviewed by: R. l. ~
R. J.OSummers, Project Engineer Reactor Pro*ec ection DRP Approved by:
28, Projects Inspection Summary:
Inspections on October 28, 1986 - November 24, 1986 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/86-31 and 50-311/86-34)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including:
followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, ESF system walkdown, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, and licensee event followu The inspection involved 131 inspector hours by the resident and regional NRC inspector In addition, meetings were held on November 11 and December 5, 1986, to discuss the licensee 1 s planned corrective actions as a result of the false loss of offsite power event on August 26, 198 Results:
No violations were identifie One unresolved item was opened concerning service water piping repairs for containment fan coil unit The results of the two meetings pertaining to the onsite electrical system are detailed in Appendix A of this repor r - - 8701070409 861222 PDR ADOCK 05000272 Q.
DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/81-23-03). This item was unresolved pending determination of compliance to regulations concerning separation of protection and control systems and single failure criteria related to instrumentation and control design of the Volume Control Tank (VCT) Level Syste Review of licensee documentation indicates that the controls for VCT level do not interface with the protection system and that the design includes redundant level control loop The inspector has no further question (Closed) I.E. Circular (272/81-CI-09; 311/81-CI-09). This circular concerns potential design deficiencies that may result in unmonitored radioactive effluent pathways from containmen The licensee determined that a release was possible if, during a LOCA, a pressure boundary leak in containment fan coil unit (CFCU) tubing or service water piping existe An operations directive was written and implemented directing isolation of affected CFCU 1 s upon identification of service water leak This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (311/83-37-06).
The inspector identified a potential problem area on the hydrogen recombiners where cable could be frayed at the junction bo The inspector reviewed a maintenance work request that installed sleeves to prevent fraying of the cabl The inspector observed the sleeves in Unit 2 containmen This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (311/84-15-02). This item was opened to review the engineering evaluation of a reactor trip and the installation of DCR 1 s lSC-1411 and 2SC-141 The inspector has reviewed the engineering evaluation, DCR 1s lSC-1411, and 2SC-1412 which remove the condenser vacuum low annunciator window and install a condenser vacuum low-low annunciato This was accomplished to give clarification to the operator regarding the condenser vacuum alar The DCR 1s also removed the turbine low vacuum alarm from the first out panel, which was misleadin The low-low alarm now alerts the operator of an approach to the turbine trip conditio This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (311/84-27-03).
This item was opened to review the licensee evaluation of a Wyle Laboratories assessment of cracked eductors on primary safety valve The inspector reviewed the Wyle Laboratories* report, valve repair procedure and the licensee's Safety Evaluation S-C-R200-MSE-28 The inspector concluded that Wyle and PSE&G determined that the eductors should not be repaired and that a determination could not be made as to the cause of the crack The licensee purchased new valves and performed NOT to determine if the new valves had a similar proble None was found and the new valves were placed in the syste To date no similar cracking has been foun The licensee believes that a manufacturing grinding technique may have contributed to the cracks during manufactur The licensee notified other utilities about the findings through Nuclear Network operating plant experience report dated July 26, 198 This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (311/85-03-01).
After reviewing LER 85-26 11 Radioactive Liquid Release Not Continuously Monitored 11 an inspection to review licensee's corrective actions during a future inspection was planne The inspector reviewed the licensee's Safety Evaluation S-2-C900-CEE-0092, RO, which recommended the installation of a new software package and a system hardware upgrad The results have improved reliability and efficiency on the R18 monito No similar problems have been identified since the modificatio This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272/85-07-01; 311/85-07-01).
Foreign matter contamination of new terrestic T-68 lube oil was identified by the license The licensee has installed a cleanup filtration system on both units and has performed a system cleanup and flush each refueling outag All receipt of lube oil is sampled and analyzed by the licensee's laboratory with results received, by the station, prior to putting the lube oil in the storage tank The resident inspector witnessed the system flush and cleanup on Unit 2 during this refueling outag This item is close.
Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators* Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log
3.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure.. On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LC0 1 s directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunci-ators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit *
3. On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown:
The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuratio This ESF system walkdown was also conducted to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat The Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System was inspecte No deficiencies were identifie.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units* operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee 1 s actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
3. Control Room Activities The resident inspectors conducted an assessment of Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room activities and housekeeping practice As a result of the assessment, the following observations were made; The control room operators and shift supervisors are easily identifiable by their uniforms which delineate the job functio l
- 3.. There is a businesslike atmosphere free of extraneous activities and noise, as a result of an access restricted door which requires shift supervisor approval prior to entr An outside annex of the control room is in place which is beginning to assume the responsibilities for tagging of systems, and maintenance contact with shift personne This allows control room personnel to concentrate on operation of the facility onl The control room housekeeping is above average and no extraneous reading material, radios or TV 1 s are in evidenc The resident inspectors concluded that the control rooms are operated in a professional environment with professionals who are alert, calm during emergencies observed, and question as well as resolve abnormal conditions iden*tified by alarms, et Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at full power throughout this inspection period with the exception of a brief power reduction for electrical grid system stabilit Unit. 2 3.3. The resident inspectors continued to follow the licensee 1s third refueling outage activitie.3. In the previous inspection report, licensee identification and actions regarding resin intrusion into the Unit 2 reactor and refueling cavity from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) was discusse Resin cleanup of the reactor vessel cavity, upper and lower internals, reactor coolant system (RCS), fuel assemblies, and RWST were completed during this inspection perio In addition, the primary channel head of No. 21 Steam Generator (SG) was inspected and a small amount of resin was foun The licensee decided that this small amount of resin did not warrant the inspection of the other SG 1 s since the RHR suction is taken off No. 21 hot leg and therefore No. 21 SG would be most likely to contain resi Nos. 21 and 23 RCP seals were
,.
flushed (Nos. 22 and 24 seals were replaced)
as was the containment spray suction heade Engineering evaluations and reviews were completed on plant procedures and operations in order to determine the root cause and source of the resins to prevent future intrusio Two possible resin sources to the RWST were identifie Backflow from the Spent Resin Storage Tank due to the absence of check valves in the primary water system in combination with a lack of strict adherence to resin sluicing procedure Backwashing of resin from the Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer in certain spent fuel cooling system configurations where the spent fuel pool pump discharge pressure may be imposed on the outlet of the demineralize (A check valve or filter failure would also be necessary to result in a path to the RWST).
The licensee determined that resin sluicing and Spent Fuel Pit Demineralizer operating instruc-tions are adequate and valve lineups are correc.3. The lic~nsee is undertaking the following actions regarding this incident:
Prior to Startup Complete a safety evaluation on the impact of resin intrusion into the RCS Monitor seal injection.filters, reactor coolant filter, spent fuel pit filter, and refueling water purification filter (change-out on high dp)
X-ray refueling water purification pump discharge check valve Slowdown RCS flow transmitters (low point in intermediate legs)
Inspect Unit 1 RWST
3. During Startup and Operations The licensee estimates that approximately 3 liters of resin remain in the RC Because resin under high temperature will decom-pose, and the decomposition materials have the potential to create a corrosion problem in the RCS, the licensee is upgrading chemistry equipment to detect small amounts of resin byproducts, primarily sulfates and Total Organic Carbon (TOC).
A chemistry monitoring program for implementation during startup is being developed and will be included in the safety evaluatio Long-term Add an inlet resin strainer on the Spent Fuel Pit Demineralizer Periodic inspections of the RWST (both units)
Additional operator training on procedure adherence, resin sluicing operations, and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System The inspectors will follow licensee activities dealing with RCS monitoring during startu The inspectors have no further questions at this tim During the refill of No. 23 SG, the licensee discovered that the secondary outboard handhole was leakin The SG was drained to investigate the cause of the lea Results of the investigation determined that two of eight SG secondary handhole gaskets withdrawn from the storeroom were of the wrong folio number and had been inadvertently mixed in with the correct gasket Investigation of the other SG 1 s handholes identified the second wrong sized gasket on No. 22 SG inboard handhol Deficiency Report No. MT86-162 dated October 30, 1986 was issued and the correct handhole gaskets were installe Quality Action Request No. SS-86-Q036 dated November 7, 1986 was issued by the licensee 1 s QA department to the Material Control department recommending revision of material control procedure Mll-P-600 (Issue Material From Stock) to ensure that stockhandlers check, prior to issue, that correct material is being issued as requeste. At the time the discrepancy occurred, the procedure had already been revised and was in the review cycl The revision requires the stockhandler to review all applicable release tag A memo was issued directing the stockhandlers to institute this policy while the procedure was in review, however full conformance to the memo had apparently not been achieve Accordingly, a training session has been held with all stockhandlers in order to preclude recurrenc The inspector had no further question During this inspection period, ultrasonic inspection of the fuel was completed with three of the fuel assemblies showing fuel pin leak Comparable fuel assemblies from spent fuel storage were identified as acceptable to be used in the place of the identified leaker The licensee plans to reconstitute the defective fuel assemblie The inspectors attended selected outage meetings including a Westinghouse shift briefing prtor to stud tensionin The inspectors witnessed core reload activities and reviewed in progress and completed procedures and documentation for the core shuffle including:
Unit 2 Third Refueling Procedure FP-PNJ-R3 Fuel Handling Data Sheets Core Shuffle Physics Data Sheets Fuel Assembly Handling Deviation Reports Maintenance Procedure M2F - Manipulator Crane Pre-Operational Inspections and Operational Tests Core reload, vessel reassembly, reactor head installation and stud tensioning was completed prior to the end of the report perio The outage is continuing with Type A containment integrated leak rate testing in progres (Refer to Inspection Report 50-311/86-35 for details).
No violations were identifie *
10 Maintenance Observations The inspector followed licensee actions relative to the following safety related maintenance activities:
4. Work Order Number 86-08-06-039-6 Procedure OCR No. 2EC-1806 Description 21 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger (CCHX)
retubing with titanium tube During a licensee QA surveillance of the retubing of 21 CCHX, the following discrepancies were identified:
hydroswaging equipment pressure fluctuations above the procedurally prescribed limit (49,700 PSI vs 48,000 PSI)
mandrel size deviation resulting in the 11 ballooning 11 of tubes beyond the tubesheet numerous cracked tubes Stop Work Order No. SS-86-S003 dated October 31, 1986, and Deficiency Report No. PI-86-118 dated November 1, 1986 were issue The licensee 1 s investigation and corrective actions were as follows:
Fluorescent liquid penetrant examination performed on all tube-to-tubesheet joints which indicated that 994 of approximately 3400 tubes were cracke Relative indications appeared as circumferential cracks in the location where the tube material expanded into the tubesheet groove There also was some evidence of longitudinal cracking in the welded seam of the tub All of the defective tubes had been hydroswaged (hydraulically expanded).
No tubes which were mechanically rolled (because location did not accommodate hydroswage equipment) showed cracking or defect Tube I.D. measurements were taken to determine whether overexpansion had taken place on the back face of the tubeshee These measurements indicated that 98 tubes had been over expanded (
11 ballooned 11 ) beyond the tubeshee As determined during pre-outage testing of the hydroswaging process by th~ vendor, the optimum pressure required to obtain a leak-tight joint using titanium tubes and a tubesheet testblock supplied by the original CCHX tubesheet
manufacturer, is 46,000 ps In accordance with OCR ZEC-1806 Engineering Instruction, Revision 1, the expansion pressure was not to exceed 48,000 psi without prior approval from Engineerin The licensee determined that, although the 49,700 psi is above that which was specified in the Engineering Instructions, it is well below the 53,000 psi at which permanent 1 i gament distortion would occur and therefor.e, does not affect the quality of the joint nor the integrity of the tubeshee All tubes that were hydraulically expanded were removed and replace The second set of tubes were mechanically rolle In keeping with the licensee 1s new philosophy of the workers being responsible for QC of jobs they perform, QC Department hold points had been removed from the tube rolling procedur QC coverage consisted of random surveillances of ongoing maintenance work (which in this case resulted in identifying the deficiency, but late in the process).
As noted below, increased QA/QC coverage and hold points were put back in the procedur QA/QC surveillance of the retubing was increased (5% of first 300 tubes were examined using fluorescent liquid penetrant, every 10th tube I.D. measured, roller expanders checked every 100 tubes).
Following the retubing evolution, a shellside hydrostatic pressure test was performed with satisfactory result Long term investigation and corrective actions to prevent recurrence are ongoing and include:
Eight (8) tubes were hydraulically expanded into a test bloc There were no failures noted when tested using fluorescent liquid penetran The licensee postulated that the actual tubesheet groove depths may be larger than specified (either due to manufacturing uncertainties or wear) resulting in overexpansion of the tubes into the grooves causing the tubes to crac However, groove depth measurements of the No. 21 CCHX tubesheet grooves showed no appreciable variance from the specification * 10% of defective tubes pulled including the tube stub and a 10 inch section of tube adjacent to tube stub were labeled and retained for testin The licensee postulated that the first batch of titanium Jtubes may have been improperly heat treated during manufacturing causing them to be susceptible to crackin Investigation and testing of the tube materials is ongoin Field Directive S-2-N210-NFD-083, Tube Rolling Procedure for No. 22 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger, was revised to incorporate the use of both mechanical roller and hydraulic expansion methods for the No's 11, 21 and 22 CCHX' In relation to the hydraulic expansion process, the revision will also address the following concerns:
Tubesheet Hole I.D. Measurement:
This step shall be expanded to include groove depth measuremen This shall be a part of QA/QC surveillanc Hydraulic Expansion Pressure:
This shall be included as part of QA/QC surveillanc An optimum pressure and allowable fluctuation above shall be specifie Pressure below optimum shall not be permitte Expansion Depth:
This step shall also be made a part of normal QA/QC surveillance; and, Upon completion of expansion of every 100 tubes, the mandrel shall be checked using a tubesheet test block or standar No deviation from pre-determined expansion depth shall be permitte Visual Inspection/Liquid Penetrant Examination:
A visual inspection of random tube to tubesheet joints shall be performed by QA/Q The area of major concern is the section of the tube that extrudes into the tubesheet groove Suspect joints shall be subjected to a fluorescent liquid penetrant examinatio No violations were identified, however the inspectors will continue to follow licensee's progress in identifying the root cause of the problem and long term corrective action Work Order Number Procedure Description 4. I.C.14.1.001 Troubleshooting N SG Leve 1 Controller due to 14BF19 going full open during lPD-2.6.057 (No. 14 SG Feed Flow)
Channel Functional Tes. No problem was identified during troubleshooting; the licensee determined the opening of the 14BF19 valve during the transfer of the controller from auto to manual to be an isolated malfunctio The licensee is monitoring performance of this surveillance for recurrence of this proble Work Order Number Procedure 86-11-07-067-4 Code Job N S-86-363 Description No. 24 Fan Coil Unit Inlet Piping (Service Water) Weld Overlay of Pitted Areas While performing a hydrostatic test on No. 23 Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU), the licensee identified a pinhole leak in a butt weld on one of the 3 11 stainless steel service water supply line As a result, the licensee radiographed 12 field welds (6 inlet, 6 outlet) on Nos. 24 and 25 CFCU 1s to determine the extent of the proble The X-rays showed evidence of pitting in the heat affected zones near the weld Based on these results, the licensee has radiographed or plans to radiograph all butt welds on 3 11 inlet and outlet piping on all of the CFCU 1 (At the conclusion of the inspection, radiography and repair of Nos. 22 and 24 CFCU 1 s was complete.)
The licensee has determined that the identified defects are either defective according to ASME Code due to lack of fusion or penetration, or defects in the pipe and fittings due to corrosio The first type of defects are being cut out and replaced in accordance with a code job package (ASME Section XI).
The second type of defects are being repaired by application of a weld overlay on the OD of the affected area of the pip This type of repair (weld overlay) is not code work as determined by the licensee, however, they plan to treat the documentation and controls as a code job packag Region I has determined that the weld overlay work may be code related and has contacted NRR for a resolutio This item is open pending NRR and Region I revie (311/86-36-01) *
4. The regional office requested that the inspectors determine if GE type HGA relays are used in functions that are important to safety at Salem statio The inspector has determined that the licensee uses GE type HGA relays in several application There are twenty-eight HGA relays used to provide supervisory indication, in the control room, for vital and group bus differential and overload protection relay These relays are for indication only and do not need to function for overload protectio There are eight HGA relays used to provide remote reset of the turbine trip circuit These relays are for remote reset onl The inspector did not identify any HGA relays required to function in any applications important to safet Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillance tests were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillances test The following surveillance tests were reviewed:
Unit 1 lPD-2.6.057 Unit 2 Channel Functional (lFT-541) No. 14 SG Feedwater Flow Protection Channel II SP(0)4.3.2.l(a)l ESF-Manual Safety Injection - SSPS (Witnessed Train B portion of test)
SP(0)4.0.5-V-MD RHR Valve Cycling and Timing (Witnessed testing of 2RH1 and 2RH2)
SP(0)4.0.5-V-SJ-3 SI Valve Cycling and Timing (Witnessed testing of 21-24 SJ 54 valves)
No violations were identified.
15 Review of Periodic and Special Reports.1 Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - October, 1986 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - October, 1986 In addition, the inspector reviewed Unit 2 Special Report 86-1 During a Technical Specification surveillance test of the 2A Diesel Generator, the unit failed to achieve rated speed in less than or equal to 10 second This is considered a valid test failure and is the third one in the last 100 start The cause of the failure was traced to a switching tachometer circui The switching tacho-meter has been replaced and the unit was tested and returned to ser-vic The inspector has no further questions concerning this report.
No violations were identifie Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LER to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification.1 Unit 1 86-019-00 T.S. 3.7.11 Non-Compliance - Fire Barrier Wall Impairment This LER addresses two improperly sealed 2 11 conduit penetrations in the wall separating service water intake structure bay The impairment was discovered by Fire Department personnel during the eighteen month surveillance inspection of the wal A one hour roving fire watch was established upon discovery of the impairmen The penetrations were subsequently sealed and the fire watch discontinue Licensee investigations into the root cause of this impairment are continuin Since the licensee's fire protection surveillance program has been
adequate to identify fire protection impairment concerns, the inspector has no further questions at this time, but will review the licensee 1 s supplemental report on this issue when complete No violations were identifie.
Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviation The unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 4..
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.
APPENDIX A PSE&G SALEM/NRC MEETING DETAILS Meeting Purpose:
A management meeting was held in the Region I Office on November 18, 1986, to discuss the licensee's interim findings and corrective actions pertaining to the false loss of offsite power event on August 26, 1986 (reference NRC Inspection Report 50-311/86-26 and LER 50-311/86-007).
An additional meeting was held on December 5, 1986, to discuss the methodology by which the licensee has analyzed transient effects on the onsite electrical distribution syste.
Attendees:
PSE&G:
- C. A. McNeill, Jr., Vice President - Nuclear
- J. M. Zupko, Jr., General Manager, Salem Operations
- R. A. Burricelli, General Manager, Engineering and Plant Betterment
- L. P. Corleto, Principal Engineer
- M. P. Morroni, Senior Engineer
- J. P. Massa, System Engineer
- P. P. O'Donnell, System Engineer
- L. N. Hannett, Senior Engineer (Consultant)
NRC:
- S. D. Ebneter, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
- W. F. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
- W. V. Johnston, Deputy Director, DRS
- S. J. Collins, Deputy Director, DRP
- L. H. Bettenhausen, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS
- J. P. Durr, Chief, Engineering Branch, DRS
- P. W. Eselgroth, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No. 2, DRP
- R. M. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A, DRP
- C. J. Anderson, Chief, Plant Systems Section, DRS
- L. J. Norrholm, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B, DRP
- T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector, Salem
- R. J. Summers, Project Engineer, DRP
- K. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector, Salem
- P. 0. Chopra, NRR
- T. Koshy, Reactor Engineer, DRS
- F. P. Paulitz, Reactor Engineer, DRS
- Attended November 18, 1986 meeting only
- Attended December 5, 1986 meeting only
- Attended both meetings
- November 18, 1986 Meeting Summary:
The licensee's presentation included: a review of the false loss of offsite power event; a root cause analysis of the vital bus transfers that occurred during the event; and, a review of corrective actions taken and planned to take in the futur The licensee also presented an interim measure that they plan to use prior to completion of the degraded grid voltage stud This interim measure will permit two unit 100% power operations, utilizing a "split bus" arrangement, yet will not result in transient voltage conditions that could adversely affect the reliability of the offsite power syste The licensee committed to providing a justification for ~ontinued operation and the supporting safety evaluation to NRC Region I prior to operating in this mod The details of the licensee's presentation are provided in Enclosure 1 to this repor.
December 5, 1986 Meeting Summary:
This meeting discussed the licensee's safety analysis for operations with a split bus arrangemen The basis for this evaluation was a study provided by a contractor which simulated the static and transient voltage conditions for the onsite electrical distributio The licensee also discussed their intent to qualify this analysis through a specific test at the sit The licensee's validation test program outline is also included in Enclosure 1 of this repor.
Conclusion:
Although the NRC had a number of questions on the licensee's safety evaluation, the fundamental concern was the need for a verification of the computer analysis used to simulate the transient voltage condition The licensee stated that such verification would be completed through an appropriate tes NRC will review the licensee's test procedure and observe the test during a future inspection.
.. ENCLOSURE 1
SALEM UNITS ONE & TWO HISTORY 1. UNIT ONE AUXILIARY POWER TRANSFORMER 2. UNIT TWO TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION/FALSE BLACKOUT 3. UNIT TWO TRIP/22 STATION POWER TRANSFORMER 4. UNIT TWO AUXILIARY POWER TRANSFORMER
- II. SAFETY EVALUATION 1. PROPOSED STATION OPERATING MODE - SHORT TERM
- 2. GROUP AND VITAL BUS LINEUP AND LOADING 3. TRANSIENT ANALYSIS
-~=-~-:.:..::---1-------*--------~ :r-**-**-**-*f **-*-~::-. * 1
- -
I
- 1*
~1 VNK;'l#tll
.
~
--
r*---------------------------*-**r*------i--------*
!1 ii
--+L*---*_"lJ_r:+----------------'t""--i I
1"1)]<;
I I
ll!o-
I I
I (
~
\\__
I
.,.......---"*
- /-*"
Jiii,.... : I I
!ifl 1 1 I
I 1;1 I
I I
I I
I I
I I
~i.,.LJ*
!
i
- ~y
... *~
I I
"
u
- ~~
~~
. ~
"'
~~
- ".':
~:
I '\\ )
I I
'I LJ L~
---4 r--
- ~
I
~ I I
~\\..__/~"
~~-,,,....-+
..
,.
~:
~:
~~
~~
~~
I I
I
- -**---~----**-**-**-**-.. -.. -**-*-**-**-"-"
...
~ny lYllA Alt "
fl
~~
lllllll,,..............
lbilr.~"'lrl'~
~~t-*i_J~~~L---~~~~~-;--~~~-+~~:.._~~~~~~~~~~~~-~
- ~
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
- *.
..
I I
I
, :
!':
!':
~*
I;:
,.. -
'-........-
/_
~:I~
r,.
-
I
~
I
~".*!
"""I
- s-
., I 1.;
~I
?_~
~ t----* ;fl*~
gt-"--*!~
~ t------
.. '
VJ I
'-'"' I v\\-~
',r-f*
',,.--.
o:
~:
l I
I
. I I
I I
'.
I I
I
~~
..
~,J
~"'
~~ ~.
~~
~
~
i-i I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
,1
~:
~:
~-Cl
~l-1~
1--,.--*
,_,,-..
1-,,.--.
~
"'
. -
- --...,,-ft
t_ ______________.;.. __ ~.-:~,~~---t----1-----------~----=
~!
~
J. J 'lr-11*
s-5
~~
' :;u
'i~
ii~
IHN!f/N :
tli!
~** :
'
.
.
~
'
.
~
- _____________________________
- -**-**-**-**-**-**-**..!**-******.-**-**-**-**-**-**-**-**-**--*-**-**-**-**-'*- -~~
T ti
<.:;
~]
I I
I NO. I ST A. PW SECT. 6 SECT. 5 TRAHS I I
I I
I I
I
'- --t'.111'. * 1~*-
t~
13 KY sys
$
NO. 2 GEN. MAIN TRANSFORMER I
NO. 2 AUX. PW TRANS I I
~--1
2AHGD 2H 4KV GRP. BUS 2E 4KY GRP. BUS 21CSD SECT. 2 21HSD J2!BSD JZIASD I
I
~
Ii 4!
I->
>......
le 22050.J 22ASD I
TRANS NO. 2 ST A. Plll TRANS..
~
SEC NO. II STA. PW IHSD
!H 4KV GRP. BUS TRANS IE 4KV GRP. BUS
- l!IASO
!!BSD llCSD
~I
~
~I
~
- ///
~
~
w
=> IZASD ::J 12BSD
- ':) 12csli IF 4K V GRP. BUS IG '4KV GRP. BUS NO. 12 ST A. PW TRANS IAHGD IAECD IBFGD IBGGO NO. ICEN. MAIN WNSFQRMER I'
I I
I I
I I
I m
~
NO. I AUX. PW I TRANS I I
I 1--~
I I
I
@>
- o Justify a different Electrical Configuration than in September 1986 J.C.O. and Salem UFSA o New Electrical Conf iquration is interim, until both Auxiliary Power Transformers are installed and considered operabl o Basis for new Electrical Conf iquration is supported by a Time Simulation Voltage Profile Stud o Study included worst case transient condition o Results justify safe operation since voltage doesn't dip below 80%
for Block Loading Safeguards Loads and the ( 2) independent paths of offsite power are not jeopardized *
'
I I
NO.ISTA.PW TRANS I
~lt'I
.....
....:
frl V>
SEC SEC x-x*
" KY BYS NO. 2 STA. PW TRANS BmllU K'I
....
f..!
~
V1
- I I I I
'
I I
I I
I I
I
'--~~--11--~
m Y NO. 2 GEN. MAIN
a TRANSFORMER x-I SECT. 2 l --l 1 *r SEC I I
NO. I GEN. MAIN y r-f--,
TRANSFORMER "'IM llA
-.,.-
_,_7124 llY I
NO. 2 AUX. PW TRANS.ll!-4Jll ltY L
__,.. y R
-.
A 2tiltY1:A""
\\5),?'PSlll HZ I
I 2AHGD I x lllElE. <
IEEIAllllS --
"it\\\\ C,oi.i Hi t"\\ KVA 21HSD NO. 21 ST A. PW H 4KV GAP.BUS TRANS.IS KV 13114 KVA 21ESD 2£ 4KV GRP. BUS r x X:::J 2!CSD X:=J 2BSD 21ASD
'"'\\ ;.,,..,n
~
1:4 a>
_.....
<>
I::: ;:;
I-""
>.,,
>,._
> ;=:
>....
~""
""....
...
a>
....
N
"'
9\\ 22BSD X~ 22ASD NO. 22 STA. PW TRANS ISA/'4.111 ICY I
I 19121&.7124 KV A ~
NO. II ST A. PW llHSD IH 4KV GRP. BUS IAHGO NO. I AUX. PW TRANS I
?
n I
TRANS.111.US KV
- mt4Jll-4JS KV y A I
IE 4KV GAP. BUS IAl:\\JU I.. l_J
-
IBllP I f.a-X:::JllASD
- JllBSD
- J UCSD
~
~~1
~
a>
4~,
""~
><
,,.,:~
.... s
..,
5>
I'->
N"""
~~
....
!!!:
e;!
NO. 12 STA. PW TRANS.8/.US KV
~12ASD x*-
~
a>
-c: >.q
""'I-
..,>
~~
~
IF 4KV GRP. BUS BFGD
~~KV GRP.BUS IBGGO X = BREAKER CLOSED
© 2ti1CV-*
13111!
<
711 Pill
w
<..::>
<[
1-
_J 0 >
TRl 105 CJ5
80 CAS
REACTOR TRIP UNIT. ~1 - LOCA UNIT #2 X POWER TECH. IN #ll STATION POWER TRANSFORMER
- 12 STATION POWER TRANSFORMER 90/. DEGRADED GRID RELAYS RESET 90/. DEGRADED GRID RELAYS TRIP MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT STARTING VOLTAGE
- l - LOCA & TRIP
- 2 - VOLTAGE RECOVER #3 - GROUP BUSES TRANSFER
- 4 - VOLTAGE RECOVERS
'. *
,.,
- ' ~
,
1'?15
~
~
w q5 C)
([
r-
_J 0 >
CJ0
80 TR3 CAS REACTOR TRIP UNIT #l - LOCA UNIT #2 X POWER TECH. IN *21 STATION POWER TRANSFORMER
- 22 STATION POWER TRANSFORMER RELAYS RESET
- 1
- 3
- 3 qeir. DEGRADED GRID RELAYS TRIP MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT STARTING VOLTAGE
- l - LOCA & TRIP
- 2 ~VOLTAGE RECOVERS
- 3 - GROUP BUSES TRANSFER
'#4 -
VOLTAGE RECOVERS
. \\'
L (.!)
([
1-
_J 0 >
TR5 105 100 9 CA
LOCA UNIT #l - REACTOR TRIP UNIT #2 X POWER TECH. IN *11 STATION POWER TRANSFORMER
- 12 STATION POWER TRANSFORMER 41'2 q({Jf. DEGRADED GRID RELAYS RESET-90/. DEGRADED GRID RELAYS TRIP MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT STARTING VOLTAGE
- l - LOCA & TRIP
- 2 - VOLTAGE RECOVERS
- 3 - GROUP BUSES TRANSFER *
- 4 - VOLTAGE RECOVERS
'or-*
l
lflJ5 100
,.....
- -..
q5 w
(!)
([
I-
.;_J 0 >
qfl)
80 TR7 CA
LOCA UNIT *1 - REACTOR TRIP UNIT #2 X POWER TECH. IN *21 STATION POWER TRANSFORMER
- 22 STATION POWER TRANSFORMER
- 4 x
DEGRADED GRID RELAYS RESET
- 3
- 3 90/. DEGRADED GRID RELAYS TRIP MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT STARTING VOLTAGE
- l - LOCA & TRIP
- 2 - VOLTAGE RECOVERS
- 3 - GROUP BUSES TRANSFER
- 4 - VOLTAGE RECOVERS
'.... "'*
VALIDATION TEST PROGRAM 1)
LOAD 2A VITAL BUSS WITH EQUIPMENT THAT NORMALLY OPERATES AT FULL BRAKE HORSEPOWER SERVICE WATER PUMPS COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMPS 460 VAC LOADS 230 VAC LOADS 2)
RECORD ALL OPERATING LOADS ON UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 BREAKER LINEUP GRID VOLTAGE STATION POWER TRANSFORMER (SPT) SECONDARY VOLTAGE 13KV RING BUSS VOLTAGE'"
460 VACPiBUSS VOLTAGE 230 VAC BUSS VOLTAGE SPT LOAD TAP CHANGER SETTING 3)
CONNECT RECORDER TO THE 2A VITAL BUSS TRANSFER POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER AND THE 2A VITAL BUSS 91%
DEGRADED GRID RELAY POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER 4)
TRANSFER VITAL BUSS 2A FROM NO. 21 SPT TO NO. 22 SPT AND COLLECT RECORDER TRACES 5)
HAVE POWER TECHNOLOGY, INC. (PTI) RUN A COMPUTER SIMULATION WITH GRID VOLTAGE, BREAKER LINEUP, AND OPERATING ELECTRICAL LOADS SUPPLIED BY PSE&G 6)
COMPARE TEST RESULTS WITH PTI SIMULATION RESULTS A)
STEADY STATE VOLTAGE AND LOAD TAP CHANGER POSITION B)
VITAL BUSS 2A DECAY AND RECOVRY TIME C)
SPT AND 2A VITAL.BUSS MINIMUM AND RECOVERY VOLTAGES