IR 05000272/1986021
| ML18092B283 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1986 |
| From: | Norrholm L, Roxanne Summers NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092B282 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-86-21, 50-311-86-21, NUDOCS 8609150231 | |
| Download: ML18092B283 (13) | |
Text
Report No Docket No License No Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/86-21 50-311/86-21 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 050311-860714 050311-860715 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station.. Units 1 arid 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
July 22, 1986 - August 18, 1986 Inspectors:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector K. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector Reviewed by:
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R. J: sumrners)PrOjeCt Engineer Reactor Projects Section No. 28, DRP Approved by:
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b-s-L. J. Norrholm, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 28, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
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date Inspections on July 22, 1986 - August 18, 1986 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/86-21 and 50-311/86-21)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations including: operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, licensee event followup, Limitorque wiring in safety related valves, and organization and administratio The inspection involved 133 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector Results: No violations were identifie One inspector follow item dealing with documentation and authorization of overtime was opene See Section 3.4 of the report for detail ~---------
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8609150231 860908
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.
Operational Safety Verification Documents Reviewed Selected Operators' Logs Senior Shift Sup~rvisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 2.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure (1)
On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LCO's directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completion.
(2)
On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
(3)
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units operation to determine compliance with the NRC 1 s regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
- Unit 1 Unit 1 began this report period (July 22) shutting down to investigate a main generator hydrogen leak into the stator water cooling syste The leak was identified on the equalization line between the two stator water cooling manifold The leak was subsequently repaired and the unit was returned to service on July 2 At 6:12 a.m. on August 5, the unit tripped from 100%
due to No. 12 Steam Generator (S.G.) Low Low Level as a result of the loss of No. 11 Main Feed Pump (MFP).
The MFP tripped on overspee All systems functioned as require The overspeed condition was subsequently identified as a blown suppression diode in the Woodward governor circui At 8:39 a.m. on August 6, the unit tripped from 35%
power with a startup in progres The trip was caused by S.G. low feed water flow with a low level in Nos. 11 and 13 S.G. 1 s resulting from No. 12 MFP sustaining a runback to *1500 RPM' (See section 3 of this report for the cause and corrective actions with regard to the trips on August 5 and 6.) At 6:30 p.m. on August 6, the licensee identified an E.Q. discrepancy with Limitorque switch wiring and cooled the plant to Mode (See section 7 of this report for details.) At 7:48 p.m. on August 12, the unit was returned to power and remained at 100% throughout the remainder of this report perio.
Unit 2 Unit 2 began this report period at 100% powe At 6:30 p.m. on August 6, the licensee identified an E.Q. discrepancy with Limitorque switch wiring resulting in a shutdown and cooldown to Mode (See section 7 of this report for details.) At 3:17 p.m. on August 14, the unit returned to power and operated at 100% through the end of this report period. *
Review of Station Overtime Policy The resident inspector reviewed station records and held discussions with licensee personnel to ascertain whether the use of overtime for operations and radiation protection personnel is in conformance with regulatory requirements and to verify that deviations from maximum overtime guidel1nes were authorized in accordance with Technical Specifications and station administra~ive procedures and directive The inspector reviewed the following:
Technical Specifications, Units 1 & 2 Salem Station Admihistrative Procedure (AP)-5 Operations Department Administrative Directive (AD)-10 Operations Department overtime records for January -
December, 1985 Radiation Protection Department 72-hour logs for March -
April, 1986 Overtime authorization/notification records The inspector verified that the overtime guidelines of NRC Generic Letter 82-12 have been incorporated into the licensee 1 s Technical Specifications, administrative procedures, and the operations department 1 s administrative directive Generic Letter 82-12 delineates maximum overtime guidelines for plant staff who perform safety functions and requires that deviations from the maximum overtime guidelines shall be authorized by the plant manager, his deputy, or higher levels of managemen The inspector observed the following:
Operations Occasions were identified where operations personnel appeared to have worked in excess of the guideline However, further investigation revealed that the personnel were not involved in performing safety functions when the overtime was worked ( training, coordinating or supporting station activities).
In other instances, it could not be determined, through review of available logsheets or disc~ssions with licensee personnel, what type of work the personnel were performing during the overtime hour The inspector noted that on one occasion, Form AP-5-1 11Salem Generating Station Overtime Authorization 11 was used for General Manager - Salem authorization to exceed the overtime guideline r
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The operations overtime log has not been maintained for 198 Although this log is not required, some formal method to assure compliance with the regulatory guidelines is neede (Refer to inspector follow item 86-21-01 at the end of this paragraph.)
Operations has implemented various programs to reduce the use of overtime for the department as a whole, such as institution of a training shift and increased staffing for senior shift supervisors, shift supervisors, and reactor operator Radiation Protection The radiation protection (Rad. Pro.) department maintains detailed overtime records for periods where excessive overtime is expected, such as during extended outage.
Several Rad. Pro. personnel appeared to have worked in excess of the overtime guidelines during the first few weeks of the last Unit 1 refueling outag The inspector noted that AP-5 includes Form AP-5-1 which states in part 11 Permission is requested...
for work in excess of AP-5 guidelines 11 and is to be used for General Manager (GM) authorization to exceed the overtime guideline During the outage, Rad. Pro. employed a version of form AP-5-1 which reads 11Notification of... overtime in excess of AP-5 guidelines 11 which listed the names and number of hours for personnel who exceeded the guideline This form was forwarded to the GM after the overtime had been worke The inspector questioned why GM authorization was not obtained prior to working the overtime in excess of the guideline The inspector was informed that the personnel who exceeded the guidelines were supervisors who were not intending to work excessive overtime, but were involved in establishing the newly installed computerized control point which is used to control personnel access into the radiation controlled are Once the computerized control point was established and the Rad. Pr contractor reported to the site (two weeks after the start of the outage) these supervisors no longer exceeded the guideline The inspector determined that these personnel were not performing safety-related functions, and therefore GM authorization to deviate from the overtime guidelines was not require No violations were identifie However, the inspector identified the following concerns:.
The licensee's record keeping of overtime to document and ensure compliance with the regulatory overtime guidelines is not consistent across station groups.
It appeared that licensee personnel were not fully aware that deviations from maximum overtime limits must be authorized by the plant manager, his deputy, or higher levels of managemen *
The resident inspector will follow licensee actions in response to these concerns (86-21-01)
No violations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The inspector also verified that the replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee's QA progra Work Order Number 86-08-08-063-0 86-08-05-039-1 86-08-06-035-3 Description Inspect and repair "A" terminal panels for MFP' Replacement of Suppression Diode for No. 11 MF Investigate and repair cause of N MFP tri Investigate the operation of No. 12 MFP control During the in~pection of the above work orders and after discussions with the licensee the following was determined with regard to the cause of the MFP trips on August 5 and August 5 No. 11 MFP tripped with indicated first out as "overspeed".
While conducting the work on work order 86-08-05-039-1 it was determined that a diode connected across the actuator coil on the governor valve was blow However, this did not appear to be related to the over-speed trip at the time of discover August 6 The unit tripped from 35% power during the restart following the August 5 trip. At the time, while a technician was replacing a blown diode on the No. 11 MFP, the running MFP (No. 12) shifted to manual control and went to idle speed causing the reactor trip on loss of feedwate Upon further investigation the licensee was able to duplicate the August 5 event, 'by first shorting the diode and then later opening the diode (this is postulated to be how a diode would fail).
The results were: the demand first goes to minimum because of the short, then goes to maximum when the diode opens causing the overspee The instrument technicians were able to
- duplicate this event several time The licensee then began to investigate the cause of No. 12 MFP trip and found that when the technician was replacing the blown suppression diode on No. 11 MFP, it caused No. 12 MFP to run back to the idle conditio After a repeat of the technicians motions while replacing the diode, it was subsequently proven that when a screwdriver came in contact with a terminal on the diode and a surrounding shielded cable (which was routed to No. 12 MFP) the runback could be reproduce The licensee has rerouted some of the cables and added precautions to the procedures to preclude future occurrence No violations were identifie.
Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspe~tor verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillances were reviewed:
Unit 2 SP(0)4.5. SP(0)4.4.7.2.l(d)
Verifies correct val~e position for ECCS subsystems for enteri~g Mode Witnessed charging pump (Nos. 21 and 23) flow path portion of the surveillanc Reviewed completed paperwork for SP(0)4~5. Verifies the integrity of ECCS subsystems check valves following termination of RHR and for entering Mode *
Witnessed SI pump and RHR pump cold leg injection check valves portion of the surveillanc Reviewed related checkoff and data sheet Verified that Technical Specification Action Statements were entered and terminated as require The resident inspector reviewed the licensee's program (Inspection Order Program) for the control and evaluation of surveillance testing, calibration, and inspection required by Section 4 of the Technical Specifications, inservice inspection and testing of pumps and valves as required by 10 CFR 50.SSa(g).
The inspector also reviewed the program for calibration of safety related instrumentation not specifically controlled by Technical Specification The following documents were reviewed:
Salem Station Administrative Procedure (AP)-10 Inspection Order Program AP-12 Technical Specification Surveillance Program AP-9 Maintenance Program AP-20 Nonconformance Program AP-27 Inservice Inspection Program AP-32 Implementing Procedure Pr6gram Selected Maintenance and ISI Department procedures Selected Nuclear Department Work Orders Selected Inspection Order Request forms The inspector observed that:
The licensee's Inspection Order program is maintained, updated, and implemente Requirements for the review, approval, and control of station procedures are delineated in the licensee's administrative procedure Selected surveillance procedures included acceptance criteria, QC hold points, and provisions for supervisory and QA revie Procedures are in place for reporting deficiencies identified during surveillance tests, calibrations, or inspection LCD requirements are identified and documented on control room logs and on the work order as appropriat Each station group who performs surveillance tests, calibrations, or inspections has implemented various controls and checks to ensure scheduling and performance requirements are me No violations were identifie.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design,
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predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report information.* The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - July, 1986 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - July, 1986 Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification Unit 2 86-004 Reactor Trip from 100% Power - Loss of 28 Inverter This event occurred on July 14, 1986, and was discussed in combined Inspection Report 50-272/86-19 and 50-311/86-1 The root cause of the event was attributed by the licensee to blown output fuses most probably resulting from the AC output deion switch being inadvertently repositioned by contractor personnel working in the are At the time, the licensee viewed this explanation as an isolated cas However, on August 8, 1986, a similar event occurred involving inadvertent repositioning of the 28 Vital Instrument Inverter AC input breaker while contractors were working in the area, but which did not result in a plant tri Licensee corrective action following the second event included: Immediate ceasing of the contractor work in the are.
Senior station management and senior contractor management met and discussed the ramifications of the incident.
Contractor personnel were counseled concerning their work habits when working in sensitive areas (i.e. Relay rooms). Licensee superv1s1on of the contractor workforce in sensitive areas was increased by requiring continuous monitoring of the contractors by a PSE&G superviso No similar incidents have occurred since the above stated corrective actions were implemented, therefore the inspector considers this item close Reactor Trip during Startup - Voltage Spike on 2B Inverter This trip occurred on July 15, 1986, and was discussed in combined Inspection Report 50-272/86-19 and 50-311/86-1 The licensee attributed the trip to personnel error and procedural inadequacy and has taken the following actions to preclude further occurrences: The electrician and I&C technicians were counseled concerning the implications of the occurrenc.
Maintenance Department Procedure M4J 11Adjustment of Garrett 5 KVA and 10 KVA Inverters 11 has been revised to add a caution immediately preceding the step for connecting the oscilloscope, requiring the use of an ungrounded adapte The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and has no further questions at this tim This item is close No violations were identifi~.
Limitorque Wiring in Safety Related Valves Background Federal Regulation 10 CFR 50.49 delineates the importance and criteria for Environmental Qualification of electrical equipment important to safety for nuclear power plant In addition to 10 CFR 50.49, the NRC has issued documents to clarify or further substantiate the criteria for Environmental Qualification (EQ).
One such document is Information Notice 86-03 which outl~nes potential problems in Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring, specifically the environmental qualification of wire used to add jumpers in the torque switch circuit Because of the information notice, discussions with other utilities and a letter from the Limitorque Corporation stating that, at one time, type TW & TEW wires were used in Limitorque operators, the licensee opened selected Limitorque operators to investigat On August 6, 1986 at 6:30 p.m., the licensee identified discrepancies in Limitorque valves inside Unit 2 containmen After identifying the discrepancies the licensee immediately began a controlled shutdown and cooldown of both units to perform an inspection of all safety related Limitorque valve The licensee informed the senior resident
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inspector and utilized the ENS phone system to inform the NRC of the unit shutdown The following is a sequence of events that ensued following the discrepancy identificatio August 6
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6:30 p.m. Identification of the discrepancies 6:32 p.m. began shutting down Unit 2 enroute to cold shutdown 6:35 p.m. began cooling down Unit 1 (which was in Mode 3 performing repairs on the feed system)
August 7 1:00 a.m. Mode 4 on Unit 1 5:30 a.m. Mode 4 on Unit 2 Both units eventually entered Mode 5 on August 7, to facilitate the tagging of, and removal of the Limitorque valves from service for inspectio The licensee began a complete wire change of the installed jumpers in all. safety related Limitorque valves in both unit (a total of 138 valves, 69 per unit)
August 8 The senior resident inspector witnessed the changing of the wiring in Limitorque operators 11SW23 and 12SW2 The inspector also inspected the inservice testing performed on 11SW2 In his review the inspector noted that proper work orders were issued, work and testing were being performed with authorized procedures and that retesting of the witnessed and reviewed valves was within the acceptance criteri August 11 Unit 1 began to heatup in preparation to return to powe The resident inspector witnessed inservice testing of the following valves in Unit 2; 22RH29, 2CV284, 2CV116, 22SJ4 SJ135, 21SJ134, 22SJ134, 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ1 NRC EQ team inspection began as part of a scheduled progra August 13 Unit 2 began to heatup in preparation to return to powe The licensee identified discrepancies in 28 valves in Unit 1 and 37 valves in Unit /
For the corrective actions taken by the licensee and the work and testing witnessed by the resident inspectors, no violations were identifie The NRC EQ team inspection report will b~ combined report 86-23/86-23 which will delineate the team's findings with regard to EQ observation.
Organization and Administration During this report period the inspector selected members of the licensee's onsite organization and reviewed personnel records to verify that the licensee's onsite organization, lines of authority and responsibility, and personnel qualification levels are in conformance with Technical Specification commitment The following were noted: The station management structure has been reorganized as described in combined Inspection Report 85-20/85-2 The licensee is preparing a proposed amendment to Section 6 of their Technical Specifications to reflect the new organizational structur The resident inspector questioned the delay for the Technical Specification amendment (nearly one year) submittal to the NRC for approva The licensee stated that there have been verbal discussions with NRR with regard to reviews and comments which will be incorporated in developing the organizational structure along with various other proposed changes to Section 6 of Technical Specifications, and that the propo~ed amend-ment is in the review process and should be ready for review by the Station Operations Review Committee shortl Prompt submittal of this proposed amendment by the licensee is warranted so that the Technical Specifications reflect the current status of the licensee's administrative control The inspector also noted that the station administrative procedure covering the station organization (AP-2) has not been updated since December 14, 198.
The licensee's vacant Radiation Protection.Engineer position was staffed during this report perio The resident inspector verified that the selected individual meets or exceeds the qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975, as required by the licensee's Technical Specification No violations were identifie.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.