IR 05000272/1986001
| ML18092B034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1986 |
| From: | Limroth D, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092B033 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-86-01, 50-272-86-1, 50-311-86-01, 50-311-86-1, IEB-83-07, IEB-83-7, NUDOCS 8603040062 | |
| Download: ML18092B034 (16) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
050311-851007 Report No Docket No License No Licensee:
50-272/86-01 50-311/86-01 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
January 1, 1986 - January 31, 1986 Inspectors:
Reviewed by:
Approved by:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector B. M. Hillman, Reactor Engineer D~~ect Engineer l. J. Nonrholm, Chief, Reactor Projects Secti n No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
.,:; /18 /81o date'
~/~110 date Inspections on January 1, 1986 - January 31, 1986 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/86-01 and 50-311/86-01)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including: followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verificatiqn, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, licensee event followup, employee concern, and unplanned exposur The inspection involved 117 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector and 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> by region based inspector Results:
No violations are identified in this repor The report discusses two reactor trips and an unplanned exposure of a HP technicia l
DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (83-BU-07).
This item concerns apparently fraudulent products sold by Ray Miller, In The inspector verified that the actions outlined in the licensee 1 s letters of March 14, 1984, and June 14, 1984, satisfied the requirements of Bulletin 83-07 and-had been complete This item is considered close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (272/84-08-07).
This item was opened to track reactor vessel head vent valves to ensure they were incorporated into the Inservice Test program (IST).
The inspector has verified that the valves are now part of the IST and considers this item c*lose (Closed)
Violation (272/84-23-03).
This violation was issued when functional testing was being performed on mechanical snubbers without an approved procedur The inspector has verified that procedures now exist to perform functional testing of mechanical snubber This item is considered close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Items (272/84-25-01, 311/84-30-01).
This item was opened to track the licensee's review of design changes, safety evaluations and field directives against the vendor manuals and station procedure The licensee has established a vendor manual review program, now in effect, to review the inspector 1 s concern This item is considered close (Closed)
Violation (272/84-32-03).
This violation was a result of licensee personnel failing to comply with radiological posting To pre-clude future incidents of this nature the licensee has implemented mandatory worker attendance for the required pre-work radiological in The inspector has confirmed the licensee's implementation of actions and has noted an improvement in radiological precaution item is considered close brief-these This (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (272/84-36-03).
This item was opened when work on 4KV and 480V breakers had been misclassified for maintenanc Recent changes to Maintenance Department planning and several upgrades to the MEL (Material Equipment List) plus the issuance of field directives to clarify equipment classifications closes this ite (Closed)
Violation (272/84-42-06).
The licensee failed to provide adequate procedures for maintaining and installing service water expansion joint The inspector has confirmed the licensee's actions stated in
their letter dated February 21, 198 The inspector also inspected the procedures, in place, which describe the installation of expansion joint This item is considered close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272/85-03-02, 272/85-03-03).
These items were opened to review licensee 1 s actions with regard to personnel error Within the past six months the licensee has instituted a disciplinary policy to deal with personnel error The inspector has noted that the amount of personnel errors has decrease The inspector considers these items close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (272/85-03-04).
This item was opened to review licensee co~rective actions taken to prevent lapses in the fire protection and housekeeping program These actions were in the form of procedural changes requiring increased employee responsibilit~ management l~vel plant inspections and assignment of departmental housekeeping area During recent inspections, the inspector noted an improvement in clean-lines This item is considered close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (272/85-07-04, 311/85-07-05).
This item was opened after a series of diesel generator failures were identified with the diesel generator overspeed trip devic The inspector has reviewed the revised monthly maintenance procedure and determined the guidance for the overspeed trip device inspection is acceptabl This item is considered close (Closed)
Violation (272/85-15-01, 311/85-17-02).
This violation was issued because improper 11 on-the-spot 11 changes caused the Chemistry Instruction CH-3.5.012 11Gas Decay Tanks Sampling 11 to be inconsistent with Technical Specification The inspector has reviewed the licensee 1 s response to the violation dated September 20, 1985, changes to procedures, and the change to the on-the-spot change procedure.. The inspector con-cludes that the violation has been resolve This item is close (Closed)
Violation (272/85-20-01).
This violation was issued when a supervisor failed to quantify the amount of reactor coolant leakage during a leak rate tes The inspector has reviewed the licensee's submittal dated November 15, 1985, and has verified that the licensee has taken the necessary corrective actio This item is close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (272/85-23-01).
This item was opened over concerns of uncorrected, repetitive low flow alarms on the waste gas analyze The analyzer is designed to continuously sample various portions of the waste gas system on 3-minute interval Insufficient flow from a sample point would cause a low flow alarm; however, it did not prohibit the analyzer from advancing to the next sample point nor
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did it indicate which sample point was responsible for the low flow conditio The licensee has installed a design change to place the analyzer on hold when an alarm is receive The licensee has also instituted a troubleshooting guide to assist operators in identifying other analyzer malfunctions should they occu The inspector considers this item close (Closed)
Deviation (311/81-20-01).
This item was opened as a result of the licensee's failure to complete sign off requirements in a startup tes The licensee has conducted extensive training to increase the awareness of station personnel to verbatim compliance with procedures and the necessity of thorough review of test result The inspector has not noted any recurrence This item is close (Closed)
Unresolved Item (311/81-25-02).
This item was opened to review licensee evaluation of minimum acceptable current readings on emergency core cooling system vital heat tracing tape The licensee determined low current readings were possible on short heat trace tapes and revised its surveillance procedures to inform operators of this possibility and actions necessary to determine reading validit The inspector considers this item close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/83-13-03).
This item was opened to follow licensee's corrective actions to preclude an unintentional boron dilution below 2000 ppm while in the refueling mod Corrective actions consisted of additional precautions and procedural steps requiring immediate actions should boron concentration fall below 2050 ppm (previous procedures required action to be taken at 2000 ppm).
The 2050 ppm limit was picked to give the operator adequate time for corrective actions to correct boron concentrations prior to falling below Technical Specific-ation limit The inspector considers this item closed..
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/83-19-03).
This item was opened to review a licensee evaluation of the intermittent or slow operation of relay actuations for 118 11 reactor trip breake The inspector has reviewed the evaluation and has witnessed subsequent testing of this breaker and considers this item close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/83-24-02 and 83-24-03).
These items were opened to review the results of laboratory analysis performed on the charcoal of the fuel handling area and auxiliary building ventilatio The inspector reviewed the results of the laboratory analysis and noted that the results indicated that the charcoal was degraded due to various contaminants which appeared to be from cleaning solvent The licensee has imposed restrictions on the use of solvents in the facility and replaced the charcoa This item is considered close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/83-24-05).
This item was opened to review an engineering evaluation of a transformer failure on the 4160V Vital Bu The inspector reviewed the engineering evaluation and Supplemental LER report which delineates an isolated inciden The
inspector could not identify any similar incidents and considers this item close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/83-24-06).
This item was opened to reviBW an engineering review of a trip coil limit switch failure on an auxiliary feedwater pum The inspector reviewed the engineering report and has confirmed that piping was replaced to eliminate water in the area that corroded the switch which prevented operatio The inspector considers this item close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/83-26-02).
This item was opened to review the results of licensee review of setpoint drifts on undervoltage relay The inspector reviewed the licensee 1 s analysis, which concluded that a new, more reliable type of relay would have to be installe The Design Change Requests have been developed and OCR lEC-1895 has been scheduled for installation in the next refueling outage of Unit 1 (March 1986), and OCR 2EC-1896 has been completed on Unit The inspector considers this item close (Closed)
Violation (311/84-08-02).
This violation was issued when the licensee failed to maintain the residual heat removal operating instructions in accordance with Technical Specification The inspector has reviewed the licensee 1 s submittal dated April 27, 1984, an engineering evaluation, and a Technical Specification change that changed the safety review process of the stations safety related document The inspector verified that the licensee has resolved the violatio This item is close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/84-13-01).
This item was opened to review licensee corrective actions following an inadvertent actuation of the pressurizer overpressure protection system while starting a reactor coolant pum The licensee has revised the procedure on filling and venting the reactor coolant system by requiring pressure to be between 325 and 360 psig prior to starting reactor coolant pump This pressure band has provided an adequate safety margin and no other incident of this type has been recorde The inspector considers this item close (Closed)
Violation (311/84-13-04).
This violation resulted from licensee failure to correct identified deficiencies in a timely manner, specific-ally the removal of packing materials and other combustibles from work area As a result of this violation, the licensee has aggressively enforced the station combustible material control progra The inspector has not noted a recurrence of this incident and considers this item close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/84-23-03).
This item was opened to follow licensee corrective actions after an inadvertent intermediate range high flux trip occurred during a routine reactor shutdow Subsequent licensee investigations revealed the trip was a result of a conservatively low setting (20% power level) on the high flux trip bistabl The bistable reset value was changed to the 25% power level required by
- Technical Specifications and shutdown procedures were modified by requiring a check on bistable reset prior to reducing power below 10%.
The inspector considers this item close (Closed)
Unresolved Item (311/85-07-02).
This item addressed the training program being provided, by the licensee, for work on diesel generator The inspector noted that the cause for the unresolved item was inadequate maintenance on a service water valve which supplied water to the diesel generato The inspector has reviewed documentation of training, by the licensee, and notes that training is being conducted for diesel generator work and does not include valve maintenance; however training is being conducted for plant personnel for the maintenance and repair of valve This item is considered close (Closed)
Violation (311/85-07-03).
This violation was issued because the licensee failed to maintain procedure 2PD8.l.002, "Rod Position Indication Calibration" in accordance with Technical Specification The inspector has reviewed the licensee response to the violation dated June 3, 1985, changes to procedures, and the change to the on-the-spot change procedur The inspector concludes that this violation has been resolve This item is close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/85-07-07).
This item was opened to track and review a design change to replace #22 Auxiliary Feedwater pump and lC vital 125-volt batter The review was also to include a 48-hour endurance test of the auxiliary feedwater pum The inspector has reviewed the completed design changes and the 48-hour endurance test and found them acceptabl This item is considered close (Closed)
Unresolved Item (311/85-15-02).
This item was unresolved pending licensee 1 s decision regarding actions to be taken relative to inadequate connections for rod control on the reactor vessel hea The licensee has issued design change requests for both units and will replace the connectors with a new desig This item is close (Closed)
Unresolved Item (311/85-31-01).
This item is close See Section 6 of this report for detail.
Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators* Logs Senior Shift Supervisor 1s (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Exposure Permits (REP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log
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The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure (1)
On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LCO's directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio (2)
On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operability.
(3)
On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the uhit's operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth: Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout this report period with the exception of those periods discussed belo At 6:39 a.m. on January 16, 1986, the unit tripped from 100% powe The trip was caused by "Negative flux rate trip high.
The sequence of events which caused the trip was subsequently assessed by the licensee and presented at a SORC Meetin (The resident inspector attended the meeting.)
The sequence of events are as follows:
An equipment operator was in the process of performing a routine tag-out on #lA Diesel Generator and was closing the breaker cabinet door when the unit trippe When the door was closed, 4KV vital bus differential relay, located in the breaker cabinet door to #lA Diesel Generator output breaker, partially trippe This is a solid state relay that had been installed to replace the plunger type (originally installed) to
meet the seismic criteria. Although solid state, there are telephone contacts within the rela It was one of these contacts that partially closed causing the actuation of the circuits that tripped lA vital bu When the lA vital bus tripped, the shutdown control rod banks C and D dropped into the core resulting in a high negative neutron flux rate tri (Within the rod control cabinet, there are two power supplies to the control rod group One supply, the normal supply, is from the output of the rod drive motor-generator se The second, the alternate supply, is from the vital bus; in this case, bus l The normal supply is usually at a slightly higher voltage then the alternat During operation, a temporary failure or transient in the normal supply had caused a transfer to the alternate suppl This event, however, does not cause an alarm indicating a supply failure unless the supply remains lo In this instance, the voltage returned to normal once the load was removed.)
All circuits functioned normally with the exception of those fed from lA vital bu The licensee has identified several areas of concer To what seismic criteria has the differential relays been designed?
When the door is shut, does the shock exceed the seismic criteria?
What can be done to alert the operator that only one power supply remains on the rod control?
The licensee has taken the following actions to preclude recurrence of a similar event:
Alerted all operators via the night order book and news letter as to the effects on the differential relay when the cabinet doors are closed too har Instituted an investigation into the seismic criteria of the installed relay Instituted an investigation into the possibility of placing an ammeter on the alternate power supply in order to ascertain if it is carrying the rod drive power suppl *
The inspector will assess the results of the licensee evaluations when availabl After the licensee had determined the cause of the trip, taken corrective actions, and performed selected maintenance on the unit, it was returned to service at 2:00 a.m., January 18, 198 On January 31, 1986 at 10:53 a.m., the reactor tripped from 100%
power due to 11 11 Steam Generator (SG) Low Flow -
Low Level.
The trip was caused by a malfunction of 11BF1 The control room operator observed a decreasing level in #11 SG and noted that the feed regulating valve 11BF19 was calling for full demand flow; however, the valve was in the intermediate positio The operator shifted the controller to manual but was unable to get a respons Subsequent investigation by the licensee failed to identify the cause of the failur Leaks were found in the control air system in the 11BF40 (feed regulating bypass valve)
but could not be directly attributable to the cause of the failur The licensee reviewed the trip with the SORC and concluded that, after testing all electrical circuits, completely blowing down the air system, instrumenting selected control signals to the valve, and X-raying the valves in the feed line for obstructions, the unit could return to powe No obstructions were identified in the areas that could be X-raye During startup, the signals and recorder traces were compared to the previous startup and no differences were identifie At the time of the trip, 11 station power transformer was out of service to perform maintenance in the switchyar The trans-former was taken out of service at 5:00 a.m. on January 31 and the unit was in the action statement 3.8. When the unit tripped, buses E and H were los (These are 4160-volt buses)
As a result, 11 and 12 RCP's stoppe All vital buses remained energized and the inspector witnessed the correct use of the proper procedures to place the unit in a stable condition with all four steam generators in servic The unit performed as expected in the abnormal electrical line-up configuration with the remaining buses performing the expected load transfers that occur during a tri This report period ends with the unit in Mode 3 and the licensee performing selected work order *
10 Unit 2 Unit 2 began this report period in Mode 5 replacing the reactor coolant pump seals in 21 and 23 reactor coolant pump On January 15, 1986 at 5:47 a.m., the unit returned to servic On January 15, 1986, the seal leak off from 22 reactor coolant pump (RCP) began to increase above the normal limi The licensee adjusted the bypass flow around the leak-off flowmeter per procedur (This is done to return the flow to mid-scale on the flow recorder.)
On January 16, the flow began to increase slowl The vendor (Westinghouse) recommended that the licensee should not exceed 8 gpm flow, and further recommended that shutdown commence if the flow reached 7 gp The seal leak-off continued to increase until, on January 19 at 3:00 a.m.,
the leak rate exceeded 7 gp At 3:05, the licensee commenced a normal shutdow At 9:25 a.m., the licensee shutdown 22 RCP and reduced primary system pressure to slow down the seal leak-off flo The unit was taken to Mode 5 and maintenance commenced.
The report period ends with the unit in Mode 4 with a startup in progres No violations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard Work Order Number 85.12.03.07.07.lb.12 Maintenance Procedure Mll M32 Description Calibration and retesting of Residual Heat Removal Pump Room cooler auxiliary switches ITD-7546 and ITD-753 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger outlet valve 21CC1 The licensee checked the valve stroke and limitorque settin Conducted a timed open and closure on the retes.12.03.00.12.01.01 M3Q6 M32
The licensee cleaned and lubricated the roller assembly on Fan Cooler Unit 23 Breaker and reteste Replacement and testing of 21 Service Water Straine The inspector also reviewed the applicable work packages, stores issue documents, work procedures and completed documentation for work performed on No. lA Diesel Generato In his review, the inspector noted that no discrepancies were identified with the completed documents; however, after discussions with QA supervision, the inspector was informed of the following by the license A governor which had been supplied by the manufacturer was not factory set to the proper speed for the Salem diese Further investigation by the licensee identified that the manufacturer had recommended a replacement governor for the diesel, and the licensee had received the new governor but the internal settings were improper for the design of the Salem diesel The licensee has taken the following action Replaced the faulty governor with one that has been tested at the sit Will return the original governor and the first replacement governor to the manufacturer for an analysi Will conduct an evaluation at the vendor 1 s facility regarding testing and calibration of governors to preclude shipment of governors with same part number but with different setting The resident inspector will review the licensee findings when availabl No violations were identifie.
Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillances were reviewed:
Unit 1 SP(0)4.6.2.la SP(0)4.6.3.l.2b Unit 2 SP(0)4.3. SP(0)4.4.l. SP(0)4.5. SP(0)4. 6. l. la-I SP(0)4.5.2b
Containment Systems - Spray System Containment Spray Flow Path Containment Systems - Containment Isolation Phase 118 11 Isolation Check Instrumentation - Post Accident Monitoring Channel Check for Operability Reactor Coolant System - RCP Status Verifies Number of Loops in Operation for Startup Emergency Core Cooling - B. Demonstrates B.I.T. Operability Containment Systems - Primary Containment 1 Demonstrates Integrity of Inner and Outer Escape Lock Doors Emergency Core Cooling - ECCS Subsystems Demonstrates Valve Positions for ECCS Flow Paths On January 10, 1986, the licensee took lA diesel generator out of service to perform the 18-month Technical Specification requirement The diesel was run fully loaded for one hour after maintenance with no identified problem The procedure then calls for the diesel to idle for three minute During the idle time, the diesel tripped on overspee The first consideration was that the governor was not responding properl The licensee replaced the governor and tested the diesel several more times but without succes The vendors for both the governor and the diesel were called by the license The governor vendor recommended changing the governor agai Another governor was installed and teste The unit then operated as designe The diesel was returned to operable status within the allowable time delineated in the Technical Specification action statemen Subsequent investigation by the licensee identified the following:
The first replacement governor was externally the same but internally differen Apparently the internal settings were wron The second replacement governor was compatible and was tested prior to starting up the diese This governor is currently installe Refer to Section 4 for further informatio No violations were identifie "
13 Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - December 1985 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - December 1985 A report filed with the Commission dated January 27, 1986, with regard to a notification to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 of an apparent violation of Technical Specification requirements which resulted in the inoperability of both Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems during operation in Mode 4 (hot shutdown).
The inspector has reviewed the report and has determined that the licensee had made the notification in error and that Tech-nical Specifications were not violate The inspector also reviewed the action taken by the licensee to preclude further misunderstanding of the Technical Specification requirements for ECCS while in Mode Accordingly, unresolved item 311/85-31-01 is acceptabl A spec~al report filed with the Commission dated January 29, 1986, with regard to diesel generator non-valid test failure, as described in Regulatory Guide 1.10 The inspector has reviewed the report and concludes that the diesel generator failure was non-valid and caused by an external sourc The inspector also concluded that the licensee made the proper report in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1 August 1977 Regulatory Position C. No violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LER to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification Unit 2 LER 85-022 Reactor Trip/Safety Injection - Voltage Spike on 2C Vital Instrument Bu This event was discussed in combined report 272/85-23 and 311/85-2 The inspector has reviewed the LER submitted by the licensee and has no further questions at this tim ' '
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14 Employee Concern A site employee expressed concerns to the inspector about the apparently extreme sensitivity of the metal and explosive detectors that have been newly installed in the facility controlled access poin The employee also questioned the methods of hands-on searching performed by the security personnel when a search is necessar The inspector conducted an inspection to evaluate the employee's concerns with the following results:
Metal and explosive detectors are being calibrated and tested in accordance with an approved procedure by the contracted vendor (supplier of the detectors) on a frequency recommended by the vendo Pat Downs 11 (hands-on searches) are being conducted in accordance with 11 NRR Supplemental Staff Position on Personal Search Requirements - September 30, 1977. 11 The inspector identified no violations of procedures or methods for performing the required searche.
Unplanned Exposure At 10:30 on January 4, 1986, during the venting of the equalizing leg on the level column of 21 eves hold up tank, a health physics technician became contaminated with liqui Through body counts and evaluations performed by the licensee, the initial results indicate that the technician received a dose of 2 MPC hours from cobalt 58 and 1.4 MPC hours from cobalt 60 for a total of 3.4 MPC hours due to internal uptak The weekly limit at Salem is 10 MPC hour The licensee:
decontaminated the individual, performed whole body counts on the individual, had the individual examined by a doctor, and performed body waste analysis The licensee is continuing to monitor the individual until the internal contamination has dissipate An evaluation to determine the cause of the event was performed by the licensee with the following results:
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The licensee determined that the cobalt in the waste holdup tank could be eliminated by draining the reactor coolant system through the demineralizers instead of directly to the waste holdup tan By utilizing the demineralizers, certain lead shielding can be removed in the area of the steam generator blow down monitor New methods of venting instruments are in the process of being developed to preclude a recurrence of the inciden HP technicians and Instrument technicians participated in discussions concerning the incident in an effort to keep all involved personnel informe The inspector has reviewed documentation for the above and has no further questions at this tim.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.