IR 05000272/1986017
| ML18092B203 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1986 |
| From: | Bicehouse H, Davidson B, Dragoun T, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092B202 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-86-17, 50-311-86-17, NUDOCS 8606270251 | |
| Download: ML18092B203 (5) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Combined Report No /86-17 50-311/86-17 Docket No ;
50-311 License No DPR-70 DPR-75 Priority Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name:
Salem Generating Station Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
May 28, June 2-3, 1986 Approved by:
s Radiation Category _c_
date date c..! ')_o- 'y '-
ate Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 28, and June 2-3, 1986 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/86-17 and 50-311/86-1 Areas Inspected:
Special, announced safety inspection of the licensee's pre-paration, packaging and shipping of spent primary demineralizer resin (licensee shipment No. 86-40) to resolve radiological controls concerns identified during Inspection Nos. 50-272/86-05; 50-311/86-0 Results:
No violations were identifie *~-
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DETAILS Persons Contacted During the course of this special inspection, the following personnel were contacted or interviewed: Licensee Personnel
- J. Zupko, Jr., General Manager-Salem Operations
- W. Britz, Manager Radiation Protection Services
- J. Clancy, Principal Health Physicist J. Frick, Technical Supervisor-Radiation Protection J. Gomeringer, Technical Supervisor-Radiation Protection
- W. Hunkele, Senior Supervisor-Radiation Protection G. Livermore, Associate Quality Assurance Engineer M. Malony, Quality Control Engineer
- J. Rupp, Operations Licensing Engineer
- J. Trejo, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager Other licensee personnel were also contacted or interviewed during this inspectio.2 U.S.NRC Personnel
- T. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. Shanbaky, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section
- Attended the Exit Interview on June 5, 198.
Purpose During Combined Inspection Nos. 50-272/86-05; 50-311/86-05, the adequacy of the licensee's radiological controls associated with primary resin transfer, dewatering, container preparation and movement was considered unresolved pending further revie Discussions with the licensee indi-cated that, during the period covered by this inspection, spent primary resin from Unit No. 1 would be transferred from the Unit No. 1 Spent Resin Storage Tank (SRST) to a liner, dewatered and prepared for shipment (as radioactive waste (radwaste)) to an authorized radwaste burial sit The purpose of this special announced inspection was to review the radio-logical controls associated with the operation including changes made by the licensee to improve the radiation protection. radwaste operation Since primary resin transfer is an infrequent event, (i.e. approximately annually for each unit), this resin transfer provided an opportunity to review the operation in detai *
- Previously Identified Item (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-272/86-05-03; 50-311/86-05-03) Adequacy of radiological controls associated with primary resin disposa This inspection reviewed and resolved issues associated with primary resin disposal as discussed belo.
Resin Disposal Operation From May 28, 1986 through June 3, 1986, spent primary demineralizer resins (totalling 227 curies) were sluiced from the Unit No. 1 SRST to a High Integrity Container (HIC), dewatered, transferred via the HIC to a CNSI 8-120 shipping container and shipped (as license shipment No. 86-40) to a waste burial sit The operation was reviewed relative to requirements in 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 71 and the licensee's Technical Specifi-cations and good practices recommended by nuclear industry standards group Licensee performance relative to the requirements and recommen-dations was determined by:
interviews and discussions with the Senior Supervisor - Radiation Protection, members of the radwaste staff and others participating in the operation; review of procedures, radiation work permits, surveys, shipping papers and other documents associated with Shipment No. 86-40; observation of work in progress during sluicing, dewatering verifi-cation, HIC lid securing, HIC transfer to the shipping container and shipping container preparation for shipment; and measurements of radiation fields associated with the HIC transfer operatio Special emphasis was placed on reviewing the following aspects of the resin disposal operation:
high radiation area control practices and procedures used; radiation work permits and other administration controls used to minimize exposure; personnel dosimetry practices during various phases; and resin spill prevention and confinement practice Within the scope of this review, no violations were identifie However, the following items were noted and discussed with the licensee:
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Procedures controlling the use of remote dose rate meters, ( Eberline Model RM-16), during the resin operation used the words 11 if available.
On May 28, 1986, the remote dose rate meter monitoring, the liner (i.e. HIC) was operable but the meter monitoring the resin transfer tubing wasn' Remote dose rate meters (including alarming capability) provide additional continuous protection against sudden, unexpectedly high dose rates at the liner or resin transfer tubing as an indication of trouble/warning to radwaste workers in the 11Demin Cage.
On June 2-3, 1986, neither remote dose rate meter was in service during dewatering verification, HIC lid securing and HIC transfer operation Since permanent area radiation monitors do not provide coverage of the work area, remote dose rate meters pro-vide additional safety for the operatio At the exit interview on June 5, 1986, the licensee indicated that the use of remote dose rate meters to provide additional continuous protection against sudden~ expectedly high dose rates would be considere Audible - alarming dosimeters were used on May 28, 1986 by radwaste workers in the 11Demin Cage."
However, audible-alarming dosimeters were not used on June 2-3, 1986 during HIC lid securing and HIC transfer operation The HIC lid securing operation accounted for approximately 80% of the radiation dose for the resin disposal operation (see related item below).
Audible-alarming dosimeters provide an adjunct dose control for individual radwaste workers (in addition to health physics technicians assigned to the operation)
and monitor exposures during crucial dose-intensive steps (e.g. HIC lid securing operations in very high radiation fields). At the exit interview on June 5, 1986, the licensee indicated that expanded use of audible-alarming dosimeters during resin disposal operations would be considere The licensee logs resin additions to the SRST to maintain an inven-tory of the total activity in the SRS However, high-retention resins (with increased radioactivity) could provide inventories too large to be safely handled using current licensee method A formal administrative control program for SRST inventories based on dose rate limitations necessitated by handling considerations and analysis of source term inventories to meet those dose rate limitations was discussed with the license At the exit interview on June 5, 1986, the licensee stated that further review and analysis would be com-pleted to provide a basis for administrative control of SRST inven-torie Review of personnel dosimetry placement during the resin disposal operations indicated that personnel monitoring devices were placed on the upper tors Th~ inspector questioned the placement of.:the.*
monitoring devices due to the non-uniform radiation fields encoun-tered during work on the HIC lid and shipping cask for decontami-natio The licensee stated that extensive studies had been completed using dosimeters on the extremities, head and torso which
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showed that the placement was adequate to monitor the exposures to those area However, the licensee was unable to locate records of those studie At the exit interview on June 5, 1986, the licensee stated that either the records would be located and provided for review or, if the records were not available, the studies would be repeate The inspector stated that this item would be reviewed in a subsequent inspection (50-272/86-17-01; 50-311/86-17-01).
The Auxiliary Building watertight door isolates the radwaste opera-tions area from the truck ba The door is equipped with an inflat-able seal and provides confinement for possible resin spill On May 28, 1986 and June 2, 1986, the water-tight door was ope On those days, the truck bay rollup door was close During the HIC transfer to the shipping cask on June 3, 1986, the water-tight door was close The inspector discussed the closure of the water-tight door during the resin sluicing operation as an additional barrier to localize potential spills to the radwaste operations area and provide protection against environmental release The licensee indicated that the water-tight door would be used for operations with a poten-tial for spills (i.e. sluicing of the resin and HIC transfer).
The HIC lid is secured by rotating the lid 360 to thread it into the HI The operation uses special tools provided by the HIC supplier and requires a rajwaste worker to enter the high radiation field directly above the HIC opening, (i.e. unshielded in the licensee 1s handling configuration).
The keyways in the HIC lid deform during rotation causing the tool to lose its grip on the li This problem appears to be inherent in the HIC lid 1 s desig The licensee has discussed this problem with the HIC vendor and attempted to modify the tool to ensure a secure gri On June 2, 1986, problems with securing the HIC lid caused by the deformation problem required two entries into the area above the HIC to secure the HIC li At the exit interview on June 5, 1986, the licensee stated that studies of the HIC lid and tool design would be undertaken to attempt to alleviate the problem and its resultant additional radiation exposur.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee 1s representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 5, 198 The inspector summarized the scope of the inspection and findings at that tim At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspecto No information exempt from disclosure under 10 CFR 2.790 is discussed in this report.