IR 05000272/1986019
| ML18092B234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1986 |
| From: | Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092B233 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-86-19, 50-311-86-19, IEIN-85-045, IEIN-86-053, NUDOCS 8608050177 | |
| Download: ML18092B234 (12) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/86-19 50-311/86-19 050272-860606 050272-860612 050272-860613 Report No Docket No License No Licensee:
50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza N~wark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
June 17, 1986 *-July 21, 1986 Inspectors: Approved by:
Inspection Summary:
Kenny, Seni~esident Inspector Gibson, s~de t Inspector
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, Cnief, Reactor Projects
, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP 7/zs(~
da e Inspections on June 17, 1986 - July 21, 1986 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/86-19 and 50-311/86-19)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including: followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, licensee event followup, containment entry, and Westinghouse Bulletins and NRC IE Information Notice The inspec-tion involved 89 inspector hours by the resident inspector Results: No violations were identifie One inspector follow item to review the results of heat shrink testing by an independent laboratory was opene See Section 9 of this report for detail ~---
608050177 860729 PDR ADDCK 05000272 G
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspec-tion.activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed) Violation (272/86-06-01) This involved the failure to comply with Quality Assurance procedures with regard to shelf lives of reagents and chemicals used in the Radiochemistry laborator The licensee further defined their chemical shelf life policy, implemented additional controls on chemical use in the lab, and retrained chemistry personnel on the chem-ical shelf life program, its' importance and us The inspector observed satisfactory control of chemicals in the. Radiochemistry laboratory follow-ing implementation of the above stated corrective action The inspector considers this item close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272/86-15-01) See Section 7, LER 86-013 of this report for details.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272/86-88-01 and 311/86-88-01) This item was left open in Inspection Report 50-272/86-16 and 50-311/86-16 to follow up on the return of ASCO valves serial number 86157Nl~20. The resident inspector has confirmed that the valves have been returned to the vendo This item is close Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators' Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Exposure Permits (REP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 3.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, techni-cians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administra-tive Procedure *
(1)
(2)
On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the-fol-lowing areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LC0 1 s directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the cor-rect positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrica-tion, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operat-ing conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit (3)
On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gas-eous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were prop-erly established;
- Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem are~s; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units* operation to determine compliance with the NRC 1 s regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee 1 s actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The fol-lowing are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth: Unit 1 This report period began with the unit restricted to 90%
power due to limited loading of Nos. 11 and 12 Station Service Transformers following the failure of the Auxiliary Power Transformer which was discussed in combined Inspec-tion Report 86-J.5/86-1 On July 14, 1986, installation of a temporary crosstie be-tween Unit 2 Group bus 2H and Unit 1 No. 11 Condensate Pump was completed, allowing the Unit 1 s third condensate pump to be placed in service and power to be increased to 100%. At 11:15 a.m. on July 21, 1986, the licensee initiated a normal shutdown of the Unit from 100% power to inspect and correct a main generator hydrogen leak into the stator wa-ter cooling syste The inspection and repairs are expect-ed to be completed in approximately seven day.
Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at 100% power from the beginning of the report period to July 14, 198 At 11:11 a.m. on July 14, 1986, the reactor tripped from 100% powe The trip was caused by failure of the No. 2B inverter, which caused a transfer of No. 2B Vital Instru-ment Bu During the transfer, the protection circuits saw an open No. 22 Reactor Coolant Breaker (the reactor coolant pump continued to run).
This caused a Reactor Coolant Low Flow/Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Open and P8 first out alarm and tri The licensee returned the 2B instrument inverter to service after completing testing and replacing fuse The procedure then called for an eight hour soak period prior to making final adjustment *
5 At 6:39 a.m. on July 15, during the inverter adjustment phase, an electrician incorrectly reversed the polarity of an oscilloscope causing a voltage spike that tripped the reactor from 4% powe The trip resulted when the voltage spike caused the turbine first stage pressure instrument to go hig This signal will cause a direct reactor trip when the turbine is unlatche The licensee performed addition-al testing and calibration of the instrument inverter and recommenced startu At 6:22 p.m. on July 16, the reactor tripped from 59% power due to turbine trip and No. 23 steam generator Hi Hi leve The licensee was incr~asing power at 10%/hr with No. 22 Main Feed Pump (MFP) idling to repair a steam leak on the warm up lin No. 21 MFP lost hydraulic control on the governor and the steam generator levels began to decreas The Main Feed Regulating Valves (MFRV) opened fully on high deman The operator could not control the speed of the No. 21 MFP and brought No. 22 MFP up to spee Because the MFRVs were fully open, steam generator levels inc0eased rapidl The operator took manual control of the MFRVs but
- ---c-o~ulanotbri ng-The steam generator levels down and tne---
Uni t trippe The licensee identified a blockage in the steam return from the gland seal system which would cause gland steam to con-dense and be drawn into the oil syste The loss of No. 21 MFP was initially attributed to water in the hydraulic con-trol syste However, in addition to the water found in the oil system, a licensee investigation also identified a mispositioned link in the control system for the governor that would not allow the governor to attain full stroke and thereby limited the output of the feed pum The unit re-mained in hot standby until completion of repairs to No. 21 MF At 3:25 a.m. on July 20, the unit returned to power and remained at 100% power thru the end of the report perio.
Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The inspector also verified that the replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee 1s QA program.
- Maintenance Work Order Number Procedure Description 86-07-02-128-1 Maintenance Procedure Auxiliary Control M3I Switches Calibration 86-07-02-153-2 II II 86-07-02-132-0 II II These work orders involved calibration of timers and temperature switches on the No. 2A Diesel Generato The switches calibrated were TD-7322, TD-7332, TD-6441, TD-6442, TD-8320, TD-6470, TD-6471, M-717 Thru M-726, M-747, M-752, AND M-77 The calibration of these switches, in conjunc-tion with additional maintenance and calibrations on the diesel, satisfies the requirements of Technical Specification (T.S.) 4.8.1.1.2. No violations were identifie.
Surveillance Observations During this-inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress survefl-lance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillances were reviewed:
Unit 2 SP(0)4.8.l.l. SP(0)4.8.l.1.2. Verifies the operability of two physically inde-pendent circuits between offsite power and onsite vital buses in accordance with T.S. 4.8.1.1. The surveillances were performed on 28 and 2C diesels due to the 2A diesel generators being removed from service for maintenanc Verifies operability of diesel generator in ac-cordance with T.S. 4.8.1.1.2. Performed on 28 and 2C diesels due to 2A diesel being out of service for maintenanc The inspector also followed up on the following events related to surveillanc On July 11, 1986, the licensee identified a 2% flow error in the con-servative direction (indicated flow 98% when actual flow is 100%)
relative to reactor coolant loop flow channels on Unit The error was introduced approximately two years ago when the flow transmitters
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were originally calibrated and installed, and is due to the incor-rect pressure compensation of test data by the computer which then used the faulty test data to calculate calibration dat This re-sulted in the calibration data and therefore the calibrations to be incorrec The licensee is in the process of revising calibration procedures to correct the calibration data and plans to recalibrate the transmitters during the upcoming outag On July 11, 1986 at 8:08 a.m., 28 diesel generator emergency trip pushbutton was bumped by contractor workers erecting scaffolding in the diesel control area causing the diesel to be in an inoperable conditio A diesel generator was also out of service at this time for maintenance wor An operator who was in the area when the inci-dent occurred immediately (at 8:09 a.m.) reset the trip, restoring the availability of the 28 diese The licensee has investigated the incident and has counseled the workers who caused the tripped conditio No violations were identifie.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and speci~l report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informa-tio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - June 1986 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - June 1986 In addition, the inspector reviewed:
Special Report 86-3 which identifies Service Water leaks inside con-tainment on fan coil unit (FCU) motor cooler The leaks (2) were non-related with regard to typ The first was on two pipe plugs on No. 11 FCU, attributed to corrosio The second was a gasket leak on No. 12 FC The reason the leaks appeared simultaneously has been attributed to an improper operation of the service water system dis-charge cross-over valve, which caused a pressure surge on the service water supply to Nos. 11 and 12 FCU Repairs were made and the FCUs were tested and returned to servic The licensee has counselled the operator and has apprised the other operators of the event in the Operations Department News Lette The event has also been incorpo-rated into the training progra The inspector considers the item closed.
- Special Report 86-5 which identifies the circumstances surrounding the degradation of a fire barrier penetration, caused by the inoperability of a fire dampe Fire damper 2CAF207, located in part of the control room ventilation system, failed to close on an auto-matic trip signa The licensee took corrective action and identi-fied a faulty trip mechanism that was binding and could not be adjuste The licensee replaced the mechanism and tested the damper satisfactorily. The inspector considers this item close No violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accor-dance with Technical Specification Unit 1
~~----=8~6_-~0=12=--~-'-'R~actor Trip from 100% - Main Generator Protection (Auxiliary Power Transformer Differential Relay Actuation)86-013 This LER identifies a turbine/reactor trip that oc~urred on June 6, 1986, which was discussed in Inspection Report 50-272/86-15 and 50-311/86-1 The LER stqted that unit power is being lim-ited to 90% due to limited loading on the secondary side of the station power transforme However, the licensee installed a temporary crosstie between Unit 2 Group bus 2H and Unit 1 No. 11 Condensate Pump, allowing the Unit's third condensate pump to be placed in service and power to be increased to 98% on July 11, 198 The inspector considers this item close Reactor trip from 90% powe This event was discussed in com-bined Inspection Report 50-272/86-15 and 50-311/86-15 and one open item remained to be addresse When the reactor tripped, No. 12 Auxiliary Feed Pump failed to start and the breaker was sent to the vendor for analysi The Vendor performed repeated closures of the affected breaker and only once reproduced the breaker failur The Vendor then dismantled the breaker with the following results:
The center cam was loose enough to allow some free rotation around the cam shaf The dog point was sheared off the bottom set screw in the switch ca The right side of the prop was chipped at the end where it was struck by the prop pin, which indicates that the prop did not have sufficient time to fall into place under the pin when the breaker malfunctione *
86-014
The following is a description of how the breaker could possibly malfunction with the loose center cam:
With the closing springs charged, the closing latch is ro-tated from under the closing roller to release the closing spring The energy in the springs rotates the center cam which raises the prop pin above the prop and allows the prop to move under the pi During this time, the opening springs are compresse If the center cam does not arrive at the proper time, the closing springs will have dissipat-ed their energy and the opening springs will force the linkage back to the reset position before the prop has time to move under the pin, as indicated by the chipped pro The Vendor further stated that no other failures of a similar nature have been identifie The new assemblies however, have two key ways instead of one on the center ca The licensee is considering adding additional visual inspections to their pre-ventive maintenance procedur The inspector considers this item close Reactor Trip From 15% - Turbine Trip and P-7 The unit tripped while shifting lube oil cooler This item was discussed in combined Inspection Report 50-272/86-15 and 50-311/
86-1 The licensee has identified the following actions to preclude further occurrence Plans to install pressure gauges on both lube oil coolers to provide positive indication that both in-service and out-of-service coolers are equalize Revised OP-III-3.3.1 for both units to insure that the equalizing valve between the lube oil coolers remain in the 11 open 11 positio (This measure may be rescinded when the pressure gauges are installed.)
The inspector considers this item close.
Containment Entry On July 7, 1986 at 6:05 p.m., a containment entry for maintenance purposes was made by an Instrument & Controls (I&C) Technician, an I&C Technician helper and a Health Physics (HP) Technician.. The workers were in a 3 mR/hr field for approximately 25 minutes when the HP Technician discovered that the I&C Technician helper was not wearing a thermoluminescent dosime-ter (TLD).
The workers immediately left containmen The I&C Technician helper had a Self Reading Dosimeter with him, but apparently handed his TLD, clipped to his security badge, to the security guard prior to enter-ing containmen The I&C Technician helper is a relatively new seasonal (temporary) employee and the licensee feels that this may have contributed
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to the occurrenc Licensee corrective action included counseling the individuals involved, HP Technicians and I&C seasonal employees to be aware of possession of personnel dosimetry when making containment en-tries. This information is also being disseminated to plant supervisors for discussion with their emp 1 oyee The in spec*tor had no further questions concerning this matte This violation of the REP requirements was identified by the licensee, immediate and long term corrective actions were taken, and, since the individual wore a Self Reading Dosimeter, dose information was availabl Accordingly, under 10 CFR 2 Appendix C, a notice of violation was not issue * Westinghouse Bulletins and NRC IE Information Notices Westinghouse issues Bulletins to the industry periodically describing con-cerns and possible malfunctions with Westinghouse related equipmen The following describes the licensee's actions with regard to the Westinghouse Bulletins and IE Information Notice.
References:
Westinghouse Letter DG-151 Dated June 10, 1985, Subject:
"Po-tential Seismic Interaction Associated with the Flux Mapping System in Westinghouse Plants" IE Information Notice 85-4 "Potential Seismic Interaction Involving the Movable In-Core Flux Mapping System Used in Westinghouse Designed Plants" Subject Potential Movement of the In-Core Flux Mapping System during a Seis-mic Event Licensee Actions The licensee has incorporated a design change that provides clip an-chors on the trolley frame and rail beams of the movable flux mapping trolley to prevent movement in the event of a seismic even This design change has been installed in Unit 1 and has been scheduled to be installed in Unit 2 during the next outage, beginning in October of 198 The resident inspector considers this item close.
References:
Westinghouse Letter NS-NRC-86-3108 to NRC James M. Taylor dated February 27, 198 Westinghouse Letter PSE-86-520 to PSE&G dated March 4, 198 Subject Potential Malfunction of Reactor Protection System Permissive P-1 Licensee Actions The Westinghouse letter provided the licensee with the following rec-ommendations to correct the possibility of a potential malfunction of Reactor Protection System permissive P-10 to reset during power reduction to below the P-10 setpoint when one channel is in a tripped status and a single failure of one of the three remaining channel.
If possible, when a Power Range Flux channel is determined to be inoperable, place the affected P-10 bistable in a non-trip con-dition when operating at, or following a reduction of power be-1 ow, 10% powe.
When reducing power to below the P-10 setpoint, verify by obser-vation of the existing control room bistable status lights, per-missive status lights, and associated alarms that the P-10
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Rermissi'{_~_J~roi:ierly chang~~ sta~ If permissive P-10 is not, and cannot be, placed in the appro-priate s*tatus for the existing condition, place the plant in a conditiDn such that the trips made inoperable by P-10 are not required to functio This may require plant shutdown followed by opening the reactor trip breakers and/or boratio.
Make all reasonable attempts to regain source range instrumenta-tion as quickly as possible if the source range(s) are inoperabl The inspector reviewed operating procedure IOP-5 11Minimum Load to Hot Standby 11 which incorporates numbers 2, 3 and 4 above into the proce-dur The inspector considers this item close.
References:
Westinghouse Letters NSID-TB-85-13 11 Rate Trips on NI 1 s 11 dated May 28, 1985 and NS-OPLS-OPL-II-86-075 11Salem Units 1 and 2 NIS Rate Trip Alignment Procedure
Subject Flux Rate Trip Setpoint Licensee Actions When the first Bulletin was issued the licensee questioned the need for the flux rate trip setpoint being lowered from 5%/2 Sec to 2.5%/2 Sec. on the basis that a turbine runback would possibly trip the
unit, which is contrary to desig After meetings and discussions with Westinghouse, the second letter (see above) was received and the licensee has modified their calibration program to conform with the Westinghouse recommendation No changes to Technical Specifications will be required as a result of the new calibration procedur The inspector considers this item close.
Reference:
IE Information Notice 86-53 Subject Improper Installation of Heat Shrinkable tubing Licensee Actions After discussion with other utilities, a review of the above Informa-tion Notice, and a plant walkdown, the licensee provided the resident inspector with the following information:
The Information Notice calls for an installation of heat shrink material manufactured by Raychem to be of a certain dimension and configuratio That is, for a 0.7-1.2 inch connection, the length of the heat shrink should be a minimum of 6 inches for the LOCA/HELB accident The licensee found that Unit 2 does conform to these specifica-tions but Unit 1 was modified slightly in that splices were cov-ered by 3 inch lengths of heat shrink individually but that the entire connection is covered with another 6 inch length of heat shrin The licensee performed a safety evaluation, based on a calcula-tion which indicates that the connection is conservativ The licensee has also contracted a laboratory to perform testing of the installed configuration on Unit The testing is expected to take approximately 3-4 month The inspector will review the results of the tests when the results are issue (50-272/86-19-01)
No violations were identifie.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.